Ausverkauf des „Tafelsilbers“: Bestimmungsfaktoren der Privatisierungserlöse in EU- und OECD-Staaten 1990–2000

The 1990s have witnessed unprecedented attempts at privatising state-owned enterprises in virtually all OECD democracies. This contribution analyzes the differences in the privatisation proceeds raised by EU and OECD countries between 1990 and 2000. It turns out that privatisations are part of a policy of economic liberalisation in previously highly regulated economies as well as a reaction to the fiscal policy challenges imposed by European integration and the globalisation of financial markets. In addition, institutional pluralism exerts significant and negative effects on privatisation proceeds. Partisan differences only emerge if economic problems are moderate, while intense economic, particularly fiscal problems foreclose differing partisan strategies.     

The politics of fiscal policy during economic downturns, 1981–2010

This article investigates fiscal policy responses to the Great Recession in historical perspective. It explores general trends in the frequency, size and composition of fiscal stimulus as well as the impact of government partisanship on fiscal policy outputs during the four international recessions of 1980–1981, 1990–1991, 2001–2002 and 2008–2009. Encompassing 17–23 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, the analysis calls into question the idea of a general retreat from fiscal policy activism since the early 1980s. The propensity of governments to respond to economic downturns by engaging in fiscal stimulus has increased over time and no secular trend in the size of stimulus measures is observed. At the same time, OECD governments have relied more on tax cuts to stimulate demand in the two recessions of the 2000s than they did in the early 1980s or early 1990s. Regarding government partisanship, no significant direct partisan effects on either the size or the composition of fiscal stimulus is found for any of the four recession episodes. However, the size of the welfare state conditioned the impact of government partisanship in the two recessions of the 2000s, with left‐leaning governments distinctly more prone to engaging in discretionary fiscal stimulus and/or spending increases in large welfare states, but not in small welfare states.     

Partisanship in the setting and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies

The principal concerns of this paper are with the roles partisan politics have played in the making of fiscal and monetary policies within OECD countries as well as the extent to which these policies have complemented each other. It is argued that parties of the left pursue fiscal policies that are distinctly different from those pursued by the right. The critical difference is in the way these parties use fiscal policy as a corrective mechanism for dealing with macroeconomic problems: leftist parties adopt counter–cyclical fiscal policies while rightwing parties adhere to pro–cyclical fiscal stances. The paper also examines two arguments regarding monetary policy and how partisan politics affect this policy area. The first and most conventional argument sees the formal independence of the central bank from government as a means of negating partisan influences on monetary policy; the second advances the proposition that, regardless of central bank independence, monetary authorities are not politically neutral but instead share views similar to those of parties on the right–hand side of the political spectrum. Empirical analysis, using a pooled cross–section time–series design with data from 14 countries between 1961 and 1994, produces evidence in favor of the argument concerning the role of partisanship in fiscal policy; it also shows little support for the view that central bank independence inhibits partisan influences while at the same time provides support for the thesis that central banks are politically non–neutral. Thus, coordination between fiscal and monetary policies is far less likely to occur when left–wing parties are in power.     

Partisanship in the setting and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies

Abstract. The principal concerns of this paper are with the roles partisan politics have played in the making of fiscal and monetary policies within OECD countries as well as the extent to which these policies have complemented each other. It is argued that parties of the left pursue fiscal policies that are distinctly different from those pursued by the right. The critical difference is in the way these parties use fiscal policy as a corrective mechanism for dealing with macroeconomic problems: leftist parties adopt counter–cyclical fiscal policies while rightwing parties adhere to pro–cyclical fiscal stances. The paper also examines two arguments regarding monetary policy and how partisan politics affect this policy area. The first and most conventional argument sees the formal independence of the central bank from government as a means of negating partisan influences on monetary policy; the second advances the proposition that, regardless of central bank independence, monetary authorities are not politically neutral but instead share views similar to those of parties on the right–hand side of the political spectrum. Empirical analysis, using a pooled cross–section time–series design with data from 14 countries between 1961 and 1994, produces evidence in favor of the argument concerning the role of partisanship in fiscal policy; it also shows little support for the view that central bank independence inhibits partisan influences while at the same time provides support for the thesis that central banks are politically non–neutral. Thus, coordination between fiscal and monetary policies is far less likely to occur when left–wing parties are in power.     

