Was Ellen Wronged?

Imagine a citizen (call her Ellen) engages in conduct the state says is a crime, for example, money laundering. Imagine too that the state of which Ellen is a citizen has decided to make money laundering a crime. Does the state wrong Ellen when it punishes her for money laundering? It depends on what you think about the authority of the criminal law. Most criminal law scholars would probably say that the criminal law as such has no authority. Whatever authority is has depends on how well it adheres to the demands of morality inasmuch as morality is the only authority we have. Thus if morality says that money laundering should not be a crime then the state wrongs Ellen when it punishes her. But if the criminal law as such does have authority, and if in the exercise of its authority the state has decided to make money laundering a crime, then the state does Ellen no wrong when it punishes her.     

Arsenic poisoning: acute or chronic? Suicide or murder?

The case of the death by arsenic poisoning of a 62-year-old white man is presented. One year prior to death, he developed intermittent bouts of severe gastroenteritis with vomiting and diarrhea, hyperpigmentation and keratosis of the skin, neutropenia, and Guillain-Barré-like neuropathy for which he was hospitalized several times. Urine test results 6 months prior to death indicating 36 mg/L arsenic were believed to be in error. At the patient's last admission, he appeared in the emergency room with severe gastroenteritis, hypotension, and dehydration. He died 3 days later. Antemortem as well as autopsy specimens revealed elevated arsenic concentrations. Arsenic micrograms/g analysis by neutron activation of hair pulled from the man's head revealed by centimeter segmental analysis proximal to distal: 226, 104, 28, 56, 41, 40, and 74. The wife of the decedent was charged with murder by arsenic poisoning of this, her fifth, husband. The defense alleged that the decedent had committed suicide. The judge awarded a directed verdict of "not guilty." Particulars of the medical, toxicological, and investigative findings are presented.     

Was the Dujail Trial Fair?

The Dujail trial against eight persons accused of crimes againsthumanity was intended as the first of fourteen trials; it wasseen as a quick and simple case that would enable the Tribunalto develop its skills outside the limelight. The trial was infact a missed opportunity in the search for Iraqi justice. Itfell short in three notable ways: (i) it was severely compromisedby political interference: lack of judicial independence, linkedto the absence of a culture of respect for the fairness andimpartiality of the judicial process, was the greatest failingof the trial; (ii) there were breaches in fair trial standardsat the trial and appellate level; (iii) due to evidentiary andanalytical gaps, the trial did not expose the full extent ofcrimes committed by the deposed regime; much of the judgmenthinged on inference and stretched notions of liability. TheDujail trial was better than previous (and current) Iraqi trials.But that was not enough to meet minimum fair trial guarantees.     

What Was It They Lost?

Abstract

The issue of family violence is a modern scourge on Canadian society. Recent estimates indicate that during the previous five years in Canada, 7% of women and 6% of men encountered spousal violence (Statistics Canada, 2005). Furthermore, Aboriginal communities in Canada experience disproportionately high rates of family violence, due to a myriad of reasons. While the impact of colonization continues to affect the lives of Aboriginal people, what is less well known are the more recent social and emotional effects of excessive resource development, particularly in isolated communities. Through an examination of the perspectives of community workers regarding family violence in their community, located in northern Canada and displaced by hydroelectric development, a range of ideas were explored. Critical race theory provides a backdrop for understanding the endemic nature of the systemic racism that characterizes the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the government. The study demonstrates that the social and emotional impact of excessive resource development continues to resonate in a negative manner, even many years following displacement.     

Does the death penalty save lives?

Research Summary Economists have recently reexamined the “capital punishment deters homicide” thesis using modern econometric methods, with most studies reporting robust deterrent effects. The current study revisits this controversial question using annual state panel data from 1977 to 2006. Employing well‐known econometric procedures for panel data analysis, our results provide no empirical support for the argument that the existence or application of the death penalty deters prospective offenders from committing homicide. Policy Implications Although policymakers and the public can continue to base support for use of the death penalty on retribution, religion, or other justifications, defending its use based solely on its deterrent effect is contrary to the evidence presented here. At a minimum, policymakers should refrain from justifying its use by claiming that it is a deterrent to homicide and should consider less costly, more effective ways of addressing crime.     

