英国温室气体排放:因素分解与减排路径研究

本文运用对数平均D氏指数(LMDI)分解法对1990年以来影响英国温室气体排放的因素进行研究,分产业考察了英国减排的具体路径。研究结果表明,在20世纪90年代,英国在减排方面主要依靠电力行业私有化、制造业产业升级以及由此引发的用能设备的更新。英国在2003年提出低碳发展战略以后实施的碳排放交易机制和碳税政策也对减排产生了一定的推动作用。综合来看,英国电力行业的减排主要得益于能源消费结构的转变,制造业则更多依靠自身的产业升级,只有服务业受政策直接推动的程度较深。因此,本文认为,没有迹象表明政策因素是推动英国温室气体减排的主要力量,英国温室气体排放量的下降与其所处经济发展的环境与水平相一致,并不单纯是主观人为因素选择的结果。     

Beyond Diplomacy? UK Relations With China Since 1997

In developing a framework for relations with China since 1997, official UK policy towards China has had two main aims: to develop commercial opportunities for UK companies and to promote 'positive' social and political change in China. Although some have argued that this represents a contradictory set of objectives, the counter argument is found in liberal theory. Economic engagement will create a dense network of transnational interactions that will generate political change in China as it becomes deeply enmeshed in the global economy. If we follow the logic of this approach through, then the UK government has transferred much of the power to attain its stated objectives in relations with China from traditional diplomatic agencies to governmental economic agencies. More important, individual companies, whilst pursuing their own commercial activities, are effectively carrying out government policy in relation to China. Thus, the key actors in post-diplomatic relations with China are increasingly non-state economic actors.     

The Development-Insecurity Nexus in China’s Near-Abroad: Rethinking Cross-Border Economic Integration in an Era of State Transformation

Surprisingly, perhaps, China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative expresses a familiar mix of the security–development nexus and liberal interdependence thesis: Chinese leaders expect economic development and integration will stabilise and secure neighbouring states and improve inter-state relations. However, drawing on the record of China’s intensive economic interaction with Myanmar, we argue that the opposite outcome may occur, for two reasons. First, capitalist development is inherently conflict-prone. Second, moreover, China’s cross-border economic relations today are shaped by state transformation – the fragmentation, decentralisation and internationalisation of party-state apparatuses. Accordingly, economic relations often emerge not from coherent national strategies, but from the uncoordinated, even contradictory, activities of various state and non-state agencies at multiple scales, which may exacerbate capitalist development’s conflictual aspects and undermine official policy goals. In the Sino-Myanmar case, the lead Chinese actors creating and managing cross-border economic engagements are sub-national agencies and enterprises based in, or operating through, Yunnan province. The rapacious form of development they have pursued has exacerbated insecurity, helped to reignite ethnic conflict in Myanmar’s borderlands, and plunged bilateral relations into crisis. Consequently, the Chinese government has had to change its policy and intervene in Myanmar’s domestic affairs to promote peace negotiations.     

Negotiating the technological capacity in Chinese engagements: Is the Tanzanian government in the driving seat?

Is the Tanzanian government in charge of development cooperation programmes with China? The literature has portrayed the Tanzanian and other state actors in Africa as passive and weakly coordinated players over the five decades of intensified cooperation with China. This paper will attempt to challenge this narrative by drawing on lessons from the negotiation efforts of individual and institutional actors in Tanzania, as they sought to improve the country's industrial and technological capacity, among other interests. Our findings revealed a gap between the capacity to attract Chinese investments and development assistance, and extraction of knowledge and technology from such engagements. President John Pombe Magufuli's anti-corruption measures signal a paradigm shift against the rent-seeking tendencies, elitism and limited utilisation of local content under the Chinese partnership projects. Nevertheless, the combination of a declining share of official Chinese engagements with the increased involvement of private actors necessitates further policy innovations in order to boost inter-firm technological spillovers.     

全球减排路线图的正义性——对胡鞍钢教授的全球减排路线图的评价与修正

任何全球减排路线图的绘制都无法脱离国际正义而具有生命力。气候变化问题的特性要求全球减排路线图尊重具有两面性的国际气候正义:环境正义和发展正义,需要考虑国家间公平、人的公平和代际公平。仅以人类发展指数(HDI)作为衡量国家承担减排责任的标准缺乏足够的正义,至少还需要加入人均历史累积排放和气候变化脆弱性两个指标。三者分别体现气候变化正义性中的人的平等发展权、减排责任分担和对受害者在排放权上的补偿。综合三大指标后的四分组分类,才是更体现正义性、更容易被接受和执行的路线图。从正义性出发,中国应承担相应的减排责任,并努力推动全球减排进程,但也要注意维护自身的发展权益。中国在全球减排中的作为,应是在国际正义与国家发展战略间取得平衡。     

