Trade Secrecy Injunctions,Disclosure Risks,and eBay's Influence

Historically, intellectual property (IP) owners could rely on injunctive remedies to prevent continued infringement. The Supreme Court's eBay v. MercExchange decision changed this, however. After eBay, patent courts no longer apply presumptions that push the deliberative scales in favor of injunctions (or “property rule” protection). Instead, patent injunctions require a careful four‐factor analysis, where plaintiffs must demonstrate irreparable injury (i.e., that money damages cannot compensate). Without question, eBay has made it harder for patent plaintiffs to secure injunctions, and has led many district courts to consider innovation policy concerns (e.g., the strategic behavior of patent “troll” plaintiffs) in the injunction calculus. By and large, courts’ more deliberative approach to patent injunctions post‐eBay has been viewed as beneficial for the patent system. Over the past decade, eBay’s influence has migrated to other areas of IP. This article offers the first account of eBay’s impact on federal trade secrecy injunctions. Important differences between trade secret law and other areas of IP—for example, the hard‐to‐quantify risk that disclosure poses to trade secret owners—has lessened eBay’s influence on trade secrecy injunctions. This article argues that disclosure risks justify a bifurcated approach to trade secrecy injunctions. That is, in cases involving the dissemination of trade secrets, courts should presume irreparable injury in the injunction calculus. However, in cases involving the unauthorized use of a trade secret—that is, where a defendant builds upon a plaintiff's trade secret but does not disseminate it—courts should not presume irreparable harm and, instead, should apply the eBay framework. As part of this assessment, courts should consider policy concerns related to cumulative innovation and employee mobility.     

Responsibility and Global Justice

The two traditional ways of thinking about justice at the global level either limit the applicability of justice to states—the only distributions that can be just or unjust, strictly speaking, are within the state—or else extend it to all human beings. The view I defend in On Global Justice (Risse 2012 ) rejects both of these approaches. Instead, my view, and thus my attempt at meeting the aforementioned challenge, acknowledges the existence of multiple grounds of justice. My purpose here is to explain what my view has to say about responsibility. First of all, I explain what my view implies about the responsibilities of the state for the realization of justice. Then I explain that in addition to obligations of justice, my view also gives rise to obligations of account‐giving. I end by sketching what all this implies for institutional reform at the global level.     

Depoliticizing Democracy

Abstract. It is now widely accepted as an ideal that democracy should be as deliberative as possible. Democracy should not involve a tussle between different interest groups or lobbies in which the numbers matter more than the arguments. And it should not be a system in which the only arguments that matter are those that voters conduct in an attempt to determine where their private or sectional advantage lies. Democracy, it is said, should promote public deliberation among citizens and authorities as to what does best for the society as a whole and should elicit decision‐making on that basis. But the ideal of deliberative democracy has two components—the deliberative and the democratic—and often they pull apart. In this paper I look in the first section at a series of problems that arise on the deliberative front, arguing that their resolution requires various degrees of depoliticization. And then I ask in the second whether the depoliticizing responses that those problems require are antithetical to the ideal of democracy. I argue that they are not in tension with the ideal, if that ideal is cast in the relatively revisionary, two‐dimensional form that I favour.¹     

Dolly and Alice

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, In re Roslin Institute, rejecting patent claims to mammals cloned from somatic cells, was rendered about a month before the United States Supreme Court''s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International. The Alice opinion explicitly sets out the standard for determining whether an invention falls within statutory patentable subject matter. Thus one is thus left to wonder what the Roslin opinion might have looked like had it been decided only a few weeks later, after the Alice decision was published, with the benefit of the Supreme Court''s further direction on patentable subject matter. In this essay I explore whether in hindsight the Alice standard might have dictated a different outcome in Roslin, suggesting how the two-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in Alice might apply to a ‘products of nature’ analysis for cloned mammals. Drawing on that analysis, I then use the Roslin case as a vehicle to highlight certain issues with the Supreme Court''s current subject matter jurisprudence as applied to biotechnology. By juxtaposing Dolly with Alice, it becomes clear that the Supreme Court has revivified a number of dormant biotechnology patent problems in the guise of subject matter analysis.     

