Britain's power and influence: Dealing with three roles and the Wilson government's defence debate at Chequers in November 1964

Prior to the advent of the Wilson government, there existed a large number of official memoranda and reports on Britain's power and influence in the world. Central to Whitehall's concern was the discovery of some means of reducing the cost of maintaining Britain's three main strategic roles ‐ nuclear deterrence, the defence of western Europe and East of Suez. It was clear that Britain should not, and could not, maintain these three roles indefinitely, a view which was shared by Labour ministers at the Chequers meeting. This article examines the evolution of Whitehall's thinking on Britain's long‐term world role during the period before and after Labour came into power in October 1964, and concludes that British ministers and officials began to consider Britain's eventual disengagement from bases East of Suez, a disengagement which was finally announced by the Wilson government in July 1967.     

What was Britain's “East of Suez Role”? Reassessing the Withdrawal, 1964–1968

Although often considered an objective fact, Britain's “East of Suez role” was actually a rhetorical construction. As such, it was dependent on the continued ability of Britain to “make” that role and other important players to “cast” Britain into it. But the Wilson government's initial support for East of Suez had the paradoxical effect of bringing its coherence into question. Without a British future in Aden, East of Suez was increasingly linked solely to the Far East, where, with the end of Confrontation in 1966, the argument for staying lost much of its force. Other interested Powers were also increasingly unable to cast Britain into the role: the nationalist tide and the United States' tribulations in Vietnam being primary factors. The article thus shows that thinking through the implications of this realisation provides a better understanding of the withdrawal than by resting on economic or domestic political factors alone.     

Britain and the Collapse of Egypt's Constitutional Order, 1950-52

Britain's longstanding practice of intervening in the struggle between King Farouk, the Wafd and the constitution was one of the main causes of the demise of parliamentary politics in Egypt. Indeed, the sharp deterioration in the political situation in the winter of 1951-52, which paved the way for the Free Officers' coup on 23 July 1952, was the result of a breakdown in the Anglo-Egyptian defence negotiations. The Wafd government used the 'British question' as a distraction from its own internal shortcomings. Britain responded by pursuing a policy of toppling the Wafd and replacing it with a more amenable administration. To this end, British officials manipulated the United States into co-sponsoring the Middle East Command proposals of October 1951, aware that American backing would be required during imminent disturbances in Egypt. The subsequent Ismailia incident of January 1952 hastened the collapse of Egypt's constitutional order and also transformed British perceptions of the usefulness of the Suez base.     

The London Ambassadorship of David K. E. Bruce During the Wilson-Johnson Years, 1964-68

Using recently released sources, this article offers a fresh perspective on the London ambassadorship of David K. E. Bruce in the years of Harold Wilson and Lyndon Johnson, 1964-68. Bruce's running of the US Embassy is examined, as are his views of the Anglo-American relationship. Further attention is given to his diplomatic management of the Anglo-American relationship in the context of the difficult personal relations between Wilson and Johnson and with regard to policy differences over the Vietnam War and Britain's position as a world power. It is argued that while Bruce did help to ease some of the personal strains between Wilson and Johnson, he was generally less significant to the White House than has previously been asserted. It is also contended that his vision of Britain joining the EEC, yet retaining extensive military commitments beyond Europe was not viable.     

Britain and the Kuwaiti crisis, 1961

The Kuwaiti crisis of 1961 has conventionally been accorded little attention in histories of Britain's role in the Middle East. In fact, the crisis was an important defining moment, focusing the minds of policymakers on British interests in the Gulf, and the question of the best means of preserving them. It was also the largest scale mobilization of British forces in the Middle East in the post-Suez era. This article sets the crisis in the context of longer term British relations with Kuwait, internal developments in the Emirate, the evolution of British strategy in the region since Suez and Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations in order to understand the significance of the episode.     

Lord Ponsonby and the Churchill affair of 1836: An episode in the eastern question

William Churchill, a British merchant in Turkey, accidentally wounded an Ottoman boy and, after being savagely beaten, was imprisoned in the notorious bagnio by the Reis Effendi and Achmet Pasha. Lord Ponsonby, the British ambassador, sought dismissal of these ministers. His tactics and threats of demands that his government would make, couched in extravagant language, provoked Russian intervention and alarmed the other powers. Before the British government could react, the Sultan dismissed the Reis Effendi, but Britain's failure to demand dismissal of Achmet left Russian influence supreme. Ponsonby, however, emerged from defeat with credit, and Churchill received compensation.     

Norway and a major international crisis: Suez - the very difficult case

This article reviews Norway's policy during the Suez crisis in 1956, how the policy was formed and how it can be explained. Emphasis is put on the decision-making process and on the role of the powerful Norwegian Shipowners' Association. It also discusses Norway's most important interests and considerations in policy formation, and how they were balanced. Norway's Suez policy is seen in connection with the close relations with Israel, which could be viewed as in conflict with the protection of Norway's NATO membership and vital economic interests, represented by the powerful shipowners. In the end, Norway's Suez policy is put in the context of the change in Norwegian foreign and security policy in general, a shift in emphasis from being Britain's close ally and friend to being under the protective umbrella of the US, the new superpower.     

