School climate and delinquency – on the significance of the perceived social and learning climate in school for refraining from offending

School is regarded as a central arena for crime prevention. This study analyses the effects of student perceptions of school contextual aspects on self-reported offending, using logistic regression with control for clustering effects. The data comprise a census of pupils in year nine in comprehensive school (15 year olds) and in year two of upper secondary school (17 year olds) in the City of Stockholm in 2006, 2008 and 2010 (n = 25,850 of which 47% are boys and 53% are girls). Besides showing that several aspects of students’ perceptions of the school setting have direct protective effects on offending, the study shows that perceiving schoolwork as meaningful appears to moderate the effect of adverse home conditions on delinquency for boys. The only aspect of school investigated in this study that was not significantly related to offending was the perception of classroom order, indicating that emotional support from teachers is more important for crime preventive implications than maintaining order in the classroom. Controlling for clustering effects shows differences in offending between classes and schools that are not produced by differences between the students.     

Youth victimization: school climate or deviant lifestyles?

Despite much focus on school violence, there has been little research that explores the relationship between offending and victimization in various school climates. School climate theory suggests that the school's social system, culture, milieu, and ecological structure affect student outcomes including academic performance, delinquency, and more recently, victimization. Hierarchical analysis of data from 5,037 11th-grade students in 33 schools found that offending behavior was the strongest predictor for both minor and more serious forms of victimization. School climate, specifically the social cohesion of schools, reduced serious violent victimization risk. However, school climate did not affect the relationship between offending and victimization, and was not substantially modified when characteristics of the school environment were considered.     

Side-payments: an effective instrument for building climate clubs?

Climate clubs have been suggested as a gateway to substantial reductions in global emissions. The club approach begins with a small number of enthusiastic countries. This paper asks under what conditions such clubs are likely to evolve into effective cooperation through side-payments to new members. The question is addressed through a range of formal thought experiments using numerical simulations. The model is calibrated using empirical data on countries’ emissions, GDP, populations, and vulnerabilities. It is simple and stylized, but allows for complex and dynamic interactions between actors. Basic equity considerations can be accommodated. The results indicate that side-payments’ theoretical potential for facilitating effective clubs is large. One or two large emitters can initiate a club that grows to cover a substantial share of global emissions if the global benefit–cost ratio for mitigation is around 3 or larger. The size of stable clubs is larger if new members contribute to making side-payments, and somewhat lower if equity considerations constrain the set of possible transfers. Side-payments’ effect is enabled by the large asymmetries between countries. Total side-payment flows range from tens to hundreds of billions of US dollars annually.     

China and India’s participation in global climate negotiations

In this paper, we discuss a range of issues concerning developing country participation in current global climate change mitigation negotiations, especially India and China. We argue that the problem of redefining ‘common yet differentiated responsibilities’ in a way which allows developing countries room to pursue their individual development goals while still achieving the necessary level of carbon mitigation is central to the debate. The choice of negotiating instruments, effective technology transfer and financial support, and other related issues have been raised principally by China and India, and may also be raised by several other countries. Kyoto non-compliance by Annex 1 countries will also greatly impact the negotiating power of China and India and other developing countries. We conclude that, once basic principles are clearly defined, the greatest incentive for China and India to participate in climate change negotiations is the prospect of future negotiating rounds that can be linked to a large number of climate change related issues, such as intellectual property, the potential for financial transfers and trade/market access.     

Australian climate policy and the Asia Pacific partnership on clean development and climate (APP). From Howard to Rudd: continuity or change?

