The Rationale Behind the Creation and Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies: The Case of the Telecommunications Sector in Egypt

The creation and diffusion of Independent ^{1 1}Three different meanings of the regulatory state have been identified by Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004): the minimal, the prudent, and the overambitious meaning. The minimal meaning refers to the regulatory state as a field of study grouping scholars from different disciplines. The prudent meaning emphasises the tendency of modern states to use power and authority. An overambitious notion, the regulatory state developed to replace other state forms such as the welfare, developmental, and stabilisation state. Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) was greatly investigated in the context of the developed countries, particularly in Europe. Many scholars have provided different theories to explain the logic behind the formation and the spread of such agencies. These theories are important but not sufficient to explain the same phenomenon in the context of the developing countries wherein socio-economic and political environments are different. Adopting an institutional framework of analysis, and based on an in-depth qualitative documentary analysis and interviews with different stakeholders, this article investigates the creation and diffusion of the IRAs in Egypt particularly in the telecommunication sector. The findings show that the creation of the IRAs in the Egyptian telecommunications sector represents a rational response to the external isomorphic pressures exerted by international agency and can be explained on functional and practical grounds rather than any other factors of democratic governance or political uncertainties.     

The micro-politics of norm contestation between the OSCE and Kazakhstan: square pegs in round holes

Norm contestation by local actors has emerged in recent years as an explanation for the failure of norm diffusion. This article contributes to the literature on norm contestation by analysing how norms diffused by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) pertaining to election observation and free and fair voting are re-constituted and contested by domestic actors in Kazakhstan. The study contributes to the idea of ‘constitutive localisation’ by emphasising a more fundamental level of disagreement beyond just congruence between the diffused norm and local beliefs; by demonstrating contestation can occur in the later stages in the norm diffusion cycle; by focusing on the micro-politics of contestation by local actors involved in the implementation of diffused norms; and by revealing how norm contestation is not necessarily a process of emancipatory politics, but a strategic act to serve authoritarian consolidation. Utilising a four-fold framework, the analysis illustrates how norms, while initially accepted by Kazakhstani authorities, are reconstituted through political discourse and/or practice, creating the moment of contestation. While this contestation is instrumentalised by political elites for their own advantage, it also remains an important element of agency within a normative order which they had little previous control over.     

Central banks under stress: Reputation,accountability and regulatory coherence

This symposium homes in on an area of public administration that has been through a period of significant change in the last ten years. Since the global financial crisis, central banks have expanded their operations in financial markets, buying up vast quantities of assets as part of expansive monetary policy strategies. They have also played a leading role in the reform of financial regulation and have been entrusted with enhanced authority to supervise financial institutions. This activity has taken place amid heightened political contestation, with central banks increasingly viewed as the quintessence of a technocratic mode of governance that eschews traditional democratic control. The purpose of this symposium is to consider how central banks’ reputation, accountability and regulatory roles have changed since the financial crisis, and what those changes tell us about the balance of power between independent regulatory agencies and elected policy‐makers.     

State transformation and cross-border regionalism in Indonesia’s periphery: contesting the centre

Abstract

This article examines how the decentralisation and fragmentation of the Indonesian state and resultant central–local dynamics affect cross-border regionalism in Indonesia’s periphery. It argues that cross-border regionalism projects are best understood as sites for scalar contestation over regulatory control between central and local government. Moreover, scalar contestation around cross-border regional projects is characterised by the struggles to control relationships with transnational capital between elites operating at different tiers of the state. When elites at different scales have conflicting interests and strategies, this can cause policy incoherence, inhibiting the development of cross-border regionalism. Conversely, when they align, and intersect with the interests of transnational business, cross-border regionalism can succeed. To illustrate the argument, this article utilises the comparative case studies of the Batam free trade zone and West Kalimantan–Sarawak cross-border cooperation.     

'RATIONAL'SOCIAL REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE COST ASSESSMENT

Since 1985 the UK government has promoted the use of compliance cost assessment (CCA) in order to quantify the impact on business of proposed new regulations. The strategy has arisen in response to a perception that there has been a tendency to overregulate, and it currently forms part of a wider deregulation initiative. The paper reviews this development, contrasting it with the use of regulatory impact assessment in the US and examining the extent to which it encourages'rational'social regulation. The authors conclude that, while the process of regulation may have become more informed as a result of the production of cca s, the exercise is narrowly focused. As a consequence, its role in improving the rationality of the legislative process is likely to be limited.     

