Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992

Previous studies provide strong evidence for the Kantian theory of peace, but a satisfactory evaluation requires establishing the causal influence of the variables. Here we focus on the reciprocal relations between economic interdependence and interstate conflict, 1885–1992. Using distributed-lags analyses, we find that economically important trade does have a substantively important effect in reducing dyadic militarized disputes, even with extensive controls for the influence of past conflict. The benefit of interdependence is particularly great in the case of conflict involving military fatalities. Militarized disputes also cause a reduction in trade, as liberal theory predicts. Democracy and joint membership in intergovernmental organizations, too, have im-portant pacific benefits; but we find only limited support for the role of costly signals in establishing the liberal peace. We find no evidence that democratization increases the incidence of interstate disputes; and contrary to realists' expectations, allies are not less conflict prone than states that are not allied. Democracies and states that share membership in many international organizations have higher levels of trade, but allies do not when these influences are held constant.     

Bilateral Import, Export, and Conflict/Cooperation Simultaneity

A mathematical model of dyadic trade and the level of political conflict/cooperation is developed and empirically tested. The model extends the literature in three ways. First, the bilateral trade quantities and the level of conflict/cooperation are simultaneously determined. Second, the commonly used unitary state actor is replaced by a government, an exporter, and an importer in each country in a dyad. Third, action-reaction conflict/cooperation dynamics are incorporated into the model. The model predicts that the effect of bilateral trade quantity on conflict/cooperation and the effect of conflict/cooperation on the monetary value of trade may be positive or negative, whereas the effect of conflict on trade quantity will be negative. These predictions depend on certain conditions, heretofore unrecognized in the literature. The empirical test employs statistical methods, and the results generally support the model's predictions. Overall, this paper suggests that contemporary trade and conflict theories may miss important elements, pointing out the need for richer, more microfounded models.     

A Unified Explanation of Territorial Conflict: Testing the Impact of Sampling Bias, 1919–1992

This article develops a new unified territorial explanation of conflict that accounts for the possibility of certain factors affecting the rise of a militarized dispute, as well as the probability that a dispute will escalate to war. In the past, research linking territorial disputes to a relatively high probability of war outbreak has been criticized for underestimating the potential problem of sampling bias in the militarized interstate dispute (MID) data. This study utilizes newly available data on territorial claims going back to 1919 to determine, using a two-stage estimation procedure, whether the presence of territorial claims in the dispute onset phase affects the relationship between territorial militarized disputes and war in the second stage. It is found that territorial claims increase the probability of a militarized dispute occurring and that territorial MIDs increase the probability of war, even while controlling for the effect of territorial claims on dispute onset. The effect of territory across the two stages is consistent with the new territorial explanation of conflict and war and shows no sampling bias with regard to territory in the MID data.     

Centers of Gravity: Regional Powers,Democracy, and Trade

Classic studies on hegemonic stability and power transition suggest that concentration of capabilities favoring a single state can promote economic cooperation and discourage militarized conflict. However, tests of these arguments have been primarily limited to examining temporal variation in global capability distributions and corresponding levels of system-wide cooperation; few have examined the impact of capability concentration at the region level. In this article, we contend that concentration of regional military capabilities corresponds to lower trade costs for states throughout a region and to an incentive for weaker states to de-prioritize expenditure on the military, freeing resources that can be used to promote trade. As a result, this condition promotes higher levels of trade, particularly within the region. We also argue that democratic regional powers are better able to foster confidence in the sustainability of cooperation; thus, the trade-enhancing impact of concentrated regional capabilities is stronger when the predominant state is more democratic. We find evidence in support of our expectations in statistical models examining state trade between 1960 and 2007.     

