Rent seeking and market competition

This paper emphasizes that political behavior of interest groups is a result of economic calculation, and therefore is affected by the market conditions under which they operate. We develop a two-stage game to link political and market decision-making. We find that if unproductive rent-seekingdirectly contributes to rent-seekers' market operations, then their lobbying efforts will be excessive if the number of outsiders is relatively large, restrained if it is relatively small. If rent-seekingdirectly impairs rent-seekers' market operations, the above described behavior will be reversed. The analysis also reveals that as wasteful rent-seeking may increase rent-seeker's production cost, market competition shifts production from now less efficient rent-seekers to their non-rent-seeking rivals. Welfare gains from this shift may overshadow the direct waste of influence activities.     

The Cadillac,the mother-in-law,and the ballot: Individual and contextual roots of ambivalence in Swiss direct democracy

Citizens may experience irreconcilable and conflictive values or feelings about a political issue. They may, for instance, both believe in a woman's right to autonomy over her body (pro choice) and that human life begins before birth (pro life). This conflictive situation – referred to as ambivalence in relevant literature – has detrimental effects on political choices. For instance, ambivalence may enhance instability in candidates' evaluations, delay the formation of vote intentions, and finally weaken predictions on vote choices.This being, literature has less looked at what may induce ambivalence, and especially on how informational context may affect it. Our paper aims to compensate for this lack, by assessing under which individual and contextual conditions ambivalence has more chances to be felt by citizens. Through a series of hierarchical estimations based on post-electoral data on Swiss direct democracy and original data retracing content of political campaigns, we will demonstrate that individual determinants (political sophistication, exposure to political campaigns, and heuristics) as well as political campaigning (intensity and negativism) strongly determine the existence of ambivalence.     

Constitutional political economy,democratic theory and institutional design

Democracy and constitutionalism are both central to the Western political tradition. And yet, constitutional restrictions are often perceived to be in tension with democratic commitments. I argue that the constitutional political economy approach developed by Nobel Laureate James Buchanan resolves the tension between constitutionalism and the values of democratic governance by shifting the analysis from a system-attributes perspective that focuses on the particular institutional properties of a political order to a system-legitimacy perspective that focuses on the manner in which political institutions gain democratic legitimacy. In so doing, the approach reveals that constitutionalism can be understood as a natural expression of democratic values.     

The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock

This paper surveys Gordon Tullock’s contributions to constitutional political economy. His first major contribution was his joint project with James Buchanan on liberal constitutional design. The explicitly constitutional analysis of The Calculus was followed by a series of papers and books that focused on the use of resources in conflict, including Tullock’s contributions to the anarchy and rent-seeking literatures. Tullock also pioneered the rational choice-based analysis of dictatorships and the relative merits of alternative legal systems, topics that has been neglected until fairly recently by most scholars working in the CPE tradition.     

Conflicts of Values and Political Forgiveness

Citizens have a right to be governed by officials with an acute awareness of the conflicts between the constitutional values of liberal democracy. Such an awareness is an integral part of a public official's integrity. That is why citizens should have a say in deciding whether to remove from office an official with such integrity. In this article, this type of conflict between constitutional values is translated into the terms of an individual official's decision making with the help of moral theory. This yields two paradoxes: one focusing on the decision maker and the other on the object of his or her decisions: the citizen. These paradoxes lead to the following questions: If running a liberal democratic constitution essentially involves moral complexity, should we not try to have it run by officials with a sensitivity to that complexity? And if officials with that sensitivity are bound to commit moral wrongs because of complexity, do not we owe them something like political forgiveness? The paradoxes are used to formulate conditions for political forgiveness.     