Power in Global Trade Governance: Is the EU a Unitary Actor,a Tool for Dominance,or a Site of Contestation? GATS and the TTIP Negotiations

The European Union (EU) plays multiple roles within global trade governance as a unitary actor with particular interests to promote, a tool for dominance by powerful interests, and a site of contestation facilitating civil society mobilization. Identifying these roles is key to analyzing the role of the EU particularly in times of crisis in global trade governance where new forms of politics are most likely to emerge. This is investigated through considering two cases of politically sensitive trade negotiation in which the EU played, and continues to play, an active role: the GATS 2000 negotiations and the EU-US TTIP.     

Rising powers and order contestation: disaggregating the normative from the representational

A central theme of the literature on rising powers is that new aspirants to great power status pose a challenge to the underlying principles and norms that underpin the existing, Western-led order. However, in much of the literature, the nature and significance of rising powers for international order are imprecisely debated, in particular the concept and practice of ‘contestation’. In this article, we aim to establish a distinction between normative contestation and what can be thought of as ‘contestation over representation’: that is, contestation over who is setting and overseeing the rules of the game rather than the content of the rules themselves and the kind of order that they underpin. The paper engages with debates on international order and international society, and its empirical basis is provided by a thorough analysis of the discourse of rising power summitry.     

Unveiling patterns of contestation over Better Regulation reforms in the European Union

Regulatory reforms labelled ‘Better Regulation’ are a prominent item on the political agendas of most advanced democracies and the European Union. Governments adopt Better Regulation measures to strengthen their democratic legitimacy and increase their regulatory and economic effectiveness. Notwithstanding their rhetorical appeal, their design and implementation are susceptible to high levels of political contestation. We therefore ask: are there systematic differences in stakeholders’ demands for what Better Regulation should achieve? What explains these differences? We argue that conflict over Better Regulation is rooted in what stakeholders prefer as a regulatory system of governance. Stakeholders demand reforms that lead to one of the following three scenarios: deregulation, technocratic or participatory policy‐making. We examine stakeholders’ demands expressed in the EU. We find that national authorities responsible for coordinating Better Regulation and cross‐sectoral business organizations support deregulatory and technocratic reforms. Business and public interest organizations are equally supportive of strengthening participatory policy‐making.     

Who’s Socialising Whom? Regional Organisations and Contested Norms in Central Asia

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) represent competing sets of international norms in Central Asia. The contestation between these sets of norms has not led to a complete polarisation between members of the two organisations, however. Instead, the OSCE has used a range of discursive tactics to reduce political contestation, downplaying some contested issues and seeking shared discourses on security threats. This article explores these tactics and suggests that these discursive shifts may eventually threaten the normative identity of the OSCE and lead to the acceptance of a more hybrid set of security-related norms in the region.     

PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS: A TALE OF TWO CITIES WITH DIFFERENT CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS

This paper analyses regulation by contract in public‐private partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure services. Although the benefits of competition for the market and subsequent regulatory contracts are recognized, the literature also identifies contract design failures. When considering these limitations, it is useful to distinguish between contracts associated with purely contractual PPPs (concessions) and contracts for institutionalized PPPs (mixed company). Two cases from the Portuguese water sector are used to illustrate problems arising in the preparation of public tender documents: the ‘best’ bidder is often not the winner. Often, risks are not allocated correctly nor is effective monitoring ensured. Comparisons between the two types of contracts show how external regulation can be useful in mitigating contractual problems. This examination of bidding procedures and contract design yields several implications for policy‐makers; in addition, the study presents recommendations for improving regulatory contracts.     

STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT IN PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION: CONNECTING TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AND LAY KNOWLEDGE IN RISK MONITORING

The exclusive position of scientific expertise in pharmaceutical regulation is being increasingly challenged. Several authors suggest that lay knowledge could play a role in governing risks. We use the literature to develop ideal‐typical regulatory arrangements with low and high lay stakeholder involvement: a technocratic and a democratic arrangement. We propose that a more technocratic arrangement will yield a better process and output performance while a more democratic arrangement will result in more stakeholder satisfaction. These propositions are explored through two case studies of pharmaceutical regulation in the Netherlands: in pandemic influenza and in HIV. Our study shows equivalent process and output performances but we found indications that the democratic approach results in more stakeholder satisfaction. We conclude that in pharmaceutical regulation, there is no a priori reason to limit involvement to experts: in situations of fundamental uncertainty, democratic monitoring of pharmaceutical risks can contribute to the system's robustness.     

