Toward a Multiprocess Model of Rivalry and the Democratic Peace

In this paper we examine recent efforts to combine quantitative research on the democratic peace with research on interstate rivalry. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we highlight problems with separately analyzing the processes associated with rivalry and the democratic peace. Specifically, we specify a multiprocess model and demonstrate that previous research on this topic may overestimate the pacifying effect of democracy on enduring rivalries. Since pairs of democracies are unlikely to experience interstate rivalry in the first place, the true effect of joint democracy is difficult to ascertain in a censored sample of interstate rivals. Our simulation results are consistent with historical data analysis that suggests that the pacifying effect of democracy is most pronounced in the enhanced probability of jointly democratic dyads averting the onset of rivalry. More generally, this article fits into a larger body of research that examines the confounding effect of selection bias on world politics research.     

Strategies,capabilities, and demands: Explaining outcomes in violent intrastate nationalist conflicts

The study of nationalist and ethnic conflict has undergone considerable growth since the end of the Cold War. Much of the effort has been focused on ascertaining the nature and origins of such conflicts, and less on their process and termination. Those studies that do focus on conflict termination have generally done so using case‐study or idiosyncratic methods. Hence, we do not yet have much large‐N or statistical evidence that might suggest broad trends in how such conflicts end, or even much experience in measuring the relevant concepts in a manner conducive to such methods. This paper will address these questions by introducing a theoretical framework that seeks to explain the outcomes of violent intrastate nationalist conflicts. It will discuss measurement issues for relevant independent variables, and present data for a group of 75 violent, intrastate nationalist conflicts from 1945–1996. This data will then be used to test propositions derived from the model. The aim is to provide a useful building block for the study of the process and outcome of conflicts which political scientists now recognize to be some of the most important for the coming century.     

The Conditional Effectiveness of Directive Mediation

ABSTRACT

This research re-examines the effectiveness of directive mediation in interstate rivalries. To do so, highlighting the importance of disputants’ willingness for successful directive mediation, this study identifies four conditions that affect the levels of disputants’ willingness to engage in mediation talks and proposes that the presence of such conditions improves or worsens the efficacy of directive strategies. We expect heavy-handed mediators will be less effective in a dispute involving highly interdependent or power-imbalanced rivalries while directive mediation performs poorly when it is led by unbiased mediators or when it is employed for long-running rivals. Our empirical findings, based on two existing rivalry datasets, suggest that directive mediation fares well when mediators are biased, when rivals are power-balanced, and when rivalries are protracted, and that the efficacy of directive mediation improves in disputes involving highly interdependent strategic rivals but decreases in the cases between highly interdependent general rivals.     

A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816-2002

This paper merges constructivist theoretical insights into the rival role identity, rival role relationships, and the resulting culture of anarchy that characterizes the interstate system with recent empirical measures of rivalry. This project is carried out through an examination of the Latin American regional subsystem, which has already received some attention from analysts concerned with interstate culture, largely because of the relative lack of interstate conflict in the region. The dyadic relationships of 17 Latin American states and the culture they produce are examined between 1948 and 1992. The paper employs simultaneous equation modeling to capture aspects of the co-constitution of these agents and structures, consistent with constructivist theory. The results indicate that the Lockean culture of anarchy and the adoption of a dyadic rival role relationship are affected by a variety of factors emphasized by realists, liberals, and constructivists in the Latin American context.     

European and Asian responses to the US-led ‘war on terror’

This article seeks to establish a context for the other contributions to this special issue. Using the lens of strategic culture, the article tries to explore how states from Europe and Asia have responded to the US-led ‘war on terror’. It argues that the nature of the threat from international terrorism requires states in Europe and Asia to develop a range of external and internal policy responses. Europe has been able to react to this changing strategic environment more successfully because of the pre-existing pattern of interstate cooperation as well as the organizational framework of the European Union. The United States has been more successful in imposing its counterterrorism priorities upon particular Asian states due to the absence of mature frameworks for international cooperation within the region.     

Sources of Leader Support and Interstate Rivalry

Since segments of the selectorate differently experience costs and benefits from rivalry, the foreign policy choices of leaders reflect these domestic preferences. As a result, shifts in the composition of the domestic coalition of support backing the leader provide a fundamental determinant of rivalry termination. While previous research sought to explore the relationship between domestic political turnover and rivalry termination using regime transitions as a proxy for turnover of the state’s domestic ruling group, in practice this measure exhibits significant disconnection with the quantity of interest. Further, there are alternative pathways through which regime transitions may lead to rivalry termination. I test the relationship using new data from the CHISOLS project, finding that when rivals undergo a change in the source of support that maintains the leader in office, the probability of rivalry termination rises dramatically. I further find that regime transitions have an effect on the probability of rivalry termination that is independent of the effect of ruling coalition turnover. This study thus both asserts the relationship between domestic political turnover and rivalry termination and clarifies the mechanism by which the relationship operates.     