Japan's Environmental Cooperation with China During the Last Two Decades

Up until now, Japan's environmental cooperation with China has principally been in response to requests by the Chinese government, with Japan making major contributions in the areas of environmental policy, human resource development, and environmental management systems, and the construction of physical infrastructure. Unlike some other Western donors, Japan is heavily engaged in resolving various environmental problems throughout the whole of China, and these contributions will continue to play a powerful role in improving China's environment for many years to come. Moreover, Japan has also made a major contribution to the raising of environmental awareness among the general public throughout China, and has been instrumental in empowering Chinese environmental citizen's groups. Specifically, Japan has been providing the Chinese government with yen loans and technical cooperation, and has supplied it with many new concepts and mechanisms in the areas of environmental policy, management systems and physical infrastructure, as well. Japan has also provided a foundation for the development of China's environmental industry by means of technology transfer and human resources development. By supplying grant aid to different parts of China, Japan has played a pioneering role in the field of environmental protection in China, enabling the expansion of training and educational facilities and programs to which the Chinese government failed, due to putting a premium on a high economic growth, to allocate sufficient budget despite its awareness of the gravity of the problems that it faces. NGO environmental cooperation programs that use Japanese government grassroots and NGO grant aid and assistance of the Japan Fund for Global Environment have been highly significant factors in the resolution at the regional level of the serious environmental problems that have arisen throughout China. The role that these have played in intensifying exchanges and friendly relations at the grassroots level between Japan and the Chinese people has been highly commendable. In particular, environmental cooperation programs with China through the ten-year-old Sino-Japan Friendship Centre for Environmental Protection (SJC) have not been confined solely to solving China's environmental problems, and have accordingly helped to build a foundation for environmental cooperation with China's various neighbors and thus helped to enhance China's standing internationally.     

Solving south Africa's Chinese puzzle: Democratic foreign policy making and the ‘two chinas’ question

When President Nelson Mandela abruptly announced on 27 November 1996 that South Africa would no longer recognise the Republic of China but would open official diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in its stead, he caught the world by surprise. In what was a fittingly bizarre end to a situation that continued to defy all expectations, the post‐apartheid government made its first significant foreign policy decision. The remarkable level of public debate, the inter‐departmental conflicts, the role of interest groups and party politics which accompanied the decision to switch recognition gave the South African government and the public as a whole its first exposure to the vagaries of conducting foreign policy in a democracy.

This article will examine the decision to recognise the People's Republic of China by investigating the historical relationship between the South African state, non‐state actors and their Chinese counterparts, the debate itself and the role of interest groups ‐ both within and outside the formal policy making process ‐ in seeking to influence the decision and analysing the dynamics of the recognition decision. In so doing, it hopes to shed some light on the policy decision making process in the new democratic South Africa.     

Geopolitics,Ethnic Conflicts along the Border,and Chinese Foreign Policy Changes toward Myanmar

Ever since Myanmar reoriented its foreign policy as a result of its transition to democratic rule in 2010, it has significantly improved its relations with the West, particularly the United States. Amid heightened geostrategic competition between the U.S. and China, how can we understand the Chinese government’s changing approaches to Myanmar, where China’s strategic and economic interests face unprecedented pressure? This article examines those changes in the context of the Chinese government’s response to three militarized ethnic conflicts along its border with Myanmar before and after Myanmar’s foreign policy reorientation. Drawing evidence from Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements and Chinese media coverage of the 2009 and 2015 Kokang conflicts and the 2011-2013 Kachin conflict, the article argues that combined geopolitical changes and domestic nationalist signaling explain the variations of China’s foreign policy approaches to Myanmar. The article thus contributes to ongoing interest in China’s foreign policy approaches to Southeast Asia in the wake of geostrategic competition between China and the United States.     

朴槿惠政府东北亚和平合作构想的具体化和改进方向

2013年2月上台的朴槿惠政府提出了一项新的外交政策,即"东北亚和平合作构想",并在国内外进行广泛宣传和研究。"东北亚和平合作构想"为了解决包括区域外国家美国在内的,东北亚区域内各国间的"亚洲悖论",以非传统安全领域的"软安全"问题为中心,开展多边对话机制,并致力于最终形成一个东北亚安全共同体。但该构想尚处于理论起步阶段,对合作(安全)议题、区域范围(参与对象国)、行为主体、国际机制(制度化)、推进战略等问题没有具体界定,距离政策化也还有一段距离。其间朴槿惠总统(政府)向美国和中国介绍了"东北亚和平合作构想",但仅得到美国的消极理解和中国原则上的支持,并没有得到对该构想的实质和具体内容的理解和支持。"东北亚和平合作构想"应要进一步具体化、理论化,以此来得到东北亚各国一致认同且可实践的国际合作体制。     

