Impersonal influence: Effects of representations of public opinion on political attitudes

Many phenomena of interest to political scientists involve what may be termed impersonal influence; that is, influence that derives from individuals' perceptions of others' attitudes, beliefs, or experiences. Others in this case refers not to the close friends and acquaintances that concerned the authors of classics such asThe People's Choice andPersonal Influence, but rather to the anonymous others outside an individual's realm of personal contacts. Modern mass media facilitate the influence of anonymous others by devoting considerable time and attention to portraying trends in mass opinion. This study explores the rationale for theories of impersonal influence, synthesizing existing research findings falling under this general theoretical framework, and investigating its psychological underpinnings using experiments embedded in representative surveys.     

Political information processing: Question order and context effects

Data from two independent field experiments indicate that changes in question order and context may well account for an apparently precipitous decline of interest in politics at the time of the CPS 1978 American National Election Study. Evidence from a question order experiment with the SRC/CPS feeling thermometers also suggests that such contextual artifacts may not be atypical. Indeed, because of the many changes in the content and organization of the election studies over the years, context effects represent plausible rival hypotheses for a number of inexplicable shifts and trends in the time-series. In testing these hypotheses the authors derive and validate an information-processing model of how respondents infer their political states of mind from observations of their own question-answering behavior in the survey interview. In addition, the authors illustrate the wide applicability of the model tosubstantive problems in the discipline and its implications for the survey-based paradigm in political behavior research.     

International trade policy in Israel: Another model — Reply

The aim of this study was to examine the tariff structure in Israel in terms of the four main theoretical models of endogenous commercial policy. The empirical results for levels of protection in Israel support several of the models. In particular the pressure group model performs well and especially the variable that represents the lobbying power of the Histadrut/public sector in Israel. This is consistent with the longstanding political power of the Histadrut in Israel. The Histadrut's role in the Israeli economy rises above the western concept of a labor union and takes on a quasi-governmental function. The clearest example of this elevated status is seen when the government included the Histadrut as part of the commission charged with the responsibility of carrying out the nominal liberalization process of the 1960s. Evidently it is this kind of political-economic power that allowed the Histadrut to affect the level of protection Histadrut-dominated industries received.The displacement costs model is also supported suggesting that officials, when deciding on tariff rates, are sensitive to the displacement costs (e.g., amount and average duration of unemployment), associated with different levels of protection for various industries. This result stands in contrast to the goals set out in the New Economics Policy of 1962 discussed earlier. Apparently tariff setting authorities desired to increase efficiency by reducing protection but were also willing, perhaps for political reasons, to trade off lower displacement costs with higher tariff rates.     

Incentives and political contributions

Two implications from this research are noted. First, from a researcher's viewpoint, our research suggests the importance of age, wealth, tax rates, and marital status as determinants of political contributions by top U.S. wealth-holders. Therefore, these factors should be included in aggregated models that attempt to analyze the relations between such variables as voting, campaign expenditures and the outcomes of elections. Second, from politicians' viewpoints, this research suggests that individual economic variables such as marginal tax rates and wealth are major determinants of individual decisions to contribute to politicians. Assuming that such contributions reflect votes, this research suggests the relative importance of focusing campaign promises on economic variables — a strategy that low tax politicians like Ronald Reagan and George Bush may keenly be aware of.The views presented are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Treasury Department.     

Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions

I examine the impact of long-term partisan loyalties on perceptions of specific political figures and events. In contrast to the notion of partisanship as a simple running tally of political assessments, I show that party identification is a pervasive dynamic force shaping citizens' perceptions of, and reactions to, the political world. My analysis employs panel data to isolate the impact of partisan bias in the context of a Bayesian model of opinion change; I also present more straightforward evidence of contrasts in Democrats' and Republicans' perceptions of objective politically relevant events. I conclude that partisan bias in political perceptions plays a crucial role in perpetuating and reinforcing sharp differences in opinion between Democrats and Republicans. This conclusion handsomely validates the emphasis placed by the authors of The American Voter on the role of enduring partisan commitments in shaping attitudes toward political objects.     

