Exploring the agency of Africa in climate change negotiations: the case of REDD+

Emerging climate change regimes, such as the mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+), are increasingly aiming to engage developing countries such as those in Africa, in sustainable development through carbon markets. The contribution of African countries to global climate negotiations determines how compatible the negotiated rules could be with the existing socioeconomic and policy circumstances of African countries. The aim of this paper is to explore the agency of Africa (African States) in the global climate change negotiations and discuss possible implications for implementing these rules using REDD+ as a case study. Drawing on document analysis and semi-structured expert interviews, our findings suggest that although African countries are extensively involved in the implementation of REDD+ interventions, the continent has a weak agency on the design of the global REDD+ architecture. This weak agency results from a number of factors including the inability of African countries to send large and diverse delegations to the negotiations as well lack of capacity to generate and transmit research evidence to the global platform. African countries also perceive themselves as victims of climate change who should be eligible for support rather than sources of technological solutions. Again, Africa’s position is fragmented across negotiation coalitions which weakens the continent's collective influence on the REDD+ agenda. This paper discusses a number of implementation deficits which could result from this weak agency. These include concerns about implementation capacity and a potential lack of coherence between REDD+ rules and existing policies in African countries. These findings call for a rethink of pathways to enhancing Africa’s strategies in engaging in multilateral climate change negotiations, especially if climate change regimes specifically targeted at developing countries are to be effective.     

Harmonising national sanctioning administrative law: An alternative to a single capital‐markets supervisor

Since the disclosure in 2009 of the Larosière Report, legislative acts disciplining financial markets have established a set of rules called to form the foundations of a sanctioning administrative law to be enforced by the Member States. Furthermore, the ECtHR and the ECJ, are contributing to apply here the guarantees of the Rome Convention and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This study, in addition to giving account of such legislation and case‐law, aims to outline the broad principles of this new law, whose purpose is levelling the ‘playing field’ amongst NCAs and fostering supervisory convergence without creating new institutions. Should this ‘experiment’ be successful, and a new way of ‘cooperative federalism’ could emerge at a global level in the Union. Otherwise, further centralisation—which is neither possible nor desirable at this stage—should be expected in future years, with a sort of single supervisory mechanism in securities markets.     

The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism

This review article offers thoughts on Kaarlo Tuori's recent book, European Constitutionalism, and more particularly on what he calls the ‘disciplinary contest over the legal characterisation of the EU and its law’. As the book's title suggests, Tuori privileges the constitutional perspective in that contest, so much so—he freely admits—that his analysis ‘predetermine[s] how the EU and its law will be portrayed’. And therein also lies the book's main weakness. Tuori's predetermined ‘constitutional’ interpretation, like so much of the dominant legal discourse in the EU today, ultimately obscures the core contradiction in EU public law. National institutions are increasingly constrained in the exercise of their own constitutional authority but supranational institutions are unable to fill the void because Europeans refuse to endow them with the sine qua non of genuine constitutionalism: the autonomous capacity to mobilise fiscal and human resources in a compulsory fashion. The EU's lack of constitutional power in this robust sense derives from the absence of the necessary socio‐political underpinnings for genuine constitutional legitimacy—what we can call the power‐legitimacy nexus in EU public law. To borrow Tuori's own evocative phrase, the EU possesses at best a ‘parasitic legitimacy’ derived from the more robust constitutionalism of the Member States as well as from the positive connotations that using ‘constitutional’ terminology evokes regardless of its ultimate aptness. The result is an ‘as if’ constitutionalism, the core feature of which is an increasingly untenable principal‐agent inversion between the EU and the Member States, one with profound consequences for the democratic life of Europeans. The sustainability of integration over the long term depends on confronting these adverse features of ‘European constitutionalism’ directly, something that legal elites—whether EU judges, lawyers, or legal scholars—ignore at their peril.     

