Issue compensation and right‐wing government social spending

It is well‐established that prolonged left‐wing incumbency has a positive long‐term effect on welfare effort in terms of high levels of social spending and reduced levels of economic inequality and poverty. Prolonged left‐wing incumbency also influences the institutional set‐up of welfare states, in particular generating strong support for existing arrangements in countries with large welfare states. The issue ownership literature furthermore shows that the public comes to distrust right‐wing parties as defenders of the welfare state. In countries that have a tradition of left‐wing incumbency it is particularly important for right‐wing governments to compensate for the distrust of the public because of the popularity of the welfare state and strong vested interests. While right‐wing governments on average are negatively associated with social spending, there is a strong positive association between right‐wing government and social spending in traditionally left‐wing countries. It is even the case that right‐wing governments in these countries spend more on social welfare than left‐wing governments. This indicates that right‐wing governments are forced to compensate for the lack of public trust by being even more generous than the left.     

Party system nationalization,presidential coalitions,and government spending

This paper argues that there is a strong relationship between geographical patterns of political parties' electoral performance and the composition of central government expenditures. When party system nationalization is high, the composition of spending will focus more on non-targetable expenditures, while targetable expenditures increase as the party system distribution of votes across different districts becomes less homogenous. However, the effect of party nationalization on spending type is conditioned by the size of the presidential coalition; targeted transfers will increase if the coalition size decreases, even if party nationalization is high. I find support for these hypotheses with an empirical analysis of district-level electoral and government expenditure data for several countries in Latin America between 1990 and 2006.     

Public policy toward life saving: Should consumer preferences rule?

Needless to say, people who face risks that entail a high probability of death are willing to pay extraordinarily large sums to reduce the probability. Those that face low risks are typically unwilling to pay anything at all to reduce those risks. Accordingly, a public policy that would allocate funds to maximize the number of lives saved conflicts sharply with the willingness-to-pay criterion. Information about their survival probabilities always increases willingness of individuals to pay for life saving. Risk-aversè individuals may reject insurance for the treatment of fatal diseases that is fairly priced, even if they plan to pay for the treatment if they get sick; this result has implications regarding the choice of treatment or prevention. If the objective of public policy is to save the largest number of lives, then the allocation of funds must be made before individuals are affected by life-threatening risks.     

Local government,industrial policy and social consensus: the case of Modena (Italy)

The ‘Emilian model’ has become well known as a case of rapid economic growth based on small firms concentrated in ‘industrial districts’. This paper gives a detailed account of three local industrial policy initiatives adopted in Modena, one of the provinces of Emilia-Romagna in which the features of the model appear clearest. The policy of industrial parks was intended to make land available to firms for their orderly development; the loan guarantee consortium aimed to secure special financing for small firms; and the creation of ‘real service centres’ was directed towards supplying information on technology and markets to industrial districts specializing in particular sectors. In addition to describing these interventions, the paper also seeks to demonstrate that a climate of social consensus and strong credibility on the part of local government are necessary prerequisites for the success of local industrial policies.     

Globalization,government spending and taxation in the OECD

Abstract. This article assesses the impact of globalization on welfare state effort in the OECD countries. Globalization is defined in terms of total trade, imports from low wage economies, foreign direct investment, and financial market integration. Welfare effort is analyzed in terms both of public spending (and separately on social service provision and income transfer programs) and taxation (effective rates of capital taxation and the ratio of capital to labor and consumption taxes). Year–to–year increases in total trade and international financial openness in the past three decades have been associated with less government spending. In contrast, integration into global markets has not been associated either with reductions in capital tax rates, or with shifts in the burden of taxation from capital to consumption and labor income. Moreover, countries with greater inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment tend to tax capital more heavily.     

Partisan politics and public finance: Changes in public spending in the industrialized democracies, 1955–1989

This paper evaluates the role that partisan politics plays in altering public spending levels. The analysis covers over three decades of data on the developments of the public sectors in 16 OECD countries. The results of the analysis lend firm support to the partisan politics model. Of special note is the distinction between the electorate' and the government' ideological preferences and the dominant role that the former plays. The results also suggest, contrary to conventional wisdom, that partisan political influences have not been eliminated with the tightening of linkages to the international economy.     