This article explains, first, why Australia’s government under John Howard, together with the United States Bush administration initiated the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) and, second, why the succeeding Rudd government continued to support this initiative. Climate policy under the conservative Howard government (1995–2007) in Australia was largely dictated by fossil fuel and mineral sector interests, and reflected a close alliance with the Bush administration. The Howard government shunned the Kyoto Protocol, refused to set national binding greenhouse gas reduction targets and preferred voluntary cooperative measures with industry. The APP was part of the Howard government’s strategy to demonstrate some policy movement on climate change while postponing serious action. Climate change was a key issue in the election of the Rudd Labor government in Australia in December 2007. The Rudd government quickly ratified Kyoto, adopted emission reduction targets, and moved to introduce emissions trading. The Rudd government’s decision to continue involvement with the APP, albeit with diminished funding, was a pragmatic one. The APP was supported by industry and provided bridges to China and India—both key countries in the post-2012 UNFCCC negotiations. Finally, in order to assess the long-term outlook of the APP, the article provides a preliminary assessment as to whether the APP advances technology transfer.

‘Multicolored’ green criminology and climate change’s achromatopsia

While green criminology may be an effective name or label for the sub-field or perspective within criminology that considers a wide range of environmental issues, it is, in reality, a ‘multicolored green’ – a criminology that engages a spectrum of issues, that reflects the interests of some racial groups more than others, that reveals and analyzes environmental harms which disproportionately impact some racial groups more than others, and that can be approached from a number of vantage points or that can be viewed with variously tinted lenses. This article begins with an overview of climate change, including a discussion of its anticipated impacts and indicators of its already-being-felt effects. It then offers some general comments on the disproportionate impact of environmental threats and harms before turning to a discussion of the present and anticipated distributional impacts of climate change. Here, this article argues that climate change is, in effect, achromatopsic – it is color-blind, in that it affects us all regardless of skin color – but that those impacts will be distributed unevenly/unequally and that various groups are and will continue to be in different positions to adapt to climate change. This article concludes by suggesting that while the environmental harms caused by climate change are real – and the risks and threats they pose tangible and serious – climate change presents an exciting challenge for our creative potential as humans. In the process of reducing our consumption of fossil fuels and stabilizing (or, better yet, reducing) our greenhouse gas emissions, we might better assist those geopolitical regions most at risk (i.e. poor, developing countries) to become more resilient – an approach that is necessary for both the physical health of the planet and the prospects for social justice.     

The socialization potential of the CDM in EU–China climate relations

This article hypothesizes that the material incentives associated with the clean development mechanism (CDM) have contributed to the internalization of climate protection norms in China. In current academic research, the CDM has both been extolled as a cost-effective and vilified as an environmentally and ethically inadequate climate mitigation instrument. Few studies so far, however, have looked into the CDM’s potential contribution to socialization-related phenomena such as raising climate change awareness in emerging economies. The relationship with the EU is highly relevant in this context, as the emission reduction credits (CERs) resulting from CDM projects would not have had any meaningful prices without the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). This article aims to fill the current research gap by studying the socialization potential of the CDM in EU–China climate relations in four periods, namely initiation (2001–2005), improvement (2005–2007), consolidation (2008–2010) and habit formation (2010–2014). We argue that there is at least a discernible effect and that the underlying causal mechanism involves the emergence and activities of norm entrepreneurs and habit formation through a process of legal institutionalization.     

Framework for the future? Exploring the possibility of majority voting in the climate negotiations

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is struggling in its attempts to address the threat of anthropogenic climate change and create an effective international climate agreement. A substantial part of the problem is consensus decision-making within the Convention. Majority voting is a potential alternative which is already being discussed within the UNFCCC. A comparative analysis of consensus and majority voting suggests that majority voting is superior in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness by allowing for quicker decision-making and semi-global approaches to a climate agreement (termed here as “Critical Mass Governance”). This paper aims to investigate how majority voting could be implemented in the UNFCCC and to consider politically feasible and effective approaches to voting arrangements for the Convention. There is a legal opportunity to introduce voting through adoption of the draft Rules of Procedure, but this faces political opposition. A type of Layered Majority Voting with larger majorities for financial and substantial matters is considered to be the optimal approach in balancing political feasibility and effectiveness. For now, voting is not politically feasible for the UNFCCC, but could be introduced into future bodies or treaties under the Convention.     

