A test of candidate equilibrium

Richard McKelvey predicts that candidates will converge to an equilibrium if candidates and voters maximize their utility and voters' preferences conform to stringent assumptions. Although there are discrepancies between electoral data and the requirements of the theory, an analysis of 1972 and 1976 survey data lends support to basic components of the theory. First, most voters did choose the candidate who provided the greater utility. Second, voter distribution was not asymmetrical enough to allow a candidate to win by moving away from the median toward a concentration of voters. Third, the winning strategy for a candidate was to locate at or near the median. While formal theories' predictions will not hold in their precisely stated form, the assumptions can be robust enough to offer an explanation of electoral choices.     

A dynamic test of the marginality hypothesis

The marginality hypothesis is an attempt to relate the voting margins of members of Congress to their subsequent legislative behavior. A major corollary of the hypothesis is that members of Congress with small victory margins will be more responsive to constituents than those with large victory margins. This has been assumed to mean that electorally secure representatives can afford to be more loyal to their congressional parties, since they have less cause to worry about their chances for reelection. Previous empirical studies have produced mixed results. We ask the question in a different way: Do changes in marginality affect party voting within Congress? If so, major shifts in the electorate potentially can have a fundamental impact on the behavior of Congress itself. We find that this is not true. Electoral margin is simply not related to party loyalty.     

Economic voting in Spain: A 2000 panel test

Considerable research shows the economy matters for voters. But that view has come under attack, with revisionists arguing that it matters little. This dissenting view fits the Spanish case well, where reigning research finds virtually no economic voting exists. We argue against the revisionist view, suggesting that conclusion stems largely from methodological limitations in its supporting cross-sectional survey analyses. Given the causality question these analyses raise, particularly in the context of likely endogeneity, a panel analysis is called for. We examine the most recent available panel survey, from the 2000 general election, estimating fully specified multinomial logit models. We find strong economic effects. Spain appears, after all, to have an electorate capable of holding the government economically accountable, at least in this instance.     

A test of the revealed-preference phenomenon in congressional elections

This study tests for the existence of a revealed-preference phenomenon in recent congressional elections. A revealed-preference analysis predicts that if candidate one defeats incumbent candidate two, then candidate one has been revealed preferred to candidate two, and can expect to secure higher pluralities in subsequent reelection contests than candidate two would have expected. I collect data on incumbents in 1946–1980 congressional elections to examine this prediction. The data provide qualified support for the presence of a revealed-preference phenomenon. The essay closes with a discussion of the possible connection between the revealed-preference phenomenon and the recent electoral experience of congressional incumbents.     

The economic model of voter participation: A further test

The central hypothesis of the economic model of voter participation was put to an empirical test. It was found that the coefficient of population size, which represents the subjective probability of affecting election results, is negative and significant in municipal local elections, but insignificant in national Knesset elections. Therefore, this variable is unable to represent subjective probability in the latter case.It was suggested that the economic model is more relevant to local elections than to Knesset elections. The empirical results revealed that the regression coefficients of municipal elections that took place separately from Knesset elections fit the expected outcome of the economic model whereas when municipal elections were held simultaneously with the Knesset election this did not hold true.     

Pre-electoral coalitions in comparative perspective: A test of existing hypotheses

Despite the vast coalition literature, pre-electoral coalitions have never been at the center of any systematic, cross-national research. Given their prevalence and potential impact on government composition and policies, this represents a serious omission in our knowledge of coalitions. I begin to remedy this situation by testing two hypotheses found in the literature on party coalitions. The first is that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form in disproportional systems if there are a sufficiently large number of parties. The second is that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form if voters face high uncertainty about the identity of future governments. These hypotheses are tested using a new dataset comprising legislative elections in 22 advanced industrialized countries between 1946 and 1998. The results of the statistical analysis support the first hypothesis, but not the second.     

How parties compete for votes: A test of saliency theory

Saliency theory is among the most influential accounts of party competition, not least in providing the theoretical framework for the Comparative Manifesto Project – one of the most widely used data collections in comparative politics. Despite its prominence, not all empirical implications of the saliency theory of party competition have yet been systematically tested. This article addresses five predictions of saliency theory, the central claim of which is that parties compete by selective issue emphasis rather than by direct confrontation. Since a fair test of the theory's assumptions needs to rely on data that measures party issue saliency and party positions independently, this article draws on new manifesto data from the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES). Analysing all manifestos issued for the 2002, 2006 and 2008 general elections, it shows that saliency theory correctly identifies some features of party competition. For instance, parties disproportionally emphasise issues they ‘own’. Yet, the core assumption of saliency theory that parties compete via selective issue emphasis rather than direct confrontation over the same issues fails to materialise in the majority of cases.     

A test of the predictive dimensions model in spatial voting theory

We model correlated voter-candidate issue data within the framework of the Enelow-Hinich spatial model of predictive dimensions. The empirical consequences of this model of the issue data are surprising and allow for an indirect test of the Enelow-Hinich spatial model. The central prediction of the correlated data model we construct, which depends critically on the underlying spatial model, is tested with issue data from the 1980 NES pre-election interview. The test results are highly supportive of the model's predictions. We conclude both that the spatial model of predictive dimensions is empirically supported and that candidate spatial locations estimated by the model are not an artifact of correlated voter-candidate issue data.     

Modeling government behavior in collective bargaining: A test for self-interested bureaucrats

This paper tests for self-interested behavior by local-government bureaucrats engaged in collective bargaining with public employee unions. A theoretical model is developed that shows the effect of Niskanen-style bureaucratic self-interest in the two standard bargaining models: the demand-constrained model and the efficient-bargain model. These predictions are then tested using national cross-section data on unionized police, fire, and sanitation workers.We wish to thank the Institute for Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois for its support of this research. Also, we thank Larry Kahn, Fran Blau, and Pablo Spiller for useful comments. Errors, of course, are ours.     

The 2020 U.S. presidential election: A litmus test

This paper provides an overview of what lies ahead of the United States in the event that Donald John Trump either lost or won a reelection bid. The uncertainty of the election outcomes is what we refer to as a litmus test. In this paper, we reflect on the ongoing events shaping the United States ahead of the 2020 presidential election and their implications on the United States. We suggest that the election provide a litmus test in shaping the politics of the United States in answering numerous questions raised in the current Trump administration. We deduce that the election could give birth to the new form of Brexit in the form of “U.S. exit” in the event the United States ignores processes that foster institutional legitimacy and civic engagement to build lost “trust” in the Americanized system.     

A simple test of the thesis that committee jurisdictions shape corporate PAC contributions

The results presented in the previous section tend to confirm the hypothesis that committee assignments shape the pattern of corporate PAC contributions. This note corroborates existing research on corporate PACs at a significantly lower level of aggregation than the samples on which existing research has been conducted. Further, because a nonparametric test was used (rather than the more standard regressional analysis), these results should increase our confidence that the essential institutions of government affect, and engender responses by, economic agents.The author thanks Arthur Denzau, Kenneth Shepsle, Barry Weingast and an anonymous referee for helpful and creative comments. Financial support for this research came from the Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis. All errors are the author's alone.