我国反垄断罚款制度的革新——基于整体主义理念的研究

我国已经启动反垄断法的修订工作,其中罚款制度的修订广受关注。在反垄断罚款制度的应用中虽然整体主义理念初露端倪,但是仍具有相当大的局限性,甚至还发生了不少背离罚款整体主义理念的案例,导致罚款威慑力受到较大的冲击。纵观20世纪90年代以来欧美国家反垄断罚款制度的革新,基于单一经济实体理论和经济连续性理论而采取的罚款整体主义制度设计是一种较为常见的做法。罚款整体主义通常包括罚款基准的整体主义和罚款责任的整体主义。新时代我国反垄断罚款制度的革新应引入整体主义理念,在制度设计上以企业集团总销售额为基准计算反垄断最高罚款限额和确定反垄断罚款大企业威慑乘数,同时明确规定母公司对子公司的罚款承担连带责任以及在一定情形下要求企业承继者承担罚款责任。     

Predatory fines and fees: Revenue,fiscal contrition,and policy change

Fiscal contrition refers to the phenomenon of policy-makers becoming aware of the social costs of fines and fees, recognizing a need to reduce those costs, and taking action to do so. In order to reveal the occurrence of fiscal contrition, this analysis examines detailed budget data from three U.S. counties. Findings indicate a dominance of predatory over punitive monetary sanctions in county budgets. That is, fines and fees that extract revenue from a justice-involved population are more common than those with social control objectives. The analysis also reveals patterns and nuances in fine and fee usage and the revenue they produce, which illuminates pathways for reducing reliance on fine and fee revenue. This approach provides useful context for the burgeoning scholarship focused on the role of monetary sanctions in fueling social inequities.     

On the enforcement of specific performance in Civil Law countries

Proponents of specific performance as a remedy for breach of contract have found support in the alleged use of the remedy in Civil Law countries. However, we provide evidence that specific performance is in fact a rare remedy in Denmark, Germany and France, and under CISG, when performance requires actions to be undertaken, and we relate this to costs of enforcement. We argue that it is administratively costly to run a system of enforcement that renders specific performance attractive to the aggrieved party, and that the Civil Law countries have (like Common Law countries) chosen not to incur these costs of enforcement. This is especially clear in the case of Denmark, where specific performance of actions has been abandoned as a legal remedy.At the normative level, we argue that enforcement costs provides an additional rationale, over and above the rationales of the theory of efficient breach, for damages and against specific performance as the general remedy.     

Sanctioning Traditional Crimes with Fines: A Comparative Analysis

Rising crime rates within traditional sanctioning patterns have resulted in a search for alternatives to incarceration in order to control both the economic and the social (humanitarian) costs of punishment. The paper explores this response in four countries: England, Germany, Sweden, and the United States—all modern, industrial democracies. The paper focuses upon the response in terms of the role accorded monetary penalties as an alternative to incarceration. This role is analyzed in terms of the actual use of fines relative to incarceration, as a sentencing disposition for traditional crimes. The major finding is that among the four countries the United States accords fines a very minor role. The reasons for this difference are explored and it is concluded that the use of fines in the United States—when compared to European experience—appears to be far below the level that would minimize the economic and social cost of punishment.     

Road Traffic and Efficient Fines

Road traffic is a typical example of an occupation with bilateral care and activity choices. In such a setting, common liability rules which simply divide damages cannot induce efficient outcomes. It is shown that fines for the violation of traffic regulations which depend on the occurrence of an accident can induce optimal behaviour. The properties of such efficient fines are derived. In particular, efficient fines tend to increase more than proportionally with the severity of an offence, while fines for repeat offenders can rise at a decreasing rate with the number of violations. To evaluate the scope for efficiency-enhancing reforms of fine systems, it is investigated whether actual regulations particularly for speeding conform to the non-proportionality requirement in selected European countries.     

International sex offender registration laws: research and evaluation issues based on a review of current scientific literature

In many jurisdictions, anyone convicted of a sexual offense is required to register with police, often for life. Nine different countries have now implemented sex offender registries in an attempt to protect the public from the perceived threat posed by sexual offenders. Yet such laws have been criticized as being overly inclusive, tying up limited law enforcement resources to track many offenders who pose little risk of sexual reoffending. This paper considers the available research evidence relevant to the effectiveness of such laws for the deterrence of sexual offending and the investigation of sex crimes. It is concluded that significant gaps persist in our knowledge of whether existing laws effectively reduce sexual offending or reoffending and that large-scale, well-designed studies of the impact of sex offender registration on rates of offending, the collateral consequences to offenders and their families, and the costs of such laws are needed.     

Graduated penalty scheme

Evaders of any dues such as local council tax, motor vehicle tax, tv license fees, etc., if detected, can pay promptly the dues plus any fine or postpone, which usually means a larger fine, and potentially imprisonment if payments are not made in full. Dominant among the likely reasons for this graduated penalty scheme are ‘default tracking costs’ and ‘imprisonment costs’. Although in conflict with the state’s basic objective of deterring evasion, a graduated penalty scheme may emerge as an optimal balance between the dual objectives of deterrence and settlement delay minimization. Based on a welfare-maximizing objective where the state determines optimal monitoring intensity and time profile of fines, an intuitively plausible condition is derived such that the fine scheme is of the graduated type.     