北伐期间日本的“满蒙观”与“九·一八”事变

北伐时期日本面对东北亦将被统一于中国中央政府之下的局势,出现了"满蒙放弃论"、"满蒙相对论"与"满蒙领有论"3种不同的政策主张。"满蒙放弃论"由于承认中国的民族主义觉醒、重视中国全局的经济利益而放弃了帝国主义,在近代日本对华政策史上留下了理智克己的一笔,但其力量有限未能成为主流。"满蒙相对论"虽也承认中国的民族主义觉醒并重视"经济扩张"手段,但却不能放弃帝国主义,最终沦为武力侵略者。"满蒙领有论"则奉行武力主义与强权主义,成为日本发动"九·一八"事变的直接策划者。     

End of an Era? The Landtagswahl in Bavaria,September 2008

The biotechnology and venture capital sectors have flourished in Germany during the 1990s, a surprising development that finds its roots in the policies of the federal government. Years before the private sector became engaged, the federal government had identified biotechnology and venture capital as important for job creation and Germany's world‐wide status as a technological leader. Its success in leading a renaissance in these sectors sits uneasily with dominant understandings of the German state as ‘semi‐sovereign’ (Katzenstein) or ‘enabling’ (Streeck) ‐ as institutionally incapable of defining policy against or without the active participation of societal actors. This article uses a history of the biotechnology and venture capital sectors since the 1970s to re‐examine the relationship between the central state and lower governments as well as organised interests in Germany. The evidence demonstrates the federal government's autonomy in formulating policy priorities as well as its ability to enhance the capabilities of lower level governments and private sector actors to achieve the objectives it defined.     

A note on the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy and the New York times cover-up

This article reveals the role of research and development (R&;D) policies in the development of the technology-intensive industries of China. Since economic reform began in 1978, the Chinese government has transformed the R&;D system from one that was wholly centrally planned into a more market-orientated system, making it more efficient and productive. At the same time, the state, its incentives and its investment remain significant. The government has increased the R&;D expenditure rapidly, while trying to develop indigenous technologies. It has actively utilised foreign direct investment inflows as the means to introduce advanced technology from developed countries. It has also provided systematic guidelines and established the economic technology development zones and high technology industrial development zones, in order to channel foreign investment inflows into technology-intensive industries. China has placed emphasis on the development of human resources in science and technology as well. Finally, the implications of the role of government in developing technology-intensive industries are considered.     

Wildlife policy matters: inclusion and exclusion by means of organisational and discursive boundaries

As a result of shifting wildlife policy, approximately one-sixth of South Africa's total land has been ‘game-fenced’ and converted for wildlife-based production during the last three decades. The wildlife industry has thereby become a multibillion rand industry with an increasingly vocal political arena. Seeing nature and its production as an organised political project, this article sets out to give insight into the shifting power relations between wildlife utilisers, government officials and civil society in South Africa. It does so by examining the production of dominant narratives on wildlife in the emerging organisational field of wildlife policy. This article studies the Wildlife Forum, an important national discursive space in which government engages with non-governmental parties about wildlife policy. The article argues that by means of organisational and discursive restructuring, government and industry actors have promoted a discourse alliance that endorses both government's conservation interests and industry's development interests, while excluding dissenting voices.     

New Labour, Gender Mainstreaming and the Women and Equality Unit

New Labour's approach to gender mainstreaming is perhaps best exemplified through the work of the Women and Equality Unit (WEU). In this article we chart the development of the Unit and varied initiatives in which it has been involved and provide a preliminary assessment of the Unit's work. We start with a discussion of Labour's approach to mainstreaming. This provides a context for a profile of the work of the Women's Unit (WU) between 1997 and 2001 and its successor the WEU, between 2001 and 2002. We consider the work of the Units in relation to the government's reforms to the policy-making process, focusing upon location, issue territory and connectivity. Using these three criteria our appraisal of the work of the WEU draws attention to three issues: firstly, the institutional uncertainty surrounding the status of the Unit; secondly, the degree to which the remit of the Unit has been unlike that of other cross-cutting units in addressing a broad gender agenda rather than specific policy areas, but that this is now shifting with the increasing focus on economic issues; and thirdly, the extent to which the Unit is reliant on non-feminist actors within the decision-making elite to help pursue its aims. We will suggest that the Unit may have made a small, but significant, contribution to the development of gender mainstreaming processes. Its contribution has been greatest where gender equality policies coincide with government priorities. Its contribution to the process of mainstreaming gendered perspectives into all policy-making is much harder to discern.     