Reshaping State Structure and Strategy: The Reform of Railway Policy in Germany and Italy

For almost four decades, the reform of the state has been a recurrent and relevant topic for social sciences. Has the s.c. positive state been replaced by a regulatory state, or have hybrid configurations emerged? Based on a comparative analysis of German and Italian railway policies, this article aims to contribute to the literature on regulation, considering the possibility of policy mixes in which elements of the positive and the regulatory state are interrelated. Such hybridization is the result of multiple-actor policy arenas, where regulatory tools are used to restructure state’s direct intervention rather than to bring about its retreat.     

Regulation and its modes: the European experience

There is a general trend in Europe, both at the national and Community level, toward greater specialization and institutionalization of regulatory functions. This essay presents three different but related sets of reasons that help to explain the rise of the regulatory state in Europe, and even why regulation seems to be becoming the new frontier of public policy and administration. A first set of reasons has to do with the failure of nationalization as a mode of regulation and the process of privatization, which have led to new regulatory bodies. The second set of factors, related to the increasing complexity and internationalization of the tasks facing policy makers, has led to new or stronger regulatory bodies at the Community level. The third set has to do with the role of the European Community as an independent “fourth branch of government” for the European nations. This latter trend has some problems, as the lack of transparency of the decision-making process. However, this problem can be solved. Moreover, the explanations for the rise of independent regulatory agencies echo many characteristic themes of the politics of efficiency, being recently rediscovered. The conviction that policy should be right, rather than the result of group struggle, leads to demands that policymakers should combine technical expertise and public deliberation to achive decisions that are substantively correct and politically legitimated.     

POWER, STRATEGY AND GAMES: ECONOMIC REGULATION OF A PRIVATIZED UTILITY

This article rejects conventional 'rational actor' models of economic regulation in favour of a focus on processes of resource exchange and dependence. Using a case-study of Yorkshire Water it identifies the membership and structure of the regulatory arena, the resources available to regulatory actors, the 'rules of the game', and the strategies adopted by regulator and regulated. It highlights the structurally privileged position of investors in water regulation and concludes that decision-making excludes customer interests; decisions are made by professional actors on the basis of co-operation and consensus; the regulator is relatively weak and depends on companies compliance to maintain its own legitimacy; and large companies have a great range of strategic options in pursuit of regulatory advantage.     

REGULATION AS SOCIAL POLICY: HOME EVICTIONS AND REPOSSESSIONS IN THE UK AND SWEDEN

This article asks how the UK and Sweden regulate, prevent, or mitigate the consequences of mortgage‐related household eviction and repossession. Contrary to initial expectations, the findings show a growth and diversity in both regulation and social spending in the UK intended to address this social issue; something that has not occurred in Sweden. In the UK's liberal ‘regulatory welfare regime’, the aim is to prevent the eviction and repossession of vulnerable borrowers who have defaulted on their housing loan. In the Swedish social democratic ‘regulatory welfare regime’, effort focuses instead on minimizing the risk of default before it occurs rather than after the fact. These findings offer a more nuanced understanding of the relations between regulation and welfare more generally, demonstrating that regulation may be used as a form of social policy once the welfare state has failed, as a safety net of last resort.     

THE WELFARE STATE: A REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE

The role of regulation and the regulatory state in social policy, redistribution, and the reforms of the welfare state are increasingly important but often underestimated and misunderstood. These problems are evident in Majone's highly influential work where the regulatory state and the ‘positive’ state stand as two alternative monomorphic forms of state. This article offers a polymorphic alternative where the regulatory state may come to the rescue of the welfare state, allowing independent extension, retrenchment, and stagnation of welfare via social regulation. The article extends a regulatory governance perspective into the core of the welfare state, clarifies the relations between fiscal and regulatory instruments, and demonstrates that the boundaries of the regulatory state are wider than are usually understood. It turns our understanding of the welfare state on its head, highlighting first the less visible regulatory layer, and then the more visible layer of fiscal transfers.     

The Local Regulatory State: A Case of Double Standards?