Realism about the Nature of Law

Legal realism comes in two main versions, namely American legal realism and Scandinavian legal realism. In this article, I shall be concerned with the Scandinavian realists, who were naturalists and non‐cognitivists, and who maintained that conceptual analysis (in a fairly broad sense) is a central task of legal philosophers, and that such analysis must proceed in a naturalist, anti‐metaphysical spirit. Specifically, I want to consider the commitment to ontological naturalism and non‐cognitivism on the part of the Scandinavians and its implications for their view of the nature of law. I argue (i) that the Scandinavians differ from legal positivists in that they reject the idea that there are legal relations, that is, legal entities and properties, and to varying degrees defend the view that law is a matter of human behavior rather than legal norms, and (ii) that they do not and cannot accept the idea that there is a ‘world of the ought’ in Kelsen's sense. I also argue, more specifically, (iii) that the objection to non‐naturalist theories raised by the Scandinavians—that there is and can be no connection between the higher realm of norms and values (the ‘world of the ought’) and the world of time and space—is convincing, and (iv) that Kelsen's introduction of a so‐called modally indifferent substrate does nothing to undermine this objection. In addition, I argue (v) that the Scandinavians can account for the existence of legal relations that do not presuppose the existence of morally binding legal norms by embracing conventionalism about the existence of the sources of law, while pointing out that in doing so they would also be abandoning their legal realism for legal positivism. Finally, I argue (vi) that the implications for legal scholarship of the realist emphasis on human behavior instead of legal norms is not well explained by the realists and appear to amount to little more than a preference for teleological interpretation of legal norms.     

The “process” of patenting: Why should we care about a potential U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Doll?

In Bilski v. Doll, the U.S. Supreme Court is called to define one of the categories of patent-eligible subject matter, “process” patents. In 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the category has a narrow meaning, and that to be eligible for a process patent under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the invention must involve a machine or apparatus or involve a transformation to a different state or thing, ultimately rejecting the patent application as unpatentable subject matter. The patent applicants have asked the U.S. Supreme Court to determine two issues: first, the meaning of “process” in 35 U.S.C. § 101 and whether the lower court properly relied on a “machine-or-transformation” test, and second, the test's potential conflict with 35 U.S.C. § 273, which provides protection for “method[s] of doing or conducting business.” The Court's decision could change the way that research and business are done, and patent protection for such investments. Parts 1 and 2 of this article address Bilski directly and what is and is not in dispute. Part 3 addresses the “machine-or-transformation” test, while Parts 4 and 5 address reasons not to adopt such a test.     

Unjust Enrichment in the ‘Fairchild Enclave’ International Energy Group Ltd v Zurich Insurance plc

In International Energy Group v Zurich Insurance, the Supreme Court considered the implications of the special rule in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd for insurers’ for employers’ liability. The question for the Court was whether, in the light of its earlier decision in Durham v BAI (Run off) Ltd, insurers could be held liable for employees’ mesothelioma claims, even if the employer was not insured throughout the period of employment. The seven Justices unanimously held that insurers’ liability was proportionate to the period of insurance. In reaching that result, the majority recognised that the insurers were entitled to ‘equitable recoupment’ from insured‐employers in respect of periods during which they were uninsured. This note critiques the recoupment right with an unjust enrichment lens.     

“What He Did Was Lawful”: Divorce Litigation and Gender Inequality in China

Sociolegal research has shed considerable light on gender inequality in the civil justice system. Existing research, however, rarely looks beyond court proceedings to examine gender inequality stemming from the prior stages in civil litigation. This article fills the gap by addressing the question of whether and how the early moments in disputing produce inequality between women and men. Based on a mixed‐methods study of divorce litigation in China, I identify two critical moments in the early stages in disputing: the initiation stage and the suit‐filing stage. Findings from the two stages indicate that, early on in disputing, the legal profession routinely dismisses and violates women's rights in marriage and family. Moreover, due to the legal profession's failure to convert important rights on the books into formal claims, women's marital grievances and rights claims fall through cracks long before they can enter court proceedings. These findings suggest that gender inequality can result not only from judicial decision making, but also from dispute processing conducted prior to—and outside of—court proceedings.     

The Inevitability and Indeterminacy of Game‐Theoretic Accounts of Legal Order

How is legal order possible? Why do people comply with law when it prevents them from doing what they think best? Two important books show how these questions can—and from some methodological perspectives must—be answered in the form of game‐theoretic accounts that show how legal compliance can be compatible with the broad self‐interest of officials and citizens. Unfortunately, however, these books also serve to demonstrate that game‐theoretic accounts along these lines lack the resources to explain how real‐world legal systems emerge and evolve or the various institutional shapes these systems take. The fundamental limitation of game theory, in this context and more generally, is its inability to predict or explain the size and shape of cooperative equilibria.     