Market imperfections,government imperfections,and policy mixes: policy innovations in Singapore

Proper roles for government and market in addressing policy problems may be assessed by considering the duality between market imperfections and government imperfections. The potential of government interventions or market mechanisms as core policy instruments can be eroded by fundamental deficiencies deeply rooted in either government or market as social institutions. The impacts of such deficiencies are much more extensive than postulated by the existing theories. Analysis here, based on policy innovations in land transport and health care in Singapore, suggests how policy mixes might become the norm of response for addressing policy problems found in a range of sectors. The analytical framework presented may help to distinguish among different policy mixes according to their effectiveness, but also provides some useful guiding principles for policy design.     

The politics of social spending after the Great Recession: The return of partisan policy making

Prior research shows that the effect of partisanship on social expenditure declined over time in Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) countries. In this article, the author argues that the 2007/2008 recession resulted in the reemergence of partisan policy making in social spending. This was a result of mainstream parties needing to respond to the growing challenge from nonmainstream parties as well as demonstrating that they responded to the economic crisis by offering different policy solutions. Using a panel of 23 OECD countries, the author shows that since the Great Recession, partisan effects on social spending are once again significant. These effects are more likely to be observed where the salience of the Left–Right dimension is higher. In accordance with classic theories of economic policy making, left‐wing governments are more likely to increase social spending when unemployment is higher and right‐wing governments restrain social expenditure when the budget deficit is greater.     

Inefficient households and the mix of government spending

A model is presented in which individuals can vote over government subsidies to a private good and over redistributive taxation. The subsidized good is purchased and shared by couples who act noncooperatively, while possibly being altruistic towards each other. The framework allows a separation of the subsidy policy from redistributive policy. In a majority voting equilibrium the subsidy is used exclusively to correct the individuals' spending pattern. The results suggest that spending on private goods should be an important item in government expenditures when there is strong positive income bias in the political process and/or when household decisions are relatively inefficient.     

Supermajority rule,the law of 1/n,and government spending: a synthesis

I develop models in which a minimum winning coalition decides on the level of government spending, where the Coase theorem holds amongst members of the winning coalition. An increase in the supermajority requirement has potentially conflicting effects on spending. A higher requirement increases the tax price internalized by the minimum winning coalition, but also increases the number of districts included in this coalition. I develop separate models in which the spending in question consists of (i) a nonexcludable good, (ii) a distributive consumption good, (iii) infrastructure spending and (iv) a transfer payment. A supermajority rule has no effect on spending for nonexcludable goods and ambiguous effects on spending for distributive projects and infrastructure spending. An increased supermajority requirement does unambiguously reduce transfer spending. I also relate the supermajority rule to the law of 1/n. If the Coase Theorem holds and a minimum winning coalition forms, an increase in the number of districts n has precisely the same effect on overall expenditure as a decrease in the supermajority requirement. Thus, the ambiguous spending effects stemming from supermajority rule carry over into this version of the law of 1/n.     

Seat-vote curves, loyalty effects and the provincial distribution of Canadian government spending

Federal government spending in the Canadian provinces for 1962–2002 is examined with emphasis on the role of seat-vote elasticities in majoritarian electoral systems. Fixed effects regressions establish that per capita federal spending in a province increases with political competition, as measured by provincial seat-vote elasticities, and with loyalty to the federal government as measured by the degree of provincial support for the federal government. However, too much loyalty can be counter-productive because very loyal provinces are uncompetitive with low seat-vote elasticities.     

Issues of measuring ideological sophistication: Level of conceptualization,attitudinal consistency,and attitudinal stability

This study uses the CPS 1972–1976 election panel to examine the construct validity of three traditional measures of belief system sophistication: level of conceptualization, attitudinal consistency, and attitudinal stability. The analysis reveals that these measures tap two distinct characteristics that are virtually unrelated to one another. As expected, level of conceptualization proves to be a valid but modestly reliable indicator of ideological sophistication. However, the consistency and stability measures are found to tap a structural or configurational property of belief systems that apparently has nothing to do with ideological sophistication. These findings strongly recommend against the use of attitudinal consistency and stability measures in future studies of political sophistication. They also call for a major reappraisal of prior attitudinal consistency and stability research.This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1985, New Orleans.     

