Supreme Court Justices’ Economic Behaviour: A Multilevel Model Analysis

Supreme Court justices are overlooked, but important, national policy‐making players who render final and consequential decisions in cases on economic conflicts. The research question asks what forces explain the decisional behaviour of Supreme Court justices in economic rights cases between a private and a public party. Theoretically, the decisional behaviour of an individual justice is a function of his or her notion as to what makes ‘good’ law, pursued in a cultural‐collegial setting that is oriented by majoritarian requirements, while constrained by the legal nature of the case being considered. Empirically, all economic decisions made by Norwegian Supreme Court justices in five‐justice panels from 1963 to 2012 are analyzed. Our multilevel model demonstrates that individual, collegial and case‐level forces all contribute to explain the justices’ votes. These results suggest that case‐related dynamics, such as who the plaintiff is or the amount of disagreement between justices, matter, but also that ideology – via appointment mechanisms – matters when a nation's high court justices decide economic cases. Understanding the foundational assumptions and the institutional procedures is vital when transporting judicial behaviour models across polities.     

Ideological influences on governance and regulation: The comparative case of supreme courts

A key influence on governance and regulation is the ideology of individual decisionmakers. However, certain branches of government – such as courts – while wielding wide ranging regulatory powers, are expected to do so with no attitudinal influence. We posit a dynamic response model to investigate attitudinal behavior in different national courts. Our ideological scores are estimated based on probability models that formalize the assumption that judicial decisions consist of ideological, strategic, and jurisprudential components. The Dynamic Comparative Attitudinal Measure estimates the attitudinal decisionmaking on the institution as a whole. Additionally, we estimate Ideological Ideal Point Preference for individual justices. Empirical results with original data for political and religious rights rulings in the Supreme Courts of the United States, Canada, India, the Philippines, and Israel corroborate the measures' validity. Future studies can utilize Ideological Ideal Point Preference and the Dynamic Comparative Attitudinal Measure to cover additional courts, legal spheres, and time frames, and to estimate government deference.     

Teaching Judicial Politics Through a Supreme Court Simulation

Abstract

This article describes various iterations of a Supreme Court simulation that we developed for undergraduate political science classes. We address when simulations should be used to introduce a topic to students, and when simulations should be used to develop students’ understanding of a topic after introducing it. In the simulations, we played the role of attorneys delivering oral arguments before the Supreme Court, while students played the role of Supreme Court justices. Students questioned attorneys, deliberated in groups, voted on the merits of the case, and explained their decisions. We varied when the simulation was conducted, with one class doing the simulation before a lesson on judicial decision making and two classes doing the simulation following a lesson on judicial decision making. We evaluate the simulation by using results from student questionnaires that assessed the students' interest in judicial politics, their knowledge of the Supreme Court, and their understanding of judicial decision making. We find that the simulation most effectively accomplished the intended learning outcomes when the simulation was conducted after a lesson on decision making in the Supreme Court, rather than before the lesson. In addition, our results demonstrate that the simulation increased students’ interest in the Supreme Court and their desire to learn more about the institution. Our results have implications for political scientists aiming to enhance student learning through simulations.     

The European Court's political power

The European Court has emerged as one of the most powerful political institutions in the European Union and the most influential international court in existence. National courts are the linchpins of the European legal system, making European Court decisions enforceable and creating an independent power base for the European Court. This article examines why national courts agreed to take on a role enforcing European law supremacy against their own governments and why national politicians did not stop an institutional transformation of the European legal system which greatly compromised national sovereignty. Competition between lower and higher national courts, each trying to enhance their influence and authority vis‐à‐vis each other, explains how national legal interpretive barriers and high‐court ambivalence regarding the European Court's declaration of European Law Supremacy was overcome. Politicians proved unable to reverse national court acceptance of European law supremacy, and institutional rules kept politicians from sanctioning either national courts or the European Court for judicial activism. Legal doctrine became a form of institution‐building, and a mechanism to make international law enforceable was created, giving the European Court the ability to make unpopular decisions and to compel compliance with European law.     

Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Why do lower courts treat Supreme Court precedents favorably or unfavorably? To address this question, we formulate a theoretical framework based on current principal‐agent models of the judiciary. We use the framework to structure an empirical analysis of a random sample of 500 Supreme Court cases, yielding over 10,000 subsequent treatments in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. When the contemporary Supreme Court is ideologically estranged from the enacting Supreme Court, lower courts treat precedent much more harshly. Controlling for the ideological distance between the enacting and contemporary Supreme Courts, the preferences of the contemporary lower court itself are unrelated to its behavior. Hence, hierarchical control appears strong and effective. At the same time, however, a lower court's previous treatments of precedent strongly influence its later treatments. The results have important implications for understanding legal change and suggest new directions for judicial principal‐agency theory.     

Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions

In 1985 state supreme courts issued the largest number of decisionsto date in which protections of individual rights were basedupon provisions of state constitutions. With increasing frequency,state high courts have held that certain constitutional minimumsof rights protection set by U.S. Supreme Court interpretationsof the U.S. Constitution do not satisfy more demanding preceptsof state constitutional law. Although much of this activityremains reactive rather than systematic, there has been a slightmove toward greater systematic analysis. Furthermore, statecourt decisionmaking can be understood in terms of five modelsthat reflect judicial perceptions of varying degrees of equivalenceor nonequivalence between rights provisions in the U.S. Constitutionand state constitutions. At the same time, however, the U.S.Supreme Court has clearly indicated an interest in monitoringthe individual rights decisions of state high courts, whilelower federal courts have begun to place greater reliance onstate constitutional law to preclude U.S. Supreme Court review.     

Judges as agents of social change: Can the courts break the affordable housing deadlock in metropolitan areas?

Abstract

Nowhere is the chasm between the races more apparent than in the physical division of metropolitan areas between inner‐city poverty and suburban affluence. Thus far, public policy efforts to introduce metropolitan perspectives into local land use regulations have been unsuccessful. The series of New Jersey Mount Laurel decisions lays out a possible path for introducing comprehensive regional planning by deploying the constitutional power of state courts. Relying on the allied professions of economics and city planning, the New Jersey Supreme Court eliminated the legal barriers to affordable housing in the suburbs.

Questions have been raised over courts’ ability to reform local government powers, but many traditional objections to the effectiveness of judicial reform seem to have been overcome in the New Jersey litigations and legislations. State courts can play an indispensable role in solving regional land use problems if they secure the support of community leadership groups.     

State Sovereignty and the Eleventh Amendment in the U.S. Supreme Court: The 1988 Term

During its 1988 term, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed two importantaspects of the Eleventh Amendment, which generally protectsstates from being sued in federal courts. First, the Court heldthat the Congress has power to abrogate states' immunity fromsuit—to subject states to suits in federal courts fordamages—under Congress' expansive commerce-clause power.Second, the Court made clear that such abrogation would be foundonly where the text of the statute itself, as distinct fromits legislative history, clearly and specifically so provided.This article describes these decisions, and analyzes some oftheir implications for judicial federalism.     

Corporations and the law: Historical lessons for contemporary practice

Abstract

This article examines the role of the courts, especially the Supreme Court, in facilitating the development of a capitalist economy and enhancing corporate power. Theoretically, I employ an approach which treats the law as a constitutive process. I first survey key legal developments in the nineteenth century through which the courts fostered and nurtured the development of a capitalist economy. Then I analyze the post‐New Deal era, examining the transformation of economic doctrines by the Supreme Court to legitimate a newly emergent corporate‐administrative state. In the last part of the article I use this historical analysis to address contemporary issues for the Left of how to bring about fundamental change in the United States. I discuss the degree to which the law can be used as a means of progressive reform and how strategic legal choices are related to the debate about social movement, discourse, class‐based, and political strategies for change.     

The Burger Court and Younger Abstention: Enhancing the Role of State Courts in Constitutional Adjudication

An important determinant of federal balance is the degree ofstate court authority to decide federal constitutional issues.This study traces the development of the Younger abstentiondoctrine, one of the primary vehicles by which the Burger Courtrestricted federal court jurisdiction and enhanced the authorityof state courts in constitutional adjudication. The Youngerdoctrine was adopted by the Supreme Court in 1971 for reasonsof comity and equitable restraint. Throughout the Burger Courtyears, Younger was expanded from an initial denial of jurisdictionto litigants seeking injunctive relief in state criminal proceedings,to litigants in cases "akin" to criminal proceedings, and thento litigants in cases "important to state interests." By relyingon Younger abstention, the Burger Court has reduced the roleof the federal courts as the primary enforcement of U.S. constitutionalrights.     

