Climate change coalition formation and equilibrium strategies in mitigation games in the post-Kyoto Era

This paper analyzes the formation of country coalitions in the context of international negotiations on climate change mitigation and simulates the emergence of an equilibrium solution in this game-theoretic framework, while accounting for the interplay with external influences. Coalition formation is gauged through clustering analysis on multiple factors including natural, economic, and social factors, RCPs, and other aspects. Projected emission is found to be the main determinant in forming coalitions, and the USA, EU, China?+?India, and the rest of the world constitute the four-coalition configuration that is stable across different scenarios. Under this base configuration, the Regional Integrated Climate-Economy model for Coalition Game model is implemented to assess the sensitivity of equilibrium solutions to parameter uncertainties, sanctions on non-mitigation, and adjustments in coalition composition. The main conclusion of the game simulations is that no coalition would adopt a mitigation strategy at the Nash equilibrium if no penalty is in place. The Nash equilibrium remains stable even when the climatic and economic parameters are disturbed. As an alternative to the conventional game, an external sanction is imposed on coalitions that choose not to mitigate climate change; in this scenario, climate change mitigation propagates across coalitions according to various sanction levels. The paper also shows that a social welfare compensation between two coalitions may alter the equilibrium game strategy depending on whether the compensation outweighs the welfare loss from mitigation.     

Attainability of International Environmental Agreements as a Social Situation

This paper applies the theory of social situations to study whether international environmental agreements (IEAs), mainly those on greenhouse gas emission reductions, can be attained. A game theoretic model is generally a black box for decision makers, where the mechanisms, which lead to solution(s) of the game, are not explicitly pointed out. This paper opens this black box by making the (institutional) move rules explicit. The usual pessimistic outcome with an ineffective and small size of stable coalitions among world regions is countered. Our model challenges conventional wisdom in the sense that large coalitions are possible outcomes of the cartel game, namely by incorporating: (1) farsightedness, and (2) coalitional moves with commitment as an alternative to myopic and individual moves which characterise the cartel game. We show that even if the international negotiations on climate change mitigation are modelled as an n-person prisoner's dilemma, one cannot rule out cooperation among world regions as a solution of the game. Indeed, in most analysed situations the grand coalition is among the solutions of the game. This shows that predictions based on cartel stability may be too pessimistic if it comes to analysing incentives to cooperate in implementing international environmental policy. Moreover, in an empirically calibrated model, we find three out of six instances where Russia (with or without the US) has an incentive to sign the Kyoto protocol.     

Technology investment, bargaining, and international environmental agreements

If countries are to engage in international environmental cooperation, they must bargain over the distribution of gains. When future bargaining over pollution abatement is expected, how should a country decide on public technology investments to reduce the domestic cost of pollution abatement? I find that while countries tend to underinvest because they fail to internalize the global benefits of new technology, the magnitude of the problem depends on a country’s bargaining power. Powerful countries underinvest less frequently, because they expect to reap most of the global benefits from new technology in the international negotiations. I also investigate the effectiveness of a simple reciprocal technology agreement. I find that it can help solve the underinvestment problem, and this beneficial effect is particularly pronounced in the case of powerful countries. These findings imply that changing the bargaining protocol on climate change to the benefit of powerful countries may help secure the necessary technology investments.     

Climate justice and bargaining coalitions: a discourse analysis

This article adopts a perspective of climate justice as an object of discourse and takes the bargaining coalitions at the Conference of the Parties as the relevant units to map the heterogeneous discourse on climate justice at the Cancun COP16. Based on the statements of nine coalitions, the analysis identifies three discourses on climate justice. The conflict discourse articulates the North–South duality over issues of historical responsibility for climate change. The transition discourse points to solving the problem of sharing the cost of mitigating climate change through a process of global low-carbon growth. The vulnerability discourse focuses on the urgency of ambitious actions by all parties. These three discourses, and their appropriation by the bargaining coalitions, are inherent of new alignments among developed and developing countries alliances and blocs that simultaneously reproduce and surpass the North–South ideological divide.     