The possibility of a desirable minimal state

There is a near consensus that organized special interests use influence to expand government into activities that are detrimental to the public at large. Consequently, as Lee (1989) suggests, it would be desirable if the general public had more control over political decisions — if government were more responsive to the public interest. However, the public interest like rent-seeking, is a subjective concept (Pasour, 1987).The possible existence of a desirable minimal state is not disproved by an approach that assumes utilities are interpersonally comparable. Individual utilities are subjective and ordinal and hence, cannot be added or weighted to determine the level of government that is socially optimal. If one accepts the subjectivist approach, it follows that no one can decide upon any policy whatever in the absence of an ultimate ethical or value judgment (Rothbard, 1982: 212). In this respect, determining the desirable minimal state is no different from determining whether an individual government program is desirable (or whether it represents rent-seeking waste).     

Do legislators' votes reflect constituency preference? A simple way to evaluate the Senate

U.S. senators frequently vote against the preference of their constituency, assuming that such a preference exists. Both of a state's senators represent the same constituency. Whenever they split their votes, one or the other is necessarily going against the constituency preference. For the sample of defense-related votes analyzed above, misrepresentation — either observable vote splitting or unobservable vote matches that go against the constituency preference — occurred at least 37 percent of the time, at least 46 percent on one vote. Although party differences accounted for more than two-thirds of the vote splitting, a substantial number of splits remained. Besides, a party difference for a state's senatorial pair is itself problematical.The method employed here can be applied easily to any data whatever on senatorial voting. Its application will show that, quite often, many senators depart from constituency preference. This finding refutes the hypothesis, popular in certain circles, that ours is a more or less perfect political market with little or no scope for ideologically driven voting by legislators.     

Admissible and sincere strategies under approval voting

This essay reasses the assumptions of the Brams-Fishburn theory of approval voting, and proposes modifications to make the theory correspond better with likely voting choices. With a small number of candidates, voters who use the inadmissible strategy of voting for all candidates can help to produce a result that better reflects the voters' wishes than is possible with admissible strategies, so we propose a widening of the definition of admissibility to encompass this case. With more than three candidates, we define first-order admissible strategies, which are the most likely strategies to be used in practice, and are also strongly sincere, in that a vote for any candidate is always accompanied by votes for all more or equally-preferred candidates. Their number is less under approval voting than under plurality voting. Both proposed modifications strengthen the technical arguments favoring approval voting over plurality voting.     

University admission requirements as rent-seeking

The paper argues that admission requirements into public universities are best viewed as rent-seeking by several groups, in contrast to the conventional rationing rationale. The rents are principally nonfinancial for some of the groups. The paper concludes by showing why admission requirements are not set too high.Discussions with Joe Jadlow, Scott Turner and Larkin Warner, and comments by colleagues on an earlier version in our departmental Workshop helped clarify the issues. I thank them, emphasizing that the normal caveat is not pro forma.     

Tollison costs and technological innovation: The case of environmental regulation

This paper departs from the Tullock cost paradigm that views competition for monopoly privilege as a welfare-inimical process that wastefully dissipates preexisting producers' surplus and, occasionally, leads to inefficient increases in costs and counterproductive uses of scarce resources. The potential availability of rent-seeking may bring about the elimination of inefficient regulatory regimes that retard or prevent the introduction of cost-reducing innovations. Air quality management is but one area in which innovation rent-seeking holds promise for concrete welfare gains. Researchers may wish to focus on institutional mechanisms designed to overcome the transactions costs and free rider disincentives to the formation of a coalition to seek innovation rents. An example of such a mechanism might be a joint venture that requires all venture members to engage in lobbying and to contribute to collective research efforts. These unaddressed questions await future research.The authors are grateful for the insightful comments of Gordon Tullock, Robert D. Tollison, Michael T. Marlow and J.R. Clark. The usual caveats apply. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and should not be taken to represent the views of their employers.     

