Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era

This article examines the impact of the Human Rights Act (HRA) on the current lack of a remedy for non-consensual publication of personal information by the media. It argues that the action for breach of confidence is now ripe for development into a privacy law in all but name and that the normative impetus for this enterprise can be found in the HRA which will require domestic courts to consider Convention jurisprudence. It will suggest that when Strasbourg decisions are examined in the context of more general Convention doctrines, they may be seen to suggest the need for an effective privacy remedy. Drawing upon approaches from other jurisdictions it seeks to demonstrate that principled solutions may be found to the thicket of legal problems associated with such development. It contends that the main objection to this enterprise, the perceived threat to media freedom, is largely misplaced, as analysis at the theoretical and doctrinal levels reveals that speech and privacy interests are in many respects mutually supportive and the areas of conflict small and readily susceptible to resolution.     

A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy and its Implications for Privacy Law

This article draws upon social interaction theory (the work of Irwin Altman) to develop a theory of the right to privacy, which reflects the way that privacy is experienced. This theory states that the right to privacy is a right to respect for barriers, and that an invasion of privacy occurs when a privacy barrier is penetrated. The first part of the paper establishes the position of the author's theory in the existing scholarship. The second part of the paper expands upon the theory to explain the nature of privacy barriers and the way that the author's theory manages a number of specific privacy issues, including threats to privacy, attempted invasions of privacy, unforeseeable interferences with privacy and waiving the right to privacy. The final part of the paper demonstrates the impact that this approach to privacy could have upon judicial reasoning, in particular Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights.     

Accommodating Children's Rights in a Post Human Rights Act Era

This article considers why so little case law currently acknowledges that children have recognisable rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and argues that the family courts are not meeting the demands of the Human Rights Act 1998 in this regard. It suggests that a reinterpretation of the 'paramountcy principle' in the Children Act 1989 should be accompanied by a radically different judicial approach to evidence relating to children's best interests. The article considers the difficulties that such an approach might produce when applied to teenagers intent on refusing life-saving medical treatment. It further argues that the courts should call on the substantial body of rights jurisprudence to provide legal and moral support for this revised approach.     

Protecting Free Speech and Academic Freedom in Universities

Restrictions on speaking events in universities have been created both by recent student‐led efforts at ‘no‐platforming’ and by Part 5 of the Counter‐terrorism and Security Act 2015 which placed aspects of the government's Prevent strategy on a statutory basis. The statutory Prevent duty in universities includes, under the accompanying Guidance, curbing or monitoring events that could have an impact in drawing persons into terrorism. This article places the combined impact of Part 5 and student‐led curbs on campus speech in context by juxtaposing pre‐existing restrictions with the various free speech duties of universities. Focusing on speaking events, it evaluates the resulting state of free speech and academic freedom in universities. It finds potential violations of established free speech norms due to the impact of pre‐emptive strikes against some campus‐linked speech articulating non‐mainstream viewpoints. But it also argues that not all such speech has a strong foundation within such norms.     

Constructing a surveillance impact assessment

This paper describes surveillance impact assessment (SIA), a methodology for identifying, assessing and resolving risks, in consultation with stakeholders, posed by the development of surveillance systems. This paper appears to be the first such to elaborate an SIA methodology. It argues that the process of conducting an SIA should be similar to that of a privacy impact assessment (PIA), but that an SIA must take account of a wider range of issues, impacts and stakeholders. The paper categorises the issues and impacts to be considered in the conduct of an SIA and identifies the benefits of a properly conducted SIA.     

Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Victim Status,Extraterritoriality and the Search for Principled Reasoning

In Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that the relevant standard of ‘victim status’ that applies in secret surveillance cases consists in a potential risk of being subjected to surveillance and that the European Convention on Human Rights does not apply to the surveillance of individuals who reside outside of the UK. This note argues that the Tribunal's finding regarding the victim status of the applicants was sound but that the underlying reasoning was not. It concludes that the Tribunal's finding on extraterritoriality is unsatisfactory and that its engagement with the European Court of Human Rights case law on the matter lacked depth. Finally, the note considers the defects of the Human Rights Watch case, and the case law on extraterritoriality more generally, against the backdrop of the place of principled reasoning in human rights adjudication.     

