“Hut ab,” “Promenade with Kamerade for Schokolade,” and the Flying Dutchman: British Soldiers in the Rhineland, 1918–1929

This essay explores the social history of the “British Army of the Rhine,” especially their interactions with the German population, over the eleven-year period of occupation in Cologne and part of the Rhineland. It covers the initial, sometimes fraught establishment of the occupation and interactions with the civil population, especially the perennial problem of British soldiers’ relations with German women. These were initially prohibited altogether, but the rule was quickly relaxed, and the British authorities even accepted and regulated the use of brothels, leading to criticisms back home. The essay also discusses the comparatively small number of serious violent crimes (including four murders) during the occupation, and concludes that the occupation was characterized on both sides by grudging acceptance and some degree of forbearance.     

The Anglo-American “Special Relationship”: The Lazarus of International Relations

Scholars have variously queried the existence of the Anglo-American “special relationship,” consigned it to history as “special no more,” or demanded that Britain choose between its European and American relationships. These critiques have become increasingly prevalent since the Cold War. Yet the current British government, like many before it, continues to portray a choice between America and Europe as a “false choice,” and the “special relationship” has arguably deepened in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. This article contends that international diplomatic history can contribute much to understanding the “Lazarus-like” quality of the “special relationship.” Specifically it argues that a number of critical continuities in post-World War II British foreign policy survived the end of the Cold War and have since contributed heavily to the determination of the British foreign policymaking elite to maintain the “special relationship” at the same time that Britain pursues a leadership role within Europe.     

“A Projected New Trusteeship”? American Internationalism, British Imperialism, and the Reconstruction of Iran, 1938-1947

Diplomatic histories identify an early cold war “paradigm shift” as restoring the troubled Anglo-American “special relationship.” However, an integrated analysis of Second World War and post-war Iran suggests continuity in ideologically based Anglo-American differences on the reconstruction of the postwar world economic periphery, and that this was the defining context for crucially elusive relations during successive crises to come. The Americans had embraced Iran as an exemplar of “new deal internationalism,” being as much opposed to competing British neo-imperialist political and economic models there as to Soviet encroachments. They continued to identify autonomous British policies and interests antipathetically during the early cold war period and beyond, not merely out of economic self-interest, but at crucial moments disavowing geopolitical realpolitik. This perplex also determined during future crises of British power, in Iran and throughout the Middle East, that US interests would shift to new relationships, whenever having to decide, with indigenous peripheral actors rather than neo-imperialist European allies, precluding institutionalized, comprehensive Anglo-American partnership, which Britain had hoped would preserve and extend its role as a regional power.     

“Brighter Futures, Better Times”: Britain, the Empire, and Anglo-American Economic Competition in Cuba, 1898-1920

This article examines Anglo-American economic competition in Cuba in the crucial twenty years after 1898. Anglo-American economic competition on the new island nation suggest a number of things about the nature of British and American imperialism, the difficult position of smaller countries—and economies—like Cuba, and the “inevitability” of American economic pre-eminence in the evolving twentieth century. And as an important corollary to the British dimension of this question is the role that Canada and Canadian overseas investment played in the extension of Britain's economic power and influence in the wider world.     

Reading “Threats to International Peace and Security,” 1946-2005

In the United Nations Charter the notion of the “threat to international peace and security” is designed to play a key enabling role in framing its collective security functions. Taking a 60-year period from the UN's founding, this article examines how the UN Security Council has developed the notion of the “threat to international peace and security” through its resolutions, and what this evolution might mean for the notion of collective security and the Council's role in it.     

The Cold War “Special Relationship” Revisited

This article focuses on one of the most potent ideas in world politics: the idea of an Anglo-American “special relationship.” It examines the use and abuse of this relationship, as cultural referent, rhetorical construct, and political imperative, during the long Cold War. It inspects the roots of specialness—the core conditions—in terms of belief and experience as well as need and opportunity. It warns of the hubris inherent in the presumption of specialness on the Churchillian model, a frame of reference (and a set of strategic contingencies) time-expired even before the expiration of the Cold War itself.     

Mending the “Unhinged Alliance” in the 1970S: Transatlantic Relations, Public Diplomacy, and the Origins of the European Union Visitors Program

This article examines in depth the foundation of the EU's one explicit example of public diplomacy, the European Union Visitors Programme. The narrative covers the historical background to the EUVP, the main individuals involved, and its significance for the development of the EU as an international actor. Public diplomacy relies on personal contacts, and the intention here is to demonstrate the importance of this petit histoire. The contribution of the EUVP towards establishing a transatlantic “community of values,” as demonstrated by the support it received from the U.S. diplomatic representation in Brussels, is an important extra dimension. The article concludes that the EUVP, while offering a potential model for the EU to project its “soft power” and world-view internationally, remains limited in scope and unable to fulfill its potential.     