Holy Trinities,Rivalry Termination,and Conflict

In this article we attempt to correct a number of gaps in the current literature on strategic rivalry. First, we argue that liberal and realist theories of conflict and cooperation have been generally ignored by scholars engaged in rivalry research. Secondly, we argue that current rivalry research fails to disentangle termination processes from conflict within rivalries, mainly due to problems with common operationalizations of rivalry. To bridge these gaps, we test the effects of liberal variables-manifested in the Kantian tripod (democracy, interdependence, and IGO membership)-and what we more loosely term the realist tripod (bipolarity, shared threat, and capability balance) on both rivalry termination and the probability that rivals will engage in a militarized conflict. We conduct this test utilizing a new data set of strategic rivalries compiled by Thompson (1999, 2001) which corrects the tautological operationalization of rivalry commonly used in rivalry research when conflict is the dependent variable. Overall, our results paint a variegated picture, underscoring the importance of rivalry as a special class of dyadic relationship. While realist variables better explain rivalry termination, the direction is opposite that predicted by some realist hypotheses; among liberal variables, only democracy is a robust predictor of both termination and conflict.     

A Streetcar Named Sarajevo: Catalysts, Multiple Causation Chains, and Rivalry Structures

"Streetcar" interpretations of world politics emphasize the significance of contingent catalysts vis-a(c)-vis structural variables and multiple, nonlinear chains of causation, among other things. Ultimately, though, it is difficult to evaluate the significance of catalysts in the absence of systematic data on war precipitants that would allow one to compare the effects of catalysts and other factors. More concrete but under conceptualized is the explanatory payoff associated with examining nonlinear interactions among multiple rivalries in bringing about wars that spread more widely than anticipated. World War I is a good case in point. A very large number of interstate rivalries contributed in various ways and over a number of years to the outbreak of a world war that no one sought precisely in the way in which it emerged. Focusing on the structure of their interactions also facilitates the synthesis of a number of alternative interpretations of why World War I began. Examining the effects of interconnected and "ripe" rivalry fields in other major power war contexts should prove to be equally beneficial.     

Peace from the Inside: Exploring the Role of the Insider-Partial Mediator

Previous quantitative research on mediation in intrastate and interstate conflicts has highlighted the role of external mediators. This study represents the first effort to systematically explore the role of internal—insider-partial—mediators. We suggest that the insider-partial mediators bring important indigenous resources to a peace process and that they can complement external mediators by mitigating the bargaining problem of information failure. Exploring new data on the occurrence and effect of mediation in unarmed insurrections from 1970–2006, we find that the insider-partial mediators significantly increase the likelihood of negotiated agreements. This applies even after controlling for so-called selection effects, where external mediators are selected, or self-selected, into the most difficult conflict situations, whereas insider-partial mediators are utilized in conflict situations that are less severe; and where insider-partial mediators have a substantially higher frequency of activity in unarmed as compared to armed insurrections. We therefore conclude that the insider-partial mediators play an important and positive role in peacemaking that merits further exploration.     

Rivalry, Reaction, and Weapons Proliferation: A Time-Series Analysis of Global Arms Transfers

This article analyzes the competitive dynamics in global arms transfers from 1951 to 1995. I discuss the enduring forces behind the proliferation of military capability during the Cold War and other historical periods, and then consider the competitive dynamics characteristic of the superpower rivalry itself. The process of military-technological advance, along with the dynamics of enduring interstate rivalry, lead us to expect certain patterns in quantitative data representing arms-transfer levels over time. Concepts in time-series analysis—cointegration and error correction—are helpful for understanding competitive arms-transfer policies during the Cold War, and I apply the relevant analytical tools to test for the hypothesized patterns in the empirical data. American and Russian, as well as NATO and Warsaw Pact, arms transfers are examined at three levels of regional aggregation: the Third World as a whole, the Middle East security complex, and the Persian Gulf subcomplex. The evidence shows that arms transfers by the Cold War rivals moved together in patterns consistent with competitive policy making in an environment of military-technological change, and that one or both sides adjusted their supply policies to correct for deviations from a moving equilibrium. This describes an action-reaction process, but a loosely coupled one deriving from military-technological uncertainties, the complexities of regional security dynamics, and the multidimensional character of the Cold War competition.     

The Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy Behavior in Middle Eastern Enduring Rivals, 1948–1998

Rivalry-related issues tend to dominate the foreign policy agenda of states in enduring rivalries. Thus, the enduring rivalry research program provides an important framework for foreign policy analysis. This paper probes the domestic elements of strategic interaction in the three main Middle Eastern rivalries: Israel–Egypt, Israel–Jordan, and Israel–Syria. The empirical tests probe whether the number of parties represented in Israel's cabinet and Arab and Israeli domestic unrest impact the propensity for these rivals to employ hostility against each other. We specify vector autoregression (VAR) models and negative binomial event count models with monthly levels of hostility as the dependent variables for the period 1948–1998. The results provide interesting foreign policy implications regarding the impact of Israeli domestic political structures on conflict dynamics in the Middle East. There is no evidence that the foreign policy behavior of Arab states becomes risk averse when Israeli leaders might need an external scapegoat. These findings are discussed in the context of other research on enduring rivalries and strategic interaction.     

European Union Training Missions: security sector reform or counter-insurgency by proxy?

With European Union Training Missions (EUTM) Mali and EUTM Somalia, the EU seeks to stabilize countries facing state weakness caused by intrastate conflict. While the EU formally promotes security sector reform (SSR) through its foreign policy, the EUTM missions in Mali and Somalia in one sense can be described as “counter-insurgency by proxy” as military trainees combat local insurgencies shortly upon graduation. This raises the question whether the EUTM missions are consistent with SSR aims, such as creating a security sector that is legitimate, sustainable, and under civilian control, or inadvertently risk contributing to negative side effects in the medium term. Based on extensive interviews in Belgium, Kenya, Mali, Sweden, and Uganda with personnel who either served in or planned these missions, this study analyses factors which hinder the EUTM concept from being fully consistent with SSR and identifies possible policies to ameliorate the risk of unintended side effects.     

Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict

We know, most notably through Ted Gurr's research, that ethnic discrimination can lead to ethnopolitical rebellion–intrastate conflict. I seek to discover what impact, if any, gender inequality has on intrastate conflict. Although democratic peace scholars and others highlight the role of peaceful domestic behavior in predicting state behavior, many scholars have argued that a domestic environment of inequality and violence—structural and cultural violence—results in a greater likelihood of violence at the state and the international level. This project contributes to this line of inquiry and further tests the grievance theory of intrastate conflict by examining the norms of violence that facilitate a call to arms. And in many ways, I provide an alternative explanation for the significance of some of the typical economic measures—the greed theory—based on the link between discrimination, inequality, and violence. I test whether states characterized by higher levels of gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict. Ultimately, the basic link between gender inequality and intrastate conflict is confirmed—states characterized by gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict, 1960–2001.     

The Role of Intra-Religious Conflicts in Intrastate Wars

Many civil wars are fought between members of different religious communities. It seems plausible to focus on these communities’ interrelations to identify the causal factors responsible for the escalating effects that religion can have in such conflicts. A closer look, however, reveals that processes within religious communities can be crucial in influencing the role religions play in intrastate wars. Within single communities, factions of religious elites compete for material and dogmatic supremacy. Such intra-religious conflicts can motivate religious elites to search for support from political allies to prevail over their religious rivals. In return, they legitimize their political patrons’ claims for political power and their violent campaigns against members of other religious communities. Thus, intra-religious conflicts can effectively contribute to the religious escalation of intrastate wars between different religious communities. This argument is exemplified with reference to conflicts in Thailand, The Philippines, and Iraq.     

Explaining Rivalry Escalation to War: Space, Position, and Contiguity in the Major Power Subsystem

Vasquez's (1996) rivalry escalation theory stressed territorial disputes as the principal focus for a two-path explanation of war. Neighbors fight over adjacent space and non-neighbors sometimes join ongoing wars between neighbors. But major powers are also much concerned with positional issues. Expanding the war motivation focus to encompass both spatial and positional issues facilitates the development of a new, more elaborate theory from which several new hypotheses can be derived, in addition to the older ones. Testing of the new theory can also proceed with rivalry data not based on dispute density measures, different types of contiguity can be assessed, and the presence of spatial-positional issues can be measured directly, as opposed to relying on a proximity proxy. The empirical outcome strongly supports the two-path, two-issue theory. In the major power subsystem, noncontiguous rivals outnumber contiguous rivals, dyadic wars are scarce, and war joining has been the norm. Spatial issues alone would have a hard time accounting for this pattern. Variable mixes of spatial and positional issues are able to account for it and a number of derived hypotheses reasonably well. This is not the last word on rivalry escalation to war but it appears to be an additional step in the right direction.     

Theorizing national preference formation

This article seeks to explain through the contextualized comparisons of a few critical cases how national preferences on an interstate bargaining issue are formed domestically. It proposes an interaction framework of national preference formation (NPF), which emphasizes the government's policy autonomy, the size of the ruling party or coalition, and the party unity in aggregating divergent domestic preferences for interstate bargaining. The framework is tested against major European Community members' preference formation on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Case studies reveal that the interaction framework quite accurately describes the national preferences of Germany, Britain, and France over EMU.     