Technology spillovers and stability of international climate coalitions

Cooperation in international environmental agreements appears difficult to attain because of strong free-rider incentives. This paper explores how different technology spillover mechanisms among regions can influence the incentives to join and stabilise an international agreement. We use an applied modelling framework (STACO) that enables us to investigate the stability of partial climate coalitions. Several theories on the impact of technology spillovers are evaluated by simulating a range of alternative specifications. We find that spillovers are a good instrument to increase the abatement efforts of coalitions and reduce the associated costs. In our setting, however, they cannot overcome the strong free-rider incentives that are present in larger coalitions, i.e. technology spillovers do not substantially increase the success of international environmental agreements. This conclusion is robust with respect to the specification of technology spillovers.

Measures to enhance the success of global climate treaties

We analyze important forces that hamper the formation of successful self-enforcing agreements to mitigate global warming from an economic point of view. The analysis combines two modules: (a) an integrated assessment model that captures the feedback between the economy, environmental damages and the climate system and (b) a game theoretic model that determines stable coalitions in the presence of free-riding incentives. We consider two types of measures to enhance the success of international environmental treaty-making: (a) transfers, aiming at balancing asymmetric gains from cooperation; (b) institutional changes, aiming at making it more difficult to upset stability of a treaty. We find that institutional changes may be as important as transfers and should therefore receive more attention in future international negotiations.

Abolition of plea bargaining in the coast guard

In the administration of criminal justice, the abolition or restriction of plea bargaining has raised many issues. Of primary concern is the impact on court systems and case dispositions. This research note looks at the Coast Guard military justice system and its 1975 decision to abolish pretrial agreements, effectively eliminating plea bargaining in that system. Studying criminal cases from 1973 to 1978, we determine if that intervention in a time series exhibits any potency. Specifically, what difference did the abolition of plea bargaining make? We find that the abolition of plea bargaining did not make much of a difference to the Coast Guard military justice system, similar to the conclusions drawn from studies of civilian courts.     

How empirical uncertainties influence the stability of climate coalitions

International climate agreements are negotiated in the face of uncertainties concerning the costs and benefits of abatement and in the presence of incentives for free-riding. Numerical climate coalition models provide estimates of the challenges affecting cooperation, but often resort to assuming certainty with respect to the values of model parameters. We study the impact of uncertainty on the stability of coalitions in the Model of International Climate Agreements using the technique of Monte Carlo analysis. We extend the existing literature by (1) calibrating parametric uncertainty about damages and abatement costs to estimates from meta-studies and by (2) explicitly considering uncertainty in the curvature of the damage function. We find that stability is more sensitive to uncertainty in damages than in abatement costs and most sensitive to uncertainty about the regional distribution of damages. Our calculations suggest that heterogeneity can increase stability of coalitions; however, this depends on the availability of transfers.     

International Environmental Agreements for biodiversity conservation: a game-theoretic analysis

This paper contributes to the emerging literature on International Environmental Agreements with an analysis of key characteristics for biodiversity conservation. We study three features that are specific to an international conservation agreement: the existence of a natural upper bound of conservation in each country, the importance of local benefits, and the subadditivity of the global conservation function. We consider asymmetries in benefits and costs of conservation and, separately, in the upper bound of conservation in each country, and we examine the impacts of these features on coalition stability and on the effectiveness of biodiversity agreements. Results show that subadditivity of the global conservation function can lead to larger stable coalitions. The inclusion of a transfer scheme that might be implemented through, e.g., international trade of biodiversity credits, can have an impact on coalition composition and can improve conservation outcomes and the size of stable coalitions in certain ranges of the parameter space.     

Bounded rationality and social interaction in negotiating a climate agreement

An agreement on climate change mitigation hinges on large-scale international cooperation. Rational agents are supposed to consider the cost and benefits of cooperation, which then determine their negotiation positions. Behavioral economics provides experimental evidence that decision-making in negotiation-like situations is influenced by systematic cognitive biases and social interaction. In this paper, we examine the impact of bounded rationality and social preferences on bargaining in international climate negotiations and illustrate how particular deviations from full rationality affect the incentives to cooperate. Of special interest are fairness preferences for burden-sharing rules and behavioral responses to different framings of climate change and policy, as well as implications of these for communication about climate change. The analysis will further address different levels of representation, including individual citizens, politicians, experts, and (professional) negotiators. The consequences of the most prominent nonstandard preferences and biases for negotiating a climate treaty are assessed, and specific strategies to foster cooperation are suggested.     

