Federal antitrust enforcement: A principal-agent perspective

We study the choices of two types of maximizing Public Servants over how far to carry privatization of industries and in what order to privatize. Two stylizations of the Public Servant's objectives are considered, a Niskanen-style Bureaucrat who maximizes a surplus budget subject to the constraint of staying in office, and a Populist who maximizes popularity/consumer welfare subject to the constraint of a balanced budget. Other things being equal, the Bureaucrat will privatize the sector (firms) with the least market power and the largest subsidy first. The Populist will adopt the same policy, if the marginal costs of products in the private sectors are not too high with respect to the marginal utilities. If the marginal costs are too high, however, the Populist will privatize the sector with the largest market power first. We also show that privatization is easier and faster in less democratic societies.     

State university boards of trustees: A principal-agent perspective

This paper extends the economic theory of organizations by examining the structure of boards of trustees in public university settings. A major implication of the analysis is that the structure of the board of trustees reflects the costs to politicians of allowing internal agent shirking. Empirical evidence supports this hypothesis and indicates that a system method of governing versus individual board governance of universities is linked to the influence of educators in the political process.     

The limits of tax and expenditure limits: TEL implementation as a principal-agent problem

Previous scholarship has shown that Tax and Expenditure Limits (TELs) often fail to constrain government growth. This paper views the implementation of TELs as a principal-agent problem. Agency theory predicts that delegation is affected by the preferences of agents and the costs of monitoring those agents. Using panel data for the US states from 1970 through 2008, I conduct an empirical test of the validity of the principal-agent model for TELs. I find that state spending limitations are only effective at cutting the growth of state and local spending under the direction of agents who have a preference for limited government. Additionally, state property tax limitations are only effective when monitoring does not require costly coordinated action. These findings contradict an alternative theory of TEL implementation that looks towards the policy’s origin. My research suggests that the arrangements of delegation determine when and under what conditions TELs effectively reduce government growth.     

制度视域下党的建设科学化思考

党的十七届四中全会首次提出"提高党的建设科学化水平"的重大命题,十八大报告再次强调"党的建设科学化",这是在新形势、新阶段条件下对党的建设提出的新思考。2003年党的十六届三中全会以来,中央日益意识到制度建设的重要性,十八大报告也多处指出制度建设的重要性,"要把制度建设摆在突出位置"、"构建科学规范、运行有效的制度体系"等。提高党的制度建设科学化水平应从三个方面着手:于规全面(全面性)、于事简便(操作性)、于法周延(系统性)。     

The political economy of China and Japan's relationship with Africa: a comparative perspective

China and Japan's policies towards Africa in the 1990s have converged, ostensibly around enhanced economic interaction with the continent based on the premise of integrating the continent into the global economy. At the same time, both countries view Africa as a useful buttress to their respective political and diplomatic goals in the international system. Connected to this and in order to garner support for their agendas, both countries promote themselves as possessing specific pro-South identities. This identity is premised around the notions of ‘non-Westernness’ and, in the case of China, in resistance to the North's hegemony. Yet paradoxically, by pursuing their respective policies in Africa, both states act to further deepen the penetration of the West into Africa. The inherent contradictions in Chinese and Japanese policies towards Africa raises questions as to the long-term viability of the current agendas being pursued by the two countries in Africa.     

The provision of lighthouses services: a political economy perspective

Ronald Coase’s 1974 article on lighthouses and the Trinity House case, in particular, has triggered extensive debate on the notion of a public good, but also on the possibility of private production of public goods. The resultant literature has discussed the concept of private property and the characteristics of a public good, and offered an economic analysis of the status of lighthouses. This contribution sets out to situate the debate in the context of an economic policy for which the lighthouse is an asset subject to political rent seeking. Thus, it highlights the fact that the characteristics of rivalry and exclusion, which define the public good, are in fact influenced by governments, which decide the nature of the services produced by lighthouses. The weight of the institutional setting, together with political competition for the control of lighthouses, calls for interpretation relating to rent seeking. In this respect, the lighthouse, prior to being a capital asset, has already emerged as a political object that is a source of revenue for certain individuals.     

Hungary's U-turn in Kornai's system paradigm perspective: a case for national authoritarian capitalism

Public Choice - In an article published in 2016, János Kornai proposes to add a third form of governance between democracy and dictatorship to his binary model of system paradigm. It is an...     

The Europeanisation of conflict: Reflections from a social movement perspective

If Europe is becoming a polity, then regular patterns of social and political conflict ‐ both institutional and non‐institutional ‐ will emerge between citizen groups and decision‐making authorities. Although we are beginning to have a substantial body of research on institutionalised interest group interaction at the European level, we know much less about non‐institutionalised forms of contentious collective action that have European policies as their targets. Using social movement theory, several varieties of such collective action can be identified. Based on the theory of political opportunity structure, it is shown why one of these forms ‐ actions intended to bring national states’ power to bear against European policies — appears to have a rich and turbulent future.     

The (f)utility of a feminist turn to Foucault

This paper explores some of the potential problems of a feminist appropriation of the ideas of Michel Foucault. In particular, it addresses questions concerning the political consequences of such a turn focusing on (i) the microphysical versus the macrophysical; and (ii) Foucalt's supposed 'ethical quandary'. In so doing, it suggests that, for from undermining feminist politics, the turn to Foucault prompts a reassessment of the foundations of political action.     

The comparative endurance and efficiency of religion: a public choice perspective

Public Choice - All of the major religious confessions existing today have outlasted every single secular ruling regime known in human history. That observation poses an interesting puzzle for...     

Empirical evidence on a special-interest-group perspective to antitrust

Public Choice - While the antitrust laws claim to serve the public interest, they are as susceptible to the influence of special-interest groups as are any public policies. This paper extends the...     

行政部门悖论：一个低度组织化的组织（下）

四、机构松散 根据意大利公共部门采用经济刺激的经历,就创新或者说就在人事管理方面运用私人部门的方法如何影响行政部门的理性化和分权化,得出一些较为概括的结论是可能的。第一个结论涉及这样一