The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy

Three topics of a European constitution are discussed. First, basic arguments from constitutional political economy that aim at restricting representatives’ potential misuse of powers in a European Union with extended competencies are summarized. Since a European demos does not yet exist, an extension of competencies of the European Parliament is not sufficient in order to legitimate political decisions at the EU level. The introduction of elements of direct democracy in the European constitution would shape the creation of such a demos and lead to a stronger control of the European legislature and executive. Second, the introduction of direct democracy in the European constitution is proposed in order to reduce the European democratic deficit. Third, the creation of a European federation requires a more transparent assignment of competencies and rules to resolve conflicts between different centers of power. A European federation should be organized according to the principles of competitive federalism.     

Bagehot Smiling: Gordon Brown's ‘New Constitution’ and the Revolution that Did Not Happen

The MPs expenses scandal that erupted in May 2009 has certainly rekindled interest in the next stage of constitutional reform and democratic renewal in Britain. This article examines how Gordon Brown's tenure as Prime Minister has differed from Tony Blair's in relation to the ‘new politics’ narrative. It argues that despite his long‐term personal commitment to major constitutional reforms, the role of crises in recalibrating the political opportunity structure and the manner in which electoral incentives can alter elite attitudes to institutional change that Brown's tenure can be characterised by optimism followed by timidity. Gordon Brown may have flown a few kites in relation to a written constitution, electoral reform, English devolution and the future of the House of Lords but he has left things far too late for a ‘constitutional moment’. Brown may have the political inclination but he lacks the capacity to deliver far‐reaching reform; Cameron is likely to have the capacity but not the inclination.     

The Lost Treasure of Arendt's Council System

Abstract

Hannah Arendt's On Revolution offers a critique of modern representative democracy combined with a manifesto-like treatise on council systems as they have arisen over the course of revolutions and uprisings. However, Arendt's contribution to democratic theory has been obscured by her commentators who argue that her reflections on democracy are either an aberration in her work or easily reconcilable within a liberal democratic framework. This paper seeks to provide a comprehensive outline of Arendt's writing on the council system and a clarification of her work outside the milieu of the post-Cold War return to Arendt. Her analyses bring to light a political system that guarantees civil and political rights while allowing all willing citizens direct participation in government. Framing her discussion within the language of the current renewed interest in constituent power, her council system could be described as a blending together of constituent power and constitutional form. Arendt resists the complete dominance and superiority of either element and argues that the foundation of a free state requires nothing less than the stabilization and persistence of constituent power within an open and fluid institution that would resist either the bureaucratization of politics or its dispersal into a revolutionary flux. Although one may conclude that her institutional suggestions are far from flawless, her political principles allow a conceptualization of democracy in more substantial ways than current liberal political philosophy.     

Constitutional Prohibitions in a Rent Seeking Model

I extend the standard rent seeking model to allow lobbying fora constitutional prohibition on wealth transfers. I examinetwo issues: (1) the ability of special interests withsignificant political capacity to block constitutional change;and (2) the effect of adding a constitutional stage on totallobbying expenditures. Defeating a prohibition on wealthtransfers is a public good for rent seekers; success inconstitutional politics merely allows them to lobby for wealthtransfers. The resulting collective action problem for rentseekers in constitutional politics offsets the generalinterest's free rider problems, reducing the probability oftransfers and expected total lobbying expenditures compared tothe traditional rent seeking contest. Introduction of aconstitutional stage also reverses several comparative staticsresults from the rent seeking game. An increase in the numberof rent seekers or the general interest's (consumers') abilityto organize increase lobbying in the rent seeking game butgenerally reduce expected lobbying in the constitutionalprohibition game.     

Lobbying and (de)centralization

This paper presents a positive theory of (de)centralization of policy decisions in an international union -defined as a supranational jurisdiction that may exercise a policy prerogative on behalf of member countries. I build a benchmark model where national lobbies can coordinate (i.e. form a trans-national lobby) at no cost and show that lobbying does not affect the fiscal regime. On the other hand, when interest groups cannot coordinate, decentralization emerges as a political equilibrium with lobbying. Policy centralization hurts national lobbies by increasing competition for influence. At a constitutional stage, interest groups induce politically motivated governments to reject centralization. Three extensions show that this result depends on the level of cross-border externalities; the voting rule at the constitutional stage; and the details of the institutional decision mechanism under centralization.     