THE COURTS AND RISK ASSESSMENT1

In the past decade the federal courts have come to play an important role in reviewing agency decision-making on prospective risks. Questioning the conventional wisdom that judges are poorly equipped for the task, the authors outline the range of choices facing courts in such cases and contend that they cannot avoid making ultimate decisions on risk policy. However, recent Supreme Court cases on nuclear hazards and occupational benzene indicate narrowing of the scope for judicial review.     

Partisans in Robes: Party Cues and Public Acceptance of Supreme Court Decisions

The public perceives the Supreme Court to be a legal institution. This perception enables the Court's legitimacy‐conferring function, which serves to increase public acceptance of its decisions. Yet, the public acknowledges a political aspect to the Court as well. To evaluate how the public responds to the different images of the Supreme Court, we investigate whether and how depictions of specifically partisan (e.g., Republican) Court rulings shape public acceptance of its decisions while varying institutional, legal, and issue characteristics. Using survey experiments, we find that party cues and partisanship, more so than the imprimatur of the Court, affect public acceptance. We also find that polarization diminishes the effect of party cues. Attributing a decision to the Court does little to increase baseline acceptance or attenuate partisan cue effects. The Court's uniqueness, at least in terms of its legitimacy‐conferring function, is perhaps overstated.     

十八届四中全会司法改革新举措之解读

党的十八届四中全会《决定》明确了一系列司法改革新举措,对司法体制改革作出新的重大部署。最高人民法院设立巡回法庭,探索设立跨行政区划的人民法院和人民检察院,建立领导干部干预司法活动、插手具体案件处理的记录、通报和责任追究制度,从制度和体制上防范和禁止地方行政权力干涉,保障审判权、检察权依法独立行使;推进以审判为中心的诉讼制度改革,实行审判权和执行权相分离体制,探索建立检察机关提起公益诉讼制度,实行立案登记制,从司法权运行机制和职能定位上强化司法权威,促进公正司法,保障国家和公民权益。     

Is the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and post-Kelo

A controversial U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London (2005) which did not limit the use of state's eminent domain powers, led to an unprecedented legislative reaction by almost all 50 states. Of all, New York State stands out as one of the single states not to respond with a legislative amendment. In this study, I ask whether the state's predation was greater in the years following these legal and political developments, in light of the freedom which was granted to local politicians by both the Supreme Court and the state's legislators. The article hypothesizes that contrary to common perceptions, judicial decisions impact local government actions even when no limits on the use of powers are being posed. I use rigorous statistics and scrupulously defined data to expand scholarly understanding of the aftermath of the judicial decision in Kelo. The main finding is that the decision has in fact affected political behavior, but in the opposite direction than commonly expected: politicians in New York City acted consistently with public opinion, which was hostile too Kelo, not by changing the law, but by changing their practice. Studying all known taking exercises in New York City between 1991 and 2019, the paper finds no increase in the number of development projects involving condemnations after 2005. In fact, the probability of a taking for economic development or urban renewal dropped by 90%. The use of eminent domain for such projects declined even when both state and federal courts refrain from interposing any actual limit on its use. The paper lends qualified support to an alternative assertion that takings decisions by government officials are largely shaped by planning and political needs and that officials are sensitive to revealed public preferences even when there is no constitutional or legal impediment on their exercise of power.     

Judicial Review and the Supreme Court of Washington, 1890-1986

The literature on judicial review by state supreme courts suggeststhat from the beginnings of the republic until today, statejudicial review has shifted generally from what can be calleda restraintist departmentalism to an activist "new federalism."Since statehood in 1889, the Supreme Court of Washington hasreacted to constitutional challenges in much the same manneras the high courts of other states. Recently, however, Washington'sjurists have forged an independent course by applying the morerestrictive aspects of the state constitution to private andgovernmental intrusions into personal lives rather than relyingon the guidelines provided by the federal Constitution and theU.S. Supreme Court. The nature of this second "Golden Age" ofstate judicial review, because of its effect on federalism ratherthan the separation of powers, requires appraisal from a newperspective.     

