Inadequately self-critical: Rwanda's self-assessment for the African peer review mechanism

During the first stage of the New Partnership for Africa’sDevelopment (NEPAD) peer review process, the country under reviewcompiles a report on the state of economic, political, social,and corporate governance in the country. This article examinesRwanda’s evaluation of its political governance duringthis first stage, as reflected in the January 2005 version ofthis country’s self-assessment report. After sketchingthe compromised political environment in which the report waswritten, it is indicated how this rosy report inadequately addressesa number of serious political problems in Rwanda, such as Rwanda’sinvolvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the inadequateseparation of powers in the Rwandan political system, tensionsin Rwandan society, and the flawed presidential and parliamentaryelections of 2003. While it remains to be seen to what extentRwanda either acknowledges its political problems in the finalversion of its self-assessment report, or is censured in thesubsequent stages of the peer review process, it is concludedthat the greater the failure to do either, the greater the doubtthat will linger over the value of the African peer-review exercise. ^1. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Memorandum of understanding on theAfrican Peer Review Mechanism’ (http://www.nepad.org,17 July, 2005). ^2. P. Chabal, ‘The quest for good government and developmentin Africa: is NEPAD the answer?’ International Affairs78, 3 (2002), pp. 447–62; I. Taylor, NEPAD: Towards Africa’sdevelopment or another false start? (Lynne Rienner, Boulder,CO, 2005). ^3. See Taylor, NEPAD, pp. 15–44. ^4. On this problem, see ibid, pp. 61–74. ^5. M. Katzenellenbogen and W. Hartley, ‘No political peerreview, says Mbeki’, Business Day, 31 October, 2002. ^6. T. Mbeki, ‘Critics ill-informed about NEPAD peer review’,ANC Official Home Page (http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2002/at45.htm,27 July, 2005). ^7. Ibid. ^8. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, Rwanda Country Self-Assessment Reportfor the African Peer Review Mechanism (Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat,Kigali, 2005). The 230-page report consists of an introduction,followed by four chapters, each addressing one of the thematicareas set out in the questionnaire. ^9. On Kigali’s ‘official line’, see J. Pottier,Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, survival and disinformation inthe late twentieth century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,2002). ^10. During the second stage of the peer review process, the countryvisit by the Country Review Team, this team’s ‘priorityorder of business will be to carry out the widest possible rangeof consultations with the Government, officials, political parties,parliamentarians and representatives of civil society organizationsincluding the media, academia, trade unions, business and professionalbodies’: NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Guidelines for countriesto prepare for and to participate in the African Peer ReviewMechanism (APRM)’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/aprm/aprmguidelinesforcountryreview200104final.pdf,27 July, 2005). Never mind that ‘representatives of civilsociety organizations’ in Rwanda tend to be not all thatindependent from the government, the NEPAD documents make nomention of possible consultations with embassy staff, the UNand its agencies, international financial instutions, internationalchurch groups and international NGOs — groups that wouldbe able to broaden the perspectives of the Country Review Team. ^11. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Declaration on democracy, political,economic, and corporate governance’, NEPAD Official HomePage (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/2.pdf, 15 July,2005). ^12. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism(APRM) base document’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/49.pdf,22 July, 2005). ^13. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Guidelines’. ^14. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment for the AfricanPeer Review Mechanism’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/156.pdf,24 January, 2005). ^15. Ibid. ^16. Ibid. ^17. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘APRM base document’. ^18. According to Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘APRM NationalCommission’, Rwanda NEPAD Magazine 1 (2004), pp. 14–16. ^19. Ibid, p. 14. ^20. NEPAD Secretariat, Final Report: African Peer Review Mechanismcountry support mission to Rwanda, 21–June 24, 2004 (NEPADSecratariat, Midrand, 2004), p. 4. ^21. Ibid. ^22. On the extent of presidential and senatorial appointments, seeGovernment of Rwanda, The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda(Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Kigali, 2003),Articles 88 and 113. ^23. In May 2003, Pro-Femmes sided with the government and attackedHuman Rights Watch for being ‘divisive’: UnitedStates Department of State, ‘Rwanda: country report onhuman rights practices 2003’, US Department of State OfficialHome Page (http://www.state.gov//g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27744.htm,27 January, 2005). ^24. They were Aimable Kabanda (African Peer Review Focal Point,Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat), Alex Semarintoya (Ministry of LocalGovernment), Solange Tuyisenge (Member of the National Assembly)and James Ngango (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). ^25. US Department of State, ‘Country Report 2003’; UnitedStates Department of State, ‘Rwanda: country report onhuman rights practices 2004’, US Department of State OfficialHome Page (http://www.state.gov//g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41621.htm,23 July, 2005). ^26. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: human rights organizationforced to close down’, Amnesty International OfficialHome Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470012005,22 January, 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: preparingfor elections: tightening control in the name of unity’,Human Right Watch Official Home Page (http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0503.bck.htm,9 February, 2005). ^27. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Declaration’, op. cit. ^28. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Communiqué: The African PeerReview (APRM) support mission to Rwanda’, Southern AfricanRegional Poverty Network Official Home Page (http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000845/P958-Rwanda_APRM.pdf,31 July, 2005). ^29. Nepad Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^30. