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1.
The aim of this paper is to clarify how Śālikanātha’s epistemology can be distinguished from that of Dharmakīrti, especially
in terms of their respective views on cognitive form (ākāra). It has been pointed out that Śālikanātha’s tripuṭī theory and svayaṃprakāśa theory are very close to Dharmakīrti’s epistemology. However, it remains questionable if Śālikanātha, who belongs to the
Prābhākara branch of the Mīmāṃsā and is therefore a nirākāravādin, can subscribe to notions that Dharmakīrti developed on the basis of sākāravāda. The present paper concludes that Śālikanātha agrees with Dharmakīrti in assuming that a single cognition consists of three
parts; unlike Dharmakīrti, however, Śālikanātha puts emphasis on the difference between these parts, especially between the
cognition and its form, on the ground that the cognitive form belongs to the external thing, and not to the cognition (nirākāravāda). In Dharmakīrti’s epistemology, the cognitive form belongs to cognition (sākāravāda); in the ultimate level, there remains no difference between the three parts. 相似文献
2.
Deven M. Patel 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2011,39(1):101-122
This paper brings kāmaśāstra into conversation with poetics (alaṅkāraśāstra) and modes of literary criticism associated with
Sanskrit literature (kāvya). It shows how historical intersections between kāvya, kāmaśāstra, and alaṅkāraśāstra have produced
insightful cross-domain typologies to understand the nature and value of canonical works of Sanskrit literature. In addition
to exploring kāmaśāstra typologies broadly as conceptual models and analytical categories useful in literary-critical contexts,
this paper takes up a specific formulation from the kāmaśāstra (the padminī-citriṇī-śaṅkhinī-hastinī type-casting of females)
used by a twentieth century literary critic to frame the relationships between canonical poets of Sanskrit literature. 相似文献
3.
4.
This paper examines the role of pramāṇa in Jayānanda’s commentary to Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra. As the only extant Indian commentary on any of Candrakīrti’s works (available only in Tibetan translation), written in the
twelfth century when Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Madhyamaka first became widely valued, Jayānanda’s Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā is crucial to our understanding of early Prāsaṅgika thought. In the portions of his text examined here, Jayānanda offers
a pointed critique of both svatantra inferences and the broader Buddhist epistemological movement. In developing this critique, he cites at length Candrakīrti’s
Prasannapadā treatment of svatantra, and so comes to comment on the locus classicus for the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction. For Jayānanda, svatantra inferences are emblematic of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti epistemological tradition, which asserts an unwarranted validity to
human cognition. As such, Nāgārjuna’s philosophy admits neither svatantra inference, nor pramāṇa (as “valid cognition”) more generally. Instead, Jayānanda argues for Nāgārjuna’s “authority” (pramāṇa) as our prime means for knowing reality. Jayānanda’s account of authority offers a helpful counterbalance to the current
trend of portraying Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka as a form of skepticism. 相似文献
5.
Douglas Osto 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2009,37(3):273-290
This article argues for a new interpretation of the Sanskrit compound gaṇḍa-vyūha as it is used in the common title of the Mahāyāna text the Gaṇḍavyūha-Sūtra.The author begins by providing a brief history of the sūtra’s appellations in Chinese and Tibetan sources. Next, the meanings
of gaṇḍa (the problematic member of the compound) are explored. The author proposes that contemporary scholars have overlooked
a meaning of gaṇḍa occurring in some compounds, wherein gaṇḍa can mean simply “great,” “big” or “massive.” This general sense is particularly common in the compound gaṇda-śaila (a “massive rock” or “boulder”) and is found in such texts as the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Harivaṃśa and the Harṣacarita. Following the discussion of Gaṇḍa, the author examines the term vyūha (“array”) as it is used in the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra. The article concludes with the suggestion that a more appropriate translation of the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra would be “The Supreme array Scripture.” 相似文献
6.