Nationalism and war for territory: from ‘divisible’ territories to inviolable homelands

How did the rise of nationalism affect patterns of interstate wars? The conventional wisdom in mainstream security studies tends to treat the rise of nationalism as a ‘force amplifier’ that allowed states to wage war on an unprecedented scale, leading to deadlier—and, consequently, less frequent—wars. By building on emerging interdisciplinary research on territory and territoriality, this essay suggests that there was a second mechanism—complementary to the ‘force amplifier’ logic—through which the rise of nationalism affected the patterns of interstate war: nationalism changed the ‘character’ of territories in the modern state system, which, in turn, transformed state preferences over their territorial belongings. Before the rise of nationalism, state elites viewed their territories more as ‘divisible’ goods, which created strong incentives for states to wage frequent yet limited wars. The rise of nationalism, in this context, rendered territory controlled by a state more of an ‘inviolable homeland’, which then contributed to the increasing severity and decreasing frequency of interstate wars. The arguments presented in this essay have implications for not only the study of nationalism and war, but also bargaining models of war and the so-called ‘border fixity’ norm.     

Threats,opportunity, and force: Repression and diversion of domestic pressure, 1948–1982

This paper explores empirically how domestic political and economic challenges affect political leaders’ propensity to respond with the use of force at home and abroad. The foreign policy and world politics literatures are replete with references to leaders’ alleged use of external conflict when confronted with domestic challenges, but rarely consider domestic responses to dissent or the role of interstate threats. Comparative research on repression primarily focuses on linkages between domestic challenges and leaders’ resort to repressive policies, but ignores international alternatives. Neither literature considers the influence of external threats and opportunity structures on resort to use of force and coercion at home and abroad. Alternatively, we contend that foreign conflict and repression are complementary and potentially interchangeable policies that leaders may use to maintain political power in the face of domestic pressure. We hypothesize that the level of domestic political constraints conditions the opportunity and likelihood of selecting either repression or foreign conflict in response to domestic challenges. Since the ability to capitalize on external conflict involvement in all likelihood is not independent of international opportunity structures, we explicitly address differences in the availability of historical interstate animosity. We test our hypotheses on resort to repression and external dispute involvement on a global sample of political leaders for the period 1948–82. Our results indicate that repression and external conflict involvement appear to be largely independent and driven by different challenges: While there is some evidence that domestic conflict increases the likelihood of disputes and that external threat may promote repression, there is little support for the idea of direct substitution in kind since leaders frequently combine both dispute involvement and repression.     

Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars

This paper examines the conditions under which warring parties will accept an outside party's offer to mediate. Specifically, we explore variation in the incentives for accepting third-party offers in interstate conflicts as compared to civil wars. We argue that since mediation in civil wars transfers legitimacy to the non-state actor and can generate a precedent of exceptions to the norm of sovereignty, the political cost associated with accepting international mediation will be substantially higher in civil wars compared to international conflicts. States should therefore only accept mediation in the most serious disputes, or when the costs of legitimizing an opponent are outweighed by the benefits of conflict resolution. Building on this theoretical reasoning, the paper analyzes the implications of differences in incentive structures between inter- and intrastate conflicts for offer and acceptance of mediation. We find an empirical discrepancy between interstate and civil wars in regard to demand-side (acceptance) of mediation, and to a somewhat lesser extent the supply-side (offer) of international mediation. In line with our argument, we find that the historical ties between the potential intermediary and at least one of the disputants play different roles in regard to acceptance of mediation in interstate compared to civil wars. This is important to take into consideration in the emerging debate on mediation bias.     

Why has the India-Pakistan Rivalry Been so Enduring? Power Asymmetry and an Intractable Conflict

The India-Pakistan conflict is one of the most enduring rivalries of the post-World War era. Thus far, it has witnessed four wars and a number of serious interstate crises. The literature on enduring rivalries suggests that the India-Pakistan dyad contains factors such as unsettled territorial issues, political incompatibility, irreconcilable positions on national identity, and the absence of significant economic and trade relations between the two states, all cause the rivalry to persist. In this article I present a crucial neglected structural factor that explains the endurance of the rivalry. I argue that the peculiar power asymmetry that has prevailed between the two antagonists for over half a century has made full termination of the rivalry difficult in the near-term. Truncated power asymmetry is a causal factor in this rivalry's persistence, as rivalries between a status quo power and a challenger state that are relatively equal in their capabilities at the local level are the most intractable and nearly impossible to resolve quickly. The duration of many other asymmetric rivalries can also be explained using a framework of global superiority versus local parity in power capabilities that exist between the antagonists.