In the eye of the storm: Ambassador James Richards' mission to Iraq in April 1957

This article discusses the visit of James Richards, President Eisenhower's special emissary to the Middle East, to Iraq in April 1957 following the pronouncement of the Eisenhower Doctrine. An analysis of the Richards Mission encompasses a range of specific issues, including the relationship in Iraq between the US and UK and American assessments of the stability of the Iraqi government. Moreover, this article examines the American strategy for navigating the rising tide of Arab nationalist sentiment in Iraq after the Suez War. This article explores the ways in which US policy-makers privileged the notions of ‘stability’ and ‘order’ in Iraqi political affairs and reflects on the critical dilemmas and contradictions underlying American policy towards Iraq and the Middle East after the 1956 Suez War.     

Conservative Leaders,Coalition, and Britain’s Decision for War in 1914

Conservative leaders may have had a decisive impact on the decision by the Liberal government to enter the Great War in August 1914. In a seminal article of 1975, Keith Wilson argued that their readiness to fight “cut the ground … from beneath the feet of the non-interventionists” in the Cabinet. Those ministers who had hitherto opposed war now recognised that continued divisions could bring the government’s collapse, in which case the Unionists, probably in a coalition with pro-war Liberals, would take office and enter the conflict anyway. Since Wilson’s essay, important light has focussed on Unionist thinking by works that look at the July Crisis as part of a longer party history. This analysis provides a detailed investigation of the actions of Unionist leaders in the days immediately leading to war. It resolves some of the main contradictions in the primary evidence, argues that the possibility of a coalition was very real and demonstrates that one key player—the first lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill—subsequently tried, with some success, to disguise his activities.     

Trick or truth? The British ANF proposal, west Germany and US nonproliferation policy, 1964-68

The deployment and control of nuclear weapons in Europe was a major aspect of Cold War diplomacy. The Multilateral Force (MLF) is a prime example. First proposed in 1960, the MLF attempted to reconcile European demands for collective alliance control within the broader framework of US nonproliferation policy. The MLF was opposed by both Britain and France, who feared the proposal would lead to a nuclear armed West Germany. To counter the MLF, the Wilson government advanced an alternate scheme - the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). This article examines British objectives in advancing the ANF. It contends that the ANF was not a cynical attempt to frustrate the MLF, as suggested by previous commentators, but embodied a serious attempt by the Labour government to implement a nonproliferation regime.     

The Politics of Restitution: The 1964–66 Labour Government’s Policy Towards Ireland

This article analyzes Harold Wilson’s policy towards the Republic of Ireland during the first eighteen months of his government. This article will demonstrate that the Labour government embarked upon a concerted effort to improve Anglo-Irish relations. In particular, the Labour government acceded to the Irish government’s time-honoured request to repatriate the remains of Roger Casement, and returned the flag that had flown over the General Post Office during the 1916 Rising. How successful these gestures were is a moot point. In the short-term it almost certainly did create a climate of goodwill between the British and Irish governments. In the longer-term, however, it could be argued these gestures served to stimulate republican sentiment in Ireland, and perhaps contributed to heightening the tensions within Northern Ireland in the late 1960s.     

'Not Proficient in Table-Thumping': Sir Ernest Satow at Peking, 1900-1906

The deployment and control of nuclear weapons in Europe was a major aspect of Cold War diplomacy. The Multilateral Force (MLF) is a prime example. First proposed in 1960, the MLF attempted to reconcile European demands for collective alliance control within the broader framework of US nonproliferation policy. The MLF was opposed by both Britain and France, who feared the proposal would lead to a nuclear armed West Germany. To counter the MLF, the Wilson government advanced an alternate scheme ‐ the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). This article examines British objectives in advancing the ANF. It contends that the ANF was not a cynical attempt to frustrate the MLF, as suggested by previous commentators, but embodied a serious attempt by the Labour government to implement a nonproliferation regime.     

D. Rossini,Woodrow Wilson and the American Myth in Italy: Culture,Diplomacy, and War Propaganda

The period 1967–1968 was a difficult one for the Anglo–American relationship, as a result of developments such as British defense cuts “East of Suez.” In the run-up to a visit to Washington by Prime Minister Harold Wilson in February 1968, the State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau provided a lively and detailed evaluation of American bonds with Britain. The analysis maintained that the relationship was based on deeply established cooperation in defense, diplomacy and intelligence, and that despite recent problems Britain would remain of unparalleled importance as an American ally. The immediate impact of the memorandum in the White House of Lyndon B. Johnson was quite limited, but among other things the document helps to explain the ready blossoming of close high-level Anglo–American bonds during, for example, the Falklands War of 1982. The most important sections of the memorandum are reproduced, and a brief analysis is provided to put the issues in context.     

