Richall Holdings v Fitzwilliam: Malory v Cheshire Homes and the LRA 2002

Richall Holdings v Fitzwilliam, holds that Malory v Cheshire Homes is binding in relation to the Land Registration Act 2002. Newey J saw himself as bound by that decision because he could find no relevant distinction between the provisions of the Land Registration Act 1925, and the Land Registration Act 2002. There are however significant differences in the general system of registration that is established. In particular the different roles of section 20 LRA 1925, and section 29 LRA 2002 mean that Malory was not binding and indeed ought not to have been followed. In addition, the treatment of the priorities rules in Richall misinterprets section 29 LRA 2002. Finally, the decision by‐passes the rectification and indemnity provisions of schedules 4 and 8. The decision ought to be overruled.     

Out of Many,One? Strasbourg's Ibrahim Decision on Article 6

This case comment considers the European Court of Human Rights decision of Ibrahim v United Kingdom on 13 September 2016. Relying on Salduz v Turkey, the applicants claimed, largely unsuccessfully, that denial of access to a lawyer during police questioning, and subsequent admission into evidence of statements made in the course of that questioning, violated fair trial rights protected by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The comment suggests that the decision's unusually emphatic statements about Article 6's ‘internal structure’ have consequences for assessing violations in future applications. Further, the decision creates greater room for public interest balancing in Article 6 cases. The decision may thus undermine the Article 6 guarantees.     

Me Voici,here I Am,Here I Stand,I Can Do No Other

This article offers a Levinasian reading of the case of Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland (1993). My contention is that the judicial reasoning that gave rise to the decision that Anthony Bland should die was driven by an ontological imperative I submit from a Levinasian perspective the decision was ethically indefensible because it failed to recognise Anthony Bland as the other. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Just When You Thought You Understood New Jersey Allocation Law: Implications,Limitations, and Complications in Applying Farmers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. New Jersey Property-Liability Ins. Guar. Ass’n

The New Jersey Supreme Court's recent decision in Farmers Mutual Fire Insurance Company of Salem v. New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association holding that a 2004 statutory amendment requires all solvent triggered liability policies be exhausted before the Guaranty Association pays statutory benefits for an insolvent's share has created many uncertainties in allocating long-tail liabilities. This article discusses the implications and the significant limitations of the Farmers Mutual decision and the questions it leaves unanswered, and responds to arguments that the decision supports revisiting other situations where New Jersey's Owens-Illinois methodology allocates losses to the insured.     

The ex turpi causa principle in Hounga and Servier

In Hounga v Allen the majority of the Supreme Court employed a test for the application of the ex turpi causa defence involving the balancing of public policy arguments for and against allowing the defence. Although this has attracted some early academic support, this note will argue it is inconsistent with authority and principle. The later decision in Servier v Apotex does not address the Hounga decision directly but strongly endorses a more conservative approach to the ex turpi causa principle. The resulting tension between these two Supreme Court decisions is likely further to destabilise the law in this area. This note advances arguments in favour of the Servier approach, summarises both decisions in terms of their consistency with authority and considers the ways in which Servier may have limited the effects of Hounga.     

Attribution in Company Law

In Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liquidation) v Nazir (No 2), the Court of Appeal held that the ex turpi causa defence was inapplicable by refusing to attribute the fraud of the directors and the sole shareholder to the company in connection with the company's claim against them and third party co‐conspirators. It is significant that the court has not only clarified the law in relation to attribution, but it did so by rejecting the majority's reasoning and endorsing the dissenting judgment in the House of Lords decision in Stone & Rolls (in liquidation) v Moore Stephens (a firm). This article evaluates the decision in Bilta by critically examining the fundamental principles and policies that apply to the three distinct circumstances under which corporate attribution should or should not take place.     