The dynamics of interpersonal attitudinal influence: Some additional evidence

The process by which one individual or group of individuals influences the attitudes of another is an important area of concern for students of political behavior. A few years ago a major political science journal published an article pointing to the salience of perceptual accuracy and issue salience in this regard. Interpersonal affective relationships were also considered but dismissed as lacking independent causal significance.Through parallel analysis of a separate data base, along with additional insights from a social conditioning approach, this report attempts to show that affectis an important variable mediating interpersonal attitudinal influence. It does so in multiplicative interaction with measures of parental cue-giving, such as issue salience. Hence, adding affect to the statistical modelafter removing the effects of cue-giving masks the joint effects.     

The pits and the core: Simple collective decision problems with concave preferences

This essay extends the theory of simple collective decision problems to spatial games in which (contrary to the traditional assumption) each agent's preferences are concave, in the sense that the alternatives that the agent does not prefer to any particular reference alternative together constitute a convex set. Such concave preferences might characterize decision problems in which, say, a site must be selected for some obnoxious facility, such as a prison, garbage dump, or facility for managing hazardous materials. The results indicate that, under these conditions, the (weak -)core can be structurally unstable, changing discontinuously with apparently minor perturbations of the decision problem. The main theorem identifies a curious property of the core when the set of feasible alternatives is compact and convex and each agent's preferences are strictly concave. Namely, a point in the feasible set's interior can belong to the core only if there is no feasible alternative that makes every member of any winning coalition strictly worse off. In this sense, an interior point belongs to the core only if it lies in the pits.A preliminary version of this essay was presented at the West Coast Conference on Small Groups Research, Stanford University, 17 April 1985, and the Experimental Social Choice Workshop, Utah State University, Logan, Utah, 20–21 June 1985. This material is based on work supported by grants from the National Science Foundation (Grants SES 83-12123 and SES 84-10094), the Real Estate Center and Department of Decision Sciences of The Wharton School, and the Research Fund of the University of Pennsylvania.     

The median and the competitive equilibrium in one dimension

Two alternative models of legislative outcomes are the minimum winning coalition and the competitive equilibrium (Koford, 1982). In a unidimensional setting, the outcome under the former is the median, while the outcome under the latter is the highest net demand location.This paper describes the competitive equilibrium in a unidimensional model, and shows that under some common conditions it coincides with the median, in particular for pure redistributive issues. However, for distributive issues, the two equilibria will differ. Finally, the comparative statics of the two models are examined; while the winning coalition is sensitive only to changes in the location of the median, for distributive issues the competitive equilibrium has the standard economic comparative statics that the outcome adjusts in the direction of the change in preferences.     

Explaining collective action with rational models

We note the failure of a rational egoist model of human behavior to generate successful predictions of important economic and political behaviors including collective action. Alternative models are presented that combine rational, utility-maximizing features with concerns about collective welfare. The performance of these models in explaining contributing behavior in an experimentally-induced public goods game is compared to the performance of a rational egoist and collective welfare model. The results indicate that a model in which subjects are presumed to trade off benefits to self with benefits to others provides a better explanation of actual contributing behavior than either the rational egoist or collective welfare models, but still explains only a small amount of the individual variance in contributing behavior.The Institute for Political Economy, Utah State University provided important financial support for this study. Donald Cundy, Alan Huston, Joe Oppenheimer, John Orbell, and Randy Simmons provided valuable comments on earlier drafts.     

What's in a word?

In this paper, we argue that citizens' views about the personality characteristics of their political leaders are subject to systematic bias, motivated by the desire to maintain existing impressions. We report two studies designed to explore how such trait biases, involving judgments of real politicians, are manifested. Drawing on work in social psychology (John, Hampson, and Goldberg, 1991), we hypothesize, and demonstrate experimentally, that traitbreadth plays a critical role in the judgment process. Specifically, people tend to select broad positive traits (e.g., kind) and narrower negative traits (gullible) to describe politicians that they like; conversely, people tend to select broad negative traits (unintelligent) and narrower positive traits (soft-hearted) to describe politicians that they dislike. This trait breadth attribution bias was much stronger among those who had a positive, rather than negative, impression of the politician, a result we discuss in the context of related evidence of affective asymmetries in political judgment (e.g., Kinder, 1986; Marcus and Mackuen, 1993). More generally, these studies illustrate the potential associated with integrating cognitive, affective, and motivational factors in the service of fully understanding political judgment and choice.     