Fiscal Rules and the Composition of Government Expenditures in OECD Countries

Since the 1990s many OECD countries have adopted fiscal rules. After the adoption of these rules, the ratio of social transfers to government consumption substantially declined, and it recovered following the global economic crisis. Using a sample of 22 OECD countries, we found a negative effect of fiscal rules on the ratio of social transfers to government consumption. This finding implies that fiscal rules are effective, but not necessarily binding. Our examination reveals that the negative effect of fiscal rules on the social transfers to government consumption ratio is particularly evident in countries with relatively weak legal protection to social rights.     

The politics of social spending after the Great Recession: The return of partisan policy making

Prior research shows that the effect of partisanship on social expenditure declined over time in Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) countries. In this article, the author argues that the 2007/2008 recession resulted in the reemergence of partisan policy making in social spending. This was a result of mainstream parties needing to respond to the growing challenge from nonmainstream parties as well as demonstrating that they responded to the economic crisis by offering different policy solutions. Using a panel of 23 OECD countries, the author shows that since the Great Recession, partisan effects on social spending are once again significant. These effects are more likely to be observed where the salience of the Left–Right dimension is higher. In accordance with classic theories of economic policy making, left‐wing governments are more likely to increase social spending when unemployment is higher and right‐wing governments restrain social expenditure when the budget deficit is greater.     

Do political variables affect fiscal policy adjustment decisions? New empirical evidence

We test eight hypotheses on political factors influencing the likelihood that a fiscal policy adjustment occurs. We employ a panel discrete choice model for 20 OECD countries for the period 1970–2003. Two different definitions of fiscal adjustments are used to capture the differences between rapid and gradual adjustments. We find that these types of fiscal adjustment are primarily driven by economic factors and are hardly affected by political variables. The likelihood that a rapid adjustment takes place is only influenced by upcoming elections, while the likelihood that a gradual adjustment takes place increases in case of broad policy reform.     

Did globalization restrict partisan politics? An empirical evaluation of social expenditures in a panel of OECD countries

This paper evaluates empirically how, in the course of globalization, partisan politics affected social expenditures in a panel of OECD countries. I introduce an updated indicator of government ideology and investigate its interaction with the KOF index of globalization. Two basic results emerge: First, at times when globalization proceeded at an average pace, partisan politics had no effect on social expenditures, but leftist governments increased social expenditures when globalization was proceeding rapidly. Second, policies differed in the 1980s and 1990s: Leftist governments pursued expansionary policies in the 1980s. Yet partisan politics disappeared in the 1990s, but not because of globalization.     

Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries

We investigate the effects of fiscal transparency and political polarization on the prevalence of electoral cycles in fiscal balance. While some recent political economy literature on electoral cycles identifies such cycles mainly in weak and recent democracies, in contrast we show, conditioning on a new index of institutional fiscal transparency, that electoral cycles in fiscal balance are a feature of many advanced industrialized economies. Using a sample of 19 OECD countries in the 1990s, we identify a persistent pattern of electoral cycles in low(er) transparency countries, while no such cycles can be observed in high(er) transparency countries. Furthermore, we find, in accordance with recent theory, that electoral cycles are larger in politically more polarized countries.     

Partisan technocratic cycles in Latin America

Given their powerful positions in presidential cabinets, technocrats are an important transmission mechanism for explaining economic policy choices, but have received less attention compared to other well-established channels such as elections or democratic tenure. I incorporate the role of technocratic advisors into a domestic policymaking framework. Specifically, I contend that left governments tend to appoint technocrats, or ministers with mainstream economics training, to signal their commitment to sound governance to the electorate. This partisan technocratic pattern, however, is conditioned by a country's place in its business cycle. During periods of high growth, left governments are more likely to align with their partisan preferences and appoint heterodox advisors that drift from fiscal discipline. Employing an originally constructed data index, the Index of Economic Advisors, I conduct a statistical test of 16 Latin American countries from 1960 to 2011, finding partisan shifts in technocratic appointments and fiscal governance that are conditioned by national business cycles.     

