A behavioral view on responsibility attribution in multi-level governance: Upward and downward responsibility attribution in response to performance below aspirations

Multi-level governance systems provide decision-makers with many avenues for external responsibility attribution in response to lacking performance. This study provides a behavioral perspective that examines responsibility attribution to the national government (upward) and policy implementers (downward) as a function of performance relative to decision-makers' aspiration levels. The study proposes that perceived accountability increases the propensity of external responsibility attribution, and that decision-makers' political alignment to actors on other governance levels explains when responsibility is deflected upwards or downwards. Using a survey experiment that presents factual information on youth care overspending to 1086 elected local government officials, the study finds consistent evidence that performance below aspirations increases upward responsibility attribution. Accountability strengthens responsibility attribution for negative performance downward to policy implementers. Finally, responsibility is attributed upward less frequently by decision-makers who are politically aligned with the national government, but information that signals performance below aspirations attenuates this tendency.     

Political Responsibility For Bureaucratic Incompetence: Tragedy At Cave Creek

In April 1995 a viewing platform built by the Department of Conservation collapsed at a New Zealand wilderness location, Cave Creek, plummeting 14 people to their deaths. The tragedy was unprecedented in New Zealand public administration. This article examines the concepts of political accountability and responsibility in the light of the disaster and the findings of the commission of inquiry into it. It does so with reference to the New Zealand state sector reforms, and theoretical and conceptual contributions to the understanding of (public) policy fiascos and disasters. Although public accountability requirements were fulfilled in the case of Cave Creek there was an unsatisfactory resolution of political responsibility. A fuller appreciation of vindicative political responsibility is needed in tragic cases of this kind where the humanity and justice of impersonal governmental systems need to be at least symbolically affirmed. However, the prospects for such a wider sense of proportion may not be enhanced in a managerialist era.     

Professional leadership in local government

Local public service professionals are experts who temper their use of expertise with public service ethics. Public service ethics differ from the ethical codes of most professions in that they stress external accountability. Ethical codes of private sector professions create a sense of responsibility to the profession and help undergird professional autonomy. Public service ethics emphasize public responsibility and help create public accountability. City and county managers show how public service ethics can help make experts accountable to the public.     

THE SCOTT REPORT

The Scott report shows that the two most serious allegations made against ministers - that they conspired to sell lethal arms to Iraq in violation of government guidelines, and that they conspired to send innocent men to prison - are unfounded.
The inquiry violated the Salmon guidelines for the conduct of tribunals and is further evidence that an informal tribunal of this type is less well-equipped to examine a matter causing nation-wide public concern and to secure justice to individuals, than a statutory tribunal appointed under the Act of 1921.
Nevertheless, the Scott report raises three issues of fundamental constitutional importance - ministerial accountability to which the final section of the report is devoted, freedom of information which Sir Richard regards as a corollary of ministerial accountability, and the proper relationships between ministers and civil servants.
Sir Richard believes that constitutionally improper things occurred during the period which his inquiry covers. The fact that no minister or civil servant paid any penalty casts doubt as to whether ministerial accountability is a genuine convention of the constitution or a convenient fiction enabling both ministers and officials to evade responsibility.     

Who is Governing What? Governing Local Technical Systems–an Issue of Accountability

The article discusses accountability in governance of local energy and IT systems. The aim is to focus on accountability of local policy making regarding technical systems by comparing consequences when new forms of governance are developed. Governance steering demands and ensures a clear division of responsibility regarding what a network is responsible for, but not regarding who is accountable for the decision making and implementation. On the other hand, in a steering context characterized by government, it is clear who is responsible and accountable for decisions, but the specific issues for which different actors can be accountable are unclear. We argue that demands for clarifications of accountability emerges from the complex modern governance.     

An Exocet in a Red Box: Parliamentary Accountability in the Sandline Affair

In the UK, it is commonly proposed that the accountability gap resulting from ministers' reluctance to accept responsibility for departmental failures could be closed by giving parliamentary select committees stronger investigative powers. In the Sandline affair the Foreign Affairs Committee sought to take on such a role, notwithstanding that a separate external inquiry was already under way. This paper compares the two mechanisms of accountability. It concludes that committees are poorly suited to investigate high‐profile administrative failures because they are too influenced by party politics. Independent inquiries are better for the purpose (though improvements are needed here too). A parliamentary resolution gave the inquiry primacy over the committee in the Sandline case. This may become an important precedent.     

Political transitions and commissions of inquiry: the politicisation of accountability in Ghana

Abstract

What role does a commission of inquiry (COI) play in delivering accountability? In theory, when the public delegates power to political leaders to formulate and implement policies, they seek political accountability in return. Using Ghana as a case study, this study examines how the operations of COIs may deliver accountability. Principal–agent theories of accountability and African conceptions of legitimacy are incomplete on their own and need to be integrated into an explanation of political accountability that takes into consideration political transitions and the role of COIs in delivering a minimalist form of accountability. This study argues that a COI is an instrument of regime legitimatisation. The demands by citizens for political accountability in Ghana correlate with political transitions. Accompanying each power alternation was a different model of political accountability. To understand the predominant applications of accountability, we emphasise the politicisation of accountability.     