The Joint Democracy–Dyadic Conflict Nexus: A Simultaneous Equations Model

Many statistical studies in international relations investigate the claim that democracies do not fight one another. Virtually all of these studies employ a single-equation design, where the dependent variable measures the presence or absence of a dyadic militarized interstate dispute (MID). A separate group of studies argues that conflict affects democracy and that its effect could be positive or negative. By and large, these two bodies of literature have not incorporated one another's insights. We argue that democracy and dyadic conflict affect each other significantly and that statistical models that ignore the reciprocal nature of these effects may make incorrect inferences. To test this argument, we develop a simultaneous equations model of democracy and dyadic conflict. Our sample includes all the politically relevant dyads from 1950 to 1992. We find that dyadic military disputes reduce joint democracy and joint democracy reduces the probability of MIDs. Compared with the single-equation estimates in the literature, the absolute effect of joint democracy in our paper is smaller while in relative terms, the effect is similar in size. The effect of joint democracy on MID involvement is considerably smaller for noncontiguous countries than for contiguous ones. The effects of a number of control variables in the MID equation are also found to differ from those reported previously in single- equation–based studies.     

Enduring trade disputes: Disguised protectionism and duration and recurrence of international trade disputes

Why do some WTO trade disputes endure and recur while others do not? States have difficulty resolving trade conflicts when they involve certain types of trade-restrictive domestic regulations. While such regulations vary in their extent of legitimacy—fulfilling non-trade domestic regulatory objectives and availability of less trade-restrictive options—complainant states cannot always distinguish legitimate barriers from illegitimate ones. In such scenarios of disguised protectionism, which I argue is most prevalent with policies involving WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, disputants confront difficulties concluding their disputes. Disputes last longer and are more likely to recur. I test the argument against a data set of WTO disputes structured in an innovative manner—one that links together related and recurring disputes into single conflicts. Both an event history analysis of conflict duration and a count analysis of conflict recurrence using this data strongly support this argument.     

The Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement—economic potentials and policy perspectives

After more than 4 years of negotiations, Japan and the EU have reached an agreement for bilateral free trade. The intended liberalization of trade in goods, agriculture, and services would create the world’s largest free trade area. Japan and Europe are sending a strong signal against protectionism and in favor of free trade and modernizing global trade rules. While free trade in the transatlantic and the transpacific context will remain an illusion for some time to come, the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (JEEPA) is a realistic option for trade partners at the western and eastern side of the Eurasian continent. The expected overall positive effects of JEEPA should not obscure the limitations and risks of the intended trade integration. There will be economic losers of the agreement both in Europe and in Japan. There is plenty of fuel for political and social conflict. And in light of the many informal barriers, market access to Japan will remain extremely difficult for European companies. Beyond trade policy, JEEPA has a political dimension, too. It shows the political will to counteract economic disintegration and the loss of political substance in the bilateral relationship. The aim is to intensify cooperation, which would benefit both sides economically and politically.     

Trade at the margin: Estimating the economic implications of preferential trade agreements

Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) have become the most prevalent form of international trade liberalization in recent decades, even though it remains far from clear what their effects on economies and their key units, firms, are. This paper evaluates the distributional consequences of trade liberalization within industries differentiating two distinct aspects in which trade liberalization could result in higher trade flows: the intensive vs. the extensive margin of trade. In particular, we analyze whether trade liberalization leads to increased trade flows because either firms trade more volume in products they have already traded before (intensive margin) or because they start to trade products they have not traded previously (extensive margin), or both. We test these arguments for the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and exporting firms based in Costa Rica for the time-period 2008–2014. The results of our study suggest that the effects of CAFTA-DR depend not only on whether we analyze the extensive versus the intensive margin of trade but also whether the product in question is homogenous or differentiated and whether the exporting firm under analysis is small or large. In particular, we find support for the theoretical expectation that firms exporting heterogeneous products, such as textiles, gain from trade agreements, such as CAFTA-DR, in that they can export more varieties of their products. Yet at the same time, they tend to lose at the intensive margin by a reduction in their trade volume while the opposite pattern occurs for firms exporting homogenous products.     