Thematic memory for politics in children

This paper reports on an experiment designed to test the way (fourth grade) children congnitively process various kinds of information about politics. Our findings provide evidence that children integrate symbols from their immediate political environment into themes. These themes may then serve to organize their political knowledge and mediate receipt of new information. We did not find similar evidence of thematic integration for adult political symbols. These findings raise questions about the degree to which events in the adult political world will directly affect children's developing orientations toward that world.     

A constitutional view of legislative pay

The distinction between constitutional rules and post-constitutional laws is often a fine line. However, this analysis suggests that, in the case of state legislative pay, constitutional rules are much more binding than post-constitutional restrictions. Further research in the area of constitutions from an economic point of view may yield fruitful results. As Tullock (1988: 140) has stated, The real importance of such an evaluation could be as a first step toward developing improved constitutional rules. Evaluating other areas of policy from a constitutional point of view might shed light on the path towards the development of optimal rules in a democratic process.Thanks go to Randy Holcombe for helpful comments and suggestions.     

The debate on World Dynamics: A response to Nordhaus

In a recent paper published in the Economic Journal, Professor William D. Nordhaus of Yale University reviewed World Dynamics by Jay W. Forrester. In his criticism, Nordhaus signals three serious problems and several additional questionable assumptions of sufficient importance to undermine the usefulness of Forrester's book. However, a careful examination of his analysis shows that each point made by Nordhaus rests on a misunderstanding of World Dynamics, a misuse of empirical data, or an inability to analyze properly the dynamic behavior of the model by static equilibrium methods.The three serious problems raised by Nordhaus concern the assumptions that connect industrialization to net birth rates in World Dynamics, the representation of technology and production within the world model, and the impact of prices on global resource use. The analysis presented here refutes the Nordhaus arguments and shows that World Dynamics is consistent with his references to real-world data on population, production, and capital accumulation.This paper is a response to William D. Nordhaus, World Dynamics: Measurement Without Data, published in the Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, December 1973. An earlier, unpublished, version of the Nordhaus paper, bearing the same title, was widely circulated hand-tohand within the United States, Canada, and Europe. A response to the original Nordhaus paper (System Dynamics Group Memorandum D-1736-4) was written in February 1973 and is available from Jay W. Forrester, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. 02139. The present paper, a revised version of the earlier response, deals with several new or modified arguments contained in the Economic Journal article by Nordhaus.     

Political variables in political socialization: Reply to “the dynamics of interpersonal attitudinal influence”

In this paper two arguments are advanced with regard to parental influence on adolescent political attitudes. First, variables like parental affect, which are of considerable theoretical interest to social psychologists, are of relatively little interest to the system-level concerns of political scientists because of their lack of variance. Second, the additive issue salience/perceptual accuracy model I proposed (1974) is a better fit to the data than a multiplicative cue-giving/parental affect model proposed in this journal by Cundy (1979). The fit of the two models is tested with the Jennings (1965) socialization data.Cundy, D. T. The dynamics of interpersonal attitudinal influence.Political Behavior, 1979,1, 269–284.     

Collective decision making and the limits on the organization's size

This essay clarifies the relationship between the technology of organizational decision making and the limits on the size of the group of decision makers within the organization. Viewing the number and quality of decision makers, and the time required for decision making as inputs in the production of collective decisions, we show that there exist generic organizational forces that offset the incentive to unlimited expansion of the organization. Even in a long run competitive environment with perfect markets for managers, unlimited duplication of the firm may not be economically feasible. We first analyze in a general setting and then illustrate in two stylized examples, the interplay between individual decisional quality, time required for an individual decision, direct and indirect costs of decision making, and the optimal number of decision makers (for example, management size).We are indebted to an anonymous referee of this journal and to P. Aranson for their very helpful comments and suggestions.