Partisanship, Political Control, and Economic Assessments

Previous research shows that partisans rate the economy more favorably when their party holds power. There are several explanations for this association, including use of different evaluative criteria, selective perception, selective exposure to information, correlations between economic experiences and partisanship, and partisan bias in survey responses. We use a panel survey around the November 2006 election to measure changes in economic expectations and behavioral intentions after an unanticipated shift in political power. Using this design, we can observe whether the association between partisanship and economic assessments holds when some leading mechanisms thought to bring it about are excluded. We find that there are large and statistically significant partisan differences in how economic assessments and behavioral intentions are revised immediately following the Democratic takeover of Congress. We conclude that this pattern of partisan response suggests partisan differences in perceptions of the economic competence of the parties, rather than alternative mechanisms.     

Choosing the path of austerity: how parties and policy coalitions influence welfare state retrenchment in periods of fiscal consolidation

What are the conditions under which some austerity programmes rely on substantial cuts to social spending? More specifically, do the partisan complexion and the type of government condition the extent to which austerity policies imply welfare state retrenchment? This article demonstrates that large budget consolidations tend to be associated with welfare state retrenchment. The findings support a partisan and a politico-institutionalist argument: (i) in periods of fiscal consolidation, welfare state retrenchment tends to be more pronounced under left-wing governments; (ii) since welfare state retrenchment is electorally and politically risky, it also tends to be more pronounced when pursued by a broad pro-reform coalition government. Therefore, the article shows that during budget consolidations implemented by left-wing broad coalition governments, welfare state retrenchment is greatest. Using long-run multipliers from autoregressive distributed lag models on 17 OECD countries during the 1982–2009 period, substantial support is found for these expectations.     

Another look at the evidence for rational partisan cycles

In presenting evidence in favor of rational partisan cycles, where electoral victories by leftist parties are expected to create temporary expansions and electoral victories by rightist parties are expected to create temporary recessions, Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1999) rely upon autoregressive time series intervention regressions. These regressions, however, are not consistent with their model. In this paper, a model is derived which is consistent with the intervention approach in its reduced-form. The differences between the models are highlighted and new empirical estimates are presented on a panel of seven OECD nations, which generally does not support the rational partisan cycle implications.     

Political parties,globalization and labour strength: Assessing differences across welfare state programs

This article investigates how globalization and organized labour condition partisan effects on different welfare state programs. The main argument is that the conditional effect of globalization on government partisanship depends on how relevant a program is to the needs of vulnerable groups and that organized labour additionally affects this relationship. Analyzing 21 OECD countries between 1980 and 2011/2014, empirical evidence largely corroborates this argument: Firstly, the expectation that partisan differences decrease with globalization in general and especially in weak labour countries in the case of programs that are less relevant for compensation holds true for old-age provision and partly for sick pay insurance. Secondly, and in accordance with theoretical expectations concerning programs that are primarily relevant for compensation, partisan differences increase with globalization, in general regarding education and only in strong labour countries regarding unemployment benefits. Therefore, while globalization constrains national politics’ room for manoeuvre in some areas, parties are still able to follow their ideologically preferred policies and respond to compensation demands in others.     

Remaking New Zealand's Economic Policy: Institutional Elites as Radical Innovators 1984–1993

During the mid-1980s and early 1990s the New Zealand economy moved from being one of the most regulated outside the former communist bloc to among the most liberal in the OECD. Largely unheralded and begun by an ostensibly social democratic Labour government, changes included the floating of the exchange rate; extensive liberalization of financial, capital and other markets; lowering of trade protection; fiscal restraint and monetary disinflation; changes to the machinery of government; corporatization and then sale of state assets; and changes to industrial relations frameworks (Castles, Gerritsen and Vowles 1996). Known as Rogernomics after Minister of Finance Roger Douglas, these economic policies were heavily derivative of neoclassical economic theories, such as the New Classical and Chicago schools, public choice and new institutional economics (Boston et al. 1996, ch. 2; Goldfinch 1997). This article explains how such radical economic restructuring occurred through the influence of a select group of strategically located institutional elites.     

