Institutional Change Through Policy Learning: The Case of the European Commission and Research Policy

Research initiatives to enhance knowledge‐based societies demand regionally coordinated policy approaches. By analyzing the case of the European Commission, Directorate‐General Research and Innovation, this study focuses on examining the cognitive mechanisms that form the foundation for institutional transformations and result in leadership positions in regional governance. Drawing on policy learning theories, the study emphasizes specific mechanisms of institutional change that are often less noticeable but can gradually lead to mobilizing diverse groups of stakeholders. Through historical and empirical data, this study shows the importance of policy learning through communication processes, Open Method of Coordination initiatives, and issue framing in creating a stronger foundation for policy coordination in European research policy since the 2000s.     

Multiple Institutional Embeddedness in Europe: The Case of Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish Government Officials

The questions posed in the current study are (1) whether, and (2) how, participation within Commission expert committees and Council working parties of the European Union (EU) affects the coordination behaviour of the participants. Based on organizational theory arguments, the coordination role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is arguably weakened by institutional dynamics existing within Commission expert committees. The opposite is argued to be the case within Council working parties. Empirically, this study is based on 160 questionnaires and 47 face-to-face interviews with Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish domestic government officials attending EU committees. Secondly, this study also includes answers from 49 officials at the permanent representation to the EU of these three Scandinavian countries. Being excluded from attending Council working parties, Norwegian civil servants participating within Commission expert committees are shown to coordinate considerably less with the foreign ministry than their Danish and Swedish counterparts. Notwithstanding these observations, this study also reveals how the coordination behaviour evoked by national civil servants reflects their domestic institutional affiliations. In addition to showing how EU committees affect coordination behaviour among the participants, the current analysis also shows how responses to integration requirements are filtered – and even conditioned – by a prior state of affairs at the domestic level of governance.     

The anatomy of autonomy: Reassessing the autonomy of the European Commission

Abstract.  The European Commission (Commission) occupies a pivotal role as the key executive institution of the European Union (EU). Yet, the factual autonomy of the Commission remains largely unexplored, contributing to contradictory assessments of it. This study reassesses the behavioural autonomy of the Commission, as well as organisational conditions thereof. The article utilises one under-researched laboratory of the Commission: temporary officials (SNEs). SNEs may serve as a crucial test-bed of Commission autonomy due to their ambiguous affiliation towards the Commission. Whereas past studies claim that SNEs have a predominantly intergovernmental behavioural pattern, this study demonstrates that the SNEs blend departmental, epistemic and supranational behavioural dynamics, thereby safeguarding their behavioural autonomy. Understanding Commission autonomy requires that the organisational anatomy of the Commission organisation be carefully considered. The organisational anatomy is measured by considering four independent variables: the organisational composition of the Commission services; organisational incompatibilities across levels of governance; recruitment procedures of Commission officials through a so-called 'submarine' approach; and socialisation dynamics inside the Commission. The autonomy of the Commission is organisationally contingent and not only subject to what has been called 'actors' conspicuous desire for autonomy'.     

Government-opposition dynamics in the European Union: The Santer Commission resignation crisis

Abstract.  This article seeks to shed light on the sources of government-opposition dynamics in the European Union (EU). It considers the ideological left-right divide and the sovereignty-integration dimension as potential sources of a government-opposition cleavage in the EU, as well as a 'representation dimension'. The empirical evaluation of these propositions is based on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the political crisis leading to the collective resignation of the Santer Commission. The article finds that government-opposition dynamics in the EU are related to the sovereignty-integration dimension of EU politics and to representation in EU executive institutions, rather than a left-right divide. Both political beliefs and opportunistic motivations determine government-support and opposition in the EU.     

The European Commission: The Limits of Centralization and the Perils of Parliamentarization

The idea of an inevitable process of centralization in the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) is a myth. Also, the metaphor of “creeping competences,” with its suggestion of a surreptitious but continuous growth of the powers of the Commission, can be misleading. It is true that the functional scope of EC/EU competences has steadily increased, but the nature of new competences has changed dramatically, as may be seen from the evolution of the methods of harmonization. The original emphasis on total harmonization, which gives the Community exclusive competence over a given policy area, has been largely replaced by more flexible but less “communitarian” methods such as optional and minimum harmonization, reference to nonbinding technical standards, and mutual recognition. Finally, the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam explicitly excluded harmonization for most new competences. Thus, the expansion of the jurisdiction of the EC/EU has not automatically increased the powers of the Commission, but has actually weakened them in several respects. In addition, the progressive parliamentarization of the Commission risks compromising its credibility as an independent regulator, without necessarily enhancing its democratic legitimacy. Since the member states continue to oppose any centralization of regulatory powers, even in areas essential to the functioning of the internal market, the task of implementing Community policies should be entrusted to networks of independent national and European regulators, roughly modeled on the European System of Central Banks. The Commission would coordinate and monitor the activities of these networks in order to ensure the coherence of EC regulatory policies. More generally, it should bring its distinctive competence more clearly into focus by concentrating on the core business of ensuring the development and proper functioning of the single European market. This is a more modest role than that of the kernel of a future government of Europe, but it is essential to the credibility of the integration process and does not overstrain the limited financial and legitimacy resources available to the Commission.     

