The impact of general versus specific expert testimonyand eyewitness confidence upon mock juror judgment

Subjects (n=128) initially viewed an eyewitness of high or low confidence. Subsequently, participants viewed a psychologist who gave either espert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness identification, specific expert testimony, or no expert (control) testimony. Subjects viewing expert testimony believed the eyewitness identified the gunman significantly less often, gave the defendant lower guilt ratings, estimated a lower general percentage of correct identifications under similar circumstances, estimated a lower percentage of general accurate eyewitness testimony, and gave significantly lower ratings to the belief that one can generally tell from eyewitness confidence whether an eyewitness is accurate than subjects in control conditions. Significant differences were also obtained between general and specific expert testimony. Participants viewing specific expert testimony estimated lower general percentages of correct identifications under the circumstances of the crime and reported relying more upon the psychologist's testimony than subjects viewing general expert testimony. Additionally, subjects viewing general expert testimony had significantly less confidence in their gunman vs. innocent person decision than subjects in specific testimony or control conditions. Subjects who viewed the high confidence eyewitness decided that the eyewitness correctly identified the gunman more often, gave the defendant higher guilt ratings, and estimated the general percentage of accurate eyewitness testimony to be significantly higher than jurors in low eyewitness confidence groups. The finding that jurors may continue to rely on eyewitness confidence to gauge the accuracy of the witness even after viewing expert testimony is discussed.     

A comparison of Chinese judges' and US judges' knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony

Abstract

We surveyed 170 Chinese judges about their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony, and compared their answers to a prior survey of 160 US judges. Although the Chinese judges were less knowledgeable than the US judges, both groups had limited knowledge of eyewitness testimony, including for such important issues as whether lay people can distinguish between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses. Unlike the US judges, greater knowledge of eyewitness factors for the Chinese judges was not related to beliefs that may be necessary to reduce eyewitness error. Compared to the US judges, the Chinese judges were much less likely to believe that they needed additional eyewitness training and that they knew more about eyewitness testimony than lay persons. We also discuss the impact of culture, legal systems, investigative procedures, and judges' function on the Chinese judges' responses, and the legal reforms that China may need to implement to reduce eyewitness error.     

Change blindness can cause mistaken eyewitness identification

The current study investigated the effects of change blindness and crime severity on eyewitness identification accuracy. This research, involving 717 subjects, examined change blindness during a simulated criminal act and its effects on subjects' accuracy for identifying the perpetrator in a photospread. Subjects who viewed videos designed to induce change blindness were more likely to falsely identify the innocent actor relative to those who viewed control videos. Crime severity did not influence detection of change; however, it did have an effect on eyewitness accuracy. Subjects who viewed a more severe crime ($500 theft) made fewer errors in perpetrator identification than those who viewed a less severe crime ($5 theft). This research has theoretical implications for our understanding of change blindness and practical implications for the real‐world problem of faulty eyewitness testimony.     

Age differences in eyewitness testimony

This study examined age differences in eyewitness testimony. Children, three and six years of age, and adults interacted with an unfamiliar man for 5 minutes. Four or five days later, the witnesses answered objective and suggestive questions, recalled what happened, and tried to identify the confederate from a target-present photo line-up. The adults and 6-year-olds did not differ in their ability to answer objective questions or identify the confederate, but 6-year-olds were more suggestible than adults and recalled less about the event. Compared to the older age groups, the 3-year-olds answered fewer objective questions correctly, recalled little about what happened, and identified the confederate less frequently. In addition, they were the most suggestible. The experiment extends our knowledge of children's ability to provide accurate eyewitness reports to a very young age group and to a situation in which participants are not merely bystander witnesses but instead directly interact with the confederate.     

Juror decision making in eyewitness identification cases

The lay-person's knowledge of the factors that influence eyewitness memory was examined by evaluating the manner in which mock jurors integrated eyewitness evidence to draw inferences about defendant culpability and the likelihood that an identification was correct. Three hundred and twenty-one undergraduates viewed a videotaped trial within which ten witness and identification factors were manipulated between trials. Manipulation checks showed that subjects demonstrated superior memory for the evidence and the manipulated variables had their intended impact on appropriate rating scales. However, only one variable, witness confidence, had reliable effects on subjects' perceptions of culpability, on the perceived likelihood that the identification was correct, and on several other relevant dependent variables. Eight variables that have been shown to affect identification accuracy in the empirical literature had trivial effects on mock jurors' inferences. It was concluded that lay-people are insensitive to the factors that influence eyewitness memory.     

Influences of accent and ethnic background on perceptions of eyewitness testimony

Abstract

The purpose of the present work was to investigate the effect two eyewitness factors, accent and ethnic background, have on the perceived favorability of eyewitness testimony and case disposition in criminal trials. Six variations of testimony were created and videotaped. The videotapes varied by accent and ethnic background of the eyewitness; the testimony text was identical. Four eyewitness favorability variables, (a) credibility, (b) judgment of accuracy, (c) deceptiveness, and (d) prestige, as well as their relationship to case disposition, were measured. One hundred and seventy-four undergraduate participants viewed one of the six videotapes. Results indicate that there was a significant main effect of accent for the four eyewitness favorability variables. Accent by ethnic background interactions also yielded significant findings for the four variables as well as for the defendant's degree of guilt. Results were interpreted using the Elaboration Likelihood Model. The potential importance of these results for judicial settings is discussed.     