All spending is not equal: European Union public spending,policy feedback and citizens’ support for the EU

While public support is central to the problem‐solving capacity of the European Union, we know little about when and why the EU can increase its citizens’ support through spending. Extensive research finds that citizens living in countries that are net beneficiaries of the EU budget are more supportive of the EU, assuming that citizens care equally about all forms of spending. It is argued in this article, however, that the amount of spending is only part of the story. Understanding the effects of spending on support requires a consideration of how transfers are spent. Drawing on policy feedback theories in comparative politics, it is shown that support for the EU is a function of the fit between the spending area and economic need in individuals’ immediate living context. Results from a statistical analysis of EU spending on human capital, infrastructure, agriculture, energy and environmental protection in 127 EU regions over the period 2001–2011 corroborate this argument. As the EU and other international organisations become increasingly publicly contested, the organisations themselves may increasingly try to shore up public support through spending, but they will only be successful under specific conditions.     

State institutions, political power and social policy choices: Reconstructing the origins of Nordic models of social policy

Abstract.  The origins of the Nordic social policy model(s) need to be viewed broadly and historically from its late nineteenth-century initiation to the immediate postwar period (1940s to the early 1960s), when a social democratic model began to consolidate. In reference to the alternate social policy traditions of British poor relief and German occupational insurance, this article analyzes the sociopolitical contexts that finally prevented Scandinavian states from developing similarly, instead enabling development of universalistic social policy. The historical narratives are arranged with respect to four analytical aspects: policy development; the configuration of state institutions; the strength of liberal, conservative and leftist power blocs; and intra-Nordic divergence in all these respects. Such an approach integrates state-centred and power-resources-focused analyses of Nordic welfare.     

Clinton,the courts,and social policy

He is author of numerous articles and Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: A Jurisprudential History;and coeditor (with Peter W. Schramm) of American Political Parties and Constitutional Government;and the forthcoming Separation of Powers and Good Government.     

Organizational reform within government: accountability and policy management

The article considers, from a United Kingdom perspective, the ways in which relations between Government Departments and Agencies are organized to ensure clarity of roles and effective accountability; and also looks at the ongoing need for effective policy management at the centre of Government. It describes the progress of the Next Steps programme, examining its successes and perceived weaknesses. In particular, it rehearses the debate running in the UK on the question of Ministerial accountability, and considers the distinctions between responsibility and accountability, and between policy matters and operations. (© 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)     

公共精神:提升地方政府政策执行力的关键因素

地方政府的执行力是保证政令畅通的首要条件,直接影响政府的公信力.目前,我国地方政府政策执行还存在着较多的问题,其关键因素在于公共精神的缺失.公共精神的缺失从根本上弱化了政府的执行力.公共精神对于提升地方政府政策执行力具有重要的价值.有效提升政府执行力,必须从内生机制与外生机制两个方面培育公共精神.     

Committee structure and political preferences: The case of Norwegian local government

Abstract.  In Norway, as in the other Nordic countries, sector-based policy making in local government is considered a problem as it is alleged to take place at the expense of a more integrated approach. Inspired by American rational choice theories on committee power, this article first sets out to establish whether the distributive rationale of the present committee system actually does promote sector-orientation among local politicians. This approach is challenged by alternative theories on committee power, focusing on the informational rationale in specialisation and the relevance of partisanship . The findings suggest that all the three theories explain in part committee member' preferences, but partisanship is most important for explaining both spending preferences and preferences on organisational forms. The article goes on to explore whether recent local council reforms, intended to replace the sector-oriented system with strong committees by a new de-specialised system with weaker committees, are likely to curb the effect of sector on committee members' preferences. The conclusion here is not easy to draw, but it is clear that sector-orientation is not encouraged by the reforms; in fact, the opposite seems to be the case. What local councils may have overlooked, however, is the influence of the informational rationale on committees and their members. The analyses are based on data obtained from a random sample of 119 of Norway's 435 municipalities.