In Tibet, the negative dialectics of Madhyamaka are typically identified with Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Nāgārjuna, and
systematic epistemology is associated with Dharmakīrti. These two figures are also held to be authoritative commentators on
a univocal doctrine of Buddhism. Despite Candrakīrti’s explicit criticism of Buddhist epistemologists in his Prasannapadā, Buddhists in Tibet have integrated the theories of Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti in unique ways. Within this integration,
there is a tension between the epistemological system-building on the one hand, and “deconstructive” negative dialectics on
the other. The integration of an epistemological system within Madhyamaka is an important part of Mipam’s (’ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912) philosophical edifice, and is an important part of understanding the place of Yogācāra in his tradition. This
paper explores the way that Mipam preserves a meaningful Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction while claiming both Yogācāra and
Prāsaṅgika as legitimate expressions of Madhyamaka. Mipam represents Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka as a discourse that emphasizes
what transcends conceptuality. As such, he portrays Prāsaṅgika as a radical discourse of denial. Since the mind cannot conceive
the “content” of nonconceptual meditative equipoise, Prāsaṅgika, as the representative discourse of meditative equipoise,
negates any formulation of that state. In contrast, he positions Yogācāra as a discourse that situates the nonconceptual within
a systematic (conceptual) structure. Rather than a discourse that re-presents the nonconceptual by enacting it (like Prāsaṅgika),
the discourse of Yogācāra represents the nonconceptual within an overarching system, a system (unlike Prāsaṅgika) that distinguishes
between the conceptual and the nonconceptual. 相似文献
7.
Daniel Raveh 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2008,36(2):319-333
The article offers a close reading of the famous upanişadic story of Indra, Virocana and Prajāpati from the eighth chapter
of the Chāndogya-Upanişad versus Śankara’s bhāşya, with special reference to the notions of suşupti and turīya. That Śankara is not always loyal to the Upanişadic texts is a well-known fact. That the Upanişads are (too) often read
through Śan-kara’s Advaitic eyes is also known. The following lines will not merely illustrate the gap between text and commentary
but will also reveal an unexpected Upanişadic depiction of ‘dreamless sleep’ and ‘transcendental consciousness’. Suşupti is described here as ‘one step too far’, as a ‘break’ or discontinuity in one’s consciousness; whereas turīya is depicted positively, and surprisingly even in wordly terms. Unlike the third state of consciousness in which there is
no ‘world’ nor ‘me’, and which is described through Indra’s character as ‘total destruction’ (vināśa); in turīya, the world ‘comes back’, or rather the ‘renouncer’ returns to the world. Sankara’s position, as far as the story under discussion
is concerned, is radically different. For him, the Upanişadic story illustrates the continuity of consciousness in all its states. For him, the identification with merely one of the consciousness-states
is an error (adhyāsa) which causes suffering. Consciousness prevails even in suşupti, and turīya has nothing to do with ‘coming back to the world’, since there is nowhere to come back from or to. Turīya, as seen by the Advaitin, consists of all the other states of consciousness together, or as K. C. Bhattacharyya puts it,
‘It is not only a stage among stages; it is the truth of the other stages’.
The article is dedicated to Prof. Daya Krishna (1924-2007). 相似文献
8.
Said Pournaghash-Tehrani 《Journal of family violence》2011,26(2):93-99
The purpose of the present article was to determine the ability of cognitive factors (beliefs and attitudes) and adverse childhood
experiences to predict men’s reactions towards their spouses’ violence. To do so, 120 males who had referred to family court
to seek divorce due to spouses’ violence were randomly selected and an author’s -made questionnaire containing 27 subscales
was administered to them. Four of the 27 subscales comprised of 22 questions regarding “types of reactions towards spouses’
violence”, “attitudes towards spouse”, and “experiencing family violence during childhood”. Our results showed that witnessing
violence during childhood could positively predict reactions such as “cessation of relationship” and “reprisal”. Men’s beliefs
regarding “permission to use violence” could positively predict reaction such as “cessation of relationship”. Furthermore,
factors such as “Believing his wife is more knowledgeable” and “Wife’s Physical Appearance” negatively predicted reactions
such as “Cessation of relationship” and “Tolerance”. Also “Man’s perceived career success” positively predicted the reaction
of “Attempts to Resume Relationship”. These results are discussed in the context of the existing literature. 相似文献
9.