The Juror,the Citizen,and the Human Being: The Presumption of Innocence and the Burden of Judgment

In this essay, I suggest that the criminal trial is not only about the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but also about the character and growth of the jurors and the communities they represent. In earlier work, I have considered the potential impact of law and politics on the character of citizens, and thus on the capacity of citizens to thrive—to live full and rich human lives. Regarding the jury, I have argued that aspects of criminal trial procedure work to fix in jurors a sense of agency in and responsibility for verdicts of conviction. Here, I draw on those ideas with respect to the presumption of innocence. I suggest that the presumption of innocence works not primarily as legal rule, but rather as a moral framing device—a sort of moral discomfort device—encouraging jurors to feel and bear the weight of what they do. I offer an account of character development in which virtues are conceived of not merely as modes of conduct developed through habituation and practice, but also as capacities and ways of being developed in part through understanding and experience. The criminal trial, framed by the presumption of innocence, can be an experience through which jurors and their communities, by learning what it means and feels like to carry a certain sort of moral weight, may engender a certain set of moral strengths—strengths valuable to them not just as jurors, but also as citizens, and as human beings.     

Democratic Party Control Reduces Gender Inequality

Women earn less than men who work in the same job with the same level of experience. We know much about this gender wage gap but relatively little about its political or partisan sources. In this article, we examine the effects of party control of state government on gender inequality in income, wages, unemployment, and poverty. Employing both a regression discontinuity design and a dynamic difference‐in‐difference analysis, we find that electing a Democratic majority to the state house leads to substantial improvement in women's incomes, wages, and unemployment relative to men—especially in recent years. We also show that greater female representation in office and more liberal policymaking on policies related to women's rights could be driving that process. We find, however, fewer clear effects on poverty and less robust results for partisan control of the governor's office or the state senate. Parties and politics matter, but not always.     

Supreme Court Ruling Creates More Standing Room in the Already Heated Global Greenhouse Gas Movement

This article reviews the recent April 2, 2007 Supreme Court decision in the Massachusetts v. EPA, a highly important case regarding greenhouse gases. The case centered on the Court's review of EPA's denial of a petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. The Court required EPA to reconsider its denial. The Court found that. 1) the petitioners have standing to challenge EPA's denial of their petition; 2) the Court has the authority to review the denial of the petition; and 3) the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. This article looks specifically at the Court's analysis of standing and jurisdiction by Justice Stevens, who wrote the Court's majority opinion, and two dissenting opinions by Justices Roberts and Scalia. Most interesting is how the closely divided Justices (5 to 4 decision) viewed, very differently, the issues regarding standing, the evidence that emissions from new motor vehicles are causing global warming and harm to Massachusetts, and the agency's judgment in denying the petition. Lastly, the article speculates on the impact of the decision and the current activities taking place at the state and regulated community level involving future regulation, litigation, and opportunities by various companies and coalitions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The article then presents five broad areas where companies that emit greenhouse gases should need to maintain or increase awareness to better position themselves in the global greenhouse gas movement.     

The Common Core between Human Rights Law and International Criminal Law: A Structural Account

Legal scholars and theorists have recently drawn a more sustained attention to the link between international human rights law (hereafter IHRL) and international criminal law (hereafter ICL). This concerns both positive and more normative accounts of the link. Whether positive or normative, the predominant approach to constructing the link is substantive. This overlap is normatively justified in similar terms by reference to a subset of moral human rights. In this paper, I offer an alternative to the substantive approach. After identifying two flaws in the substantive approach (the problem of threshold and the problem of ethical neutrality), I defend what I call a structural account by focusing on duty‐holders. I start by reconstructing two structural characteristics common to IHRL and ICL qua international legal regimes: who has the authority to address violations of IHRL and ICL, and who can be liable for those violations. I then infer that public authority (functionally construed) constitutes the common structural core of IHRL and ICL. I rely on the extraterritorial application of IHRL and on the collective dimension of ICL violations to further support the argument. I finally offer an argument explaining the normative point of those structural features. I hold that IHRL and ICL (their adjudicative and liability regimes) are both necessary (but clearly not sufficient) to render this exercise of public authority legitimate to its subjects.     

Just-in-Time Justice: Globalization and the Changing Character of Law,Order, and Power

This article examines how economic globalization has dialectically interacted with the nation-state and legal order to facilitate the production of “just-in-time justice”—the increasingly flexible character of law, order, and power. Utilizing Chambliss’s analytic strategy, particularly his dialectical approach to lawmaking, I first examine the relationship between the global social order, economic globalization, and the changing architecture of nation-states. I then explore ways that the legal order has been flexibilized, including the creation of “states of exception,” the privatization of social control functions of the state, the development of transnational spaces for governance, and the widespread use of surveillance. My analysis of these transformations suggests that the greatest danger in the contemporary moment may be what we do not know, what is hidden from public accountability, beyond the public gaze. Importantly, this analysis also highlights that law continues to matter—or else there would not be such a press to ensure its disappearance.     