How responsible is 'responsive' government?

The work of John Rohr focuses primarily upon the constitutional dimension of the work of public servants, most particularly, but not exclusively, career civil servants employed in central government. In stressing public service ethics as a form of constitutional practice Rohr's aim is to help reinforce the legitimate role of career public servants in government and to remind practising public bureaucrats (and academics and politicians) of the nobility of the 'administrative vocation' of state service, a somewhat daunting task in today's political climate. In this article I examine Rohr's work to see what ethical light it might throw upon recent and ongoing political attempts to make the British public administration more 'responsive'. I do so, first, by outlining the main themes of Rohr's work and their location within the US constitutional tradition. I then proceed to discuss the extent to which they translate into other constitutional contexts. Finally, I attempt to put Rohr's work to use in discussing aspects of civil service reform in Britain under recent Conservative administrations and that of the present New Labour government.     

Pierre-Louis Rœderer and the Debate on Forms of Government in Revolutionary France

The French Revolution raised the problem of how to construct a modern republic under conditions of acute political conflict. The debate over the forms of government was at its most intense before the outbreak of the Terror in 1793, when there seemed to be no alternative to instituting a republic, but there was serious disagreement over what this entailed. The problem was considered in terms of the political thought of Hobbes, Locke, Bayle, Voltaire, Helvetius, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Sieyès. The urgent political and constitutional need to reconcile accountable with effective government was central to the use made of both inherited and new ideas about the republican form of government. This parallels Madison's concern to reconcile accountable with effective government during the constitutional debates of the American Revolution.     

Ideas,spaces and ‘sovereigntyscapes’: Dramatising Scotland's production of a new institutional fix

Abstract

As part of a general endeavour to ‘modernise’ Britain for the epoch of globalisation, Britain's New Labour government has sought to integrate wide‐ranging constitutional reform with new structures for regional governance. Perhaps the most radical proposal concerns the attempt to align continued UK sovereignty with an elected parliament for Scotland in what has been called a ‘new covenant with the people’. This paper draws on Jane Jenson's neo‐Gramscian discourse‐regulation theory and its stress on social agency and the politics of representation, to explore the political, economic and socio‐spatial tensions and the related ideas, discursive forms and political processes that have given rise to this emergent institutional and representational ‘fix’. The author argues that rather than being perceived of solely as some ‘modernisation move’ on the part of a New Labour project, this reconfiguration of power and representation also needs to be traced to the political and representational style of Thatcherism, in particular, the latter's continuous ‘testing’ of the 1707 Treaty between Scotland and England as a negotiated settlement of economic and political union. The paper concludes with some reflections on the future prospects facing any future Scotland‐UK institutional settlement, including the question of sovereignty.     

Social welfare functions when preferences are convex,strictly monotonic,and continuous

The paper shows that if the class of admissible preference orderings is restricted in a manner appropriate for economic and political models, then Arrow's impossibility theorem for social welfare functions continues to be valid. Specifically if the space of alternatives is R ₊ ⁿ , n ≥ 3, where each dimension represents a different public good and if each person's preferences are restricted to be convex, continuous, and strictly monotonic, then no social welfare function exists that satisfies unanimity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and nondictatorship.     

Politicians,voters and democracy: The 2011 UK referendum on the Alternative Vote

At the 2010 UK election, Labour proposed a referendum on changing the House of Commons electoral system from single member plurality to the Alternative Vote. Subsequently, a coalition was formed between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, yet it was Labour's policy on electoral reform that was implemented. The paper explains why this proved to be politically convenient for Labour's opponents. At the same time, however, holding the referendum reflected an emergent de facto convention that significant constitutional change should only be introduced after it has secured popular endorsement. The paper assesses whether the dynamics of public opinion during the AV referendum suggests that voters' eventual decisions about constitutional questions reflect their views about the merits of the relevant arguments.     