Market-based mechanism and ‘climate justice’: reframing the debate for a way forward

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - The Paris Agreement on climate change recognizes, reluctantly albeit, the importance of ‘climate justice’ in its...     

Japan’s position in international climate policy: navigating between Kyoto and the APP

The emergence of technology-oriented agreements such as the 2005 Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) may have significant implications for the future of global climate governance, as these agreements could be perceived as an alternative for the existing international climate regime. It is, therefore, important to examine what has moved countries to be involved in these agreements alongside the UN climate regime. This article seeks to identify possible factors contributing to Japan’s participation in both the UN climate regime and the APP, looking at the position of domestic interest groups, the distribution of climate policy-making at the government level and varying international pressures. It concludes that Japan’s participation in both the APP and the UN climate regime flows from a policy-making process that tries to accommodate conflicting viewpoints at the domestic and international levels. To what extent Japan’s participation in both fora can be regarded as constructive will depend on the partnership’s ability to support the implementation of a future climate regime.

Open or closed meetings? Explaining nonstate actor involvement in the international climate change negotiations

When do states allow nonstate actors (NSAs) to observe negotiations at intergovernmental meetings? Previous studies have identified the need for states to close negotiations when the issues under discussion are sensitive. This paper argues that sensitivity alone cannot adequately explain the dynamic of closing down negotiations to observers. Questions that have received little attention in the literature include which issues are considered sensitive and how the decision is made to move the negotiations behind closed doors. This paper examines the practices of NSA involvement in climate diplomacy from three analytical perspectives: functional efficiency, political dynamics, and historical institutionalism. Based on interviews and UNFCCC documents, this paper suggests that to understand the issue of openness in negotiations, institutional factors and the politics of NSA involvement need to be better scrutinized. The paper shows that each perspective has particular advantages when analyzing different dimensions of the negotiations, with implications of how we understand the role of NSAs in global environmental governance.     

China in the Asia–Pacific Partnership: consequences for UN climate change mitigation efforts?

This article discusses China’s motives for participation in the Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), and whether this has or will have consequences for its participation and efforts in the UN track of international climate governance. In order to discuss these issues, it also provides an outline of key national priorities and explains the nature of China’s involvement in both the UN track and the APP. It suggests that the APP is a complement to the UN process, not a competitor, in the case of China. APP participation represents a win–win situation in terms of the transfer of technology and know-how for solving challenges related to energy security and greenhouse gas emissions. For the Chinese leadership, this seems preferable to taking on UN commitments which it fears would impede economic development. The APP’s projects also seem to complement the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism project in China. This article argues that there is little indication that China would make less of an effort under the UN track.

Can intellectual property rights within climate technology transfer work for the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement?

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - Since the UNFCCC 1992 mandated technology transfer commitments, how to fulfil the commitments and effectively facilitate the...     

Small island developing states and international climate change negotiations: the power of moral “leadership”

Being at the frontline of climate change, small island developing states (SIDS) hold a serious stake in climate negotiations. However, these countries usually are marginalized in the international political arena, due to their lack of structural power. This paper explores the strategic influence of SIDS and its representative organization, the Alliance of Small Island States, in the negotiations leading to the Copenhagen summit of December 2009. Using the concepts of leadership and discourses, the position, strategies, and impact of SIDS are analyzed on negotiation processes and their final outcome, focusing on three core demands of small island countries at Copenhagen: a temperature rise limit of 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels, funding for adaptation, and a legally binding outcome. Results reveal that SIDS practiced entrepreneurial, intellectual, and environmental leadership strategies and especially made use of moral claims in the debate. Given their near absence of structural power, they managed to secure a surprisingly large part of “their” agenda and interests in the final Copenhagen Accord, especially through (discourse) coalitions with various other state and non-state stakeholders.     

