Bases of political judgments: The role of stereotypic and nonstereotypic information

Three experiments investigated the role of stereotypic and nonstereotypic criteria in judgments of political candidates. The effects of physical attractiveness, political party, and stands on specific issues on both absolute and comparative judgments of political candidates were examined to evaluate three hypotheses about stereotype and attribute use. In the absence of other information, candidates' physical attractiveness (conveyed through photographs) had a substantial influence on subjects' global evaluations of them and inferences of both their personal qualities and their political ideology. When other information about the candidates' party membership and stands on specific issues was available, however, the candidates' attractiveness had no effect on the evaluations of them. When subjects made judgments of only one candidate, subjects relied exclusively on the candidate's voting record. When subjects were asked to make comparative judgments of two candidates, however, they based their judgments on each candidate's party membership and not on their respective voting records. Implications of these results for the processes that underlie political judgments and decisions are evaluated.     

Bureaucratic dilemmas: Civil servants between political responsiveness and normative constraints

The interaction between political executives and civil servants rests on a delicate balance between political responsiveness and the duty of civil servants and ministers to respect legal and other normative constraints on executive authority. In Danish central government, this balance is stressed by norms that define the correct behavior when the civil service provides ministers with political advice and assistance. Organizational factors strongly influence civil servants' behavior when they have to balance responsiveness against constraints on their role as political advisers. Moreover, civil servants working closely with ministers pay more attention to legal constraints than their peers among agency officials and specialists. Agency officials and specialists are much more prone to prioritize professional standards. We argue that this pattern can be generalized West European systems.     

Causal inference and American political development: contrasts and complementarities

Public Choice - Causal inference and American political development (APD) are widely separated and (to some) fundamentally incompatible tendencies within political science. In this paper, we...     

Causal inference and American political development: common challenges and opportunities

Public Choice - The causal inference (CI) movement has forced political scientists to think far more seriously about what can be learned from a particular research design and to be more attentive...     

Learning from each other: causal inference and American political development

Public Choice - Within political science, a movement focused on increasing the credibility of causal inferences (CIs) has gained considerable traction in recent years. While CI has been...     

Making rules credible: divided government and political budget cycles

Political budget cycles (PBCs) can result from the credibility problems office-motivated incumbents face under asymmetric information, due to the temptation to manipulate fiscal policy to increase their electoral chances. We analyze the role of rules that limit public debt, because borrowing is a necessary condition for aggregate PBCs. Since the legislature must typically authorize new debt, divided government can make these fiscal rules credible. Commitment is undermined by either unified government or imperfect compliance with the budget law, which can help explain why PBCs are stronger in developing countries and in new democracies. When divided government affects efficiency, voters must trade off electoral distortions and government competence.     

American political development and new challenges of causal inference

Public Choice - Members of the subfield of American Political Development (APD), like other political scientists, are confronting the identification revolution in the social sciences. They are...     

Causal inference and American political development: the case of the gag rule

Public Choice - We extend previous work on the role of politically motivated donors who contribute to candidates in an election with single dimension policy preferences. In a two-stage game wherein...     

Reinforcement vs. change: The political influence of the media

The aim of this paper is to analyze competition between two ideological media outlets that want to influence their viewers so as to boot the number of votes for their preferred political party. We consider two ways of influencing viewers, which correspond to two prominent theories borrowed from the literature on Sociology: the “Reinforcement Approach” and the “Attitudinal Orientations Approach”. Our findings show that the aim of influencing viewers generally pushes media outlets to differentiate their opinions, and that the extend of this differentiation deeply depends on the viewers’ behavior. More precisely, we observe that if the viewers channel hop, media outlets end up differentiating their opinions more than if the viewers receive all their information from just one media.     

Interest in political campaigns: The influence of question order and electoral context

A split-ballot experiment shows that, when people are asked how interested they are in following political campaigns, their response depends not only on the order in which the question is asked, but also on the broader electoral context in which it is posed. When asked how interested they were in following the political campaigns immediatelyafter a question about whether or not they voted in the (1982) election, people were more likely to think they were interested in the campaign, especially if they claimed to have voted, than if they were asked about it immediatelybefore the question on whether or not they voted. This order effect, however, appears to depend onwhen the questions are asked. If asked within a few weeks after the election, there is little or no order effect. But later, as the memory of the campaign fades, the order of the questions makes a sizable difference in the results. This order effect also seems to be more pronounced among better-educated respondents, suggesting that they are more likely to feel pressured by a social norm to vote and to express an interest in political affairs, not only in real life, but in the survey interview as well. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the implications for the design of the interview schedule used in the American National Election Studies.The research reported in this paper was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (SES81-11404).     

