Proportionality and Self-Interest

This paper offers a justification of the principle of military proportionality that is based in considerations of self-interest. By offering such a justification, I hope to vindicate the principle on the basis of the least controversial argument available. The war between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006 is used as a case study. Part 1 surveys recent work on military proportionality and suggests that the importance of this principle has increased in the age of asymmetrical warfare. Part 2 considers and rejects the traditional realist concerns about proportionality. Part 3 offers a realist rationale for adhering to the principle.     

Proportionality and exaggeration in the British electoral system

The British electoral system has traditionally been defended on the grounds that its systematic exaggeration of the lead of the Conservatives over Labour or vice versa secured for the largest party an overall majority of seats on a minority of the votes and thereby enabled the electorate directly to determine which party holds office. Recent changes in the electoral geography of Britain have eroded that systematic exaggeration at Westminster elections and may soon remove it entirely. Meanwhile the electoral system is discouraging the pursuit of geographically aggregative policies. Consequently, the single member plurality system is no longer a suitable instrument to achieve the ends of its defenders but, despite their availability, alternative systems which could meet those aims have not been seriously considered.     

Representation and the democratic deficit

In the early years of the Community it was assumed that there was a widespread consensus about the future development of Europe, and that decisions by the Council of Ministers were broadly in line with public opinion. In recent years the growth in the powers and responsibilities of European institutions has been considerable, through the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. The Community is now the world's largest trading group, and one of the three most important players on the world economic scene alongside the USA and Japan. The EU has grown from six to fifteen member states, and further waves of enlargement are on the horizon. Yet many fear that processes of representation and accountability have not kept pace with this expansion, producing a legitimacy crisis (Anderson & Eliassen 1996; Hayward 1995). The key issue addressed throughout this Special Issue is the classic one of political representation: how the preferences of European citizens can be linked to decision making within the European Union.     

Representation and the democratic deficit

Abstract In the early years of the Community it was assumed that there was a widespread consensus about the future development of Europe, and that decisions by the Council of Ministers were broadly in line with public opinion. In recent years the growth in the powers and responsibilities of European institutions has been considerable, through the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. The Community is now the world's largest trading group, and one of the three most important players on the world economic scene alongside the USA and Japan. The EU has grown from six to fifteen member states, and further waves of enlargement are on the horizon. Yet many fear that processes of representation and accountability have not kept pace with this expansion, producing a legitimacy crisis (Anderson & Eliassen 1996; Hayward 1995). The key issue addressed throughout this Special Issue is the classic one of political representation: how the preferences of European citizens can be linked to decision making within the European Union.     

Proportional Representation and the Framers

Techniques for conducting elections developed since 1800 have raised a question about the soundness of the American framers’ majoritarianism. John Stuart Mill notably argued that the framers’ desire to reward merit, as opposed to party loyalty, would be better served by a system of proportional representation that gave deserving minorities a voice. This article considers the likelihood that a system such as Mill proposed would have the results he hoped for; it concludes that such a system is more likely to worsen problems with the existing system of representation than to solve them.     

Representation and voter participation

Abstract This paper presents results from a study of turnout in the 1994 European Parliament elections which inserted several new questions into the post–election Eurobarometer, including some open–ended questions. It distinguishes between circumstantial and voluntary abstention and shows how each type varies depending on the institutional arrangements for the election. Using both the subjective reasons given for abstention and a range of more objective measures of attitudes, it makes the case that conventional views as to the impact of Sunday–voting and the proportionality of the electoral system and as to the non–impact of attitudes to the European Union need to be modified. It concludes by identifying some practical institutional and political measures that could encourage higher levels of participation.     

Representation and voter participation

This paper presents results from a study of turnout in the 1994 European Parliament elections which inserted several new questions into the post–election Eurobarometer, including some open–ended questions. It distinguishes between circumstantial and voluntary abstention and shows how each type varies depending on the institutional arrangements for the election. Using both the subjective reasons given for abstention and a range of more objective measures of attitudes, it makes the case that conventional views as to the impact of Sunday–voting and the proportionality of the electoral system and as to the non–impact of attitudes to the European Union need to be modified. It concludes by identifying some practical institutional and political measures that could encourage higher levels of participation.     