John Nemec 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2012,40(2):225-257
In this essay, it is argued that Abhinavagupta’s theory of error, the apūrṇakhyāti theory, synthesizes two distinguishable Pratyabhij?ā treatments of error that were developed in three phases prior to him.
The first theory was developed in two stages, initially by Somānanda in the Śivadṛṣṭi (ŚD) and subsequently by Utpaladeva in his Īśvarapratyabhij?ākārikās (ĪPK) and his short autocommentary thereon, the Īśvarapratyabhij?āvṛtti (ĪPVṛ). This theory served to explain individual acts of misperception, and it was developed with the philosophy of the Buddhist
epistemologists in mind. In a third phase, Utpaladeva developed in his Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti (ŚDVṛ) a second theory of error, one that involved the noncognition of non-duality (abhedākhyāti) and served to explain both the appearance and perception of multiplicity, despite the strict monism to which all Pratyabhij?ā
authors subscribe. Abhinavagupta’s treatment of error, then, is significant not only because it was meant to explain all the
various theories of error offered by opposing philosophical schools, as Rastogi has shown, but more importantly because it
synthesized the thinking of his predecessors on the matter in a single, elegant account of error. 相似文献
10.
The concept of avidyā or ignorance is central to the Advaita Vedāntic position of Śȧnkara. The post-Śaṅkara Advaitins wrote sub-commentaries
on the original texts of Śaṅkara with the intention of strengthening his views. Over the passage of time the views of these
sub-commentators of Śaṅkara came to be regarded as representing the doctrine of Advaita particularly with regard to the concept
of avidyā. Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati, a scholar-monk of Holenarsipur, challenged the accepted tradition through the publication
of his work Mūlāvidyānirāsaḥ, particularly with regard to the avidyādoctrine. It was his contention that the post-Śaṅkara commentators brought their own innovations particularly on the nature
of avidyā. This was the idea of mūlāvidyā or ‘root ignorance’, a positive entity which is the material cause of the phenomenal world. Saraswati argues that such an
idea of mūlāvidyā is not to be found in the bhāṣyas (commentaries) of Śaṅkara and is foisted upon Śaṅkara. This paper attempts to show that although Śaṅkara may not have
explicitly favoured such a view of mūlāvidyā, his lack of clarity on the nature of avidyā left enough scope for the post-Śaṅkara commentators to take such a position on avidyā. 相似文献
11.
Some words occur to us in pairs, often to the extent that wefind it difficult to hear the one without recalling the other.Thus Romeo suggests Juliet; Anthonyinvokes Cleopatra; Héloïsefollows Abélard and so on. Many furtherexamples exist, particularly in the case of lovers. In intellectual property circles the concepts of authorand royalties are also closely linkedbuttheir relationship is strained. While the author's love forroyalties is sincere and undiminished 相似文献
12.
In spite of the fact that the mūla-text of the Cārvākasūtra is lost, we have some 30 fragments of the commentaries written by no fewer than four commentators, namely, Kambalāśvatara,
Purandara, Aviddhakarṇa, and Udbhaṭa. The existence of other commentators too has been suggested, of whom only one name is
mentioned: Bhāvivikta. Unfortunately no extract from his work is quoted anywhere. The position of the Cārvākas was nearer
the Buddhists (who admitted both perception and inference) than any other philosophical system. But in order to brand the
Cārvākas as pramāṇaikavādins they were made to appear as one with Bhartṛhari. Even though the commentators of the Cārvākasūtra had some differences among themselves concerning the interpretation of some aphorisms, they seem to have been unanimous in
regard to the number of pramāṇas to be admitted. It was perception and inference based on perception. Only in this sense they were pramāṇaikavādins. Unlike other systems of philosophy, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata did not accord equal value to perception and inference. Inference,
they said, must be grounded on perception first, so it was of secondary kind (gauṇa). From the available evidence it is clear that the commentators were unanimous in one point, namely, primacy of perception
which includes admittance of such laukika inference as is preceded and hence can be tested by repeated observations. In this respect both Aviddkarṇa and Udbhaṭa were
in agreement with Purandara. Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa or Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa was known as a commentator who differed from the traditional Cārvākas
and broke new grounds in explaining some of the aphorisms. His commentary is creative in its own way but at the same time
unreliable in reconstructing the original Cārvāka position. Udbhaṭa seems to have digressed from the original, monist materialist position by taking a dualist position
concerning the body-consciousness relation. Moreover, he seems to verge on the idealist side in his explication of an aphorism.