SITUATING ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY: A COMPARISON OF MEDIEVAL CHRISTIAN AND MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC ADMINISTRATIVE THOUGHT

Contemporary studies of administrative thought allow only a limited range of viability for medieval and non‐Western thought on the subject of public administration. This tendency belies the wealth of thought embedded within this broad literature. This paper investigates the matter of administrative accountability and responsibility through the lens of a comparative theorist of historical administrative thought. In order to assess the explanatory potential of early and non‐Western administrative studies, two texts have been chosen, both previously unanalysed in conjunction (to the best of my knowledge) from the perspective of the administrative theorist – John of Salisbury’s Policraticus and Abu al‐Hassan Al‐Mawardi’s Al‐Akham al‐Sultaniyya w’al‐Wilayat al Diniyya (The Ordinances of Government). Through an analysis of ideas of delegation and responsibility within these texts, the paper seeks to develop a critique of the place of revealed religious authority in the solution to the questions ‘who are administrators responsible to?’ and ‘what are administrators responsible for?’     

Vertical Alignment,Elite Power,and the Democratic Recess in the French Health Care System

The article critically examines administrative restructuring of the French health care system. Despite calculated benefits of New Public Management (NPM) reforms, conflicts between values escalated. NPM-endorsed decentralization never took off in France. Instead, a re-concentration of health policy decisions benefited a Ministry-level welfare elite that sought to restore fiscal discipline rather than responsiveness to users. That process triggered a clash of culture with the medical profession and was at the expense of democratic participation. The role of citizens as reform overseers, although initially contained in the NPM doctrinal puzzle, never materialized. Key issues such as greater accountability and responsibility remain unresolved.     

Private administration of a public function: The news election service

The United States government has no elections office and does not attempt to administer congressional and presidential elections. The responsibility for the administration of elections and certification of winners in the United States national elections rests with the states. The states divide election administration responsibilities between state and local election officials, whose objective is an efficiently administered honest election, with the ballots correctly tabulated. The formal structure of election administration in the United States is not capable of providing tirely results of the presidential and congressional election. Similar structural difficulties in other policy areas often result in ad hoc operating agreements or informal cooperation among agencies at different levels of the federal system. In the case of election administration, however, the public officials have abdicated responsibility for election night aqgregation of the national Vote totals to a private organization, News Election Service, which is owned by five major news organizations. This private organization performs without a contract, without public compensation, and without supervision by public officials. It makes decisions concerning its duties according to its own criteria. The questions of responsibility and accountability have not arisen in part because of the private organization's performance record and in part because the responsibility was assumed gradually over a lengthy period without ever being evaluated as an item on the public agenda.     

An Exocet in a Red Box: Parliamentary Accountability in the Sandline Affair

In the UK, it is commonly proposed that the accountability gap resulting from ministers' reluctance to accept responsibility for departmental failures could be closed by giving parliamentary select committees stronger investigative powers. In the Sandline affair the Foreign Affairs Committee sought to take on such a role, notwithstanding that a separate external inquiry was already under way.
This paper compares the two mechanisms of accountability. It concludes that committees are poorly suited to investigate high-profile administrative failures because they are too influenced by party politics. Independent inquiries are better for the purpose (though improvements are needed here too). A parliamentary resolution gave the inquiry primacy over the committee in the Sandline case. This may become an important precedent.     

From Discourses to Policy: Analyzing the Creation of an Accountability Discourse in Colombia

This article analyses the construction of a public discourse about accountability in Colombia. The article maps the different interpretations that actors make of political ideas related to accountability and their change over a period of 13 years (1991–2014). The article has an interpretive framework and uses content and discourse analysis techniques to identify meanings different actors give to the concept of “accountability” and changes in these meanings. It identifies an academic discourse on accountability, as well as external actors’ discourses that influenced the construction of a public and official discourse in Colombia. It concludes by identifying the effect of this process of building consensus about meaning on the resulting public policy.     

Discretion drift in primary care commissioning in England: Towards a conceptualization of hybrid accountability obligations

In the context of welfare delivery, hybrid organizations mix public and ‘new’ market, social, and professional types of mechanisms and rationales. This article contributes to our understanding of accountability within hybrid organizations by highlighting how accountability obligations can become hybrid, simultaneously formal and informal. Instead of seeing accountability as hybrid only in the sense of the coexistence of types of organizational mechanisms and structures (i.e., the prevalence of both state and market types), we examine accountability arrangements governing a hybrid model—primary care commissioning in England—and interrogate the relationships between accountability actors and their accountability forums. We conceptualize ‘hybrid accountability obligations’ as a state whereby the nature of obligation underpinning accountability relationships is both formal-informal and vertical-horizontal concurrently. The article concludes by highlighting the consequences of this kind of hybridity, namely how it extended discretion from welfare delivery to the domain of welfare governance.     

UNHCR and the pursuit of international protection: accountability through technology?

