Social network analysis and counterinsurgency: a counterproductive strategy?

Social network analysis has been adopted by a number of governments in their counterinsurgency campaigns. By using network analysis, security agencies claim they can render militant groups impotent by targeting ‘nodal points’ or key links in insurgent networks. The article makes three arguments on the potentially counterproductive nature of social network analysis-assisted counterinsurgency campaigns. Firstly, social network analysis may be ‘too successful’ in stripping militant movements of a cadre who could negotiate a peace accord. Secondly, social network analysis-assisted campaigns fail to address the root causes of violent conflict. Thirdly, by denuding communities of social capital and social entrepreneurs, social network analysis – as a counterinsurgency tool – may condemn communities to underdevelopment and failed post-war reconstruction. In short, the ‘magic weapon’ of social network analysis might actually prolong the conflict it is supposed to help quell. The article employs the government of Sri Lanka's social network analysis-assisted counterinsurgency campaign as a case study, though it also has application to other cases. It concludes by considering if social network analysis can be put to more constructive uses, specifically in the rebuilding of communities after violent conflict.     

Defected and loyal? A case study of counter-defection mechanisms inside Chechen paramilitaries

Can former insurgents in the service of counterinsurgent paramilitaries be considered a perfectly loyal force? What mechanisms may help to deter subsequent defections of individuals who have already “betrayed” once? Drawing on a unique set of primary data, this article examines the effective counter-defection practices of Chechnya’s pro-Moscow paramilitaries toward prospective defectors from among ex-insurgents. It explores three interwoven mechanisms employed with various intensities to avert “double defections” at the peak of the locally fought counterinsurgency in Chechnya from 2000 to 2005. These mechanisms are: a) extrajudicial executions of recidivists and their relatives, b) initiation violence targeting insurgents’ relatives, and c) disclosure of the identities of defected insurgents who were responsible for killing insurgents in combat to the families of slain insurgents.     

Terrorism in an Era of Unconventional Warfare

Academic studies of terrorism and mass political violence have developed largely independently of one another. Insurgents, in contrast, have tended to incorporate terrorism tactics along with other types of unconventional warfare in their repertoire of action. This tendency has become more apparent among insurgents engaging in armed confrontations in the twenty-first century. In order to take account of this development, scholars and others interested in contemporary warfare need to incorporate terrorism studies within the broader subject of insurgencies and “small wars”—political violence, in other words.     

Third-Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946–2000

Past studies regarding the success and/or failure of conflict management activities have brought about a wide range of results. In this paper we attempt to gain more definitive conclusions about effectiveness by accomplishing two tasks. First, using a basic theoretical framework we identify expectations of efficacy as they relate to differences between states, coalitions, and IGOs. Second, we also examine the utility of different conflict management techniques in an effort to place in greater perspective the effectiveness of mediation, the most utilized technique of third party intermediaries. Using a new dataset on third-party intermediary behavior in militarized disputes from 1946 to 2000, we find that while all conflict managers are useful in assisting belligerents in reaching a negotiated settlement, IGOs are the most effective. Additionally, while mediation is an effective technique to produce settlements, military intermediary actions, such as peacekeeping, are much more useful.     

Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence

Over half of all civil wars that began and ended between 1944 and 1997 were followed by at least one if not more episodes of civil war. We present a model to explain which characteristics of a civil war and the post-war environment make civil war more or less likely to recur. We test this model with data on civil wars that began and ended between 1944 and 1997. Findings suggest that civil wars are less likely to recur following rebel victories and peace agreements supported by peacekeeping forces. Post-war economic development also reduces the probability of civil war recurrence, and the longer the peace can be sustained, the less likely civil war is to recur. These effects hold regardless of whether the previous war was ethnically based or not, and whether it was secessionist or revolutionary.     

Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace

The invasion of Iraq has been justified, ex post , as for the purpose of promoting the democratic peace. It does not, however, appear to have been a principal goal ex ante . Most democratic peace theorists, moreover, do not endorse democratic regime change by great-power external military intervention. Success is difficult to achieve (usually at high cost), and the conditions in Iraq were not promising even had the occupation been carried out more competently. Greater success in democratization has been achieved by UN peacekeeping operations, and by various regional international organizations using a variety of peaceful measures to ensure free elections, constrain authoritarian leaders, and empower democratic forces. International organizations, notably those whose membership is largely composed of democracies, are especially likely to succeed in promoting democracy.     

Promoting Democracy after Conflict: The Difficult Choices

This article examines the democratic reconstruction model advocated by western countries for postconflict societies. It finds that the model has not been implemented successfully, in part because of a lack of international political will and financial resources, in part because the model has grown too complex. As the international community learned from successive experiences with postconflict reconstruction, the model grew in sophistication and complexity. While this is good in theory, in practice it widens the gap between the ideal and what can actually be accomplished with limited international resources and weak local governments. Even in Bosnia, where international commitment has been large, this maximalist approach to state reconstruction has met with only limited success. The international community must rethink its approach to postconflict reconstruction and scale it down to something that can realistically be achieved.     

The revitalisation of Buddhist peace activism in post-war Cambodia

This article examines the Buddhist peace movements in Cambodia, which are being revitalised after a long silence since the late 1990s. Specifically, it explains how Cambodian Buddhist monks develop and maintain their normative legitimacy and connection with civilian followers by focusing on their approaches to four types of resources: religious authority, cultural knowledge, social networks, and new communication technology. Through the analysis, the study aims to offer empirical examples of religious leaders’ strategies for promoting peace activism and to demonstrate an ideal type of locally owned peace-building promoted in post-conflict contexts, both of which are rarely available in the existing literature.