Monetary Penalties and Noncompliance with Environmental Laws: a Mediation Analysis

Studies that assess the impact of monetary penalties on environmental compliance have yielded mixed results. While some studies suggest fines deter future violations other studies find that fines do little to encourage compliance. This longitudinal study examines the impact of the dollar amount of fines on compliance with environmental laws among major facilities in the state of Michigan (n?=?37). Results from a mediation analysis suggest that while noncompliance may slightly decrease immediately following a fine there are few changes to a firm’s long term compliance behavior. Furthermore, analyses of these data suggest that total fines levied prior to the most recent fine actually have a positive relationship with noncompliance. We suggest these results imply a decaying effect of deterrence that is perhaps connected to the organizational structure of the treadmill of production.     

Human trafficking: the need for human rights and government effectiveness in enforcing anti-trafficking

Human trafficking constitutes a global problem. Involving exploitation of individuals through forced labour, sex, or organ removal, trafficking is an egregious human rights violation and illegal in many countries. Although laws have arisen to combat trafficking, it has persisted and inconsistent enforcement of anti-trafficking measures has been a concern. Using new data on trafficking, the enforcement patterns of 168 countries from 2001 to 2011 are examined. Findings suggest enforcement is predicted by the interaction of states’ world culture ties and government effectiveness, trafficking flows, and other state-level political mechanisms. Theoretically important factors, such as female legislators or various economic measures, are insignificant.     

论民事执行权配置的基本理念——比较法视角的研究

意大利、澳大利亚、德国、日本、英国、美国、瑞士等国的执行机构各不相同,但都奉行着相同的执行权配置理念,即对执行权按行政权和司法权进行有效的分权;对执行权,尤其是执行权中的行政权性质部分进行严密制约监督;规定严密有效的救济程序;对执行权的行使作出诸多限制性规定,既严格锁定执行权的权限范围,又兼顾执行的其他程序独立价值。这些理念对我国进行民事执行机构改革和进行民事执行权的配置具有深刻的启示作用。     

行政执法与刑事司法衔接机制的立法问题研究——以公安机关的经济犯罪侦查为中心

行政执法与刑事司法因属于不同法域,由于部门保护主义与行政执法遮蔽而使得以罚代刑成为常态。建立的衔接机制存在问题导致行政执法机关移送案件的数量呈下降趋势。有关此问题的立法应当在报案线索与案件移送、受理与处理以及证据的转化等方面作出修改,使“脱节”的环节得到衔接。     

Fragile Convergence: Understanding Variation in the Enforcement of China's Industrial Pollution Law

Official statistics and independent survey data show that in the last decade China has witnessed a remarkable change in its enforcement of environmental pollution violations, moving toward more formalistic and coercive law enforcement with more enforcement cases as well as higher fines. The data also show that there is considerable regional variation with coastal areas having more and higher punishments than those inland. This article explores these findings, seeking to understand the explanation and meaning of these temporal and regional variation patterns. The study shows how enforcement varies when there is a convergence of governmental, social, and economic institutional forces. The article argues that the basis for such convergence has been fragile, as national pressures have lacked consistency and local community and government support evaporates when dominant sources of income are at stake.     

Higher Fines—Fewer Traffic Offences? A Multi-Site Observational Study

Assess the impact of a 100-per cent increase of fines on compliance with speed-limits (50 km/h) and parking regulations in urban areas. Norm violations were measured through standardized observations in all five major cities in Switzerland before and after fines had been raised by 100 % or more at two pre- and two post-intervention periods. The speed of 20,000 cars was measured, and 10,000 parked cars were controlled. Levels of police controls remained stable over the entire period, but enforcement activity varied considerably across cities. Violations of parking regulations decreased by 32 %. Speed-limit violations remained unaffected in the longer run by higher fines. When cities without relevant enforcement activity were excluded, a reduction by 17 % was observed. No causal inferences can be drawn given the absence of a control area. However, the data suggest that higher fines deter traffic violations, provided enforcement activity remains at relevant levels.     

Simple rules for the developing world

Much of the discussion in favor of simplicity of legal rules and against complex regulation is rooted in economically developed countries with strong state capacity. With economic development and state capacity comes the presumption that complex rules will be enforced. Therefore, analysis focuses on the administrative and error costs, and the unintended consequences of complex rules that are enforced. This paper argues that the Epsteinian insight is even more relevant to the developing world where countries often lack enough state capacity to even take on simple governance tasks. Developing countries often have less than 20 percent of the state capacity of developed countries. However, this does not mean they limit the regulatory structure to a fifth of the tasks. Under-enforcement or non-enforcement of complex rules imposes different costs and unintended consequences on society. Using examples from India, this paper highlights problems of enforcement swamping, deadweight loss, and corruption arising from the under-enforcement of complex rules. To avoid these problems, the paper concludes that a fortiori less developed countries should favor simple rules.

