The global revolution in public management: Driving themes,missing links

Since the late 1970s, a truly remarkable revolution has swept public management around the world. Understanding this revolution means sorting through three issues: the basic ideas of reform; the connections between the reforms and governmental processes, like budgeting and personnel; and the links between these processes and governance. These reforms have proven surprisingly productive but, in the process, they have raised a new generation of fundamentally important issues that have been largely unexplored.     

The ethical poverty of cost-benefit methods: Autonomy,efficiency and public policy choice

The principle of efficiency holds as the basic standard of market decision-making. Routinely however, it has been applied as a standard of judgement to public choices as well. This essay proceeds on the basis of four assumptions. First, that efficiency, outside the market context, has two manifestations (Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Cost-Benefit Methods) which are made distinct by one's concentration on judging the most cost-effective means to policy ends otherwise arrived at, and the other's use of efficiency to judge both the means and end of policy choice. Second, that although efficiency is a fit primary decision standard within a competitive market a principle with more distinctly moral weight is needed to judge ends outside of markets. Third, that one possible source of this moral weight is individual autonomy or freedom that is a fit ethical principle upon which to set the ends of public policy. Fourth, that the use of cost-benefit methods rather than cost-effectiveness analysis implies that it can satisfy the requirements of both efficiency and autonomy. If the efficient policy choice also provided protection of individual autonomy then cost-benefit methods could be used for the analysis of public policy ends, but if it fails to have a deeper moral justification then the role of efficiency in the public sector must be limited only to its judgement of cost-effective means to policy ends arrived at by a non-efficiency standard. I will argue that the autonomy of individual choice in a market is a thin and morally impoverished ethical standard of judgement that adds no additional moral weight to market efficiency for the judgements of policy ends. This conclusion limits efficiency to the consideration of public means alone, eliminating cost-benefit methods as a fit approach to policy analysis while simultaneously promoting cost-effectiveness analysis and the search for an independent moral standard for the assessment of public ends.This essay was originally prepared for the 1989 meeting of the APSA in Atlanta and I wish to thank all those who read and commented on my work at that time. In addition, I would like to thank those who participated in its evolution to this form: Douglas MacLean, Mark Sagoff, Brian Barry, Alan Donagan, Russell Hardin, Maurice Wade, Andy Gold, Thomas Reilly, Diana Evans, an anonymous reviewer at Policy Sciences and its two editors, William Ascher and G. Brewer.     

The place of political science in public choice

This study examines the effects of alternative executive veto structures in a model of the budgetary process. For the model examined it is shown that the outcome of the budgetary process must be contained in the Pareto set if the executive has either no veto authority or the authority to exercise an all-or-nothing veto. When the executive has item veto authority, however, the outcome need not be contained in the Pareto set.     

Rational choice theory,public policy and the liberal state

Liberalism requires a high order of responsible behaviour from its citizens in order to be sustainable. Yet when the modern liberal state makes policy, it is the stereotyped economic man, driven by self-interest and influenced only by carrots and sticks, who occupies center stage. This regulatory approach to public policy can be shown theoretically to give rise to a paradox — the greater the need for regulation, the less likely, because of compliance problems, it is to succeed. It is contended that an alternative approach which explicitly focuses on a broader behavioral understanding of citizens' attitudes and motivations provides a rationale for the use of a much wider range of policy instruments than does the regulatory framework, and is also more in keeping with those values necessary to the sustainability of the liberal state.     

Agent-based modeling, public choice, and the legacy of Gordon Tullock

The future of modeling in public choice may be glimpsed by examining its evolution in economics. For problems that are influenced by heterogeneity of actors, social networks, or emergence—the arising of a complex system from simple phenomena, such as Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”—economists increasingly are turning to agent-based modeling. Agent-based modeling is a form of computational analysis that focuses on agents rather than on aggregates. In his long career as a founding scholar of public choice, Gordon Tullock repeatedly followed the agent-oriented approach of methodological individualism. Many of Tullock’s models are thus highly amenable to further exploration using that method. As agent-based modeling becomes more and more popular, the importance of Tullock’s work will continue to grow.     

The comparative endurance and efficiency of religion: a public choice perspective

Public Choice - All of the major religious confessions existing today have outlasted every single secular ruling regime known in human history. That observation poses an interesting puzzle for...     

The theory of economic regulation and public choice and the determinants of public sector bargaining legislation

In this study we used the theory of economic regulation and public choice to derive a model to explain the pattern of public sector bargaining laws among the states. We find this type of legislation is influenced by the following demand factors: (1) the extent of public sector union membership, which represents the interest group hypothesis, has a positive influence on pro-union legislation; (2) the extent of employer opposition to unions, as measured by unfair labor practice charges against employers in representation elections, has a negative effect on bargaining laws; (3) two taste variables — the salaries of public employees and the percent of nonwhite employment in the state — have a positive influence on these laws. A result which will be surprising to many people is that the extent of private sector union membership has no significant influence on the passage of public sector bargaining legislation.Our empirical analysis indicates that supply factors are also important in explaining the pattern of public employee bargaining laws across the state. We find that states are more likely to enact pro-union legislation under the following conditions: (1) constituents appear to hold pro-labor views as represented by their Congressmen's voting record; (2) neighboring states have passed mandatory bargaining laws; and (3) when competition is greater among the political parties.     

Perestroika and public choice: The economics of autocratic succession in a rent-seeking society

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Public Choice Society Meetings, Tucson, AZ, March 1990, and at the Austrian Economics Colloquium at New York University, September 1990. We would like to thank the participants at our session, and those at the Colloquium, for their comments and criticisms. In addition, Hal Hochman, Israel Kirzner, Mario Rizzo, Charles Rowley, Robert Tollison, Gordon Tullock, and an anonymous referee provided useful comments and criticisms. The usual caveat applies.     

Exchange, unanimity and consent: a defence of the public choice account of power

An enduring criticism of public choice theory is that it does not adequately address the question of power in contemporary capitalist societies. In particular it is argued that the exchange paradigm and the principle of unanimity lead to a conservative defence of the unequal and unjust status quo of such societies. These criticisms are often presented as unanswered and unanswerable. Indeed, public choice scholars have tended to pursue their own research agendas rather than engage such criticisms. This article seeks to make good this lacuna by providing a defence of the public choice account of power. It is shown that within the public choice approach the exchange paradigm and the unanimity principle serve as idealized models against which to judge real world institutional arrangements. As such, these models serve as a basis for critique of contemporary capitalist societies in which all individuals may be subject to predation as a matter of routine. It is shown that the public choice account of power addresses the legitimization and limitation of power, whereas the critics of public choice in effect propose to allocate power to those deemed deserving. Hence, the public choice approach provides a basis for a genuinely consensual politics and exposes the fact that alternative conceptions of politics are fundamentally non-consensual. On this basis it is concluded that the public choice account of power in contemporary capitalist societies is superior to that offered by its critics.