Equity concern and the political economy of protection in New Zealand

A number of empirical models have found protection to be greatest for industries employing poorly skilled, low paid workers. This has caused some economists, notably Robert Baldwin, to suggest that equity concern by politicians in an alternative to the interest group hypothesis. This paper reports the result of a test on New Zealand data that shows that this equity concern is absent for industries with few employees or firms. Equity concern variables were only important for industries with many employees and firms. This suggests that equity concern is selective and may be reconcilable with self-interest motivations.I am grateful to John Tressler, Richard Harris and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments.     

Behavioral Public Administration: Combining Insights from Public Administration and Psychology

Behavioral public administration is the analysis of public administration from the micro‐level perspective of individual behavior and attitudes by drawing on insights from psychology on the behavior of individuals and groups. The authors discuss how scholars in public administration currently draw on theories and methods from psychology and related fields and point to research in public administration that could benefit from further integration. An analysis of public administration topics through a psychological lens can be useful to confirm, add nuance to, or extend classical public administration theories. As such, behavioral public administration complements traditional public administration. Furthermore, it could be a two‐way street for psychologists who want to test the external validity of their theories in a political‐administrative setting. Finally, four principles are proposed to narrow the gap between public administration and psychology.     

Planning for substainable development: Insights from the literatures of political science

Abstract. Over the past decade European political leaders have increasingly come to refer to 'sustainable development' as a legitimate focus of government activity. Starting from the premises that sustainable development is a complex and contested ideal, and that experiences with state planning in the twentieth century have been deeply ambiguous, this article reflects on the insights which political science can shed on the new social project of 'planning for sustainable development'. The discussion centres on three relevant political science literatures — meta critiques of planning, 'new governance' debates, and enquiries into policy related learning. Consideration of these perspectives suggest that to the extent that it is possible for 'planning for sustainable development' to attain its declared objectives this will depend upon the integration of sustainable development norms into existing planning structures and modalities, the extensive development of co–operative management initiatives, and vigorous debates about alternative futures. Coordination among the inevitably disjointed and partially contradictory efforts of multiple agencies will rely upon the integrative potential of the sustainable development norm, central government initiatives, and collision, negotiation and mutual adjustment.     

The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy

We evaluate the impact of political forces in the allocation of intergovernmental grants in Portugal, as it matured from a young to an established democracy. Using a large and unexplored dataset we show that political variables condition the granting system, and that their importance changed over time. While tactical manipulation in the distribution of grants among municipalities seems to exist only in the early years of democracy, opportunistic effects are stronger in the latter years. We argue that the latter effect is due to a change in the political environment and to the electorate’s lack of information on intergovernmental grants.     

Chicago political economy: A public choice perspective

George J. Stigler (Ed.), Chicago studies in political economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. Pages xviii + 641.     

Immigration and income redistribution: A political economy analysis

This paper examines the effect of immigration on the extent of income redistribution via majority voting on the income tax. The tax outcome depends on the size of the native majority and the initial amount of redistribution in the economy, which in turn determines the skill composition of immigrants. As a main result, we derive conditions for multiple tax equilibria: if the native majority of either skilled or unskilled is not too strong and immigrants are allowed to vote, both a high-tax and a low-tax outcome is possible. In a referendum, natives will then vote against immigrant voting. At best, natives are indifferent towards immigrant voting.     

Introduction: A post-Polanyian political economy for our times

Abstract

2014 is the seventieth anniversary of the publication of Karl Polanyi's The great transformation and the fiftieth anniversary of its author's passing. This special issue celebrates these markers by bringing together a collection of critical engagements with Polanyi's work which, whilst sympathetic to his intellectual aims, ward against any straightforward application to contemporary issues. In so doing, it suggests that part of the value of Polanyi's work lies not in its ability to be recited, repeated and re-applied in its original form, but rather in its openness and its susceptibility to alteration and transmutation. In this introductory article, I consider the return to intellectual ‘voices from the past’ in the post-2008 landscape. I suggest that the distinctiveness of Polanyi's voice comes from his attempt to problematize, challenge and re-imagine the very notion of ‘economy’ itself, a theme which underpins all of his most important ideas, and one which reverberates across contributions to this special issue. I suggest that, beyond his immediate critique of free-market ideas, the desire to de-centre the notion of an autonomous economic sphere – and to challenge abstract modes of thought that address such a notion, regardless of their political sensibilities – is his most valuable legacy, and one which might encourage us to seek out new innovations and engagements in future Polanyian scholarship.     