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 26. ^31. See Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: observing the rules ofwar?’ Human Rights Watch Official Home Page (http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/rwanda2,15 February, 2005). ^32. See Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo:killing human decency’, Amnesty International OfficialHome Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620072000,9 February, 2005); Amnesty International, ‘DemocraticRepublic of Congo: Rwandese-controlled east: devastating humantoll’, Amnesty International Official Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620112001,19 July, 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Observing the rulesof war?’ ^33. Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo:"Our brothers who help kill us" — economic exploitationand human rights abuses in the east’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620102003,19 July, 2005). ^34. T. Longman, ‘The complex reasons for Rwanda’s engagementin Congo’, in J.F. Clark (ed.), The African Stakes ofthe Congo War (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002), p. 136. ^35. Government of Rwanda, ‘Reply to the final report (documentS/2002/1146) of the Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitationof natural resources and other forms of wealth of the DemocraticRepublic of Congo’ (http://www.afrol.com/Countries/Rwanda/documents/reply_un_resources_2002.htm,15 June, 2005). ^36. Amnesty International, ‘Our brothers who help kill us’. ^37. United Nations, ‘Final report of the panel of expertson the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other formsof wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UnitedNations in Denmark Official Home Page (http://www.un.dk/doc/S20021146.pdf,10 February, 2005). See also Amnesty International, ‘Ourbrother who help kill us’. ^38. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,pp. 34–5. ^39. Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo:Arming the east’, Amnesty International Official HomePage (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620062005,14 July, 2005). ^40. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 25. ^41. Amnesty International, ‘Arming the East’. ^42. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^43. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 36. ^44. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^45. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’; USDepartment of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^46. F. Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, ten years on: from genocide todictatorship’, African Affairs 103, 411 (2004), p. 187. ^47. Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, p. 9. ^48. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^49. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^50. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 31. ^51. National Electoral Commission, ‘Executive summaries ofNational Electoral Commission reports on the constitutionalreferendum, presidential and parliamentary elections’,National Electoral Commission of Rwanda Offical Home Page (http://www.comelena.gov.rw/english/resumeelection2003.html,18 July, 2005). ^52. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 31. ^53. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^54. European Union Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report2003’, EU Official Home Page (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/rwanda/moe_ue_final_2003.pdf,25 July, 2005). ^55. During the presidential elections (August 2003), the incumbent,Paul Kagame, won 95 percent of the vote, while his party, theRwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), won 74 percent of the vote inthe parliamentary elections (September 2003). ^57. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: government slams dooron political life and civil society’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470122004,22 January, 2005); US Department of State, ‘Country report2003’. ^56. The US Department of State referred to the 2003 presidentialelections as ‘seriously marred’: US Department ofState, ‘Country report 2003’. ^58. Amnesty International, ‘Government slams door’;Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: run-up to presidentialelections marred by threats and harassment’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470102003,22 January, 2005); I. Samset and O. Dalby, ‘Rwanda: presidentialand parliamentary elections 2003’, Norwegian Centre forHuman Rights Official Home Page (http://www.humanrights.uio.no/forskning/publ/nr/2003/12.pdf,28 February, 2005). ^59. Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: resolve disappearances, assassination’,Human Right Watch Official Home Page (http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/05/04/rwanda133.htm,9 February, 2005). ^60. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: deeper into the abyss— waging war on civil society’ Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470132004,22 January 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^61. Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^62. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^63. Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^64. Samset and Dalby, ‘Presidential and parliamentary elections’. ^65. EU Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report 2003’. ^66. Samset and Dalby, ‘Presidential and parliamentary elections’. ^67. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^68. EU Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report’. ^69. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^70. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,pp. 34–5. ^71. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^72. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’, emphasisadded. ^73. Amnesty International, ‘Devastating human toll’(http://web.amnesty.org, 19 July, 2005). ^74. As had happened during the previous year, as during 2004 Rwanda’sjudiciary ‘was subject to presidential influence’:US Department of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^75. N. van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of PermanentCrisis, 1979–1999 (Cambridge University Press, 2001),p. 51. ^76. On this tension, see Chabal, ‘Good government and developmentin Africa’; Taylor, NEPAD. ^77. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Communiqué issued at the endof the third summit of the Committee of Participating Headsof State and Government in the African Peer Review Mechanism(APR Forum), 19 June, 2005, Abuja, Nigeria’, Institutefor Security Studies Official Home Page (http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/nepad/aprm/comsum3jun05.pdf,28 July, 2005).     