Beyond “Sic Utere …” to the Regional General Welfare

Since the lower court opinions in Oakwood at Madison and Mt. Laurel, a definitive decision has been awaited from the New Jersey Supreme Court dealing with the issues of exclusion in housing and land use regulations. It was also expected that Justice Hall, author of the well-known Vickers' dissent, would have the chance to lead the majority in its decision, Though Madison reached the court first, it was fraught with delays and unusual circumstances, placing it in line behind Mt. Laurel. Thus, Mt. Laurel emerged as the vehicle for this court's important restatement of the law of municipal land use control. Announced March 24, 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Mt. Laurel was indeed written by Justice Hall—a valedictory of sorts just before his retirement from the bench in April.     

Remedies for Breach of Trust

The decision of the Supreme Court in AIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler & Co confirms the approach taken by Lord Browne‐Wilkinson in Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns: where a trustee misapplies trust assets, a beneficiary is limited to a claim for equitable compensation for losses caused by the trustee's breach of duty. This seems to be a departure from traditional equitable doctrine, which held that the beneficiary could falsify the trustee's unauthorised disbursement and bring a claim for an ‘equitable debt’. This note considers the impact of the decision of the Supreme Court, and how the law regarding ‘equitable compensation’ might continue to develop.     

The Signaling Effect of Pro se Status

When claimants press their claims without counsel, they fail at virtually every stage of civil litigation and overwhelmingly fail to obtain meaningful access to justice. This research program harnesses psychological science to experimentally test a novel hypothesis: mainly, a claimant's pro se status itself sends a signal that biases decision making about the claimant and her claim. We conducted social psychological experiments with the public (N = 157), law students (N = 198), and employment discrimination lawyers (N = 39), holding the quality and merit of a Title VII sex discrimination case constant. In so doing, we examined whether a claimant's pro se status itself shapes stereotypes held about the claimant and biases decision making about settlement awards. These experiments reveal that pro se status influences stereotypes of claimants and settlement awards received. Moreover, the signaling effect of pro se status is exacerbated by socialization in the legal profession. Among law‐trained individuals (i.e., law students and lawyers), a claimant's pro se status generates negative stereotypes about the claimant and these negative stereotypes explain the adverse effect of pro se status on decision making about settlement awards.     

Fair Share Housing for Managed Growth

The Mt. Laurel decision represents the culmination of judicial thinking in exclusionary zoning type litigation. Implicit in decisions striking down local land use controls found to be “exclusionary” in nature has been the notion that a community has a legal duty to accept a “fair share” of the housing needs of the region. Fair share housing now begins to take on some substance with the New Jersey court's decision. Similar language on responsibilities for regional needs may be found in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions in Kit-Mar and Girsh, and in the federal district court's opinion in Petaluma.     

U.S. Supreme Court Affirms Potentially Responsible Parties' Right of Action for Cost Recovery

In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Aviall—that potentially responsible parties (PRPs) are not permitted to seek contribution from other PRPs under CERCLA unless they have been sued or otherwise settled their CERCLA liability—PRPs and the courts have struggled to identify a remedy for those that voluntarily undertake cleanup of contaminated sites. The Atlantic Research decision resolves a conflict among the circuits and clarifies that PRPs voluntarily incurring cleanup costs pursuant to CERCLA, can maintain an action for cost recovery against other PRPs. The authors discuss the current legal landscape regarding actions for cost recovery as presented in Atlantic Research.     

Consent to Treatment for Transgender Youth: The Next Chapter – Bell & Anor v The Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust & Ors

In September 2021, the Court of Appeal reversed the controversial decision of Quincy Bell v Tavistock and Portman NHS Trust in a victory for transgender rights. At first instance, the Divisional Court had set a high legal threshold for transgender children to attain Gillick competence to consent to treatment with puberty blockers – effectively restricting access to treatment for many. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that children are capable in law of giving valid consent to treatment for gender dysphoria, and court authorisation would not be routinely required before children could access such treatment. This note considers the implications of the Court of Appeal decision for the law on minors and consent to medical treatment in the transgender health context.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

WAIVER HEARING A FRUSTRATING TASK

In the September decision in Haziel v. United States, Chief Judge Bazelon, speaking for the majority of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, said:     

The War of the Booksellers: Natural Law,Equity, and Literary Property in Eighteenth-Century Scotland

This article analyses the case of Hinton v Donaldson (1773) in which the judges of the Scottish Court of Session refused to follow their English brethren in recognizing an author's right of property outside the Statute of Anne (1710). The decision must be understood against the background of distinct notions of common law and equity in Scots law, drawn from the Natural law tradition of the European jus commune. At the same time the decision reveals developing strands of Enlightenment thought and concepts of the judicial role in relation to legislation.     