Better management and new technological solutions are increasingly portrayed as the way to improve refugee protection and enhance the accountability of humanitarian actors. Taking concepts of legibility, quantification and co-production as the point of departure, this article explores how techno-bureaucratic practices shape conceptions of international refugee protection. We do this by examining the evolving roles of results-based management (RBM), biometrics and cash-based interventions as ‘accountability technologies’ in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ international protection efforts. The article challenges the assumption that these technologies produce a seamless form of accountability that is equally attentive to donor requests and the protection needs of refugees. By focusing on how the constitution of these techniques as ‘accountability solutions’ shapes conceptions of the very meaning of protection (ie the problem to be addressed), we also show what dimensions of protection get omitted in this co-production of technical solutions and socio-political problems.     

Slapping Accountability in the Face: Observance of Accountability in Malawi's Local Governments in the Absence of Councilors

Against the background of Malawi having had no councilors since the second quarter of 2005, this article aims at establishing the effects of the absence of councilors on the promotion of accountability as a tenet of good governance as espoused in the National Decentralization Policy. Adopting a mixed research design with a strong bias towards qualitative research methodologies, the article finds out that in the absence of councilors, observance of accountability by local governments has been negatively affected. The article argues that in the absence of councilors there has been reversal of accountabilities whereby horizontal accountability has been given more emphasis than vertical accountability; having a secretariat that is both a decision-maker and implementer of decisions has been a recipe for abuse of power; and interim mechanisms and emerging institutions responsible for advocating accountability are limited and a mockery of good governance.     

REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCOTT REPORT FOR GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

The immediate impact of the Scott report was slight because it had no conclusion and led to no ministerial or other resignations. Reasons for this inconclusiveness were examined, including conventions of the judicial process, the difficulty Scott had in defining the offences he was examining, the slipperiness of those offences as constitutional conventions and Scott's lack of grasp of administrative processes.
Yet his report is a mine of information on problems of accountability in the area of government defence sales. It was atypical in that three departments pursuing four policies between them and with another department as policeman had a locus in the process. Given the nearly 100,000 licences being processed at one time, it was a large, complex and fragmented administrative activity which might easily have resulted in more mishaps than it did.
Despite its special features the author argues that it does provide evidence of six areas of difficulty in government accountability which are also of (growing) relevance outside the area Scott surveyed: how one finds who is responsible for policy and policy change; how accountability is secured where confidentiality is justified for national security or other reasons; how one gets operational accountability for executive operations within departments; the accountability of junior to departmental ministers; of junior to more senior civil servants; and of civil servants to ministers.     

The UK BSE Crisis as a Failure of Government

This paper uses the BSE ('mad cow disease') crisis as a case study of the workings of the British core executive during a crisis event. Using the evidence from the Philips Inquiry, which reported on the BSE/vCJD crisis in 2000, the study analyses the patterns of decision making and the structures of institutional and resource dependence. It concludes that the lack of co-ordination between and within institutions and what was acknowledged to be the mismanagement of expert advice raise serious questions about the executive's ability to manage serious crises. The findings concur with scholarship indicating executive fragmentation and lack of accountability. Consecutive British governments have sought to diminish the centre's responsibility for managing public policy without putting an effective alternative mechanism in place.     

MANAGING GOVERNMENT-THIRD SECTOR COLLABORATION: ACCOUNTABILITY,AMBIGUITY, AND POLITICS

Recent years have witnessed increased revelations by watchdog agents of mismanagement and abuse in third sector organizations that collaborate with government resulting in a decline in public trust and signs of a portending legitimacy crisis. Strengthening accountability mechanisms seems an obvious response to this trend. Yet, Israeli attempts to improve accountability of government-third sector collaborations have largely failed. Politics of accountability theory provides an explanation as to why. The findings demonstrate that political, bureaucratic and third sector stakeholders have a mutual interest in maintaining a cloak of ambiguity over government-third sector collaborations. The effects of four alternative accountability types on accountability, ambiguity, flexibility and politics are examined in an attempt to identify feasible and effective accountability strategies. There is no one ideal accountability type for all situations. Attention to the pitfalls of each accountability type may alert accountability decision-makers to appropriate combinations of accountability types for particular circumstances. However, the actual choice of accountability types has more to do with the politics of accountability than with scientific analysis of what is most appropriate.     

POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE AUDIT: THE CASE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL IN NORWAY

Performance audit is widely used in public administration, but, at present, little empirical evidence exists on its usefulness and contribution to accountability. Based on survey data from 353 civil servants in Norway, this article analyzes the auditees' perceptions of the audit. Performance audit was seen as useful by a majority of the auditees. If auditees agreed to audit criteria and assessments, were allowed to influence the process, had favourable opinions of the reports, and believed that the State Audit Institution contributed to accountability and improvement, then they regarded it as useful. Reports used for accountability purposes were not perceived as less useful. The auditees' administrative level, the use of the report to further interests, and attention from politicians, the media, and the Parliament impacted on the accountability dimension. These results indicate that performance audit can influence civil servants, but the influence is contingent on how the audited civil servants perceive the performance audit.