Voting rules in insolvency law: a simple-game theoretic approach

A chief characteristic of modern insolvency law in Canada, Germany, the UK, and the US is the provision for ‘workouts’ or ‘schemes of arrangement’ by which insolvent companies can attempt to rehabilitate the business. If reorganization is chosen, the debtor has to devise a plan of action which will be voted upon by claimants. The voting rules, however, differ in each jurisdiction to a greater or lesser extent and as yet have not been analyzed in any rigorous manner. This paper provides an approach based upon the theory of simple games to analyze the rules in terms of the ease which each of these regimes can pass (or hinder) plans and how these rules distribute value among claimants. We pay particular attention to the role of classification and the effect of coalition formation.     

‘Citizens’ and ‘Foreigners’ in EU Law. Migration Law and its Cosmopolitan Outlook

Migration has become a controversial subject across Europe and beyond. At the same time, the EU has built up an impressive set of rules for third‐country nationals over the past two decades, which—unlike the mobility of EU citizens—received comparatively little attention apart from immigration and asylum specialists. This contribution presents the constitutional framework for ‘migration law’ towards third‐country nationals and shows in how far they depart from the paradigm of intra‐European mobility. It will be argued that differences can be rationalised by divergent objectives and do, nonetheless, not present a move towards ‘fortress Europe’. EU migration law maintains the distinction between citizens and foreigners at the same time as it protects migrants, including refugees. By accommodating migrants' rights and self‐government, EU migration law can be construed as an endeavour to replace traditional notions of alienage with constitutional rules with a cosmopolitan outlook.     

An optional European contract law code: Advantages and disadvantages

Should the EU introduce an Optional European Contract Law Code and what should it look like? By applying economic theories of federalism and regulatory competition (legal federalism), it is shown why an Optional Code would be a very suitable legal instrument within a two-level European System of Contract Laws. By allowing private parties’ choice of law to a certain extent, it can combine the most important advantages of centralisation and decentralisation of competences for legal rules. Through differentiated analyses of three kinds of contract law rules (mandatory substantive rules, mandatory information rules and facilitative law), important conclusions can be reached: which kinds of contract law rules are most suitable to be applied on an optional basis (e.g. facilitative law) and which might be less so (e.g. a core of information regulations). Furthermore a number of additional general conclusions about the design and scope of an Optional EU Code and some conclusions in regard to sales law are derived.     

Gangs and governance in Russia: the paradox of law and lawlessness

ABSTRACT

The paper addresses the nature of gang governance. It questions the notion that gangs regulate social and economic transactions and create stable orders in certain territories. It shows that, while presenting themselves as upholders of the ‘law’ in their territory, the gangs also create a climate of uncertainty and fear. The gangs manipulate their own unwritten rules and set up traps for residents and businessmen. These traps are designed to deprive non-gang civilians of presumed rights and identities and extort their money. The paper uses Schmitt’s notion of ‘state of exception’ and Agamben’s idea of ‘bare life’ to explain how gangs function.     

Labour Constitutions and Occupational Communities: Social Norms and Legal Norms at Work

This paper considers the interaction of legal norms and social norms in the regulation of work and working relations, observing that, with the contraction of collective bargaining, this is a matter that no longer attracts the attention that it deserves. Drawing upon two concepts from sociology – Max Weber's ‘labour constitution’ and Seymour Martin Lipset's ‘occupational community’ – it focuses on possibilities for the emergence, within groups of workers, of shared normative beliefs concerning ‘industrial justice’ (Selznick); for collective solidarity and agency; for the transformation of shared beliefs into legally binding norms; and for the enforcement of those norms. If labour law is currently in ‘crisis’, then a promising route out of the crisis, we argue, is for the law to recover its procedural focus, facilitating and encouraging these processes.     

It Ain't Necessarily So: A Legal Realist Perspective on the Law of Agency Work

Analysis of UK employment and labour law is often characterised by a curious dissonance. The overarching narrative mandates that labour law is a countervailing force to the inequality of bargaining power, embedded with values and assumptions concerning the nature of employment relations and the role of labour law. And yet, labour law jurisprudence tends to treat with respect, and seeks to decipher, abstract statutory concepts and tests derived from judicial pronouncements as if they were, indeed, a ‘brooding omnipresence in the sky’. This paper seeks to bridge that gap, by offering a legal realist account of the legal doctrine that governs the employment of agency workers, focusing on the ‘necessity’ and ‘sham’ tests. It assesses the legitimacy of importing legal tests from one (commercial) context to another (employment) context; questions the courts’ protestations that their use is mandated by precedent; and outlines the real implications for the status and rights of agency workers in the UK.     