Withdrawal of Parental Responsibility: Lost Authority and a Lost Opportunity

This comment examines Re D (Withdrawal of Parental Responsibility), the first reported Court of Appeal decision on withdrawal of parental responsibility pursuant to section 4(2A) of the Children Act 1989. It demonstrates that the Court overlooked earlier Court of Appeal authority, resulting in tension in the Court's guidance. The comment criticises the Court of Appeal's characterisation of parental responsibility as entirely child‐centred and its uncritical acceptance that the child's welfare is the paramount consideration in applications for withdrawal of parental responsibility. It argues that such an approach may not adequately respect the parent's interests in retaining parental responsibility, especially in the context of an order which is more draconian in effect than a care order. The impact upon applications for removal of parental responsibility of the new presumption of parental involvement, which was implemented shortly after the decision in Re D, is also considered.     

Unmanned aircraft systems: Surveillance,ethics and privacy in civil applications

This paper examines how the use of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) for surveillance in civil applications impacts upon privacy and other civil liberties. It argues that, despite the heterogeneity of these systems, the same “usual suspects” – the poor, people of colour and anti-government protesters – are targeted by UAS deployments. It discusses how current privacy-related legislation in the US, UK and European Union might apply to UASs. We find that current regulatory mechanisms do not adequately address privacy and civil liberties concerns because UASs are complex, multimodal surveillance systems that integrate a range of technologies and capabilities. The paper argues for a combination of top-down, legislated requirements and bottom-up impact assessments to adequately address privacy and civil liberties.     

Public security versus privacy in technology law: A balancing act?

Technology invades a person's privacy but this has been justified in law on public security grounds. The more technology advances, the more difficult it is to control its privacy intrusive use. This paper argues that there are a number of difficulties posed by such use concerning the respect of one's privacy. The meaning of ‘public security’ is not entirely clear and there are various laws which authorise the invasion of privacy for public security reasons. Technology is developing at such a fast pace and in a more diffused manner without taking on board its privacy implications whilst technological privacy enhancement mechanisms are not catching up. The law of privacy is not sufficiently elaborate and is slow in coming to terms to deal with these novel situations posed by rapid technological advances. The paper thus develops universally legally binding minimum core principles that could be applied indiscriminately to all privacy intrusive technology.     

Restrictions on cryptography in India – A case studyof encryption and privacy

The developments of technology in communications industry have radically altered the ways in which we communicate and exchange information. Along with the speed, efficiency, and cost-saving benefits of the digital revolution come new challenges to the security and privacy of communications and information traversing the global communications infrastructure. As is with any technology the misuse of technology is noticed similarly the encryption technology. Encryption and other advanced technologies may be used, with direct impact on law enforcement and therefore some restrictions are necessary in the interests of national security. The problem, however, is ensuring that the restriction is legitimate and solely for in the interests of national security, the state not being allowed to interfere and keep a track on individuals' activities and private lives without sufficient cause. The individual needs encryption to protect their personal privacy and confidential data such as medical information, personal financial data, and electronic mail. In a networked environment, such information is increasingly at risk of being stolen or misused. Therefore, encryption is critical to building a secure and trusted global information infrastructure. Digital computers have changed the landscape considerably and the entire issue, at its simplest level, boils down to a form of balancing of interests. The specific legal and rights-related problems arising from the issue of cryptography and privacy in the Indian context are examined in this paper.     