Patent first, ask questions later: morality and biotechnology in patent law

This Article explores the U.S. "patent first, ask questions later" approach to determining what subject matter should receive patent protection. Under this approach, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO or the Agency) issues patents on "anything under the sun made by man," and to the extent a patent's subject matter is sufficiently controversial, Congress acts retrospectively in assessing whether patents should issue on such interventions. This practice has important ramifications for morally controversial biotechnology patents specifically, and for American society generally. For many years a judicially created "moral utility" doctrine served as a type of gatekeeper of patent subject matter eligibility. The doctrine allowed both the USTPO and courts to deny patents on morally controversial subject matter under the fiction that such inventions were not "useful." The gate, however, is currently untended. A combination of the demise of the moral utility doctrine, along with expansive judicial interpretations of the scope of patent-eligible subject matter, has resulted in virtually no basis on which the USTPO or courts can deny patent protection to morally controversial, but otherwise patentable, subject matter. This is so despite position statements by the Agency to the contrary. Biotechnology is an area in which many morally controversial inventions are generated. Congress has been in react-mode following the issuance of a stream of morally controversial biotech patents, including patents on transgenic animals, surgical methods, and methods of cloning humans. With no statutory limits on patent eligibility, and with myriad concerns complicating congressional action following a patent's issuance, it is not Congress, the representative of the people, determining patent eligibility. Instead, it is patent applicants, scientific inventors, who are deciding matters of high public policy through the contents of the applications they file with the USTPO. This Article explores how the United States has come to be in this position, exposes latent problems with the "patent first" approach, and considers the benefits and disadvantages of the "ask questions first, patents later" approaches employed by some other countries. The Article concludes that granting patents on morally controversial biotech subject matter and then asking whether such inventions should be patentable is bad policy for the United States and its patent system, and posits workable, proactive ways for Congress to successfully guard the patent-eligibility gate.     

美国2011年专利法第一案Myriad案评——人类基因可专利性的再思考

Myriad公司从人体DNA中分离的两种基因片断(BRCA1,BRCA2)获得了专利。美国分子病理协会等提起诉讼,宣称人类基因不是可专利性客体,该专利无效。上诉法院判定该基因片断是合法的专利客体,但该判决与最高法院的先例并不完全吻合。在成文法及司法先例对基因类专利都没有明确规定的情况下,公共政策的分析是更适当的切入角度。从政策性角度分析,否认人类基因的可专利性是对社会最有利的政策。专利制度是工具,不是目的。加拿大的有益实践启示我国也应坚持否认人类基因类专利的政策。     

Applying Precaution in EU Authorisation of Genetically Modified Products—Challenges and Suggestions for Reform

In this article, I endeavour to examine concrete challenges that arise with regard to implementation of the precautionary principle in the field of European Union regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Developed by the European courts into a general legal principle, precaution requires EU regulators to strike a balance between scientific and political legitimacy when taking decisions on risk‐entailing products. Following this understanding, the current GMO legislation creates precautionary governance structures that allow for a broad input into the authorisation process, not only of scientific, but also of ‘other legitimate factors’. At the same time, it can be criticised for narrowly defining precaution as a decision rule, which, if applied correctly, will lead the decision maker to the ‘right’ decision. I argue that this misconception is one of the reasons why, in the current authorisation practice, the EU institutions fail to apply the principle in a balanced way, falling into the extremes of either purely science‐based decision making or a highly politicised precautionary rhetoric. I suggest that in order not to be paralysing, precaution should be understood as a procedural principle that provides for precautionary governance, thus enabling regulators to make appropriate risk choices.     

Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse: Experiences With the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund

In this article I report the results of a quantitative and qualitative empirical study of how those who were injured or lost a family member in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks evaluated the tradeoff between a cash payment—available through the Victim Compensation Fund—and the pursuit of litigation. Responses make it clear that potential plaintiffs saw much more at stake than monetary compensation and that the choice to forego litigation required the sacrifice of important nonmonetary, civic values: obtaining and publicizing information about what happened, prompting public findings of accountability for those responsible, and participating in the process of ensuring that there would be responsive change to what was learned about how the attacks and deaths happened. The results shed light on the framing component of the transformation of disputes, and in particular on how potential litigants see the decision to sue, or not, as a decision as much or more about how they understand their relationship to their community and their responsibilities as a citizen as how they evaluate monetary considerations.