The contested terrain of land governance reform in Myanmar

State control of land plays a critical role in producing land dispossession throughout the Global South. In Myanmar, the state’s approach towards territorial expansion has driven the country’s system of land governance, resulting in widespread and systemic land grabbing. This article investigates ongoing land governance reforms as key terrains for contesting such abuses of power. Employing a relational land governance approach, we view reform processes as shaped by changing power-laden social relations among government, civil society, and international donor actors. Legal and regulatory reforms in Myanmar potentially act as sites of meaningful social change but in practice tend to maintain significant limitations in altering governance dynamics. Civil society organizations and their alliances in Myanmar have played an important role in opening up policy processes to a broader group of political actors. Yet, policies and legal frameworks still are often captured by elite actors, becoming trapped in path dependent power relations.     

Reading the Trump Administration’s China Policy

The policy toward China under the Trump Administration is a rare combination of the toughest part of that of the Democratic Party, which is trade, and of the Republican Party, which is national security. The National Security Strategy by the Trump Administration defined China and Russia as competitors. It is the first time for the US Government to be harsh against both China and Russia (the Soviet Union included) since the late 1960s. Though trade is by far the most salient aspect of President Trump’s confrontational China policy, it is in fact a whole-of-the-government approach or pushback that the US government is taking with China, which means that not just the White House but various Departments and the Congress are tough with China, dealing with many issues from trade to human rights to national security. The President might actually be the softest link, almost exclusively focusing on trade. This might be a historic turnaround in US policy toward China.     

当前日本实施观光立国战略的研究

2012年底,安倍晋三重新执政之后,为推进观光立国战略的发展,改组了日本旅游行政管理机构,并要求相关部门要紧密合作共同打造"日本品牌",以此吸引外国游客访问日本。此外,日本政府还采取对东南亚国家放松旅游签证管制、开拓穆斯林客源市场以及向世界推广日本饮食文化等措施发展观光立国。虽然日本政府采取了许多措施吸引外国游客赴日旅游,但是由于忽视了中国大陆客源市场的巨大潜力,日本推进观光立国战略发展的政策措施效果将会大打折扣。     

Politicians and decolonization of Hong Kong

This article discusses the nature of political leadership in Hong Kong in general and the dilemmas facing politicians in the process of decolonization in particular. The politicians are certainly not performing “public service” as in a colonial administration. They are competing for political power and control in the government during the transition of Hong Kong from a British colony to a Chinese Special Administrative Region. Some politicians adopt a mobilization style of leadership to draw public support; some maintain an elitist style to preserve the status quo; some use a confrontational style to push for a democratic government and to resist Chinese intervention in the internal affairs of Hong Kong; some take a cooperative and compromising approach in resolving conflicts and dealing with China; and some attempt to adopt a moderate style by emphasizing rational and workable solutions to political dilemmas. The dilemmas of transition include: (1) the choice between democracy and conservatism; (2) the proper relationship between Hong Kong and China after 1997; (3) the conflict as to whom the politicians represent: the Hong Kong people or the Chinese leaders. The choice of any two polarized positions in the dilemmas will result in devastating consequences for Hong Kong. The task of the politicians is therefore to balance, rather than to accentuate, the divergent tensions between the antagonistic political forces. In the final analysis, the politicians will have to play the role of balancer between the future sovereign master and various political actors.     

RISE OF THE DISLOYAL: INCREASING RESENTMENT IN NORTH KOREA

Why has loyalty to the Kim Family Regime and the Worker’s Party diminished over the past twenty years despite a rise in the average standard of living, greater social mobility, and a regime policy of benign neglect towards marketization? Unthinkable in the Kim Il Sung era, the increase in expressions of resentment toward the North Korean authorities represents a shift in the ideology, behavior, and motivation of the population. Four critical factors have heightened tensions between state and society in North Korea, leading to a reduction in loyalty among the general population. The author considers the impact of labor mobilizations, the declining importance of party membership, the influence of foreign media, and the rise of rent seeking and extractive policies. While all play a role, it is important and possible to identify the primary cause. Extractive policies and rent-seeking position the regime and the people in a directly adversarial relationship. All tiers and agencies of the government have become complicit in efforts to siphon off profits, control market actors through crony capitalism, rent seek, over-regulate, and compete against private market actors, causing the residents to express frustration and resentment towards a government that does not have their interests at heart.     

从中国妇女受辱案看马来西亚华文报的历史责任

本文以中国女子受辱事件为观察对象,论述了马来西亚华文报纸的特点与功能,指出它们具有高度的新闻职业精神、履行华人喉舌职能、维护华人权益和帮助政府改善施政等特点。