The Federal Judiciary and Northern School Desegregation: Law, Politics, and Judicial Management

Using a three-tier analysis, this article examines how the interplayof political and legal factors has influenced the developmentof school desegregation policy in Michigan and Ohio. The authorconcludes, among other things, that the district courts, theSixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court aresensitive to the influences of politics and legalism, but thatthe responses of the three kinds of federal courts are different.Recognizing a constitutional imperative to eradicate segregation,district courts have emphasized the participation of electedofficials and affected community groups in the remedial process.Because of isolation and low visibility, the Sixth Circuit hastended to pursue a more tenacious policy course than eitherthe district court or the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the U.S.Supreme Court has generally championed the cause of local officialsby attempting to balance the interest of eliminating segregationwith that of protecting the integrity of state and local decisionmakers.     

Ideological Proximity and Support for The Supreme Court

Although the Supreme Court is a countermajoritarian institution by design, many scholars have contended that without concrete powers, the Court relies on public support for legitimacy. Accordingly, it is important to understand the relationship between people’s ideological proximity to the Court and their support for it. Existing empirical research suggests a correspondence between public opinion and the Court’s positions, but these studies do not directly compare masses and elites in a common space. To address these issues, we conducted an original survey asking respondents about their positions on ten recently decided Supreme Court cases. This allows us to estimate the positions of citizens and justices on the same ideological scale. Further, while some existing theories of perceptions of judicial legitimacy suggest similar relationships between ideological distance and various types of support for the Court, we propose a theory of heterogeneous responsiveness which posits that citizens’ ideological distance from the Court should be negatively related to their approval of and trust in the institution, but positively related to their support for its countermajoritarian function. Our empirical approach finds support for the theory.     

Backlash and Legitimation: Macro Political Responses to Supreme Court Decisions

This article is a first attempt to develop and assess the competing predictions of the thermostatic model of public opinion and legitimation theory for the responses of public mood to Supreme Court decisions. While the thermostatic model predicts a negative relationship between the ideological direction of Supreme Court decisions and changes in public mood, legitimation theory predicts that changes in mood should be positively associated with the ideological content of the Court's actions. I assess these rival expectations by modeling the dynamic relationship between mood and cumulative judicial liberalism. The model estimates indicate a complex interaction between the Court and the mass public characterized by short‐term backlash against Supreme Court decisions in mood followed by long‐run movement toward the ideological positions taken by the Court. The results emphasize the legitimacy of the Court in American politics and point to a unique role for the Court in shaping public opinion.     

Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Students of judicial behavior have increasingly turned to strategic accounts to understand judicial decision making. Scholarship on the Supreme Court and state high courts suggests that the decision to dissent is better understood in light of strategic considerations rather than simply reflecting ideological disagreement. We investigate whether these findings comport with behavior by judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. We develop a spatial model of the decision to dissent that incorporates both attitudinal and strategic elements and subject this model to empirical analysis. We find that ideological disagreement between a judge and the majority opinion writer is a more persuasive explanation of the decision to dissent than a strategic account in which a judge conditions a dissent on whether circuit intervention would obtain the judge's preferred outcome. Though we do not discount the existence of other types of strategic behavior on the Courts of Appeals, our research suggests that strategic accounts of dissenting behavior are not generalizable to all courts .     

The Legal Order and the Administration of Federal and State Courts

The Nigerian Constitution of 1989 establishes a system of federaland state courts, but within a structure of unified federal-statejurisdiction from the federal and state high courts, to thefederal Court of Appeal, and to the national Supreme Court.Thus, both sets of courts exercise jurisdiction with respectto federal and state laws. Although this system mitigates certainfederal-state jurisdictional conflicts, it does not eliminatesuch conflicts. At the same time, however, the Constitutionalso provides for Sharia courts of appeal under Moslem law andfor customary-law courts of appeal, thus establishing a tripartitesystem of justice. Although this system seeks to accommodateNigeria's ethnic and religious diversity, it does raise problemsfor national unity, judicial uniformity, and equity in the administrationof civil and criminal justice.