Commons as possessions: The path to protection of the commons in the ECHR system

The ‘commons’ is not mentioned in the texts of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P‐1). This essay argues that ‘possessions’ — which does appear in the latter — should be interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to protect commons against national governments' undue interferences. The argument comprises two parts. First, we analyse the polysemic term ‘possessions’ to show how the current understanding of this category is marred by flawed assumptions and by false dichotomies. Then, we propose an ‘ecological’ construction of legal relationships between subjects and objects. We find support in the ECtHR case law on Article 8. We argue this approach should be extended to Article 1 P‐1: once disentangled from possessive individualism and market paradigms, ‘possessions’ encompass the commons and the category offers a solid legal basis toward the justiciability in Strasbourg of privatisations.     

Why fairness cannot be automated: Bridging the gap between EU non-discrimination law and AI

In recent years a substantial literature has emerged concerning bias, discrimination, and fairness in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning. Connecting this work to existing legal non-discrimination frameworks is essential to create tools and methods that are practically useful across divergent legal regimes. While much work has been undertaken from an American legal perspective, comparatively little has mapped the effects and requirements of EU law. This Article addresses this critical gap between legal, technical, and organisational notions of algorithmic fairness. Through analysis of EU non-discrimination law and jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and national courts, we identify a critical incompatibility between European notions of discrimination and existing work on algorithmic and automated fairness. A clear gap exists between statistical measures of fairness as embedded in myriad fairness toolkits and governance mechanisms and the context-sensitive, often intuitive and ambiguous discrimination metrics and evidential requirements used by the ECJ; we refer to this approach as “contextual equality.”This Article makes three contributions. First, we review the evidential requirements to bring a claim under EU non-discrimination law. Due to the disparate nature of algorithmic and human discrimination, the EU's current requirements are too contextual, reliant on intuition, and open to judicial interpretation to be automated. Many of the concepts fundamental to bringing a claim, such as the composition of the disadvantaged and advantaged group, the severity and type of harm suffered, and requirements for the relevance and admissibility of evidence, require normative or political choices to be made by the judiciary on a case-by-case basis. We show that automating fairness or non-discrimination in Europe may be impossible because the law, by design, does not provide a static or homogenous framework suited to testing for discrimination in AI systems.Second, we show how the legal protection offered by non-discrimination law is challenged when AI, not humans, discriminate. Humans discriminate due to negative attitudes (e.g. stereotypes, prejudice) and unintentional biases (e.g. organisational practices or internalised stereotypes) which can act as a signal to victims that discrimination has occurred. Equivalent signalling mechanisms and agency do not exist in algorithmic systems. Compared to traditional forms of discrimination, automated discrimination is more abstract and unintuitive, subtle, intangible, and difficult to detect. The increasing use of algorithms disrupts traditional legal remedies and procedures for detection, investigation, prevention, and correction of discrimination which have predominantly relied upon intuition. Consistent assessment procedures that define a common standard for statistical evidence to detect and assess prima facie automated discrimination are urgently needed to support judges, regulators, system controllers and developers, and claimants.Finally, we examine how existing work on fairness in machine learning lines up with procedures for assessing cases under EU non-discrimination law. A ‘gold standard’ for assessment of prima facie discrimination has been advanced by the European Court of Justice but not yet translated into standard assessment procedures for automated discrimination. We propose ‘conditional demographic disparity’ (CDD) as a standard baseline statistical measurement that aligns with the Court's ‘gold standard’. Establishing a standard set of statistical evidence for automated discrimination cases can help ensure consistent procedures for assessment, but not judicial interpretation, of cases involving AI and automated systems. Through this proposal for procedural regularity in the identification and assessment of automated discrimination, we clarify how to build considerations of fairness into automated systems as far as possible while still respecting and enabling the contextual approach to judicial interpretation practiced under EU non-discrimination law.     