Criminal justice employee rights: An overview

This article provides a comprehensive overview of the legal rights of criminal justice employees. Among the issues discussed are: property interests in employment; due process and other rights in discipline and termination; First Amendment rights; privacy rights; and protections against discrimination and a hostile work environment. The affirmative obligation of the criminal justice agency to take a proactive stance in formulation, implementation, and enforcement of policies is also discussed.     

Sickness Absence and the Court of Justice: Examining the Role of Fundamental Rights in EU Employment Law

Being absent from work due to sickness is a critical issue for individuals and their employers, but it has traditionally fallen outside the scope of EU employment legislation. This article argues that this is changing; it examines case‐law under the Working Time and Employment Equality Directives. The article considers the justifications that the Court of Justice has advanced to explain this expansion in EU employment law. It finds that the Court has, at times, invoked fundamental social rights as a basis for interpreting employment legislation in a manner favourable to workers. Yet the way in which the Court deploys rights‐based reasoning can be difficult to anticipate, not least the countervailing weight attached to the interests of employers. The case studies indicate that fundamental rights discourse offers a possible foundation for more extensive readings of employment legislation, but it is not a simple ‘trump card’ for advocates of stronger worker protection.     

Reconciliation: I Know It When I see It 1

States emerging from conflict increasingly seek ways in which to address the violence and human rights abuses of the past in order to move forward into a more peaceful future. The initial responses to mass atrocities were based in legal processes focused on the punishment of the person responsible for the harm. The inadequacy of such an approach resulted in the introduction of a variety of new goals in the transitional period, including the abstract notion of reconciliation which is increasingly advanced as the central goal in dealing with the legacy of the past. This article argues that the failure to examine the relationship between a discourse originally based on human rights and legal approaches and the introduction of reconciliation has only added new challenges rather than resolved existing ones and therefore must be re‐examined. The article also argues that no single approach should take prominence in addressing mass atrocities. Rather a range of options should be available to victims, in particular given the relative youth and inexperience of approaches to violent conflict.     

Casting Aside Clanking Medieval Chains: Prerogative,Statute and Article 50 after the EU Referendum

This article confronts the controversies surrounding Article 50 by analysing the relationship between statute and prerogative in the UK. The piece focuses on domestic constitutional issues and suggests a new way of classifying the relationship between statute and prerogative into two types falling under ‘the abeyance principle’ or ‘the frustration principle’. The abeyance principle means that where statute and prerogative overlap, the prerogative goes into abeyance. The frustration principle means that where statute and prerogative give rise to potential inconsistencies, but do not overlap, the prerogative cannot be used inconsistently with the intention of parliament as expressed in the relevant legislation. It then argues that Article 50 has the status of primary or ‘primary‐equivalent’ legislation which could justify applying the abeyance principle. This would mean that the trigger power would be exercised on statutory authority rather than through prerogative powers. If the courts are unable thus to construe the relevant legislation it argues EU law requires the courts to bridge the gap. Alternatively, if the abeyance principle is not applicable, it argues the frustration principle could apply but the circumstances in this litigation fall outside it. In the further alternative, EU law could require the frustration principle itself to be set aside in this case.     

Narratives about privacy and forgetting in English law

This paper examines narratives about the right of privacy in the UK. It argues that until relatively recently the dominant narrative was one that associated privacy with celebrity claimants and media defendants. Other narratives, such as those concerned with digital privacy and data protection, did not feature as prominently. But changing technological and social contexts mean that these narratives are now understood to be of immense importance too. This paper explores these narratives against the backdrop of the European Commission's proposals for a ‘right to be forgotten’ (now relabelled a ‘right to erasure’), the subject-matter of this special issue, as well as the 2014 Google Spain judgment. The paper emphasises the importance of forgetting as an aspect of the right to privacy and argues that while the UK legislator and courts have been slow to give effect to erasure remedies, they must now start exploring the bounds of legal possibility in order to meet the challenges of the digital age.     