The Politics of Fiscal Austerity: Implications for the United States

As austerity becomes the new normal for advanced nations, questions are raised about whether nations can make the hard choices necessary to bring about a sustainable fiscal future. The political defeat experienced by so many European governments undertaking fiscal consolidations points to the vulnerabilities that leaders will face. This article shows that how some Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations have survived the daunting politics of fiscal consolidation by timing actions for periods of economic recovery and political honeymoons following elections and by pursuing deficit reduction strategies that emphasize broad sweeping changes yielding high potential for dramatic economic gains over the longer term. Unlike many European nations today, the seemingly endless appetite for US treasuries by worldwide markets give the United States the luxury of choosing to begin deficit reduction only when the economy strengthens. However, the absence of market pressure also reduces the sense of urgency, consigning national leaders to create internal crises such as the 2012 “fiscal cliff” to force their own hand. While the polarized politics characterizing our party system does not bode well for concerted fiscal action, divided government carries the potential for spreading political risks and promoting more sustainable fiscal outcomes, as it has in our recent history and in other nations as well.     

The Politics and economics of revenue growth: A cross–national analysis

Despite considerable interest in comparative fiscal policy in general, and the high salience of tax policy and tax reform in the industrialized democracies, there are relatively few cross–national studies of the economic and political correlates of revenues over time. We undertake a cross–national time series study of revenue growth in fourteen OECD countries between 1958 and 1990.We test a number of political and economic hypotheses about revenue change, including political business cycle, 'fiscal illusion', elasticity, and ideological theories. For the 1958—1990 period, we find that all countries, regardless of revenue structure, experience higher real revenue growth as a result of inflation, but that revenue growth is more responsive to unemployment in countries that rely more on direct taxes compared to countries with less direct–tax reliance. We find that this effect is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We also find that revenue tends to increase in the years following elections, consistent with the idea that governments try to minimize the political fallout from tax increases by separating them as much as possible from election campaign periods; this effect, too, is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We find no support for 'fiscal illusion' and ideological theories of revenue growth.     

Der Kampf um knappe Mittel: Die Bestimmungsfaktoren der öffentlichen, privaten und sektoralen Bildungsausgaben im OECD-Länder-Vergleich

This article identifies the statistical determinants of public, private, and sectoral education spending in 21 OECD countries in the time period from 1980 to 2002. It is shown that socio-economic variables like the economic well-being of a country and the size of the youth population are important factors driving spending. In addition, political and institutional factors like the partisan composition of the government or the number of veto points play a major role as well. Private spending can in part substitute for a lack of public spending. The analysis of public spending on higher education shows that countries with left governments and a high openness of trade exhibit higher levels of spending, probably to compensate for negative externalities of internationalization.     

Partisan Differences in Economic Outcomes and Corresponding Voting Behavior: Evidence from the U.S.

The present empirical work examines the differences ineconomic outcomes delivered by partisan governments, and theway in which voters take this into account. Autoregressivemodels of output growth, unemployment and inflation, augmentedwith political variables; and probit binary choice models ofvoting decisions, incorporating expectations about inflationand unemployment, are estimated for U.S. post-war data. Theanalysis confirms that partisan differences in economic outcomes are actually observed in the data. U.S. unemployment rate exhibits adistinct partisan cycle, behavior of output growth andinflation rate partly supports the partisan differenceshypothesis. Thus suggesting that each party can be``instrumental'' in solving particular economic problems. Inline with this logic, U.S. voters seem to believe in theasymmetric abilities of parties to fight inflation andunemployment. Most interesting empirical findings includeevidence that U.S. citizens tend to vote for the left party(Democrats) when high unemployment is expected, and for theright party (Republicans) when high inflation is expected.This relation is especially robust for Presidential elections.There is also evidence pointing to the presence of electoralinertia and absence of ``midterm'' electoral cycle in the U.S.     

The politics and economics of revenue growth: A cross-national analysis

Abstract Despite considerable interest in comparative fiscal policy in general, and the high salience of tax policy and tax reform in the industrialized democracies, there are relatively few cross–national studies of the economic and political correlates of revenues over time. We undertake a cross–national time series study of revenue growth in fourteen OECD countries between 1958 and 1990.We test a number of political and economic hypotheses about revenue change, including political business cycle, 'fiscal illusion', elasticity, and ideological theories. For the 1958—1990 period, we find that all countries, regardless of revenue structure, experience higher real revenue growth as a result of inflation, but that revenue growth is more responsive to unemployment in countries that rely more on direct taxes compared to countries with less direct–tax reliance. We find that this effect is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We also find that revenue tends to increase in the years following elections, consistent with the idea that governments try to minimize the political fallout from tax increases by separating them as much as possible from election campaign periods; this effect, too, is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We find no support for 'fiscal illusion' and ideological theories of revenue growth.