Globalization and extraterritorial application of economic regulation: crisis in international law and balancing interests

There are two developments the combination of which has led to new challenges to international law: the growth of economic regulations and globalisation. While the modern economies are associated with the proliferation of regulatory laws which are rooted in the national economic and social policies, the loosening of the national borders and globalisation has led to conflicts of economic regulations. Such developments have posed various risks of violations of national economic regulations by the economic actors and could lead to tension among national states which have jurisdiction over multinational enterprises in one way or another. The private parties involved in such a situation could somehow avoid such risks by their own initiatives and contractual arrangements but in most cases such measures do now work and the conflict has to be resolved through the cooperation between the countries involved. The paper investigates the potentials for public international law to come up with rules, principles and norms to resolve such complex disputes which touch up issues such as non-intervention, equality of sovereign states, state immunity, self-determination and other principles of international law. Unlike certain area of international law such as law of sea where a few factors involved and the disputes could be resolved by relying on simple facts and rules, the application of national economic regulations extraterritorially creates tensions among the nation states in respect of the demarcation of national jurisdictions. It is here that public international faces a new challenges and need to come up with new approaches such a balancing of interests of the states involved in the conflicts.     

Interpreting the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Scales of Justice</Emphasis>: Architecture,Symbolism and Semiotics of the Supreme Court of India

The neutrality of the art and architecture of courtrooms and courthouses has dominated the public perception in the Indian context. The courtroom design and the visual artistic elements present within these judicial places have very often been considered to be insignificant to the notions of law and justice that they reflect. As art and architecture present certain historical narratives, reflect political allegories and have significant impact on the perceptions of their viewers, they have critical socio-political ramifications. This makes it pertinent to explore them and investigate the paradox of their deployment and interpretation in today’s increasingly mediatized world. Through an ethnographic study of the Supreme Court of India, this paper interprets its art and architecture, and, the symbolism and semiotics reflected through them. Arguing against their neutrality and insignificance, the paper demonstrates how they reflect nationalism, certain ideologies and power-space dynamics. It further argues that they act as evidence of political metaphors related to justice, power and democracy. With a conversation between law, architecture and semiotics, the paper investigates the historical and spatial dimensions of its architecture and artistic elements. Mapping the Court’s architectural elements, I examine how the visual representation of ‘justice as virtue’ finds translation in its design through transfer of certain images, including the image of the ‘scales of justice’, into it, while absenting the notion of ‘justice as struggle’—to contemplate on how legal architecture gives evidence to the vexed relationship between law and justice and also of the break from the colonial past     

Transparency of machine-learning in healthcare: The GDPR & European health law

Machine-learning (‘ML’) models are powerful tools which can support personalised clinical judgments, as well as patients’ choices about their healthcare. Concern has been raised, however, as to their ‘black box’ nature, in which calculations are so complex they are difficult to understand and independently verify. In considering the use of ML in healthcare, we divide the question of transparency into three different scenarios:

• 1)Solely automated decisions. We suggest these will be unusual in healthcare, as Article 22(4) of the General Data Protection Regulation presents a high bar. However, if solely automatic decisions are made (e.g. for inpatient triage), data subjects will have a right to ‘meaningful information’ about the logic involved.
• 2)Clinical decisions. These are decisions made ultimately by clinicians—such as diagnosis—and the standard of transparency under the GDPR is lower due to this human mediation.
• 3)Patient decisions. Decisions about treatment are ultimately taken by the patient or their representative, albeit in dialogue with clinicians. Here, the patient will require a personalised level of medical information, depending on the severity of the risk, and how much they wish to know.