Sudden unexpected death in epilepsy: is death by seizures a cardiac disease?

RESULTS: Sudden unexpected death in epilepsy (SUDEP) gains more and more acknowledgment across the various interdisciplinary fields. Accordingly, we performed in a prospective setting a case-control study of all SUDEP cases in a well-defined part of Denmark (Northern Jutland), between January 1998 and September 2000. We attempted to look into the cardiopathologic mechanism behind this phenomenon by assessing the degree of myocardial fibrosis in SUDEP patients versus controls. The histologic evaluation was possible in 65% of the cases (15/23) whose death was attributed to SUDEP and in 71% (15/21) of controls. Forty percent of the SUDEP cases (6/15) presented several foci of fibrotic changes in the deep and subendocardial myocardium in contrast to 1 control (6.6%, P = 0.03). None of the subjects from the SUDEP group showed fibrotic changes in their conduction system as compared with 1 control (6.6%). The quantitative evaluation of fibrosis demonstrated a trend toward more fibrosis in the deep and subendocardial myocardium of the SUDEP cases. Forty percent of cases in the SUDEP group were men (6/15), characteristically young at time of death (mean age 38 years) and with a late epilepsy onset (mean age 21 years). Antemortem, 73% of the SUDEP patients (11/15) had experienced infrequent seizures (self-reported). We conclude that the SUDEP cases displayed significant fibrosis of the myocardium when this was assessed by qualitative means. This fibrosis may be the consequence of myocardial ischemia as a direct result of repetitive epileptic seizures, which, associated with the ictal sympathetic storm, may lead to lethal arrhythmias.     

Was Inclusive Legal Positivism Founded on a Mistake?

In this paper, I present a new argument against inclusive legal positivism. As I show, any theory which permits morality to be a condition on legality cannot account for a core feature of legal activity, namely, that it is an activity of social planning. If the aim of a legal institution is to guide the conduct of the community through plans, it would be self-defeating if the existence of these plans could only be determined through deliberation on the merits. I also argue that, insofar as inclusive legal positivism was developed as a response to Ronald Dworkin's critique of H. L. A. Hart's theory of law, it was founded on a mistake. For once we appreciate the role that planning plays in legal regulation, we will see that Dworkin's objection is based on a flawed conception of legal obligations and rights and hence does not present an objection that inclusive legal positivists were required to answer.     

Constitutional pluralism: Chronicle of a death foretold?

What remains of the idea of constitutional pluralism in the wake of the Euro‐crisis? According to the new anti‐pluralists, the recent OMT saga signals its demise, calling to an end the tense stalemate between the ECJ and the German Constitutional Court on the question of ultimate authority. With the ECJ's checkmate, OMT represents a new stage in the constitutionalisation of the European Union, towards a fully monist order. Since constitutional pluralism was an inherently unstable and undesirable compromise, that is both inevitable and to be welcomed. It is argued here that this is misguided in attending to the formal at the expense of the material dimension of constitutional development. The material perspective reveals a deeply dysfunctional constitutional dynamic, of which the judicial battle in OMT is merely a surface reflection. This dynamic now reaches a critical conjuncture, encapsulated in the debate over ‘Grexit’, and the material conflict between solidarity and austerity. Constitutional pluralism, in conclusion, may be an idea worth defending, but as a normative plea for the co‐existence of a horizontal plurality of constitutional orders. This requires radical constitutional re‐imagination of the European project.     

Is organ procurement causing the death of patients?

This article offers a philosophical foundation for the Uniform Determination of Death Act as it first examines death per se, and then examines brain death and the non-heart beating donor criteria for determining death. The author suggests that many of the debates over death can be bypassed by changing the terms of the debate: what matters is not whether death is a process or an event, but death as a state. Understanding death as a state allows us to determine death in a functional manner that is compatible with the needs of law and medicine. The second part examines objections that arise from ignoring or rejecting the distinction between killing and letting die and the principle of double effect. By clarifying the lines between life and death, on the one hand, and between intentionally killing and unintentionally hastening death, on the other, the author hopes to restore a sense that the proposals to drop the dead donor rule are radical recommendations to cross lines we have never crossed before.