Two starkly contrasting strategies are discernible in the way local authorities currently approach and go about their regulatory and enforcement responsibilities. On the one hand, a “deterrence” strategy of “pursue and punish” is robustly pursued in many local areas in relation to individuals who infringe and contravene local regulations, notably in relation to “street scene” issues of littering, waste/recycling and materials sorting/separation, smoking in public places, parking, cycling on pavements, feeding pigeons, and so on, while, on the other, a much more positive “compliance” strategy of “counsel and conduce” is widely promoted and pursued in relation to the regulation of standards in local businesses, for example, in relation to public and environmental health/hygiene, health and safety in the workplace, animal welfare, and licensing of premises.

Why do local authorities operate with such apparent double standards? Why do comparatively minor infringements by local citizens so frequently result in the summary imposition of fixed penalties (which can be quite punitive for those on low incomes) while at the same time local businesses are mostly treated to a regulatory culture which is much more sympathetic and supportive in promoting compliance with the rules? This article draws on research conducted in different local regulatory settings which illustrates the two contrasting regimes in practice. It presents five propositions which help us to understand and explain the apparent double standards and it concludes by considering the steps that might be taken to ensure a more equitable and consistent local regulatory framework for the future.     

Competition and Contracting in the Transition from CCT to Best Value: Towards a More Reflexive Regulation?

Following publication of the government’s proposals for a statutory framework of Best Value, and the introduction of regulations increasing the flexibility of CCT pending its abolition, this paper examines the relationship between the compulsory regime and its likely successor. First, the paper suggests that the Best Value frame-work is likely to impose a range of regulatory, monitoring and enforcement constraints similar in effect to the formal requirements that operate under CCT. Continuity with Conservative policy will be reinforced practically through transitional arrangements for the gradual abolition of CCT and the phased introduction of its replacement. Second, the paper argues that contracting is likely to continue to have a significant role under the new regime as the natural adjunct to the voluntary competitive processes that will be the preferred management tools for securing improvements in service performance. Open tendering and public-private sector partnership arrangements, both of which imply contractual governance, are given explicit priority in the consultation document over benchmarking, performance indicators and other comparative public management mechanisms. Third, the paper argues that local authorities are likely to want to retain and develop contracting arrangements that potentially permit a degree of control over service provision that might not be available were more radical service-providing alternatives to be adopted, involving the complete transfer of functions outside the public sector and/or their vesting in independent companies. Finally, the paper assesses the transition from CCT to Best Value from the theoretical perspective of responsive and reflexive regulation. Following a brief account of the reflexive failures of CCT, the paper argues that, although the Best Value framework is characterized by inherently reflexive processes involving self-review, consultation and standard-setting, its relative success is likely to depend ultimately both on the tightness with which legislation is drafted and on the manner of its practical interpretation, implementation and enforcement.     

Regulating lobbying through voluntary transparency clubs: The connoisseurs’ assessment. Evidence from the European Union

Regulating private actors’ participation in policy‐making is key to democratic governance. Across political systems, targeted transparency is used to regulate lobbying activities. We examine the extent to which primary regulatory targets (organizations with frequent access to policy‐makers) support the architecture of lobbying regulation regimes set up as voluntary transparency clubs. Our empirical testing ground is the European Union. We conceptualize the EU Transparency Register as a Voluntary Transparency Club, elaborate on its club goods, and derive a set of theoretical expectations about its members’ evaluations of the club's transparency standards, membership size, and monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. We find significant differences between members’ and non‐members’ assessment regarding the regulatory performance of this transparency club. Members with frequent access to executive policy‐makers criticize the club's transparency standards and do not consider the Register a useful regulatory instrument. Yet, they support expanding its regulatory remit and increasing the club membership.     

Steering the Community Regulatory System: the Challenges Ahead

This article reviews the process of regulatory reform in the European Union (EU). The main argument is that EU initiatives have been cast in a rather narrow conceptual framework, limited to issues such as simplification and better law-making. Although important, these issues are only a component of the wider task of governing regulation. Therefore I introduce and discuss three proposals for re-casting the debate on EU regulation. First, the focus should be shifted from 'better law-making' to 'better regulatory policy-making'. Second, regulatory management, rather than simplification, should represent the strategic objective of EU institutions. Third, regulatory reform should be accompanied by administrative reform. Consequently, the relative impenetrability of the Commission to administrative reform represents a serious obstacle to regulatory reform.