Courtroom testimony by psychologists on eyewitness identification issues

This article makes two major points in regard to expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification. First, the attention devoted by psychologists to eyewitness identification issues is far out of proportion to the incidence of trials involving eyewitness identifications of criminal defendants; furthermore, the often-expressed concern over wrongful convictions is probably misplaced. Second, the experimental methods used in studies of eyewitness performance are fundamentally unsuited for drawing conclusions about actual witnesses. Hence, there is not an adequate scientific foundation for expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification. Archival research is perhaps the most promising approach to the study of the criminal justice system.     

Influence of expert testimony regarding eyewitness accuracy on jury decisions

To determine the influence of expert testimony regarding the general unreliability of eyewitnesses, a two-phase study was conducted. In the first phase, 24 community residents served as jurors on four six-person juries. A burglary case was tried in 120 District Court. El Paso, Texas. Two juries heard all the evidence including the expert testimony of a psychologist and the other two heard all of the testimony except that of the psychologist. During the second phase, 24 student jurors constituting four six-person juries viewed a videotape of the trial. Two of these juries saw the entire proceeding from the first phase including the expert testimony and the remaining two saw all but the expert testimony. All juries acquitted the defendant; however, those who heard the expert testimony significantly lowered their judgments of the accuracy and reliability of eyewitness identification as well as its overall importance to the trial. Further, those juries that heard the expert testimony spent a significantly longer time discussing eyewitness identification as well as other relevant evidence. No differences between community residents and college student juries were obtained.The authors wish to thank Judge Brunson Moore, Mr. David Jeans, Mr. Ricky Glenn Smith, Detective James Christianson, D. Steven Cooper, Rachel Hanna, Daniel Torres, and Patricia Tetreault. All of these people participated in the trial and without them this research could not have been conducted. This research was supported by Gift Funds of the Department of Psychology, University of Texas at El Paso.     

What judges know about eyewitness testimony: A comparison of Norwegian and US judges

Abstract

We surveyed 157 Norwegian judges about their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony, and compared their answers to a prior survey of 160 US judges. Although the Norwegian judges were somewhat more knowledgeable than the US judges, both groups had limited knowledge of eyewitness testimony. The Norwegian judges, like the US judges, frequently differed from eyewitness experts in their responses to such important issues as whether eyewitness confidence is related to identification accuracy at trial and what is the best method for conducting identification procedures. As was true for the US judges, more knowledgeable Norwegian judges had many of the beliefs that may be necessary for reducing and mitigating the effects of eyewitness error. The results suggest that increasing judges’ knowledge of eyewitness testimony may be an important component of the solution to eyewitness error.     

Juror Sensitivity to the Cross-Race Effect

Black and White mock jurors' sensitivity to the cross-race effect was investigated by varying the race of the eyewitness in a simulated murder trial of a Black defendant. Participants heard an audiotape of a trial after which they rendered a verdict and rated the credibility of the witnesses. White participants found the prosecution witnesses (including the eyewitness) more credible, and the defense witness less credible, than did Black participants; they were also more likely to find the defendant guilty. The Black eyewitness was perceived as more credible than was the White eyewitness, but eyewitness race had no effect on verdict. These results are consistent with the literature indicating that jurors of different races reach different verdicts, and also that jurors are relatively insensitive to factors that affect eyewitness testimony, such as the cross-race effect.     

Expert testimony about eyewitness identification

Recent research concerning eyewitness identification is surveyed with respect to its adequacy (reliability and validity) to support expert testimony. The conclusion is that the scientific basis is generally inadequate and that the more we have learned about various aspects of eyewitness identification, the most inadequate it appears. The argument is made that presentation in policy settings requires greater circumspection than would be required in presentation to scientific audiences. Prudential rules are suggested. They would have the effect of sharply reducing participation in the adversarial system.     

The impact of protective shields and videotape testimony on conviction rates in a simulated trial of child sexual abuse

In Experiment 1 mock jurors watched a videotape simulation of a sexual abuse trial that included a 10-year-old child witness testifying in one of three different modalities: (1) The child testified in court while directly confronting the defendant (open court condition). (2) The child testified in court with a protective shield placed between the child and the defendant (shield condition). (3) The child testified outside the courtroom and the child's testimony was presented to the jury and the defendant on a video monitor (video condition). The mock jurors judged the guilt of the defendant after watching the entire trial. The modality of the child's testimony had no impact on conviction rates. In Experiment 2 subjects watched the same trial that was used in Experiment 1. The trial was stopped immediately after the child testified (the child was the first witness to take the stand), and subjects judged the guilt of the defendant. The modality of the child's testimony had a significant impact on conviction rates. Subjects in the open court condition were more likely to convict the defendant than subjects in the shield and videotape conditions. These findings are relevant to Supreme Court decisions regarding the use of protective devices with child witnesses.