History’s Challenge to Criminal Law Theory

After briefly sketching an historical account of criminal law that emphasizes its longstanding reach into social, commercial and personal life outside the core areas of criminal offenses, this paper explores why criminal law theory has never succeeded in limiting the content of criminal codes to offenses that fit the criteria of dominant theories, particularly versions of the harm principle. Early American writers on criminal law endorsed no such limiting principles to criminal law, and early American criminal law consequently was substantively broad. But even with the rise of theories in the mid-nineteenth century that sought to limit criminal law’s reach, codified offenses continued to widely and deeply regulate social life and exceed the limits of those normative arguments. This essay suggests that this practical failure of criminal law theory occurred because it was never adopted by an institutional actor that could limit offense definitions in accord with normative commitments. Legislatures are institutionally unsuited to having their policy actions limited by principled arguments, and courts passed on the opportunity to incorporate a limiting principle for criminal law once they began, in the Lochner era, actively regulating legislative decisions through Constitutional law. The one avenue through which criminal law theory has had some success in affecting criminal codes is through the influence of specialized bodies that influence legislation, especially the American Law Institute advocacy of the Model Penal Code. But the institutional structure of American criminal law policymaking permits an unusually small role for such specialized bodies, and without such an institutional mechanism, criminal law theory is likely to continue to have little effect on actual criminal codes.     

Improving the Law for Animals: a Campaigning Lawyer’s Perspective

Liverpool Law Review - The protection which the law gives animals is based on a fundamentally different philosophy to that it gives people. With people, causing significant physical harm is nearly...     

Levinas’s Contribution to the Law of Hospitality

Liverpool Law Review - This article examines the ethical thinking of Levinas, from which Derrida’s Law of Hospitality is derived, to see if it is sustainable in the face of Badiou’s...     

Islamo-Arabic Culture and Women’s Law: An Introduction to the Sociology of Women’s Law in Islam

The present paper addresses the mutual relationship between society and law in shaping women’s law in Islam from the perspective of the sociology of law. It analyzes the role of pre-Islamic social, political, and economic structures in the Arabian Peninsula in modeling women’s law and highlights some customary laws which were rejected or revived and integrated in Islamic jurisprudence. In this regard, the paper reviews issues such as polygyny, rights to inheritance, marriage, the process of testimony and acceptable forms of evidence in legal matters, diyya (blood money), the exclusion of women from the judiciary and the system of issuing fatwa (legal opinion), natural right of guardianship (wilāya) of underage children after divorce, and regulations related to the veil. Finally, referring to the manner of the Prophet of Islam, the paper suggests that ?urf (custom) can be considered as a source of Islamic legislation alongside other commonly known sources of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence).     

Agamben’s Grammar of the Secret Under the Sign of the Law

This paper suggests that a grammar of the secret forms a concept in Agamben’s work, a gap that grounds the enigma of sovereignty. Between the Indo-European *krei, *se, and *per themes, the secret is etymologically linked to the logics of separation and potentiality that together enable the pliant and emergent structure of sovereignty. Sovereignty’s logic of separation meets the logic of relation in the form of abandonment: the point at which division has exhausted itself and reaches an indivisible element, bare life, the exception separated from the form of life and captured in a separate sphere. The arcanum imperii of sovereignty and the cipher of bare life are held together in the relation of the ban as the twin secrets of biopower, maintained by the potentiality of law that works itself as a concealed, inscrutable force. But the ‘real’ secret of sovereignty, I suggest, is its dialectical reversibility, the point at which the concept of the secret is met by its own immanent unworking by the critic and scribe under the *krei theme, and subject to abandonment through the work of profanation; here, different species of the secret are thrown against one another, one order undoing the other. The secret founded upon the sacred is displaced by Agamben’s critical orientation toward the immanent: what is immanent is both potential and hiddenness.     

Sinthome Law: Theoretical Constructions upon Lacan’s Concept of the Sinthome

Lacan’s psychoanalytical theory is of interest to legal theorists for a number of reasons. In particular, the concept of the Name of the Father allows a sophisticated theorisation of law and legal institutions. However, the Name of the Father was not Lacan’s only theory of law. In his final Seminars, Lacan developed a second and fundamentally different theory of law: the sinthome. By drawing upon Roberto Harari’s commentary on Lacan’s concept of the sinthome, the sinthome can be investigated in terms of topology, chaos, and morphogenetic theories. This can allow a complex theory of the sinthome to be put forward as real, immanent, emergent ordering through the de-limiting of singularities. From this a concept of Sinthome Law can be developed as a novel concept of law, and as a potential way to understand some contemporary problematics in law. The example of the emerging law on electronic signatures is introduced to indicate this.     

Promoting Whole-Process People’s Democracy Following the Rule of Law

Whole-process people’s democracy profoundly reflects the features of socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics, and comprehensively and systematically reveals the concept of people’s democracy as providing important mechanisms of national and social governance. Based on the traditional democratic understanding of democracy as majority rule, whole-process people’s democracy emphasizes the universality and extensive range of democratic governance, but also has the natural value defects of democratic value itself. Therefore, we must organically combine democracy with the values of the rule of law and human rights, to build a well-defined governance order based on people’s democratic value. The whole process in the “whole-process people’s democracy” has really resolved the situation of people’s “absence” from many links of state power operation caused by over-emphasizing the election-democracy in the Western capitalist democratic system. Through the people’s extensive participation and effective supervision, the state power operation mechanism based on the fundamental political system, the people’s congress system, has been ensured to be always in the framework of people’s democratic governance. This effectively realizes the people’s sovereignty and is consistent with the declaration that “all power in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) belongs to the people,” stipulated in the Constitution of China. To improve the governance efficiency of whole-process people’s democracy in practice, we must bring it onto the rule of law, and use the rule of law philosophy and methods to reasonably and effectively resolve all kinds of theoretical and practical problems.     