In this sense he was a reformist or revisionist. Aviddhakarṇa, like Udbhaṭa, attempted to interpret the Cārvāka aphorisms
from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika point of view, perhaps without being converted to the Cārvāka. Since it is not possible at the present
state of our knowledge to determine whether they were Cārvākas converted to Nyāya or Naiyāyikas converted to Lokāyata, the
suggestion that they simply adopted the Cārvāka position while writing their commentaries without being converted to the Cārvāka,
may be taken as a third alternative. In spite of the meagre material available, it is evident that (1) not unlike the other
systems, there is a lack of uniformity in the commentary tradition of the Cārvākasūtra, (2) not all commentators were committed monistic materialists; at least one, namely, Udbhaṭa, was a dualist, and (3) in
course of time Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terminology, such as gamya, gamaka, etc., quite foreign to the traditional Cārvāka, has been introduced into the Cārvāka system. 相似文献
13.
Sthaneshwar Timalsina 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2009,37(3):189-206
The literature of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana attention in contemporary times. The writings of the prominent linguistic philosopher
and grammarian Bhartṛhari and of Manḍana, an encyclopedic scholar of later seventh century and most likely a senior contemporary
of Śaṅkara, shape Indian philosophical thinking to a great extent. On this premise, this study of the influence of Bhartṛhari
on Maṇḍana’s literature, the scope of this essay, allows us to explore the significance of Bhartṛhari’s writings, not only
to comprehend the philosophy of language, but also to understand the contribution of linguistic philosophy in shaping Advaita
philosophy in subsequent times. This comparison is not to question originality on the part of Maṇḍana, but rather to explore
the interrelationship between linguistic philosophy and the monistic philosophy of the Upaniṣadic tradition. Besides excavating
the role of Bhartṛhari writings on the texts of Maṇḍana, analysis this will reveal the interrelatedness of the Advaita school
of Śaṅkara often addressed as ‘pure non-dualism’ (Kevalādvaita) and the Advaita of Bhartṛhari, identified as ‘non-dualism of the word-principle’ (Śabdādvaita). 相似文献
14.
This study examined maltreated and non-maltreated children’s (N = 183) emerging understanding of “truth” and “lie,” terms about which they are quizzed to qualify as competent to testify.
Four- to six-year-old children were asked to accept or reject true and false (T/F) statements, label T/F statements as the
“truth” or “a lie,” label T/F statements as “good” or “bad,” and label “truth” and “lie” as “good” or “bad.” The youngest
children were at ceiling in accepting/rejecting T/F statements. The labeling tasks revealed improvement with age and children
performed similarly across the tasks. Most children were better able to evaluate “truth” than “lie.” Maltreated children exhibited
somewhat different response patterns, suggesting greater sensitivity to the immorality of lying. 相似文献
15.
Ronald M. Davidson 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2009,37(2):97-147
The Mahāyāna Buddhist term dhāraṇī has been understood to be problematic since the mid-nineteenth century, when it was often translated as “magical phrase”
or “magical formula” and was considered to be emblematic of tantric Buddhism. The situation improved in contributions by Bernhard,
Lamotte and Braarvig, and the latter two suggested the translation be “memory,” but this remained difficult in many environments.