Alain Badiou's Politics and the Problem of Social History

Abstract

This paper explores the plausibility of Alain Badiou's ahistorical theory of politics. By insisting that the events of egalitarian politics are radically subtracted from social and historical conditions Badiou imagines a form of political action that effectively comes out of nothing. However, in order to establish the very prospect of an event's occurrence Badiou is forced to ground the possibility of political intervention in his theory of "evental recurrence", which effectively enables the subjects of political action to draw on the consequences of a preceding event in order to act in the here and now. The paper argues that by introducing the social dimensions of evental recurrence it is possible to construct an alternative account of political action that resolves a number of inconsistencies in Badiou's otherwise miraculous vision of politics. Consequently, rather than a militant activist that comes out of nowhere, evental recurrence implies that the militants of political action are saturated in their immediate social and political circumstances and in the memory of past struggles.     

Political budget cycles and media freedom

This paper examines the effects of elections on the conduct of central governments' fiscal policies. To do so, it uses a unique panel database that includes disaggregated spending and revenue series at the central government level for multiple countries over the 1975–2010 period. Examining political environments under which incumbent governments generate political budget cycles (PBCs), and comparing the relative importance of factors influencing cycles, we identify media freedom as the factor that plays the most critical role. This result provides a micro-foundation for rational opportunistic models for PBCs that rely on asymmetry of information about politicians' competence, and also offers a way to relate different conditioning factors of PBCs, including fiscal transparency and the maturity of democracies. Further, we show that the election-year rise in budget deficits under low media freedom is primarily driven by an increase in the current, not capital, component of public expenditure.     

Decentralized Governance under Centralized Party Rule in Ethiopia: The Tigray Experience

Abstract

In the mid-1990s Ethiopia adopted a federal constitution promising regional autonomy and the creation and strengthening of local government units below the regional level. Some observers attribute the various shortcomings of Ethiopian federalism that have emerged since then to the original institutional/constitutional design. This paper, however, argues that what is not in the constitution has come to influence the workings of decentralization more than what is codified in it. The dominant national party in power, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), either directly or through affiliates, controls political office at all levels of government, thereby limiting the room for local initiative and autonomy. The presence of a national dominant party limits the responsiveness and downward accountability of Wereda (district) authorities; it also undermines political competition, and by extension, good governance at the grassroots level. The paper is based on field research carried out in the Tigray regional state of Ethiopia. The conclusion is that when one party dominates the politics of the region and its institutions, extra-constitutional intra-party politics determine how things work, thereby subjugating localities’ autonomy and impeding their ability to deliver on promises of decentralization.     

European citizenship and political identity

A common European identity is necessary to support European citizenship. National identity does not represent a suitable model for European identity because it relies on elements of kinship, like ancestry, culture, language and traditions, which are not shared by all European citizens at the same time. Only a model of collective identity based on political association could bring together all the different European cultural and national identities. However, if we reject the national, culturally homogeneous model of identity in favour of an entirely political one, we are faced with the task of defining the substance of European political identity. The main purpose of this paper is to outline the essential elements of a European political identity, by looking at Europe's political and constitutional history and at the practice of citizenship in the European Union. European political identity and citizenship will be confronted with two major issues affecting the fields of identity and citizenship: pluralism and exclusion.     

Auctions or grandfathering: the political economy of tradable emission permits

Despite the prevalence of grandfathered permits, we still observe that a hybrid policy, in which a fraction of initial emission permits is distributed through auctions, is adopted in some cases. We also observe that some polluting industries support auctioned permits, and that most environmental groups support grandfathered permits. This paper attempts to explain these phenomena from the perspective of political economy, and investigates the conditions under which grandfathering, auctions, or a hybrid instrument will be the equilibrium policy. By constructing a two-stage lobbying game, in which the type of policy instrument (auction, grandfathering, or a hybrid instrument) is determined in the first stage, and then the number of permits is decided in the second stage, we highlight the strategic interaction of the lobbying activities between the two stages in explaining the behavior of the lobbying groups.