The European Commission as a Network Organization

The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), Maastricht II,was intended to focus on the effectiveness of the policies andinstitutions of the European Union. It should not be deflectedfrom its primary purpose. The EU has a management deficit thatis at least as important as its democratic deficit. In orderto improve the effectiveness of European governance, the EuropeanCommission should be reinvented as a network organization withthe mission of designing and developing multilevel, intergovernmentalnetworks for managing European Union policies. The reasons forredefining the role of the EC is that European integration ison a pluralistic trajectory of federation among nations ratherthan amalgamation into a European federal state. The effectivenessof this mode of integration depends on building and strengtheninginterorganizational networks. The task of the Commission, asa network organization, is to strengthen collaborative advantage—theorganizational capacities to manage interdependence—ratherthan seek to impose central control. Acting as a network organizationrequires three-core competency for: (1) constructing regimes;(2) designing administrative partnerships; and (3) developingcoordination capacities.     

Recruitment and Expertise in the European Commission

The article examines the changes in the European Commission’s recruitment practices from its creation in the 1950s until today. Based on the insight that recruitment shapes the role of professional experts in public bureaucracies, the article traces the emphasis on specialist skills and qualifications in the Commission’s recruitment competitions (the concours) over time. It finds that the selection of policy staff to the Commission has become more generalist since the 1960s, a surprising finding given that the organisation is often regarded as a ‘technocracy’ dominated by experts. The article attributes this development to the multinational character of the administration, as the need to integrate citizens from new member states has prompted the Commission to rely on one-size-fits-all recruitment tests. It also discusses whether the declining emphasis on specialist knowledge in staff selection can be seen as part of a broader trend towards a more generalist Commission, where officials are required to change jobs frequently and where expert functions are outsourced to other bodies.     

公职人员责任体系研究

公职人员行使公共权力，理应尽职尽责地履行义务，否则就应受到谴责或制裁，这就是责任。公职人员承担责任的形式有：政治责任、行政责任、刑事责任、赔偿责任和道义责任等。本文试图在深入剖析这些不同责任形式的基础之上，构筑中国公职人员的责任体系。     

The European Parliament and the Commission Crisis: A New Assertiveness?

This article examines two claims made about the "Commission crisis" of 1999: first, that the accountability of the Commission to the European Parliament (EP) was significantly increased; and, second, that the model of parliamentary government in the European Union (EU) was advanced by events in 1999. In analyzing the crisis and its consequences, this article focuses upon the powers of dismissal and appointment, and what these powers reveal about the capacity of the EP both to hold the Commission responsible for its collective and individual actions and to influence its policy agenda. If a parliamentary model is to develop in the EU, the negative parliamentary powers of censure and dismissal have to be balanced by the positive powers of appointment and enhanced executive responsiveness. On both counts—dismissal and appointment—the 1999 "Commission crisis" did not point to the clear and unambiguous dawning of a "genuine European parliamentary democracy."     

Survival at the Intersection of Government and Business: The Unique Case of the Australian Trade and Investment Commission (Austrade)

The Australian Trade and Investment Commission (Austrade) is a government organization whose responsibility is to promote Australian exports and investment facilitation in global markets. It has a unique position of being a government agency and at the same time working alongside and with business in assisting exporters enter overseas markets. This relationship is often strained both for reasons of changing government preferences in terms of assisting exporters as well as pressures on the government budgets. Yet Austrade has been able to remain a steadfast intersection between government and business despite the competing strategies of its two main stakeholders – government and business. This paper assesses Austrade as a case of organizational survival maintaining its equilibrium through sound management and serendipity.     