Anglo-American Competition in Central America, 1905-13: The Role of Sir Lionel Carden

Lionel Carden's years as a senior diplomat coincided with the rise of American power in, and Great Britain's strategic disengagement from, the Caribbean region. This changing order naturally gave rise to complications: Great Britain had extensive economic interests in the region, and diplomatic personnel - Carden in particular - endeavoured to protect these interests while at the same time the Foreign Office sought to maintain a good relationship with the United States. Carden's vigorous defence of British economic interests in Central America earned him the reputation in Washington of being 'anti-American'. Carden, however, was most likely acting as a 'buffer' to deflect criticism from policy makers at home.     

Separated by the Atlantic: The British and de Gaulle, 1958-1967

The British and French held divergent views from the late 1940s on relations with the United States and on the development of European integration. Differences between the two countries caused particular strain once General Charles de Gaulle returned to power in 1958. The clash that ensued between British and French policies towards the Atlantic Alliance and Europe during his presidency is the subject of this article. It suggests that while the British were unable to overcome de Gaulle's resistance to their membership of the EEC, Britain's fortunes in Europe were nevertheless improved by the Wilson government's response to de Gaulle's actions in the Atlantic Alliance.     

The British are “Taking to the Boat”: Australian Attempts to Forestall Britain's Military Disengagement from Southeast Asia, 1965–1966

This article examines the strategies pursued by the Australian Liberal-Country Party coalition governments of Robert Menzies and Harold Holt in their quest to secure a continuing British military presence in Malaysia and Singapore. It focuses on the first eighteen months of the Wilson premiership (October 1964–March 1966) when Labour's thinking on the future of Britain's defence role east of Suez was still fluid and had not yet crystallised into a firm decision to withdraw from “east of Suez.” In doing so, the article considers whether both Menzies and Holt did all they could to encourage London to remain politically and militarily engaged in Southeast Asia. In addressing this question, this study provides an interesting insight into the conduct of post-war Australian foreign policy and the management of Australia's relations with its major allies, the United States and Britain.     

Sterling,Bretton Woods,and Social Democracy, 1968–1970

Following the November 1967 sterling devaluation, the British Labour government of Harold Wilson struggled to defend the new exchange rate of £1?=?$2.40. Sterling's travails continued throughout 1968 and well into 1969 despite growing evidence that the external balance was moving into the black. Its problems arose from external difficulties, notably from the growth of footloose balances of foreign currencies—especially Eurodollars—within the international economy and from instability caused by the decline of the Bretton Woods system. Labour was determined to protect the new exchange rate, since a new devaluation or even a float would have led to a run on the pound, the collapse of its economic strategy, and the failure of its attempt to build a social-democratic order in Britain. It was successful in the end thanks to growing confidence in its policies and to belated international co-operation designed to salvage the Bretton Wood regime.     

Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the rebirth of the ottoman empire

For more than three decades Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz played a crucial role in the development of military relations between the German and Ottoman Empires. He trained and advised the Ottoman army, and commanded Ottoman troops in the First World War. He was a firm believer in the possibility of the Ottoman Empire's political and military revival, this belief reflecting his own conservative, militarist ideology. From 1898 onwards he was also a firm advocate of a German-Ottoman alliance in a future war against Britain, arguing that Ottoman expeditionary forces sent against Egypt and India could deal mortal blows to Britain's world power.     

The Political Survival of Foreign Ministers

The survival of governments ultimately depends on the survival of its components. These components are politicians whose goal is to stay in office. There has been extensive research on the survival of leaders, but not on the survival of other politicians in government; and even less on how the survival of one affects the survival of the others. The purpose of this article is to take the first step in this direction by analyzing and precisely measuring the impact of the tenure of leaders on the tenure of foreign ministers. This article provides a systematic and formal investigation of the variables that affect the duration in office of foreign ministers. The investigation is based on a new data base on the tenure of more than 7,500 foreign ministers spanning three centuries. Although evidence shows that political institutions have significant impact on the tenure of foreign ministers, internal coalition dynamics such as affinity and loyalty toward a leader, uncertainty, and time dependence are better predictors of their political survival.     

Introduction

Even before 1865, it was an axiom that British foreign policy was designed and pursued to ensure international stability. Stability not only gave security to the British Isles and to its global Empire; it minimized disruptions to trade and commerce - the life-blood of 'Great' Britain. In the century after 1865, the pursuit of international stability remained at the heart of diplomatic initiatives supported by capable armed forces and a strong economy. The grand strategy by which successive British governments endeavoured to achieve these national and imperial ends involved the maintenance of a balance of power - both in Europe and in the wider world where the protection of British interests in the form of prestige, markets, strategic outposts, and lines of communication preoccupied cabinets, the Foreign Office, the service ministries, other departments of state, and, sometimes, public opinion. In one sense, there were a number of individual balances of power - in Western Europe, in the western and eastern Mediterranean, in the Western Hemisphere, in South Asia, and in the Far East and Pacific Ocean. In the British diplomatic parlance of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these balances were represented as 'questions', like the 'Eastern Question'; and the answers to these questions combined in the minds of those responsible for British foreign policy as representing a global balance of power. In this context, the European balance of power had decided importance because any continental disequilibrium could imperil the security of the home islands, the centre of the Empire, and the well-being of Britain's people and economy.