The impact of government structure on local public expenditures

Though the relationship between local government structure and expenditure has received considerable attention, there is little consensus as to how the features of representative government affect local expenditure. An exception is city council size, which has consistently been found to be positively related to spending. Previous results rely on cross-sectional estimation which may be subject to omitted variable bias. This paper analyzes three components of municipal governments—the form of government, the size of the city council, and the election method of city councilors. Once fixed effects estimation is employed, the positive relationship between city council size and expenditure disappears.     

Urban local government finance in Nigeria: The case of Onitsha local government

Onitsha, located along the route that connects south-western and south-eastern Nigeria, has a very financially dynamic local government. Over one-quarter of the total revenues of this local government come from its market and motor parks. This is an unusual source for a local government that has perhaps the largest per capita revenue in Nigeria—almost N40, compared with the national average of N4.9. The procedure for collecting this revenue is regarded as highly successful since there is greater reliance on the citizens than tax officials. The volume of revenues collected has allowed the council maintain a large surplus revenue over a long period of time, which enables it to carry out important programmes of primary and adult education. It is also beginning to develop its property revenue collection system in collaboration with the Anambra State government.     

A partisan model of government expenditure

Partisan models of budget politics largely concentrate on the size of government, budget deficits and debt, but most theories have little to say as to what the effect of party politics on both the size and the composition of budgets is. This paper seeks to extend previous literature in two directions. First, a model of spending preferences is developed that relates actors' preferred level and allocation of expenditure to electoral gains from fiscal policies. Second, changes in both total expenditure and the expenditure mix of two budget categories are analyzed for the effect of parties' spending preferences as stated in their election manifestos. Using data on 19 OECD countries from 1971 to 1999, the paper finds support for general partisan hypothesis. The results suggest that the actual spending preferences of parties matter whereas they do not indicate that parties of the left consistently differ from parties of the right in their spending behavior.     

The demand for local government goods

Abstract. This paper analyses the spending preferences of local government elected politicians. It is argued that the median voter model is inappropriate in multi-party systems that provide multiple government services, and that the preferences of the representatives are consequential to local resource allocation. We develop a micromodel in which service demand is conditioned by exogenous public revenue, prices, and demographic factors. We hypothesise that politicians demands are affected by party affiliation, public sector occupation and committee assignment. The estimates of the micro demand functions are based on data pertaining to Norwegian local governments. It is found that the estimated income elasticities correspond approximately with elasticities of output studies. Party affiliation has an impact on demand patterns, while government occupation and committee appointment are major determinants of politicians desired allocation of public services. Further analyses reveal that the numerical strength of parties impacts weakly on the actual service allocation, whereas the representation of government employees has occasional effect. The budgetary allocations are imperfect expressions of the elected council's underlying preferences.     

The local state and urban local government in Zambia

It is argued, with reference to urban local government in Zambia, particularly in Lusaka, that recent debates on the form and functions of the national state in Africa may be used to illuminate the working of the urban local state. Available evidence on the class interests represented in the urban local state is reviewed, and these interests and their actions with respect to personal accumulation and political clientelism are found to be similar to those found at the national level. The urban local state in Zambia performs functions similar to those which have been revealed by analyses of other countries, although the nature of these functions, and the extent to which they are successfully performed, is influenced by the political and economic context, the institutional framework and especially the constraints imposed by central government on local autonomy. The changes proposed in the 1980 Local Administration Act are outlined, and a preliminary assessment made of the extent to which they are likely to change the form and functions of the urban local state.     

The politics of redistribution in local government

Abstract. This paper deals with the politics of redistribution in local government. Traditionally, it has been assumed that redistributive policies are crucial in electoral competition and party politics, both in national and local political systems. From this perspective, differences in local competition and party systems are essential to an explanation of local redistributive efforts. Peterson (1981), however, claims that redistributive policies are excluded from the local agenda because they impair local economic prosperity. These policies are therefore not conceived as instruments in the vote-maximizing strategies of local political parties. In this paper, hypotheses on the impact of party competition and party politics on local redistribution are formulated and tested on data for 342 Dutch municipalities. The results show that, contrary to what would be expected from Peterson's perspective, municipal redistributive efforts were related to electoral competitiveness and the party system. The proposed model, however, proved to be unsatisfactory in accurately predicting the direction of the effects of these explanatory variables. These results suggest that, rather than abandoning the study of local redistribution as a non-issue in subnational politics, an effort should be made to develop a better theoretical understanding of the ways in which competition and party politics shape these policies.     

The revenue position of local government in Nigeria

Financial viability has been presented officially as crucial to the success of the sweeping reforms of local government in Nigeria and this article reviews the situation facing the new local government councils four years after the reforms were instituted. It sets the present situation against a background of past trends in which local government was financially dependent on regional and state governments, and subjected to increasingly detailed controls. Reviewing the present continuing dependence on state and federal government for finance, the limited use made of independent revenue bases, and the political and administrative factors militating against financial viability, the article argues that local government cannot escape from the vicious circle of underdevelopment.     