In the final category of decisions made by patients, we suggest European healthcare law sets a more personalised standard of information requirement than the GDPR. Clinical information must be tailored to the individual patient according to their needs and priorities; there is no monolithic ‘explanation’ of risk under healthcare law. When giving advice based (even partly) on a ML model, clinicians must have a sufficient grasp of the medically-relevant factors involved in the model output to offer patients this personalised level of medical information. We use the UK, Ireland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden as examples of European health law jurisdictions which require this personalised transparency to support patients’ rights to make informed choices. This adds to the argument for post-hoc, rationale explanations of ML to support healthcare decisions in all three scenarios.     

Eating Peas with One’s Fingers: A Semiotic Approach to Law and Social Norms

This paper proposes a semiotic theory of norms—what I term normative semiotics. The paper’s central contention is that social norms are a language. Moreover, it is a language that we instinctively learn to speak. Normative behaviour is a mode of communication, the intelligibility of which allows us to establish cooperative relationships with others. Normative behaviour communicates an actor’s potential as a cooperative partner. Compliance with a norm is an act of communication: compliance signals cooperativeness; noncompliance signals uncooperativeness. An evolutionary model is proposed to explain how this comes about: evolution has generated an instinctual proficiency in working with these signals much like a language—a proficiency that manifests in an emotional context. We see these social rules as possessing a certain ‘rightness’ in normative terms. This adaptive trait is what we call internalization. Internalization enhances the individual’s ability to speak this code. Because these signals communicate who is and who is not a reliable co-operator, sending and receiving cooperation signals is crucial to individual survival. Individuals who internalized the entire process and thus became more adept at speaking the language were at an advantage. Law seeks to shape the language of norms by maintaining the collective standards of society; as such, understanding how and why this normative language emerges is critical to understanding a core function of law.     

Doing family

This paper draws on how constructions of ‘the migrant family’ in political discourse influence migrants' and their families' lives. In specific national contexts, ‘the migrant family’ is determined according to the national and European debates and expressed by their respective rules and regulations. By ‘doing family’, migrants and their families develop strategies in order to fit these requirements of living a certain family life. Fulfilling specific norms and perceptions which are not necessarily required for the majority of society is a precondition to succeed. Who is and who is not part of the family, who holds responsibility — such aspects have to be proved and repeatedly reproduced by migrants and their families. This not only affects their position in society, but also has strong implications on their lives as a couple and family, since it requires the continuous adaptation and reconstructions of their everyday reality.     

The balance between equity and efficiency; reflections on the goals of the new Nigerian competition law

In January 2019, the Nigerian Government finally enacted its first competition law after several attempts to do so previously failed. Since all competition regimes advance one or more goals, the paper provides a critical evaluation of what the goals of the Nigerian Competition Law ‘is’ or ‘are’ and/or what they should be. This paper posits that discussion on goals must relate fundamentally to the true reason(s) the nation ‘needs’ an antitrust legislation and the relationship between these reasons (as reflected in the preamble of the legislation) and the prohibitory aspects of the law.Although the goal of competition is generally thought to be relating to promoting economic efficiency, however, for developing countries (including Nigeria), competition must compose of an important equity dimension. Ironically, the work uses the ‘developed’ experience of the EU in later stages to show that the goals of an antitrust policy are never static but dynamic and may not necessarily always admit of ‘efficiency’ considerations. This paper’s argument is that Nigeria needs a welfarist approach to competition which means efficiency should sit as a top objective and that any compromise on economic efficiency as the goal must be accommodated only to the extent that basic principles of a market driven competition is not harmed. Consequently, the work reflects on how the new Nigerian law has provided a balance between market efficiency and other goals of competition and how the new Nigerian competition body can operationalise this balance in the development of the nation’s antitrust policy. In this regard, the EU also provides some important enforcement lessons.     

Victim and Society: Sharing Wrongs, but in Which Roles?

