Industrial structure of the federal sector: Evidence from bureau market share data

This paper examines the industrial organization of the federal sector by measuring the variation of bureau market shares of appropriations. The two measures employed are rank-shift analysis (turnover) and the Hymer-Pashigian index of market share instability which have been used to indicate the level of competitiveness within private sector industries. The results of both the rank-shift and market share instability analyses strongly suggest that there is considerable competition among bureaus within the federal sector. These results are consistent with the hypothesis and existing evidence that bureaus engage in nonprice competitive strategies.     

The provocative public sector: Domestic political protest and public sector growth in the OECD, 1965–1982

The results shown in Tables 1 through 8 above are consistent in that %GG is repeatedly shown to be significant whether making cross-national comparisons of DPP or predicting intra-national variations over time. Therefore, Hypotheses 1a and 1b are confirmed. The confirmation of Hypotheses 2a and 2b shows that, taking into account public sector size, government growth is most provocative in countries where it represents a major socio-economic change (i.e., where the public sector is small). Government growth has a neutral impact where the role of the public sector is long-established (i.e., where the public sector is large).Hypotheses 3a and 3b posited that average and annual rates of economic growth would be inversely associated with domestic protest. These hypotheses, too, were confirmed. The belief that economic growth rates would clearly provide the margin of affordability for public sector growth was not confirmed, as the coefficient of the interaction term (%GG*%GDP) was not statistically significant.     

Leviathans, federal transfers, and the cartelization hypothesis

Federal fiscal arrangements are argued to give rise to tacit collusion among competing Leviathans (Brennan and Buchanan, The Power to Tax, CUP, 1980). Though frequently encountered in academic and policy discussions, the cartelization hypothesis has rarely been scrutinized formally. This paper explores the effect of federal equalizing transfers on Leviathans engaged in tax competition. Contrary to the hypothesis, equalization is found to potentially complement tax competition in taming the Leviathan by implicitly taxing tax revenues extracted by the Leviathan. Thus, transfers might be an appropriate constitutional provision against fiscal expropriation.     

Private sector shrinkage and the growth of industrialized economies: Reply

Further tests and thoughts on the OECD data lead me to conclude that, if anything, my 1986 paper underestimated the magnitude of the inverse relation between economic growth and government size. If one takes the nominal-based measure of government scale, as advised by Saunders, the significance levels, coefficient magnitudes and goodness of fits improve over what I found with my initial investigation. I would suggest that Saunders reconsider his reluctance to believe that the size of the public sector is unrelated to economic growth in OECD countries over this time period.One additional thought appears relevant to the current policy debate concerning budget deficits and economic performance within the major industrialized economies. The empirical work displayed here and in my 1986 paper suggests serious problems associated with the various proposals urging governments to raise taxes and/or ease fiscal policy. Elsewhere, I have suggested that available empirical evidence implies that plans to increase taxes as a way out of budget deficits are plans that carry the potential for raising government spending and possibly future deficits as well. Coupled with the evidence presented here, we should also recognize the potential of tax increases to raise the level of government participation in a country and, accordingly, exert inverse influences on its future economic performance as well. As suggested in my 1986 paper, the empirical evidence may suggest the following irony: While political participants may crave larger and larger non-market resource allocations, their future ability to satisfy that craving may very well be severely constrained by the satisfaction of that same appetite.     

Evaluating the impact of manufacturing extension on productivity growth

This article combines the richest data set and most rigorous econometric methodology used, to date, to evaluate the impact of manufacturing extension services on client productivity growth. Client plants are identified in the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) and their labor productivity growth between 1987 and 1992 is compared to nonclients. Both simple OLS and two‐stage models are used to estimate the effect of manufacturing extension on productivity growth. The first‐stage probit model is informative about the client selection process. Results suggest that participation in manufacturing extension is associated with between 3.4 and 16 percent higher labor productivity growth between 1987 and 1992. The article demonstrates the usefulness of longitudinal microdata sets, such as the LRD, for program evaluation. © 1998 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Tax exporting,federal deductibility,and state tax structure

This paper studies the interaction between the federal and state tax systems during the 1980s and, in particular, considers how the Tax Reform Act of 1986 affected state tax structure. Using a panel data set on state governments over a nine-year period, I estimate tax share equations for six categories of taxes. I find that the state personal income tax is sensitive to changes in its tax price, but find a much smaller sensitivity to changes in tax prices for the general sales tax. I then consider various reasons why the sales tax does not exhibit a sensitivity to changes in tax price and consider the implications of these results for policymakers. The regression results suggest that different income groups are concerned with different tax instruments. Moreover, the results motivate a possible benefit approach to taxation at the state level. Linking taxes, about which a particular income group is most concerned, to services received by that group might generate additional political support for state tax systems during a time when many states are facing fiscal crisis.     

Chairman reappointments,presidential elections and policy actions of the federal reserve

A number of recent studies have analyzed whether there is a political influence on monetary policy, focusing primarily on whether monetary policy becomes easier just prior to elections. In addition to exploring whether there exists an election period cycle in monetary policy, this article explores the existence of another political influence on policy. Following up on some recent anecdotal evidence provided by John T. Woolley, this article explores whether incumbent FED chairmen have succeeded in influencing monetary policy in order to improve their reappointment chances. The analysis, which spans the administrations of seven U.S. presidents and four FED chairmen, finds no conclusive evidence that FED policy changes systematically either before elections or chairman reappointment dates. The analysis has implications for the issue of rules versus discretion in monetary policy.     

The impact of parties,economic growth,and public sector expansion: A comparison of long-term dynamics in the Scandinavian and Anglo-American democracies

Abstract. This paper discusses (1) the extent to which the partisan composition of government affects economic policies and macroeconomic outcomes, and (2) the interrelationship between public spending, taxation and economic growth. These two issues are connected. Since target variables and instruments affect each other reciprocally, the specification of the partisan model should encompass both a reaction function and an outcome function. A pooled vector autoregressive model suggests that during the last century left–wing governments in the United States, Britain and Canada have reinforced the growth of both public spending and GNP. Only public sector expansion is affected by partisanship in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. In the Anglo–American countries changes in spending occur before changes in economic growth in terms of a lagged crowding out effect. Spending and revenues appear to affect each other reciprocally. By contrast, public sector expansion in Scandinavia stimulates growth, while taxation leads spending.     

A new framework for testing the effect of government spending on growth and productivity

Does government spending have a positive or negative effect on economic growth? The results of earlier empirical studies give mixed results. In this study we suggest a new method for testing the effect of different kinds of government expenditure on productivity growth in the private sector. The focus on productivity in the private sector and the use of disaggregated data makes it possible to avoid or mitigate a number of methodological problems. The major conclusions, which are quite robust, are that government transfers, consumption and total outlays have consistently negative effects, while educational expenditure has a positive effect, and government investment has no effect on private productivity growth. The impact is also found to work solely through total factor productivity and not via the marginal productivity of labor and capital.     

On the distribution of federal taxes and expenditures,and the new war between the states

As federal government expenditures have grown, there has been an increasing awareness of the distribution of taxes and expenditures across states. States in the Northeast have claimed that sunbelt states have been getting more than their fair share of federal spending, with the sunbelt states denying the charge. A theory of political coalitions is developed to explain why the sunbelt should be unable to receive differentially high expenditures, although the sunbelt may pay less than a proportional amount in taxes because of its relatively low income. An empirical test shows that the data are in agreement with this theory.