干部选拔任用中圈子文化的成因、影响与整治

干部选拔任用中圈子文化盛行主要源于传统官僚文化的承袭与市场利益驱动的交织、人事任免权力过于集中、干部的资源依赖与人身依附心理作祟等多重因素。圈子文化一旦渗入干部选任的各个环节,会造成破坏干部选任原则与标准、削弱干部队伍的领导和治理能力、阻碍动议与民主推荐中的制度执行等负面影响。要破除干部选拔任用中圈子文化的束缚与藩篱,在积极正向的政治文化和政治生态中打造忠诚干净担当的干部队伍,就必须构建科学的干部选任标准,优化干部选任制度体系,做实民主推荐强化过程监督,多主体协同培育优良政治文化,同时也要从源头加大对圈子文化的整治力度,防止圈子文化的蔓延和对政治生态的侵蚀。     

Public Officials,Government and the Public Trust: Schizophrenia?

In late 1996 the Queensland government introduced new legislation to govern its public sector, the Public Service Act 1996. For a few short weeks the supposedly draconian legislation was front-page news, as the government was forced to defend its changes to standards of accountability in public sector employment. Was the fuss a storm in a teacup? Were the changes really so significant? In this article the impact of the legislation upon the central core of public sector employment, the public trust, is considered, and the legislation's interrelationship with the Queensland public sector ethics regime is analysed. These unhappy people were proposing schemes for persuading monarchs to choose favourites upon the score of their wisdom, capacity and virtue; of teaching ministers to consult the public good; of rewarding merit, great abilities and eminent services; of instructing princes to know their true interest by placing it on the same foundation with that of their people: of choosing for employment persons qualified to exercise them; with many other wild chimeras, that never entered before into the heart of man to conceive, and confirmed in me the old observation, that there is nothing so extravagant and irrational which some philosophers have not maintained for truth (Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels).     

Managing Pluralism: The European Case

This article begins by clarifying the meanings attributed to pluralism; it then places the European case in a global context. The body of the article looks at the management of religious pluralism in Europe in terms of commonality and difference. At one and the same time, Europe is becoming increasingly secular and religiously plural—both trends are important if we are to understand the issues at stake. A close examination of four individual cases (Britain, France, the Netherlands and Greece) reveals, however, that it is important not to jump to conclusions regarding outcomes. Each country must be considered on its own terms. The final section introduces a rather different feature: the European Court of Human Rights, noting its place in the management of religious pluralism. A growing jurisprudence emanating from the Court is becoming increasingly influential.     

Theorizing Implementation of Public Management Policy Reforms: A Case Study of Strategic Planning and Programming in the European Commission

As a measure to rectify the European Commission's "management deficit," the institution's authorities decided to introduce new forms of commission-wide strategic planning and programming in 2000. Drawing on semistructured interviews with Commission officials, this article tracks the key turning points, trajectories, and outcomes of events within the implementation stage of this part of the Commission managerial reform. As an instrumental case study, the article begins to theorize the process of implementing public management policy change. Major conceptual issues addressed include how reform decisions serve to activate the social mechanism of actor certification and how actor conduct amplifies such certification. Actor certification provides a link from reform choices to organizational change. In this respect and others, the research argument contrasts and integrates social theory mind-sets deriving from institutionalism and social interactionism (processualism) in line with research trends in historical sociology, organization science, and public management.     

European Commission merger control: Combining competition and the creation of larger European firms

The article examines the European Commission's use of its legal powers over mergers. It discusses and tests two views. One is that the ‘neoliberal’ Commission has ended previous industrial policies of aiding ‘national champion’ firms to grow through mergers and instead pursues a ‘merger‐constraining’ policy of vigorously using its legal powers to block mergers. The other is that the Commission follows an ‘integrationist policy’ of seeking the development of larger European firms to deepen economic integration. It examines Commission decisions under the 1989 EC Merger Regulation between 1990 and 2009. It selects three major sectors that are ‘likely’ for the ‘merger‐constraining’ view – banking, energy and telecommunications – and analyses a dataset of almost 600 Commission decisions and then individual merger cases. It finds that the Commission has approved almost all mergers, including by former ‘national champion’ firms. There have been only two prohibitions over 20 years in the three sectors and the outcome has been the creation of larger European firms through mergers. It explains how the Commission can pursue an integrationist policy through the application of competition processes and criteria. The wider implication is that the Commission can combine competition policy with achieving the ‘industrial policy’ aim of aiding the development of larger European firms.     

Reinventing Government: The Case of National Service

When Bill Clinton embraced national service as one of his administration's priorities, he took a step forward on two of his key initiatives. Not only was national service a new initiative in its own right, but Clinton also held it up as a model of his efforts to reinvent government. It would be an exemplar of government that is catalytic, competitive, decentralized, and results oriented. This case study examines the theory and reality of reinvention. The Corporation for National Service and its programs have come under fire for being more political than catalytic, being simultaneously too centralized and too decentralized, and pursuing too many unclear goals. This article seeks to identify discontinuities between the rhetoric and the reality of reinvention in this instance and draw lessons for public-sector reform.