Investigating the determinants of pretrial settlement rates: contingent versus non-contingent lawyers’ fees

In this article, we explore the possibility that the percentage of litigations settled outside of court is affected by the degree of contingency of lawyers’ fees. In our view, a litigation is a game where not only the plaintiff and the defendant, but also their lawyers are independent players. The main consequence of this assumption is that the authority to settle is allocated endogenously to either the clients or their lawyers, depending on the value of the relevant parameters. In this game theoretical setup, (1) we compare the incentives to settle provided by contingent and non-contingent lawyers’ fees, and (2) we state the conditions under which settlement is more likely to happen.      

Plea bargaining with budgetary constraints

In this paper, we construct a simple model that illustrates a perverse effect associated with plea bargaining in which an increase in sanctions can lead to reduced deterrence. This finding is derived from the interaction of binding budgetary constraints and plea bargaining. In an environment with these institutional features, higher sanctions are not always optimal when resources are limited, even if such sanctions are costless. Such potential phenomena may be useful in explaining the fact that many states have introduced limitations on plea bargaining. Prosecutors being concerned with their conviction rates is necessary for such a result to be present.     

Plans established or maintained pursuant to collective bargaining agreements under section 3(40)(A)--Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration. Notice of intent to form a negotiated rulemaking advisory committee

The Department of Labor (Department) intends to form a Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Committee (Committee) in accordance with the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 and the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The Committee will negotiate the development of a proposed rule implementing the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461 (ERISA). The purpose of the proposed rule is to establish a process and criteria for a finding by the Secretary of Labor that an agreement is a collective bargaining agreement for purposes of section 3(40) of ERISA. The proposed rule will also provide guidance for determining when an employee benefit plan is established or maintained under or pursuant to such an agreement. Employee benefit plans that are established or maintained for the purpose of providing benefits to the employees of more than one employer are "multiple employer welfare arrangements" under section 3(40) of ERISA, and therefore are subject to certain state regulations, unless they meet one of the exceptions set forth in section 3(40)(A). At issue in this regulation is the exception for plans or arrangements that are established or maintained under one or more agreements which the Secretary finds to be collective bargaining agreements. If adopted, the proposed rule would affect employee welfare benefit plans, their sponsors, participants and beneficiaries, as well as service providers to plans. It may also affect plan fiduciaries, unions, employer organizations, the insurance industry, and state insurance regulators.     

The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey

This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process impacts different stages of agreement formation and stability. We distinguish the rules defined during pre-negotiations that govern negotiations, ratification and implementation. Strategic delegation and lobbying are directly relevant during the negotiation and ratification phases. Implementation, the choice of policy instruments at the national level, will also be impacted by lobbying and indirectly influence negotiations. We find that the basic theoretical framework for the analysis of international environmental agreements is largely unrelated to empirical approaches. Furthermore, we observe that models of the political process of agreement formation, like for example sequential game models, are yet to be developed.     

Freedom to bargain and disputes’ resolution

When two parties are embedded in a dispute, they generally have the possibility to bargain before an external solution is imposed to them, notably through alternative dispute resolution. This bargaining phase may either result from a choice of disputants to negotiate or be imposed by laws or legal contracts. The aim of this paper is to analyze the differences in terms of parties’ bargaining behavior, depending upon the fact that bargaining has been imposed to them or comes from their own will. We conduct an experimental analysis and find out that, under some conditions, a procedure in which parties are forced to bargain leads to more agreements than when parties are free whether to do so. This main result is interpreted in the light of behavioral economics.     