The conditional impact of winner/loser status and ideological proximity on citizen participation

Many scholars have investigated the relationship between ideological orientations and mass participation, and there is also a growing number of studies comparing political attitudes and behaviour between electoral winners and losers. This article seeks to bring together these two strands of literature with respect to political participation, focusing on the interaction between citizens’ winner/loser status and ideological distance from their government. Analysis of data from 34 countries highlights the importance of this interactive effect: while previous works suggest that losers have a greater propensity to take part in political activities, it is shown here that this relationship holds true only when losers occupy a position along the left‐right spectrum distant from the government. Furthermore, while the hypothesised interactive effect is empirically confirmed for turnout, the magnitude of its impact is much greater for more costly modes of participation such as contacting, campaigning and protesting     

The political trend in local government tax setting

Previous fiscal studies have paid little attention to the effects of social interaction on local tax setting. This paper seeks to fill this gap by developing a theoretical model in which politicians belonging to the same party interact with each other in order to draw inferences about ideology. This phenomenon produces a mimic effect which is called the political trend. The results of the analysis show that the political trend gives rise to higher income tax rates and to tax mimicking at the local government level. The framework developed also makes it possible to discriminate between Leviathan-type and welfarist-type politicians. The results show that the former are more sensitive than the latter to changes in the average income tax rate of their peers. Moreover, Leviathan-type politicians are less sensitive than benevolent ones to changes in the central government’s income tax rate.     

Criteria for compensating for the impacts of large projects: The impact of british columbia's revelstoke dam on local government services

This article presents the criteria used to screen compensation claims generated by the construction of a large hydroelectric dam on the Columbia River. It examines the issues that emerged as a result of the flawed negotiation procedure that had secured only vague commitments by the project developer. The case study illustrates the practical concerns that arise when applying microeconomic concepts to help resolve contentious issues. The article concludes with a discussion of how the context of the impact assessment and negotiation procedures can affect its outcome.     

The politics of local government reform in rural Bangladesh

Several changes have been introduced in the system of local government in rural Bangladesh following the country's independence. Examination reveals that they were changes only in nomenclature, and did not result in significant improvements. The constant effort by the central government to retain control over local bodies, and the tendency of the ruling elite not to disturb the existing local government system, have worked to the detriment of reforms. The existing local government system failed to satisfy the aspirations of the rural Bangladeshis for increased participation in local affairs. After the first change of government in Bangladesh, the new ruling group felt the need for a support base in the rural areas. The formation of a new political party and the necessity of extending it to the grass roots, increased the desire of the people to participate in local affairs, and the realization of the importance of initiating and completing rural development programmes at the lowest level made the government aware of the need for local government institutions based in the villages. The government was impressed by the success of the Swanirvar Bangladesh Andolon, and introduced Swanirvar Gram Sarkar as a major reform in the local government system.     

The impact of parties in government on legislative output in Italy

Abstract. Frequent government crisis and high legislative output have distinguished Italy for over forty years. Previous explanations of the Italian legislative process have focused on the institutions established since the Second World War. In particular, the ability of the parliamentary committees to pass legislation, and the 'polarized' nature of the Italian party system have received a great deal of attention. This type of structural analysis has proved unable to successfully explain the significant variations in legislative output which have occurred since the early 1950s. This paper attempts to add to previous structural models by demonstrating that much of the variation which has occurred can be linked to the number of parties participating in the governing coalition. Furthermore, the paper questions previous interpretations of leggine (small laws) and the role they play within the legislative process by demonstrating their positive relationship to regular legislation.     

Towards more flexibility of government expenditure: Some recent developments in The Netherlands

As government revenues diminish, budgetary discretions or flexibilities have similarly decreased. A pressing question is therefore how to minimize the inflexible elements or components of a budget. This article distinguishes between technical and political inflexibilities as they are reflected in the budgetary process and argues that the latter are much more difficult to correct. After drawing some examples from studies of the Dutch national budget, the article proposes the use of reconsideration reports as a means to alleviate the politically inflexible components of the budget, as well as a way to assess government programs.I am grateful to Dr. L. J. C. M. Le Blanc, former Director General of the Budget in the Dutch Ministry of Finance for his valuable critical remarks and suggestions to earlier drafts of this article.     

The impact of welfare reform on local labor markets

We develop a local labor market information system to assess the labor market effects of recently adopted welfare reform laws. Using the Cleveland-Akron metropolitan area as a prototype, we develop an occupationally and geographically specific inventory of projected job openings and measure the skill mismatch between projected job openings and the welfare population likely to enter the labor market. We find the skill mismatches are quite large: Following implementation of reform, welfare recipients entering the labor force would initially have to claim anywhere from 34 to 61 percent of expected low-skill job openings in order to become fully employed. Labor market opportunities are further diminished if one takes into account the effect of gender and space in limiting job accessibility. Welfare recipients entering the labor market as a result of reform would require from 40 to 75 percent of jobs remaining if predominately male occupations are removed from consideration. The AFDC recipients who depend on public transportation, even in extraordinarily long commutes, can access only 40 to 44 percent of entry-level job openings. © 1998 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

地方政府的行为博弈与其外在性

在中国 ,随着中央与地方分权化的改革进程 ,部分地确立了地方政府的经济地位、增强了其独立的利益目标 ,一方面 ,地方政府在中央政府给定的约束线内进行自主性决策 ,市场主体地位增强 ;另一方面 ,分税制以及财政分级预算使地方政府追求经济绩效有了强大的激励机制 ,地方经济利益增进目标突出。但是 ,地方政府在和中央政府以及企业行为博弈的过程中也已引起了一些外在性问题 ,影响了区域经济的均衡发展 ,阻碍了整个社会的帕累托改进。