Alan Bullock, 1914-2004: “I Only Write Enormous Books”

Alan Bullock (1914-2004) was one of Britain's most distinguished scholars and the author of several extremely important books on recent and modern European civilization, history and culture. His enormous contribution to British, European, and Anglo-Saxon culture and historiography is easily discernible in his many books and essays. Chief among them his biography of Hitler, parallel study of Hitler and Stalin, three volume biography of Ernest Bevin, and the Fontana dictionaries of modern thought. One of Bullock's greatest achievements was the establishment of St. Catherine's College in Oxford University, at which he served as the Founding Master for more than a generation (1962-1990). Prior to WW II, recent European history was not considered a respectable research field worthy of serious academic work, nor was it thought that there existed the necessary distance from recent events for historians to deal with such history in a proper fashion. However, Alan Bullock's books turned the study of modern and recent European history into the mainstream of postgraduate studies at Oxford. Lord Bullock contributed tremendously (together with Hugh Seton-Watson, Bill Deakin, Hugh Trevor-Roper and A. J. P. Taylor) to the breakthrough which turned contemporary history into a focus for academic research and teaching.     

“The Sore That would Never HeaL”: The Genesis of the Polish Corridor

This paper consists of an examination of the historic and ethnographic origins of the Polish Corridor question and of the various suggestions proposed for its equitable solution in the aftermath of World War One. It outlines the negotiations and memoranda devoted to the issue at the Versailles Conference and, in particular, the role played by the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. It concludes that the result of these deliberations was as much the product of international tensions and a collective failure of vision as of any coherent planning or policy.     

Essence of Negotiation: Understanding Appeasement and “The Great Munich Stereotype”

The relative merits of rational choice and behavioral approaches to the study of negotiation continue to be hotly debated. This article tests qualitative postdictions (assertions or deductions about something in the past) from these paradigms as well as the alternative approach of new institutional theory against the extensive record of negotiation process, contractual form, and contract implementation from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. I find the incomplete relational form of the peace treaty to be consistent with the behavioral and new institutional concepts and find that only behavioral theory can explain how unilateral German moves unraveled the treaty during the 1930s. But the historical record further reveals that the close fit between the behavioral paradigm and these events is more than coincidence. I also discuss the role of conference participants, particularly John Maynard Keynes and Walter Lippmann, in establishing the basis for modern behavioral science. The behavioral paradigm emerged from efforts to understand and fix serious policy mistakes such as those made in the peace negotiations. The study of human error was intended to serve as the basis for broad‐based organizational solutions. Finally, I discuss the impact of “the Munich stereotype” on such recent events as the planning for the American invasion and reconstruction of Iraq; such examples suggest continued imperfections in the system of organized intelligence that has actually evolved in the United States.     

Revisiting the Transatlantic Triangle: The Decolonisation of the British Caribbean in Light of the Anglo-American Special Relationship

The international collapse in the price of sugar, together with increasing immigration restrictions in the late 1920s and 1930s, produced great pressure on wages and employment throughout the British Caribbean. The underlying tensions reached their boiling point in the years between 1935 and 1938. The chronology proved fateful and speaks for itself: a sugar strike in St. Kitts, 1935; a revolt against an increase of customs duties in St. Vincent, 1935; a coal strike in St. Lucia, 1935; labor disputes in the sugar plantations of British Guiana, 1935; oil strikes in Trinidad and Tobago, 1937; urban riots in Barbados, 1937; and acute disturbances in Jamaica, 1938. While these disturbances, together with the radicalization of the colonial discourse, facilitated the archipelago's constitutional decolonization, attributing all social, economic, and constitutional postwar reforms to the riots alone constitutes an immense leap of faith. A careful analysis of the chronology, let alone a detailed study of the archival records, suggests a robust correlation between the islands' constitutional evolution and the geopolitical worries of the Anglo-American alliance. The German threat, on the one hand, led Britain to re-articulate its colonial project and, on the other, compelled the US to make sure the British did not walk away from their responsibilities. The strategic importance of “the slums of empire” came to light dramatically once the theater of war became apparent. The Caribbean now became “the show window” where British and American interests collided against each other.     