Fair models of political fairness

Abstract. In this note we study different methods of aggregation of preferences met on the occasion of elections. Through a simple geometrical representation, we analyse several of their properties, in particular those linked to Arrow's theorem for ordinal rankings; we pursue this discussion in the case of cardinal rankings, the qualities of which convince us of the usefulness of experiencing their introduction in real ballots.     

关于公平问题的哲学思考

是否与生产方式相适应是理解公平的科学方法论原则。社会主义生产方式决定了这一阶段的公平只能是形式公平与内容公平的统一。衡量形式公平是以劳动为尺度,衡量内容公平是以需要为尺度。在整个社会主义阶段,形式公平都将居于主导地位,但从发展趋势看,内容公平在公平中的比重将愈来愈大。坚持形式公平时,不应出现贫富差距过大的现象;坚持内容公平时,不应过于影响效率。从当前的社会实际情况看,我们应该更加关注和强调内容公平。     

Proportional Representation and the Fortunes of Right-Wing Extremist Parties

This article examines the relationship between electoral systems and extremist political parties. Focusing on the West European parties of the extreme right, it first investigates the extent to which district magnitude and electoral formula - the two main dimensions of electoral systems - influence the scores of these parties. It then considers the overall impact of the disproportionality of the electoral system. The article concludes that whilst proportional electoral systems do undeniably make it easier for extremist parties to gain legislative representation, there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that they promote extremism. Instead, the share of the vote going to extremist parties appears unrelated to the type of electoral system employed.     

Gender-Related Political Knowledge and the Descriptive Representation of Women

Past scholarship has documented that women tend to know less about politics than men. This study finds that political knowledge of one kind—knowledge about the actual level of women's representation—is related to support for having more women in office. Individuals who underestimate the percentage of women in office are more likely than individuals who know the correct percentage to support increasing women's representation. Meanwhile, individuals who overestimate the percentage of women in office are less likely to support increasing women's representation. Ironically, women are more likely than men to overestimate the presence of women in office. I also find that gender predicts support for having more women in office, with women more supportive than men. Women would be even more supportive of electing more women to office if they were as knowledgeable as men about the extent of women's underrepresentation.     

Retrospective Voting and Political Representation

This article develops a theoretical model of political representation under the single-member district system. I establish the existence of equilibria in which legislative voting of each legislator depends only on her preference and her electorate's preference and voters sanction badly behaved incumbents and retain well-behaved ones based solely on their own representatives' roll-call records. In equilibrium, voters achieve a partial representation with respect to representatives' behavior in each district. However, with respect to representation of the social majority, my findings are indeterminate. On the one hand, there exists an equilibrium in which the majority-preferred alternative is the outcome guaranteed, except in very special circumstances. On the other hand, this equilibrium is not generally the unique equilibrium, and, for some parameter values, there is an equilibrium in which the majority-preferred alternative is less likely than the alternative preferred only by the minority to be the outcome.     

公共政策的公平价值选择及其实现

公共政策的价值问题是政策科学的基础理论问题.公共政策的价值包括公平、效率、可行性、实践性等,而公平与效率则是其中最基本的价值.现代公共行政越来越强调将公平作为公共政策的基本价值目标.公共政策的公平价值目标的实现需要通过一定的途径.     

Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation

We introduce a Downsian model in which policy‐relevant information is revealed to the elected politician after the election. The electorate benefits from giving the elected politician discretion to adapt policies to his information. But limits on discretion are desirable when politicians do not share the electorate's policy preferences. Optimal political representation generally consists of a mixture of the delegate (no discretion) and trustee (full discretion) models. Ambiguous electoral platforms are essential for achieving beneficial representation. Nevertheless, electoral competition does not ensure optimal representation: The winning candidate's platform is generally overly ambiguous. While our theory rationalizes a positive correlation between ambiguity and electoral success, it shows that the relationship need not be causal.