Resistance to European Law and Constitutional Identity in Germany: Herbert Kraus and Solange in its Intellectual Context

This article recasts our understanding of the Federal Constitutional Court's Solange decision by tracing its lineage within the domestic context and as part of a new history of EU law. The external dynamic of the decision, a moment of judicial discourse between two of Europe's highest panels, has been the focus of many studies. Much rarer are attempts to embed the decision within its internal context: the struggle within the German legal academy to accept the primacy of EU law. Central to this contextualisation is the reinvigoration of the ‘structural congruence’ theory of Herbert Kraus, which long shaped the German reception of EU law. This article recounts Kraus' theory, tracing the struggle for the German legal consciousness between three positions: constitutionalists, traditionalists, and the congruence advocates. While Hallstein's constitutionalism is most closely associated with Germany's early Europhilia, even he admitted by 1975 that Kraus had won the day.     

Inclusionary Housing After Koontz

Abstract

Inclusionary housing requirements, typically determined locally, have met with mixed success in the courts. After the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District (Koontz), many are wondering if they have become harder to defend.     

Closing the Floodgates on Privacy Class Actions: Lloyd v Google LLC

In Lloyd v Google LLC [2021] UKSC 50, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal's decision, which had allowed a claim under the Data Protection Act 1998 to proceed as a representative action under CPR 19.6. This is significant because the Court of Appeal's decision arguably paved the way for further data protection/privacy claims to be brought as opt-out ‘class actions’ using this procedure. This case note summarises the Supreme Court decision and assesses its implications for both the procedural law of collective redress and the substantive law of privacy in England. It argues that the Supreme Court's reasoning in relation to both of these areas is sound as a matter of precedent and statutory construction. As a matter of public policy, the decision is likely to re-enliven debate about the availability of collective redress in English law and whether the existing collective proceedings regime should be broadened.     

Godden v Hales revisited – James II and the dispensing power

This article considers whether the King's Bench decision in Godden v Hales (1686) allowing James II to dispense with the application of the Test Acts was correct. Most modern historians believe that the decision was either correct, or at least a justifiable interpretation of the legal precedents; contemporaries overwhelmingly believed the decision was wholly wrong. This article explains the nature and importance of the dispensing power, and considers the relevant case law precedents in detail. It concludes that the line of authorities forbidding the king from dispensing with the anti-simony statutes should have been applied to the Test Acts. The accusations of illegal and unconstitutional conduct relating to the dispensing power made against James II during the 1688 Revolution and in the Declaration of Rights were thus wholly justified.     

Judging a Judge: A Reappraisal of Lord Mansfield and Somerset’s Case

This article presents an occasion on which moral judgement can, and should, take place. When the chief justice of the court of king’s bench – William Murray, first earl of Mansfield – was presented with the case of Somerset v Stewart in 1772, he was presented with choices that unveiled aspects of his character. By first establishing the ambiguity of the legal context and the multifarious political pressures that preceded Somerset’s case, this article identifies the extent of Lord Mansfield’s ‘room for manoeuvre’ with respect to three elements of his conduct: the delay and reluctance in making a decision, the choices regarding the substantive decision and the manner of expressing that decision. To what extent did Mansfield have freedom of action, and how did he exercise it? Are those free actions worthy of praise or condemnation? Through an essential questioning of previous historians’ assumptions and omissions, this article sharpens the strokes through which a complex portrait of Mansfield may be rendered.