"Cold Storage": British Policy and the Beginnings of the Irian Barat/West New Guinea Dispute

During the struggle for independence, the British had sought to bring the Dutch and the Indonesians together: they wanted the friendship of the Dutch, their neighbours in Europe, but also believed that the Western powers could stay in Southeast Asia only if they came to terms with nationalism. The 1949 agreement that transferred sovereignty postponed the question of Irian Barat/West New Guinea. The British rather hoped that the Dutch would stay but,particularly as the Cold War intensified, did not wish to alienate the Indonesians. If no agreement could be reached on the issue, they wanted to put it into "cold storage" for a number of years. The Australian government was not satisfied with these policies. It opposed an Indonesian takeover, or indeed any Indonesian role in West New Guinea. Its aim was thepreservation of the status quo: even "cold storage" was insufficient.     

Higher Education in West Africa

On the 19th June, the long awaited reports of the Asquith Commissionand the Elliot Commission were published as Cmd. 6647 and 6655.The Asquith Report (2/-) contains 119 pages with tables: theElliot Report (3/-) is even longer— 190 pages with tables,maps and plans. Members will appreciate the work of Mr. Hussey,a former Director of Education in Nigeria, who has kindly summarisedthe main findings, in the hope of stimulating the public ofboth Britain and West Africa to study the full Reports.     

When Britain Saved the West: The Story of 1940

When Britain Saved the West: The Story of 1940. By Robin Prior (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2015), pp.xxi + 335. AU$55.00 (cloth), distributed in Australia by Footprint Books.     

Fatah from Below: The Clash of Generations in Palestine

Dominated by a Fatah/Palestinian National Authority coalition, West Bank politics is characterized by authoritarianism, factionalism and an accommodating policy vis-à-vis the Israeli occupier. These features are prominent parts of what Hisham Sharabi called neopatriarchy, a dysfunctional political system that leaves societies internally repressive and externally weak, marginalizing the young and accommodating colonial interests. The resulting alienation and dissatisfaction among young Palestinians have led to two kinds of reaction that bear on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict: a well-organized but leaderless popular resistance, and destructive, spontaneous outbursts of violence. The onus is on the elite to reform the political culture, as liberation from Israeli occupation will not by itself improve the dysfunctional organization of West Bank politics.     

Book Reviews

Book reviewed in this article: BIRSL, Ursula (2005): Migration und Migrationspolitik im Prozess der europäischen Integration? Opladen: Barbara Budrich, 360 Seiten. BERTOZZI, Fabio, Giuliano BONOLI et Benoīt GAY‐DES‐COMBES (2005). La réforme de l'état social en Suisse. Vieillissement, emploi, conflit travail‐famille. Collection Le savoir suisse. Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes, 131 pages. BOCHSLER, Daniel, Christophe KOLLER, Pascal SCIARINI, Sylvie TRAIMOND und Ivar TRIPPOLINI (2005). Die Schweizer Kantone unter der Lupe. Behörden, Personal, Finanzen. Bern, Stuttgart, Wien: Haupt, 167 Seiten. DONGES, Patrick (Hrsg.)(2005). Politische Kommunikation in der Schweiz. Bern, Stuttgart, Wien: Haupt Verlag, 224 Seiten. KLÖTI, Ulrich, Christian HIRSCHI, Uwe SERDÜLT und Thomas WIDMER (2005). Verkannte Aussenpolitik. Entscheidungsprozesse in der Schweiz. Zürich, Chur: Verlag Rüegger, 322 Seiten.     