The Liberal Peace Revisited: The Role of Democracy,Dependence, and Development in Militarized Interstate Dispute Initiation, 1950–1999

We test a model of the liberal peace by examining the initiation of militarized interstate disputes at the monadic level of analysis from 1950–1999. Liberal peace theory contends that both economic dependence and democratic political systems reduce conflict propensities. Extant empirical analyses of the monadic liberal peace, however, are under-specified. First, the concept of economic dependence not only includes trade, but also foreign investment. Second, existing models do not control for the influence of economic development. Previous research on the monadic liberal peace has also failed to distinguish between the initiation of conflict and participation in conflict. We find evidence for a liberal peace: trade dependence, foreign investment, and democracy reduce a state’s propensity to initiate militarized disputes.     

Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and Interstate Conflict: Parsing Out IGO Effects for Alternative Dimensions of Conflict in Postcommunist Space

While the relationship between intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and conflict has captured the attention of international relations scholars for decades, the empirical results of this research agenda have presented contradictory conclusions regarding the pacifying effect normally attributed to IGOs. We address these contradictions by refocusing primarily on potential IGO effects on low-severity conflicts. We examine new states in the postcommunist space spanning Europe and Central Asia as a useful research site to explore these relationships in the post-Cold War era. We argue that especially in the case of newly emerging states, where there is little institutional memory and long-term experience in foreign affairs, IGOs expose differential policy preferences between members, and such information should be associated with the likelihood of increased low levels of conflict. We find a strong association between shared IGO membership and low severity conflict, a significant relationship between low and high severity conflict, and differences between IGO membership effects on low versus high severity conflict, consistent with our theoretical argument.     

中朝金融合作的驱动因素与对策分析

2000年以来,中朝双边经贸关系迅速发展,人民币跨境流动规模不断扩大,但双方金融合作滞后于经贸合作,制约了经济资源在两国间的流动和有效配置。加强金融合作应立足于中朝经贸合作的长远规划,加强中朝双方中央银行的沟通与合作;推动双方边境地区的金融合作;发挥双方银行结算主渠道作用;加强双方金融监管合作;以"两岛一区"经贸合作带动双方金融合作。     

Competing interests and technology policies: A rational choice approach

This paper explores the competition over technology policies by various domestic and foreign interest groups or stakeholders. An expected utility model is used to simulate the competition over the nature and direction of the American supersonic transport (SST) program in the 60s and 70s. The simulation shows that this rational choice approach offers a powerful analytical tool for examing technology and other foreign economic policy processes. The expected utility simulation allows for a more rigorous inspection of the explanations presented in the political economy literature which should allow scholars to’ further explore expectations and conclusions about strategic trade and other foreign economic policies.     

中蒙国际贸易依存度比较分析

蒙古国计划经济时期与转型时期的对外贸易依存度都较高,但计划经济时期对外贸易依存度保护相对稳定,转型时期的对外贸易依存度周期性波动特征明显;中国已经成为蒙古国最为重要的贸易顺差来源国,双边进出口贸易的相互依赖程度存在不断提高的趋势,波动性较强,面临不平衡性和波动性双重风险;通过双边或者多边贸易协定可以稳定双边贸易关系并控制贸易风险。     

Globalization and Population: International Trade and the Demographic Transition

I study the effect of international trade on birth rates across a large number of countries. A supply-demand model of the birth rate explains that a rise in international trade reduces the demand for children and encourages an earlier onset of the mortality revolution. These two effects caused by the rise of international trade lead to a lower birth rate. A time-series cross-section empirical analysis for a large sample of developed and developing countries exhibits that international trade has a statistically significant and inverse effect on the birth rate. The policy implications relating to trade, economic growth, and conflict are discussed in the conclusion.     

Location,Location, Location…Identifying Hot spots of International Conflict

Abstract

This article introduces new variables summarizing the geographic location of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) and “hot spots” of these locations for the years 1816 to 2001. Three exercises are detailed: (1) the specification and collection of geographic location data for each MID onset; (2) the generation of static map representations of these data; and (3) the application of spatial cluster analysis techniques to examine their geographic distribution. Initially, I address the protocol followed while carrying out the first two of these steps - offering thoughts on the coding procedures and examples of the mapped representations of the data. I then detail the techniques used to conduct spatial cluster analysis. The results of these analyses confirm the apparent evidence of the mapped presentations of the data, offering evidence in support of the a priori expectation that dispute onsets are clustered in space and time; revealing apparent “hot spots” of conflict across most regions of the world. I conclude with a discussion of potential applications of this new MID location dataset.     