Level Two Negotiations: Helping the Other Side Meet Its “Behind‐the‐Table” Challenges

A long analytic tradition has explored the challenge of productively synchronizing “internal” with “external” negotiations, with a special focus on how each side can best manage internal opposition to agreements negotiated “at the table.” Implicit in much of this work has been the view that each side's leadership is best positioned to manage its own internal conflicts, often by pressing for deal terms that will overcome internal objections and by effectively “selling” the agreement to key constituencies. Far less frequently have analysts considered how each side can help the other side with its “behind‐the‐table” barriers to successful agreement. Following Robert Putnam's two‐level games schema, I characterize such “behind‐the‐table” or “Level Two” barriers more broadly, offer several innovative examples of how each side can help the other overcome them, and develop more general advice on doing so most effectively. As a fuller illustration of a Level Two negotiator helping the other side with its formidable behind‐the‐table challenges, I pay special attention to the end‐of‐Cold‐War negotiations over German reunification in which former American Secretary of State James Baker played a key role.     

Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967-1970

The military coup of 21 April 1967 brought to power a repressive dictatorship in Greece. It proceeded to deprive Greeks of their human rights and civil liberties, outraged international public opinion and strained transatlantic relations during the Cold War. The “Greek case” culminated in the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe and calls for its expulsion from NATO. This article will analyse the foreign policy considerations that determined British policy towards the Greek junta during 1967—such as Cold War realities, alliance dynamics, economic and commercial imperatives, regional instability in the Mediterranean and domestic pressures. It will look at how these factors coalesced into shaping British policy towards the Greek junta into one in which human rights had little bearing. The article will also consider the impact of the “Greek case” on the image and credibility of the Labour government of 1966-1970 and explain why vociferous anti-junta activities in London were to create such policy difficulties for the British government.     

“Reformology”: The Case of Slovakia

Over the eight years beginning with the election of a reformist government in September 1998, Slovakia achieved a remarkable turnaround from reform laggard into one of the leaders among the postcommunist transitions of Central and Eastern Europe. This article examines the lessons learned from this successful transition, which demonstrates that quick and effective implementation of a cogent set of economic reforms can produce positive short-term economic results, with favorable and prompt political benefits. Foreign governments, multinational financial institutions, and nationals with technical training abroad who return home to serve in key positions can make a real difference.     

Sir Eric Phipps, the British Government, and the Appeasement of Germany, 1933-1937

This article argues that Sir Eric Phipps' reputation as an “anti-appeaser” of Germany during his Berlin embassy 1933-1937 is not accurate. While Phipps was not in favor of placating Hitler by making territorial concessions, he had much in common with those who had sought a rapprochement with Germany in the 1920s through a policy of inclusion and reconciliation. Particular importance is placed on Phipps' attitude towards the League of Nations, with detailed consideration also being accorded to his relationship with the British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Office officials of the period, as well as his views on the Entente Cordiale.     

New Evidence from Japan: The Emperor and Nomura Kichisaburō, October 1949

This brief essay might properly be divided into two parts: a newly-discovered document translated and reproduced in its entirety, as well as a brief historical sketch to introduce readers to the document. Authored by Admiral Nomura Kichisaburō in October 1949, the document is of interest for various reasons. First, it sheds light on the perceptions driving one of the central participants in Japan's postwar maritime rearmament process. That alone ensures the document's significance, if only because a lack of documentary sources have hampered historians in their efforts to penetrate the intellectual milieu in which Nomura moved in the latter half of Japan's occupation. The document's second point of significance rests with Nomura's audience: the Emperor. The fact that in late 1949 Nomura took his case to Hirohito suggests that, although Japan's postwar constitution had stripped the Emperor of his considerable political powers, the Throne remained something of a player in occupation-era Japanese politics. Finally, the document reproduced in this essay ought to be of interest to those with a scholarly interest in Japan's occupation, but are unable to penetrate the language barrier.     

In Pursuit of a Pacific Strategy:British Planning for the Defeat of Japan, 1943-45

This article seeks to explain why the British pushed for a role in Pacific operations during the Second World War when it faced other strategic priorities in Southeast Asia, as well as a powerful American military that maintained tight control over operational decision-making. Although several quarters in Whitehall, including the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, had doubts about the necessity of a Pacific strategy, there were sensible reasons behind pursuing such a course. It would illustrate to an “anti-imperialist” America that Britain was not only interested in recovering its colonial possessions but also prepared to fight the Japanese on their homeland. More importantly, taking part in the main operations would allow the British to claim a voice at the peace table while helping to encourage the Americans to cement their close working relationship with Britain in the postwar period.     

Allies and Other Strangers: European Integration and the American “Empire by Invitation”

Current tensions between the United States and Europe have raised questions about the future of the transatlantic relationship, though historical analysis suggests that the good old days were not perfect either. This article considers the history of U.S.-European relations and concludes that they have always been complex, as neither Americans nor Europeans have been sure how an integrated Europe would fit into an Atlantic partnership. It concludes that the future of the West depends on Europeans’ developing on their own a clearer vision of the concrete shape and international role of the eu.