This paper argues that dhāraṇī is a function term denoting “codes/coding,” so that the category dhāraṇī is polysemic and context-sensitive. After reviewing Western scholarship, the article discusses dhāraṇī semantic values and issues of synonymy, the early applications of mantras, the sonic/graphic background of coding in India
extended into Buddhist applications, and the soteriological ideology of dhāraṇīs along with some of its many varieties. 相似文献
16.
John A. Hunter Aurelio Jose Figueredo Neil M. Malamuth 《Journal of family violence》2010,25(2):141-148
Path analysis was used to assess the contribution of four exogenous developmental variables (sexual abuse, physical abuse,
exposure to violence, exposure to pornography—each occurring prior to age 13) and four personality constructs (“psychopathic
and antagonistic attitudes,” “psychosocial deficits,” “pedophilia,” “hostile masculinity”) to the prediction of non-sexual
delinquency and number of male child victims in a sample of 256 adolescent males with a history of “hands-on” sexual offending.
“Psychosocial deficits” was found to partially mediate the effects of the exogenous variables on both outcomes. Exposure to
violence both directly, and indirectly through “psychopathic and antagonistic attitudes,” contributed to the prediction of
non-sexual delinquency. Sexual abuse by a male directly, and indirectly through “hostile masculinity” and “pedophila”, contributed
to prediction of number of male child victims. Clinical implications of the findings are discussed. 相似文献
17.
Valerie Stoker 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2007,35(2):169-199
This article explores the way in which Madhva (1238–1317), the founder of the Dvaita Vedānta system of Hindu thought, reformulates
the traditional exegetic practice of nirukta or “word derivation” to validate his pluralistic, hierarchical, and Vaiṣṇava reading of the Ṛgvedic hymns. Madhva’s Ṛgbhāṣya
(RB) is conspicuous for its heavy reliance on and unique deployment of this exegetical tactic to validate several key features
of his distinctive theology. These features include his belief in Viṣṇu’s unique possession of all perfect attributes (guṇaparipūrṇatva)
and His related conveyability by all Vedic words (sarvaśabdavācyatva). Such an understanding of Vedic language invokes the
basic nirukta presupposition that words are eternally affiliated with the meanings they convey. But it is also based onMadhva’s
access to a lexicon entitled Vyāsa’s Nirukti with which his critics and perhaps even his commentators seem to be unfamiliar.While
the precise status of this text is the subject of ongoing debate, Madhva’s possession of special insight into the sacred canon
is established in part by his unique claim to be an avatāra of the wind god Vāyu and a direct disciple of Viṣṇu Himself in
the form of Vyāsa1. Thus, Madhva’s use of nirukta invokes his personal charisma to challenge not only conventional understandings of the hymns
but traditional exegetic norms. Madhva’s provision of an alternative tradition of nirukta provoked sectarian debate throughout
the Vijayanagara period over the extent to which one could innovate in established practices of reading the Veda. Articulating
the Veda’s precise authority was a key feature of Brahmin debates during this period and reflects both the empire’s concern
with promoting a shared religious ideology and the competition among rival Brahman sects for imperial patronage that this
concern elicited. By looking at how two of Madhva’s most important commentators (the 14th-century Jayatīrtha and the 17th-century Rāghavendra) sought to defend his niruktis, this article will explore how notions of normative nirukta were articulated
in response to Madhva’s deviations. At the same time, however, examining Madhva’s commentators’ defense of his niruktis also
demonstrates the extent to which Madhva actually adhered to selected exegetic norms. This reveals that discomfort with Madhva’s
particular methods for deriving words stemmed, in part, from a more general ambivalence towards this exegetical tactic whose
inherent open-endedness threatened to undermine the fixity of the canon’s very substance: its language.
Vyāsa’s Nirukti is one of several ”unknown sources” cited in Madhva’s commentaries whose exact status continues to be debated.