Book Reviews

Books reviewed in this issue. How We Missed the Story: Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and the Hijacking of Afghanistan , by Roy Gutman. The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq , by Bing West. Nights in the Pink Motel: An American Strategist's Pursuit of Peace in Iraq , by Robert Earle. The Persian Gulf in History , by Lawrence G. Potter, ed. One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict , by Benny Morris. Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present , by Yevgeny Primakov (translated by Paul Gould).     

Nigeria's foreign policy and transnational security challenges in West Africa

This article explores how Nigeria's foreign policy has responded to transnational security challenges in West Africa. It engages in a conceptual overview of the discourse on transnational security and links this with a discussion of Nigeria's foreign policy towards West Africa. Of note is Nigeria's pursuit of a leadership role in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in its quest for security, economic integration and development. Several questions are posed: What do Nigerian policymakers consider to be the most significant transnational threats in West Africa? How and through what legitimate policies and instruments do they respond to such threats? How important is ECOWAS to Nigeria's attempt to respond to transnational threats? And how effective have Nigeria's attempts to influence the ECOWAS agenda in this regard been? Although ECOWAS has remained central to Nigeria's responses to transnational security threats in the subregion, the country has not been able to match its rhetoric on addressing transnational security threats with far-reaching concrete achievements. It is suggested that social transformation of Nigeria's current foreign policy (that is, to one focused and committed to putting people at its centre) and a change in the policies of dominant global powers towards West Africa would enhance human emancipation and eliminate the numerous insecurities confronting the peoples of the subregion.     

Book Reviews

Books reviewed: Stokes, Doug (2005) America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia. Helmke, Gretchen (2005) Courts under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina. Wood, Andrew Grant (ed.) (2004) On the Border: Society and Culture between the United States and Mexico. Ochoa, Gilda L. (2004) Becoming Neighbors in a Mexican American Community: Power, Conflict and Solidarity. Yashar, Deborah J. (2005) Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge. Herrera, Robinson A. (2003). Natives, Europeans, and Africans in Sixteenth‐Century Santiago de Guatemala. Butler, Matthew (2004) Popular Piety and Political Identity in Mexico's Cristero Rebellion: Michoacán, 1927–1929. Whitehead, Neil L. and Wright, Robin (eds) (2004) In Darkness and Secrecy: The Anthropology of Assault Sorcery and Witchcraft in Amazonia. Richard, Nelly (2004) The Insubordination of Signs: Political Change, Cultural Transformation and Poetics of the Crisis Richard, Nelly (2004) Masculine/Feminine: Practices of Difference Steven Palmer and Ivan Molina (eds) (2004). The Costa Rica Reader: History, Culture, Politics.     

Security culture,transnational challenges and the Economic Community of West African States

This special issue explores how one particular regional organisation, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has defined certain transnational issues as security threats and how it has addressed them. In this introductory article, we begin by providing an overview and analysis of some of the most important transnational security challenges facing West Africa. Specifically, we discuss some of the problems raised by cross-border insurgencies, health challenges, organised criminal activities, terrorism and environmental degradation. We then examine the different levels at which actors have responded to these challenges. The section ‘Security culture: shaping the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) response?’ sets out our approach to thinking about the concept of security culture and asks whether it might be relevant to understanding how and why ECOWAS has focused on responding to certain transnational security challenges and not to others. The final section provides an overview of the other articles in this issue.     

Good governance as a precondition for subsidiarity: human rights litigation in Nigeria and ECOWAS

ABSTRACT

Similar to the European Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) evolved gradually from little more than a customs union to a supranational organisation with sophisticated governance arrangements. As a consequence, subsidiarity has become an inevitable adjustment mechanism to align individual member state policies with objectives of the Community as a whole. In particular, since the inclusion of a protocol on good governance and democracy in 2001 an increasing number of policy areas require a delineation of competencies between state and Community organs. Moreover, the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice confines itself to the vertical application of human rights law and does not accept human rights claims against private persons since the extension of its mandate in 2005. Many cases involving the Federal Republic of Nigeria illustrate well a double procedural effect of the principle of subsidiarity in the human rights litigation within the ECOWAS legal order.     

The Age of Catastrophe: A History of the West, 1914–1945

The Age of Catastrophe: A History of the West, 1914–1945. By Heinrich August Winkler, translated by Stewart Spencer (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), originally Geschichte des Westens: Die Zeit der Weltkriege (Munich: Beck Verlag, 2011), pp. xiii + 998. AU$114.00 (cloth), available in Australia through Footprint Books.     

