Imperialism from Below: Informal Empire and the Private Sector in Nineteenth‐Century Germany

Far from being the product of atavistic feudal remnants within German society, nineteenth‐century German imperialism stemmed from precisely the liberal milieu that had come to prominence during 1848‐49. Through an analysis of imperialist texts dealing with Central and South America, and the social logic of these imperialist works, an understanding of the nature of private sector and civil society imperialistic projects emerges that sees liberal imperialists seeking out alternatives to statist solutions in the light of political blockages to their efforts.     

Welfare State Restructuring without Grand Coalitions: The Role of Informal Cooperation in Blame Avoidance

This article argues that welfare state restructuring, which is highly unpopular among voters, is politically feasible if government and opposition parties cooperate informally with one another. Contrary to what key arguments made in the literature assert, restructuring does not require the formation of a grand coalition to diffuse blame from voters. Informal cooperation between parties is a distinctive blame-avoiding strategy, which differs not only from other party-oriented strategies such as building a grand coalition, but also from voter-oriented ones, such as obfuscation and exemption. By analysing the politics of pension reform in Germany, this article shows that informal cooperation enables political parties to restructure the welfare state without running the risk of electoral failure.     

恐怖、帝国神话和资本过程

后冷战时代,有一种观点认为,在和平和发展这个主题之外,恐怖和帝国构成了全球化的一个副主题.孱弱的恐怖活动以庞大的资本帝国为攻击目标,资本帝国以反恐为工具,二者在全球化过程中相互对抗,是全球体系的腐败区域所孳生的孪生物.从这个角度看,恐怖和帝国在本质上都是失败者.全球性本体的生成和全球社会的确立是全球化所要到达的终极目的地,而恐怖和帝国必将在到达这一目的地的过程中最终消亡     

Inequality,Protests, and the Progressive Allocation of Cash Transfers in the Argentine Provinces

In the last 20 years, two broadly defined theories have sought to explain the relationship between economic inequality and redistribution. The well‐known hypothesis set forth by Meltzer and Richard (1981) states that larger income differences between the median voter and the average income earner should increase redistributive pressures in democratic regimes. Power Resource Theory (PRT), by contrast, argues that income inequality breeds power inequality and should dampen redistribution. Critical to both theories is the translation of redistributive interest into policy signals. This article considers protests as signals that increase the salience of inequality among voters. Results provide evidence that protests facilitate more progressive cash transfers in highly unequal environments but have modest effects in more egalitarian ones.     

Britain,Ireland and the Italian Risorgimento

Britain, Ireland and the Italian Risorgimento. Edited by Nick Carter (London: Palgrave, 2015), £60.00 (cloth).