Some scholars (e.g. Rao, Sharma, Siauve) maintain that these texts are part of a now lost Pāṅcarātra tradition that Madhva
is attempting to preserve. This may be true for many of these citations. However, in addition to claiming to be both an avatāra
of Vāyu and Viṣṇu-as-Vyāsa’s student, Madhva states in several places (e.g., VTN 42, RB 162) that the canon has suffered loss
during transmission and that only Viṣṇu can reveal it in its entirety. Thus, it is possible that Madhva intends texts like
Vyāsa’s Nirukti to be viewed as part of an ongoing and corrective revelation, a notion that is compatible with many Vaiṣṇava
traditions (Halbfass, 1991: 4). 相似文献
18.
K. A. Jacobsen 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2006,34(6):587-605
In Sāṃkhya similes are an important means to communicate basic philosophical teachings. In the texts similes are frequently
used, especially in the Sāṃkhya passages in the Mahābhārata, in the Sāṃkhyakārikā and in the Sāṃkhyasūtra. This paper compares the similes in these three texts and analyses changes in the philosophy as revealed in the similes.
A comparison of the similes of Sāṃkhya texts produced over more than one thousand years reveals changes in the emphasis in
this philosophical system. The purpose of the similes in the Sāṃkhya passages of the Mahābhārata is to produce an intuitive understanding of the separateness of puruṣa and prakṛti. The similes are designed to lead the
listener to understand this basic dualism. In the Sāṃkhyakārikā the most difficult issues are the relationship between prakṛti
and puruṣa and the idea of prakṛti working for the salvation of puruṣa. One whole chapter of the Sāṃkhyasūtra is devoted to similes. 相似文献
19.
This article consists of a tentative exploration regarding the Buddhist portrayal and critique of Sāṃkhya epistemology and the theory of reflection (pratibimbavāda) as expressed in the Sāṃkhyatattvāvatāraḥ chapter of Bhāviveka’s 6th century Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā, and its auto-commentary the Tarkajvālā; and the Jain portrayal and critique of Sāṃkhya epistemology and the theory of reflection as expressed in Haribhadrasūri’s 8th century Śātravārtāsamuccaya (ŚVS) and Yogabindu. The article includes a translation of the Yogabindu, verses 444–457. 相似文献
20.
André Couture 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2006,34(6):571-585
There are good reasons to think that Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha already form a sort of implicit tetrad
in the HV. The aim of this paper is to draw attention to often overlooked data related to this tetrad. (1) Upon first reading,
the sequence of the HV episodes appears to be somewhat disconnected, and might lead one to conclude that no such grouping
of these figures had as of yet taken place. Nevertheless, a closer look at the structure of the text makes it clear that these
four characters are one of the main focuses of the narrator’s interest. (2) The relationships of these four heroes to one
another and to other deities will be examined. In addition to their close kinship, these heroes with the exception of Aniruddha,
are also said to be incarnations of other entities; thus the logic underpinning this grouping must be located at this other
level. (3) Considered against the backdrop of the entire HV, one realizes that a basic pattern is established in which the
presence of the goddess, under various names and functions, is required not only to facilitate Saṃkarṣaṇa’s and Kr̥ṣṇa’s births
and actions on earth, but also the actions of Pradyumna and Aniruddha. In fact, neither Kr̥ṣṇa Vāsudeva, nor Saṃkarṣaṇa, nor
Pradyumna nor Aniruddha can act entirely independently of her assistance. (4) The HV does not employ the word vyūha in connection with the group of Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Nevertheless, during the battle waged to deliver
Aniruddha, the idea of vyūha is present even if the word itself is not. HV 110.47–49 describes a true trivyūha composed of three fighters (Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa and Pradyumna), who are arranged in such a way as to protect one another.
The episode of Aniruddha’s liberation appears to be the missing link, showing clearly that at least Kr̥ṣṇa, Saṃkarṣaṇa and
Pradyumna are capable of assuming a vyūha as they fight the Rudraic forces. 相似文献