Distorting Fundamental Norms of International Law to Resurrect the Soviet Union: The International Law Context of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Netherlands International Law Review - Russia’s invasion of Ukraine which commenced on 24 February 2022 represented just the latest, albeit most devastating, intervention in a neighbouring...     

Representations of Law and the Nonfiction Novel: Capote’s In Cold Blood Revisited

The article describes the way in which law-related events are represented in Truman Capote??s In Cold Blood. Based on a narrative analysis, the paper will posit that In Cold Blood played a particular role in originating and shaping an innovative mode of representing law-related events, a mode that was widely employed since, in various artistic mediums and in popular culture. As the paper further elaborates, Capote??s work paved new ways for challenging the conventional boundaries between ??reality?? and ??fiction?? with regard to the representation of law-related events. The paper will also maintain that in addition to its contribution to the law and literature discourse, In Cold Blood can be also seen as an early prototype to the digital legal spectacles that are now common. Revisiting In Cold Blood reveals not only its standing as originating model of many present-day cultural representations of the legal system in action, but also the essential difference between the almost unrestrainedly produced digital law-related content, to a artistic enterprise, characterized by poetic distinctiveness.     

What’s Inside and Outside the Law?

In this article I take up a conceptual question: What is the distinction between ‘the law’ and the behavior the law regulates, or, as I formulate it, the distinction between what is ‘inside’ the law and what is ‘outside’ it? That conceptual question is in play in (at least) three different doctrinal domains: the constitutional law doctrines regarding the limits on the delegation of legislative powers; the criminal law doctrines regarding mistakes of law; and the constitutional rights doctrines that turn on the distinction between state action and the acts of non-state actors. I argue that legal doctrines should turn solely on normative considerations and should not turn on answers to conceptual questions. However, the doctrines I discuss appear to turn on the conceptual question regarding what is ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the law. I show how each of these doctrinal areas appears to raise this conceptual issue, and I explain how the doctrines might or might not escape being held hostage to conceptual controversy.     

The International Law of Naval Blockade and Israel’s Interception of the Mavi Marmara

In this article I discuss the legality of Israel’s interception of the Mavi Marmara on 31 May 2010. Although Israel’s stopping, boarding and inspection of the Mavi whilst on the high seas would undoubtedly constitute a violation of the law of the sea during peace time, I examine whether this violation can be justified on the basis of international humanitarian law. Specifically, Israel asserts that it was enforcing a naval blockade. I examine the legality of this blockade. I suggest that the blockade was unlawful on the basis that customary international humanitarian law permits the use of naval blockades only in times of an international armed conflict. I argue that on 31 May 2010 Israel was not engaged in an international armed conflict with Hamas. Moreover, I submit that customary international law prohibits the use of blockades where they are intended to deny the civilian population objects essential for its survival or where the damage to the civilian population is excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. Israel argues that the intention of the blockade was to prevent war material from being delivered to Hamas fighters. This notwithstanding, I argue that because this blockade was causing a severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza on 31 May 2010, it was incompatible with customary international law and therefore unlawful. Furthermore, even if the deployment of the blockade could be considered lawful, I argue that the enforcement of the blockade was unlawful because Israel’s use of force to capture the vessel went beyond what was necessary in the circumstances.

     

Adorno,Freedom and Criminal Law: The ‘Determinist Challenge’ Revitalised

This article argues—against the present compatibilist orthodoxy in the philosophy of criminal law—for the contemporary relevance of a kind of critique of criminal law known as the ‘determinist challenge’, through a reconstruction of Theodor Adorno’s thought on freedom and determinism. The article begins by considering traditional forms of the determinist challenge, which expressed a widespread intuition that it is irrational or inappropriate for the criminal law to hold people responsible for actions that are causally determined by social and psychological forces in such a way that they cannot be said to have acted freely. Yet as traditionally presented it was possible for its opponents to interpret this challenge as an incompatibilist position within the traditional free will/determinism debate, and to present compatibilist arguments against it—in particular, that the determinist challenge is unmotivated and has implausible implications. It is argued that these compatibilist objections hold only on a certain interpretation of the determinist challenge, but that this interpretation is not the only one available. Adorno’s distinctive position on freedom and determinism is presented as an alternative version of the challenge, which cannot be assimilated to the terms of the traditional compatibilist/incompatibilist disputes. This novel, ‘metacritical’ version of the determinist challenge is essentially a social–historical, not metaphysical, thesis about the moral significance of the freedom-undermining effects of modern social forms. As such, it is argued, it is invulnerable to the usual compatibilist objections, and presents a serious challenge to our criminal legal institutions.     

Afrazul’s murder: Law and love jihad

Jindal Global Law Review - In December 2017, Shambhu Lal Raigher (a Hindu), brutally killed a Muslim labourer named Afrazul Khan in Rajasthan, without any immediate or individualised cause. The...     

Retracing One’s Steps: Searching for the Ethics of Legal Interpretation

The article discusses the problem of interpretation in law. Are there some criteria by which we can distinguish a good interpretation from a bad one, interpretation from over-interpretation? It is argued in this article that there is always a choice in defining the meaning of a text and this choice can be seen as an ethical one. This article thus studies the question of limits of interpretation by focusing on the ethical elements of interpretation. It is argued here that legal interpretation contains a requirement of justice that shapes the responsibility that the interpreter carries for his choices of meaning. Therefore the ethical elements of interpretation are especially pressing in the interpretation of legal texts.