     

Company Liability and Competition Law: Exposure of Company to Risk of Undesirable Behaviour of Directors

In order to protect the objectives of competition policy, companies as undertakings are primarily targeted for the competition law infringements based on the mixed approach of compliance and deterrence theories relying on the view that company directors are incentivised to comply with the rules of competition law by the internal compliance programmes and corporate fines are the consequences of incompliance. This enforcement strategy gives rise to a tension between corporate governance, company law and competition law, as the former two focus on the behaviour of individuals within the corporate structure, while the latter concerns the impact of the company’s behaviour in the market. The question that arises in this tension is whether or to what extent competition law actually considers the way in which the company is run internally while it seeks to promote these primary objectives. This article analyses the deterrent effectiveness of primary enforcement strategy employed in the UK competition law regime and argues that competition law does not tend to localise the source of conduct or particular decisions and does not aim to correct the right wrongdoer. Despite that lack of effectiveness of public enforcement strategy to deter further anti-competitive behaviour has led individual sanctions to be introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002 and the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 in the UK, companies are still primarily targeted by corporate fines even though directors have intentionally breached the rules of competition law and this strategy is unlikely to deter directors from engaging with undesirable behaviour which exposes the company to risk of liability and loss.

     

论公私协作执法

公私协作执法是公共执法和私人执法基于各自特点进行协作的法律执行模式,可以有效弥补公共执法动力不足、腐败和信息劣势的缺陷,也可以有效弥补单纯私人执法过程中的执法过度、缺乏强制力等缺陷.长期以来,我国法律执行活动被公共执法机构垄断,公私协作执法的制度空间不大.为此,应当通过扩张诉讼当事人资格、建立罚金分享制度、增加惩罚性赔偿规定以及放宽风险代理诉讼限制等方式为公私协作执法开辟空间,使公私协作执法能够成为我国法律执行机制改革的重要方向.     

Fines and Justice Administration: The Experience of the Federal Republic of Germany

As part of the penal code revised in 1969, the Federal Republic of Germany increased its reliance on fines, including the introduction of day-fines, in lieu of short-term imprisonment for minor offenses. The previous trend toward the use of fines was accelerated by the requirement that courts order imprisonment only in exceptional cases. Traffic cases were particularly affected. The qualities of the offense and the absence of previous offenses, rather than an individualized study of the offender, continued to be the dominant criterium influencing the choice of a fine. The chief effect of day fines was higher amounts applied to the more affluent defendants; the amount of the fine appeared to have no effect on subsequent recidivism. For first offenders, fines were superior to imprisonment in avoiding reconviction. Day-fines were no more effective (but not less effective) than imprisonment in the instance of traffic offenses. Fines were superior to other sanctions for petty property offenders but not for career thieves.     

An economic approach on countering the misuse of the right to challenge judges: an experiment

Parties can challenge a judge (request a recusal) when they have reasons to believe that a judge is not impartial. In practice this procedure is sometimes abused by lawyers who, for example, want to delay proceedings. Countries have taken different measures to deter the improper use of the procedure to request a recusal, like fines for dismissed requests, or immediately dismissing evidently unfounded requests. In a laboratory experiment we examine the effects of a summary review whether a challenge is evidently unfounded, with or without fines. We find that a review without fine improves legal protection in practice as well as efficiency by reducing unfounded challenges and increasing challenges that have a substantial chance of success. Overall the number of challenges declines. With a fine, challenges decline, but also legal protection.     

宽严相济刑事政策与罚金刑改革

刑罚体系中的罚金刑本质上与宽严相济刑事政策的精神相契合,能够在贯彻宽严相济刑事政策中发挥重要的作用。我国现有罚金刑制度还存在罚金刑地位不高、适用范围狭窄、无限额罚金制的规定较多、罚金刑配置方式单一、罚金刑执行难等诸多问题和缺陷,影响到对宽严相济刑事政策的贯彻执行,需要我们对其进行相应的一系列的改革完善,以使其在体现和贯彻宽严相济刑事政策中的作用得以充分发挥。     

Revisiting the Role of Negotiation and Trivialization in Environmental Law Enforcement

Using an empirical assessment of the use of enforcement undertakings by the Environment Agency and the engagement of the courts with the recently enacted sentencing guidelines for environmental offences, this article argues that the enforcement of environmental law is undergoing significant change. This change manifests itself in an increased reliance on written negotiated agreements in the form of enforcement undertakings by the Enivironment Agency and the willingness of the courts to hand down significant fines in cases against certain types of polluters. These new dynamics suggest that negotiation continues to play an important role in the enforcement of environmental law, albeit in a contractualized form. The application of the sentencing guidelines conversely suggests that environmental offences are no longer trivialized by the courts. Taken together, these emerging dynamics not only create specific incentives between agencies and offenders but also call into question established understandings and perceptions of regulatory enforcement.