Economics,security, and individual-level preferences for trade agreements

Empirical research on the determinants of individual-level support for trade liberalization has focused almost entirely on the economic effects of trade. Yet, international relations scholarship has long recognized that commerce also has a variety of security implications. This paper explores if and when security considerations influence individual attitudes toward trade. In this study, we ask two questions: First, to what extent do expectations about the security implications of trade affect individual-level attitudes toward trade agreements? Second, does the introduction of security concerns into the discussion of trade agreements influence how heavily individuals weigh their economic costs and benefits? We employ an original experiment embedded in a conjoint survey to investigate the relative impact of a variety of economic and security considerations on respondents’ support for trade. Our findings suggest that security information matters and undermines the appeal of some, though not all, economic arguments for trade liberalization among our respondents.     

贸易对中日韩经济周期协动性的影响研究

对中日韩贸易对经济周期协动性的影响进行分析,可以得出结论:双边贸易强度对经济周期协动性的影响取决于双边产业内贸易强度的大小。产业内贸易强度大,则双边贸易强度与经济周期协动性为正相关;产业内贸易强度小,则双边贸易强度与经济周期协动性为负相关。另外,中日贸易中纺织纱线等6种行业的贸易有助于提高经济周期协动性,而服装等2种行业的贸易降低经济周期协动性;中韩贸易中有色金属相关行业等6种行业的贸易有助于提高经济周期协动性,而塑料等2种行业的贸易降低经济周期协动性。     

International Mediation and Social Networks: The Importance of Indirect Ties

This study extends the previous literature on actors' incentives in conflict management by examining how direct and indirect links between fighting parties influence the prospects for mediation onset from a social network perspective. The paper argues, contrary to existing research, that direct links, i.e., bilateral ties between warring parties, do not notably increase the likelihood of mediation. Rather, indirect links, i.e., ties that connect two states via one or more than one third party to each other, are more likely to determine whether a conflict sees mediation. Although direct links can indicate mutual interests, shared preferences, and decreased uncertainty between the warring parties, these ties either lose importance or become cut off when states enter a conflict. By contrast, indirect ties create a social network that involves outside parties in the dispute process, and indirect ties increase the exchange of information between belligerents and potential mediators and the chances that third parties will have a vital interest in intervention. My empirical analysis using conflict and social network data in 1946–1995 provides strong support for the theory.     

Lobbying as a Private Good with Intra-Industry Trade

Intra-industry trade—trade in different varieties of the same product between countries with similar factor endowments—has been an important and surprising feature of the postwar international economy. Economists have explained this trade with models of monopolistic competition, which suggest that intra-industry trade does not have the stark distributional consequences that the more traditional "endowments-based" trade does. I do not dispute that claim here, although I do dispute a political implication drawn from it—that intra-industry trade produces less political action than endowments-based trade. I argue that, because firms involved in intra-industry trade are monopolists, lobbying essentially becomes a private good . If intra-industry trade places costs on firms, they do not have less incentive to take political action to stop it, as the conventional wisdom suggests. I provide evidence for this contention from complaints lodged with the International Trade Commission. The results show that the higher the degree of intra-industry trade the more likely an industry will request protection from the ITC.     

Civil War Settlements,Size of Governing Coalition,and Durability of Peace in Post–Civil War States

We examine the ways in which the size of the governing coalition in a post–civil war state affects the durability of the peace. Previous studies relate the durability of the peace to the outcome of the civil war, the extent and forms of power-sharing arrangements, and the role of third-party security guarantors. We argue that the way conflict terminates and the power-sharing agreements between former protagonists structure the composition of governing coalition in the post–civil war state. Any settlement to civil war that broadens the size of the governing coalition should increase actors' incentives to sustain the peace rather than renew the armed conflict. Peace is more likely to fail where the governing coalition is smaller because those excluded from the governing coalition have little to lose from resuming armed rebellion. To test these propositions, we analyze data on post–civil war peace spells from 1946–2005.