Transitions in the negotiations on climate change: from prisoner’s dilemma to chicken and beyond

Frequently, international environmental negotiations have been analyzed in two-agent (2 × 2) games. Yet, in order to involve additional strategies, (3 × 3) games gained attention recently. We employ such a (3 × 3) game setting in order to depict international negotiations on climate change and integrate both the prisoner’s dilemma and the chicken games in this setting. We analyze transitions of negotiation states and describe how ancillary benefits and first-mover advantages influence agents’ behavior in the negotiations, when three different strategies or levels of climate protection efforts are available. Finally, we also integrate strategies to mitigate and to adapt to climate change into the analysis in the (3 × 3) game setting.     

“A different world” exploring and understanding the climate of a recently re-rolled sexual offender prison

Understanding how sexual offenders experience prison and its environment is important because such experiences can impact on rehabilitation outcomes. The purpose of this research investigation was to explore the rehabilitative and therapeutic climate of a recently re-rolled sexual offender prison. The research took a mixed methods approach and consisted of quantitative and qualitative phases. There were differences between prisoners and staff on their perception of the prison climate and for prisoner and staff relationships. The qualitative results helped to explain the quantitative findings and added a more nuanced understanding of the experience of the prison, the nature of prisoner and staff relationships and the opportunities for personal growth within the prison. The study has important implications for prisons that co-locate sexual offenders and want to provide an environment conducive to rehabilitation.     

An agenda for change in U.S. climate policies? Presidential ambitions and congressional powers

The U.S. membership in the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) constituted an important element in the Bush administration’s voluntary and non-committing ‘soft-law’ approach to climate change. With the inauguration of President Barack Obama, the U.S. has embarked on a shift in its climate policy towards a legislative, ‘hard-law’ strategy. Obama’s approach implies that the distribution of interests in Congress becomes more significant. In this article, we assess the rules and procedures governing the relationship between the president and the Congress embedded in the U.S. Constitution and explore implications of a stronger congressional involvement in U.S. climate policies for President Obama’s ability to realise his climate policy ambitions at both the domestic and the international levels. We argue that the strong relationship between natural resource dependence (coal and oil) and opposition to climate policies is a constant feature of the U.S. climate policy debate. In order to succeed, Obama must break the enduring gridlock characterising congressional debate in this policy area by designing policies that, through compromise and compensation, can mobilise the support of oil- and coal-state representatives in Congress. The acceptability of an international climate treaty in Congress, moreover, depends inter alia on the resolution of the difficult issue of developing country participation. Success may be enhanced by using the APP and the Major Economies Initiative as informal arenas for negotiation and sector-based cooperation, thus providing a much-needed supplement to the UN-based negotiation process.

Limiting costs or correcting market failures? Finance ministries and frame alignment in UN climate finance negotiations

Finance ministries are increasingly involved in UN climate finance negotiations, yet this development received very limited attention in the literature on climate finance or climate negotiations. It is not obvious from the literature on bureaucratic politics how these ministries will position themselves on climate finance: they may frame climate finance as expenditure to be limited or as an instrument for correcting the market failure of climate change. This paper investigates which frames have characterised the positions of finance ministries on key issues in the climate finance negotiations, and whether the use of a given frame corresponds to particular factors. Case studies of Denmark, India, Indonesia and the USA based on official documents and interviews show that the position of each finance ministry is generally consistent with one particular frame. The Indonesian and Danish finance ministries predominantly framed climate finance as a way of correcting a market failure. The Indian Ministry of Finance emphasised Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, which fits with the budget frame. The US Treasury’s position similarly fits with the budget frame while sharing elements of the market failure frame. Finance ministries that had the lead on climate finance were more likely follow the budget frame. The use of both frames cuts across the divide between industrialised and emerging economies. With the exception of the USA, left- and right-wing governments were equally likely to adopt either frame. These findings indicate that strengthening finance ministry forums built around the market failure frame can be a way of reducing norm fragmentation.