Workplace Monitoring and the Right to Private Life at Work

In Barbulescu v Romania, the European Court of Human Rights clarified the application of the Article 8 right to private life in the workplace, and the extent of the state's positive obligations to protect the right against workplace monitoring. The decision establishes that there is an irreducible core to the right to private life at work that does not depend on an employee's reasonable expectations of privacy, and sets out clear principles for striking a fair balance between Article 8 and the employer's interests in the context of workplace monitoring. This article considers the nature of states’ positive obligation to protect human rights at work, the scope of the right to private life, and the impact of the decision on domestic law of unfair dismissal.     

Five years of the APEC Privacy Framework: Failure or promise?

The APEC Privacy Framework was developed from 2003, adopted by APEC in 2004 and finalised in 2005. It was intended as a means of improving the standard of information privacy protection throughout the APEC countries of the Asia–Pacific, and of facilitating the trans-border flow of personal information between those countries. In 2007 a number of ‘Pathfinder’ projects for cross-border data transfers were launched under the Framework. In the five years since the process commenced, what has it achieved, and what is it likely to achieve? This paper argues that the APEC Privacy Framework has had many flaws from its inception, including Privacy Principles that are unnecessarily weak, and no meaningful enforcement requirements. Since its adoption in 2004, little attempt has been made to encourage its use as a minimal standard for privacy legislation in developing countries (which might have been useful), and it is having little impact on the significant number of legislative developments now taking place.     

The European Union's approach to online behavioural advertising: Protecting individuals or restricting business?

The European Union (EU) has firmly set its stall out to protect individuals' data and privacy and has demonstrated this through the rejection of the old opt-out regime and the introduction of the new opt-in rules. These require businesses to obtain individual's prior and informed consent before their data are collected, stored and used for the purposes of online behavioural advertising (OBA). Individuals in the EU are afforded protection from the apparent dangers relating to data privacy and misuse that is associated with OBA, which is beyond the expectation of most Internet users. However, there are some criticisms levelled at the law that the EU has produced. Is simply gaining informed consent sufficient for protecting all types of information? Do certain types of information require a higher level of consent than others? Does the law fulfil its aim of protecting data subject's privacy and data? Is the current law restrictive to business? Do individuals know or care that their information is being collected for the purposes of targeted advertising and is there a better way to ensure that they do? Finally, will proposed new law to be found in the EU Data Protection Regulation solve any of these problems? This article will assess whether, as a policy decision, the EU's current approach has been too cautious in its attempts to protect individuals or restrict business.     

Sorting out smart surveillance

Surveillance is becoming ubiquitous in our society. We can also see the emergence of “smart” surveillance technologies and the assemblages (or combinations) of such technologies, supposedly to combat crime and terrorism, but in fact used for a variety of purposes, many of which are intrusive upon the privacy of law-abiding citizens. Following the dark days of 9/11, security and surveillance became paramount. More recently, in Europe, there has been a policy commitment to restore privacy to centre stage. This paper examines the legal tools available to ensure that privacy and personal data protection are respected in attempts to ensure the security of our society, and finds that improvements are needed in our legal and regulatory framework if privacy is indeed to be respected by law enforcement authorities and intelligence agencies. It then goes on to argue that privacy impact assessments should be used to sort out the necessity and proportionality of security and surveillance programmes and policies vis-à-vis privacy.     

Legal Capacity at a Crossroad: Mental Disability and Family Law

In this introductory essay to the Special Issue, I argue that both family law and disability rights law scholars should examine a key point of intersection across areas: legal capacity or the law's recognition of the rights and responsibilities of an individual. For example, parental termination proceedings center on parental fitness and functional capabilities. I contextualize the articles in the Special Issue by Leslie Francis and Robyn Powell on the role of reasonable accommodations for parents with disabilities in parental termination proceedings. In addition, I call upon legal scholars, family law courts, and practitioners to reimagine governing legal standards in family law according to principles of universal design to shift the baseline capabilities associated with parenting and parental fitness.