Modes of regulatory governance: A political economy perspective

This article introduces the special issue by presenting a framework for the study of regulatory politics using the analytical tools and approaches of comparative political economy. Having traced the evolution of studies on regulation, it argues that scholars should pay more attention to the systemic features affecting regulation and to the relationship between regulatory policies and their outcomes. The article presents the foundations of an analytical framework based on the “regulatory policy process,” a comprehensive approach that links inputs, outputs, and outcomes. The review of the contributions to this special issue shows that regulatory regimes can be better understood by placing them within the broader political economy of a state or region. A renewed focus on regulatory outcomes can help foresee what one should expect from the impact of a certain regulatory regime on a political‐economic system.     

Shocks and oscillations: The political economy of Hungary

While economic voting studies exist for the new democracies in post-communist Europe, time-series vote functions are scarce. Here, we fill this void by testing how public support for the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) responds to political shocks and economic oscillations, using monthly data from 2002 to 2009 (N = 83). As the economy fluctuates, on both objective and subjective measures, Hungarians reward or punish the Prime Minister’s party in the traditional manner. Political shocks, including the change to an MSZP minority government, the 2006 riots, and the IMF bailout, induced increased support for the party while troops in Iraq and the election campaign led Hungarians to be less supportive of the party. Clearly, government support in Hungary can be explained in political economic terms, despite the newness of democracy and the severe economic uncertainties of the times.     

On the political economy of national tax revenue forecasts: evidence from OECD countries

Sustainable budgets are important quality signals for the electorate. Politicians might thus have an incentive to influence tax revenue forecasts, which are widely regarded as a key element of national budget plans. Looking at the time period from 1996 to 2012, we systematically analyze whether national tax revenue forecasts in 18 OECD countries are biased due to political manipulation. Drawing on theories from the field of political economy, we test three hypotheses using panel estimation techniques. We find support for partisan politics. Left-wing governments seem to produce more optimistic, or less pessimistic, tax revenue forecasts than do right-wing ones. Contrary to the theoretical prediction based on the “common pool” problem, we find that more fragmented governments and parliaments tend to produce more pessimistic, or less optimistic, tax revenue forecasts. We find no empirical evidence that political business cycles play a role in tax revenue forecasts.     

The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy

Three topics of a European constitution are discussed. First, basic arguments from constitutional political economy that aim at restricting representatives’ potential misuse of powers in a European Union with extended competencies are summarized. Since a European demos does not yet exist, an extension of competencies of the European Parliament is not sufficient in order to legitimate political decisions at the EU level. The introduction of elements of direct democracy in the European constitution would shape the creation of such a demos and lead to a stronger control of the European legislature and executive. Second, the introduction of direct democracy in the European constitution is proposed in order to reduce the European democratic deficit. Third, the creation of a European federation requires a more transparent assignment of competencies and rules to resolve conflicts between different centers of power. A European federation should be organized according to the principles of competitive federalism.     

The provision of lighthouses services: a political economy perspective

Ronald Coase’s 1974 article on lighthouses and the Trinity House case, in particular, has triggered extensive debate on the notion of a public good, but also on the possibility of private production of public goods. The resultant literature has discussed the concept of private property and the characteristics of a public good, and offered an economic analysis of the status of lighthouses. This contribution sets out to situate the debate in the context of an economic policy for which the lighthouse is an asset subject to political rent seeking. Thus, it highlights the fact that the characteristics of rivalry and exclusion, which define the public good, are in fact influenced by governments, which decide the nature of the services produced by lighthouses. The weight of the institutional setting, together with political competition for the control of lighthouses, calls for interpretation relating to rent seeking. In this respect, the lighthouse, prior to being a capital asset, has already emerged as a political object that is a source of revenue for certain individuals.     

Public choice, political economy and development: an introduction to the life, times and themes of Martin Paldam

Martin Paldam is one of the most prominent figures of Danish economics and European public choice. In this introduction to the special issue, we identify five of the areas, where he has made significant contributions: (1) vote and popularity functions and political business cycles; (2) democracy and institutions; (3) the economics of corruption; (4) development aid; and (5) social capital.     

Arye L. Hillman: Public finance and public policy: a political economy perspective on the responsibilities and limitations of government

Public Choice - I assume that voters mark ballots exclusively to express their true preferences among parties, leaving aside any considerations about an election’s possible outcome. The paper...