In defense of criminal defense expenditures and plea bargaining

Given the continuing controversy over defendants' buying justice through defense expenditures, this paper shows that disparities in criminal defense expenditures can insure that it is the guilty and not the innocent who will be punished. Our model allows defense and prosecution expenditures to be simultaneously determined. We show that criminal defense expenditures result in lower expected penalties for the innocent at trial and that they helo ensure that plea bargaining efficiently screens defendants even when differential risk aversion is present. Finally, we examine how differences in defendant's wealth and the use of public defenders affect the legal system's ability to differentiate the innocent from the guilty.     

Credible plea bargaining

This paper demonstrates that the role of plea bargaining as a screening device depends neither on the commitment to trial nor on the commitment to some prosecutorial expenditures. In a situation where a prosecutor cannot commit to trial nor spends resources to obtain more evidence, I find a semi-separating equilibrium in which the prosecutor makes an offer that can be accepted only by the guilty defendant with some positive probability, and then, if the offer is rejected, he proceeds to trial, based on his updated belief. I also consider the prosecutor’s decision to choose the amount of (per capita) prosecutorial expenditures both in the commitment case and in the noncommitment case, and argue that an increase in the per capita expenditure may reduce the gross expenditures on prosecution by lowering the chance of trial.     

Enhancing climate resilience of transboundary water allocation agreements: the impact of shortening the agreement’s lifetime on cooperation stability

Efficient use of transboundary rivers under climate change requires periodic adaptation of their governing regime to the hydrological realities of the basin. Applying a short-term time horizon to an agreement on water allocation can make it easier for the riparian states to update the terms of their cooperation periodically, and thus, adapt them to changes in water availability resulting from climate change. However, agreements with a pre-agreed termination date can only increase the efficiency of water use if they lead to a stable cooperation. In this paper, I analyze how riparian states’ previous knowledge of the termination date of a water allocation agreement affects the agreement’s stability. The results show that when riparian states are aware of the agreement’s termination date, there is a higher chance for them to free-ride. However, certain cases may occur in which previous knowledge of the agreement’s termination date can contribute to the stability of an agreement by enforcing compliance.     

The role of the Asia Pacific Partnership in discursive contestation of the international climate regime

After withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol, the US Bush Administration and the Australian Howard Government pursued an international climate change policy focussed on voluntary international agreements outside the UN climate negotiations. This strategy included the formation of several climate agreements directed at technology development, including the 2005 Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP). The APP provides a model for international climate change policy directed at voluntary national greenhouse gas intensity targets, technology development through sectoral public–private partnerships and technology diffusion through trade. This article situates the APP within these US and Australian inspired climate agreements formed outside the UN negotiations. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand’s (in M. Pettenger (ed.) The social construction of climate change: power knowledge norms discourses, 2007) discourse analysis in relation to the international climate negotiations is used to explore differences between the APP and UN climate treaties. We find the APP embodies a discourse of what we call ‘deregulatory ecological modernisation’ that promotes limited public funding to ease informational failures in markets for cleaner technologies and management practices. The deregulatory ecological modernisation discourse is a deeply intensive market liberal approach to international climate change policy, which contests binding emission reduction targets and the development of a global carbon market. The USA, Australia, Japan and Canada represented a core group of countries that used the APP to promote the deregulatory ecological modernisation discourse and thereby contest any deepening of developed nations' emission reduction targets for the post-2012 period. However, with changes of leadership and new parties in power in the USA and Australia, it appears that the deregulatory ecological modernisation discourse has lost ground compared to a reengagement with discourses supportive of developed country emission reduction targets and equity-based adaptation and technology transfer assistance for developing nations.     

Technology transfer negotiations: Determinants of MNEs' bargaining power

Technology is, perhaps, the most desirable attribute of multinational enterprises (MNEs) to the less developed countries (LDCs) and constitutes their primary source of bargaining power. Similarly, the attractiveness of a market to the MNEs constitutes LDCs' principal source of negotiating strength in dealing with MNEs on such matters as the conditions for investment and technology transfer. What is unclear is how these independent variables are most successfully utilized. The aim of this paper is to identify and examine the bargaining power variables and their level of influence in technology transfer negotiations. The result shows that though technology is always a source of negotiating strength to MNEs, locational attractiveness may not always be a significant source of bargaining power to LDCs in all negotiations with multinational enterprises.