This paper discusses what kinds of conflicts arise when a crime has been committed, and with whom—and in which of their possible roles—the offender should be seen as having such conflicts. The possible roles of the victim are in focus, as is the constitutive role of the act of criminalizing a certain kind of behavior. It is argued that while in the tort conflict the victim should be seen as a party qua him- or herself in a ‘fuller’ sense (and with full freedom on how to handle the conflict, including dropping it), in the criminal law conflict it is community, the ‘we’, that should be looked upon as the party to the conflict with the offender. The victim should not be seen as excluded from the criminal law conflict, though: to the contrary, he or she is a member of community and has an important role to play. This role, however, needs to be strictly defined in a way that gives the victim the function of a certain kind of representative for ‘us’, the community. This role should not allow the victim much room to influence how the criminal law conflict is handled. The model I am suggesting presupposes—I think, at least—that criminal law conflict and tort conflict should be handled together at the same trial.     

Social Insurance Monopolies in Community Competition Law and the Italian Constitution: 'Practical' Convergences and 'Theoretical' Conflicts

An Italian judge, following earlier suggestions of the national antitrust Authority, has referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC Treaty two questions on the interpretation of Articles 81 and 86 of the EC Treaty. With those questions, raised in an action brought by a self‐employee against the Istituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (INAIL) concerning the actor's refusal to pay for social insurance contributions, the Tribunale di Vicenza has in summary asked the Court of Justice whether the public entity concerned, managing a general scheme for the social insurance of accidents at work and professional diseases, can be qualified as an enterprise under Article 81 EC Treaty and, if so, whether its dominant position can be considered in contrast with EC competition rules. This article takes this preliminary reference as a starting point to consider in more general terms the complex constitutional issues raised by what Ge´rard Lyon‐Caen has evocatively called the progressive ‘infiltration’ of EC competition rules into the national systems of labour and social security law. The analysis is particularly focused on the significant risks of ‘constitutional collision’, between the ‘solidaristic’ principles enshrined in the Italian constitution and the fundamental market freedoms protected by the EC competition rules, which are implied by the questions raised in the preliminary reference. It considers first the evolution of ECJ case law—from Poucet and Pistre to Albany International BV—about the limits Member States have in granting exclusive rights to social security institutions under EC competition rules. It then considers specularly, from the Italian constitutional law perspective, the most recent case law of the Italian Constitutional Court on the same issues. The ‘contextual’ reading of the ECJ's and the Italian Constitutional Court's case law with specific regard to the case referred to by the Tribunale di Vicenza leads to the conclusion that there will probably be a ‘practical convergence’in casu between the ‘European’ and the ‘national’ approach. Following the arguments put forward by the Court of Justice in Albany, the INAIL should not be considered as an enterprise, in line also with a recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court. And even when it was to be qualified as an enterprise, the INAIL should in any case be able to escape the ‘accuse’ of abuse of dominant position and be allowed to retain its exclusive rights, pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. This ‘practical convergence’in casu does not, however, remove the latent ‘theoretical conflict’ between the two approaches and the risk of ‘constitutional collision’ that it implies. A risk of a ‘conflict’ of that kind could be obviously detrimental for the European integration process. The Italian Constitutional Court claims for herself the control over the fundamental principles of the national constitutional order, assigning them the role of ‘counter‐limits’ to the supremacy of European law and to European integration. At the same time, and more generally, the pervasive spill over of the EC market and competition law virtually into every area of national regulation runs the risk of undermining the social and democratic values enshrined in the national labour law traditions without compensating the potential de‐regulatory effects through measures of positive integration at the supranational level. This also may contribute to undermine and threaten, in the long run, the (already weak) democratic legitimacy of the European integration process. The search for a more suitable and less elusive and unilateral balance between social rights and economic freedoms at the supranational level should therefore become one of the most relevant tasks of what Joseph Weiler has called the ‘European neo‐constitutionalism’. In this perspective, the article, always looking at the specific questions referred to the Court of Justice by the Tribunale di Vicenza, deals with the issue of the ‘rebalance’ between social rights and economic and market freedoms along three distinct but connected lines of reasoning. The first has to do with the need of a more open and respectful dialogue between the ECJ and the national constitutional courts. The second is linked to the ongoing discussion about the ‘constitutionalization’ of the fundamental social rights at the EC level. The third finally considers the same issues from the specific point of view of the division of competences between the European Community and the Member States in the area of social (protection) policies.