The institutional and political factors that influence voter turnout

State data were used to develop an econometric model of voter turnout for an off-year (1982) general election. The premise of the research was that existing voter turnout models lacked some of the true explanatory variables. In particular, the political efficacy component of the decision to vote was believed to be under-represented in those models. Previously untested institutional, political, and weather variables proved to be significant explanatory variables. Many variables that were significant in previous studies were not significant in the 1982 general election analysis. 91% of the variation in voter turnout was explained, a significant improvement over previous efforts. Since the values of many of the variables are directly chosen by elected officials, the model provides policymakers with a menu of opportunities for boosting voter turnout.     

Guilty by disassociation (and innocent by association): The impact of relevant and irrelevant analogies on political judgments

We investigate how associative (X is similar to Y) and disassociative (X is different from Y) analogies may affect judgments of political target stimuli they are employed to embellish. In an experimental study it was hypothesized that the judgmental relevance of the analogy-target relation is an important determinant of the effect of the analogy on subsequent judgments. It was reasoned that for irrelevant analogies the (dis)associative relation would be less efficiently encoded and utilized than the evaluative tone of the analogy itself, resulting in relative assimilation to the connotation of irrelevant analogies, even where the analogy was actually disassociated from the target. Where the analogy-target relation was relevant to judgments of the target, these judgments were predicted to follow the specified analogy-target relation for both associative and disassociative analogies. The predictions were supported. The relation of these results to social judgment models and to the rhetorical devices used to influence political judgment is discussed.     

Lobbying, corruption and political influence

The paper explores the determinants of generalized trust across countries. The findings suggest that only few variables can be considered significant. Social polarization in the form of income inequality and ethnic diversity reduces trust, Protestantism and having a monarchy increases trust while post-communist societies are less trusting than other. The findings also provide support for the use of a standard indicator as a stable measure of generalized trust and emphasize the importance of taking endogeneity seriously.     

Institutions and representation: How institutional rules shape political recruitment in French regional elections

This article attempts to develop an approach to political recruitment that combines the study of strategies deployed by candidates, party officials and local leaders, with an analysis of the effects induced by the institutional environment within which they act. It is suggested that institutional ‘rules’ specific to French political life shape the competition among political actors who participate in the selection of candidates standing for regional election. More specifically, political recruitment can be fully understood only if three kinds of institutional variables are combined: the rules of the regional electoral system; the organisational features of political activity at the local level; and, above all, the variety of non‐codified norms and criteria which orient the perceptions and beliefs of the political groups involved in the selection process. The main empirical conclusion is that institutional variables engender ‘unexpected effects’ which modify traditional mechanisms of local elite recruitment.     

National financial structures,capital mobility,and international economic rules: The normative consequences of East Asian,European, and American distinctiveness

In addressing the relationship between the structures of national financial markets, capital mobility, and the rules governing international trade and investment, this article combines theory and policy. Focusing mainly on the United States, Germany, and Japan, it first draws together themes and suggestive evidence from diverse bodies of research on international capital mobility and national financial structures. On this basis, it argues that, notwithstanding the increasing mobility of capital, asymmetries in those structures persist and have important consequences for the rules of the international economic game as they are now evolving. The article then looks more deeply at East Asia, the region that appears to be presenting the clearest challenge to existing international rules. In its conclusion, and in light of that challenge, the article discusses the agenda that confronts researchers and policy-makers as they attempt to assess and re-calibrate rules to govern the more complex international economy of the 1990s and beyond.     

Rent-seeking,political influence and inequality: A simple analytical example

A simple model allowing an analysis of the interaction between economic policy decisions and rent-seeking by private agents competing for political influence, is developed. Rent-seeking may be of the directly unproductive type, requiring resources that are withdrawn from productive activities, or it may manifest itself as income transfers (corruption) to political decisionmakers. In the political-economic equilibrium of the model the extent of rent-seeking, economic policy decisions, income inequality, etc. are endogenously determined.