Competition and Coalescence in European Party Systems: Social Democracy and Christian Democracy Moving into the 21st Century

Party systems in Europe have been in transition since the 1990s. New parties have emerged and appear more successful in gaining representation in parliament and government than before. Conversely the established party families in many postwar West European party systems ‐ Social Democracy and Christian Democracy in particular ‐ seem to have lost ground. We argue that an ideological convergence is developing between these two party families towards the ‘centre of gravity’ of their respective party systems. This may help to explain why ‘new’ parties of the Left and the Right have competed more successfully since the 1990s: they have bypassed Social and Christian Democratic parties in terms of both Left/Right and Progressive/Conservative dimensions and differences. These developments are explored by analysing party programmes. It appears that many Social and Christian Democratic parties are indeed often moving closer to each other. In fact, we conclude that being in the centre of a party system or in government is hardly an electoral asset any more in most West European polities.     

Book Reviews

Book reviewed in this article: BECKER, Uwe and Herman M. SCHWARTZ (eds.)(2005). Employment ‘Miracles’. A Critical Comparison of the Dutch, Scandinavian, Swiss, Australian and Irish Cases versus Germany and the US. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 287 pages. CHABAL, Patrick and Jean‐Pascal DALOZ (2006). Culture Troubles. Politics and the Interpretation of Meaning. London: Hurst & Company, 395 pages. KOOPMANS, Ruud, Paul STATHAM, Marco GIUGNI and Florence PASSY (2005). Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 312 pages. OBINGER, Herbert, Stephan LEIBFRIED and Francis G. CASTLES (eds.) (2005). Federalism and the Welfare State. New World and European Experiences. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 380 pages.     

Some recent additions to the library

Richard Calland &; Paul Graham (Eds), IDASA's Democracy Index — Democracy in the Time of Mbeki, Cape Town: Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), Cape Town, 2005, R150, 252 pages.

Pieter Wolvaardt, A Diplomat's Story: Apartheid and Beyond, 1969–1998, South Africa: Galago Publishing, 2005. ISBN 1–919854–15–0, R225, 336 pages.

Greg Mills, The Security Intersection: The Paradox of Power in an Age of Terror, Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2005, 321 pages.

Hugh Pope, Sons of the Conquerors. The Rise of the Turkic World, New York: Overlook Duckworth, 2005. ISBN 1–58567–641–1. 413 pages.     

Popular Reactions to State Repression: Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe

In May 2005, the government of Zimbabwe launched Operation Murambatsvina(OM), a state-sponsored campaign to stifle independent economicand political activity in the country’s urban areas. Thisarticle employs a national probability sample survey to analysethe popular reactions of ordinary Zimbabweans to this landmarkevent. It shows that the application of state repression succeedsat some goals, fails at others, and has powerful unintendedeffects. We report that the scope of OM was wide and that themain victims of OM were younger, unemployed families whom statesecurity agents saw as potential recruits for social unrest.Whereas OM undoubtedly disrupted the informal economy, we showthat it did not succeed in banishing urban dwellers to ruralareas or permanently shutting down illicit trade. Moreover,the crackdown thoroughly discredited the police and other stateinstitutions. We also demonstrate that state repression emboldenedits victims, deepening polarisation between political partiesand fortifying the ranks of Zimbabwe’s opposition movement. ^1. Disturbing accounts of the human toll are given by the CatholicCommission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, Breaking the Silence,Building True Peace: A report on the disturbances in Matabelelandand the Midlands, 1980 to 1988 (Legal Resources Foundation,Harare, 1997) and Richard Werbner, Tears of the Dead (EdinburghUniversity Press, Edinburgh, 1991). On systematic electoralviolence, see Norma Kriger, ‘ZANU-PF strategies in generalelections, 1980–2000: discourse and coercion’, AfricanAffairs 104 (2005), pp. 1–34. On the violence associatedwith land invasions and crackdowns on journalists, see StephenChan, Robert Mugabe: A life of power and violence (I.B. Taurus,London, 2003) and Andrew Meldrum, Where We Have Hope: A memoirof Zimbabwe (Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 2004). ^2. For an insightful collection of current analyses by a varietyof Zimbabwean commentators, see David Harold-Berry (ed.), Zimbabwe:The past is the future (Weaver Press, Harare, 2004). ^3. ‘Zimbabwe police target minibuses’, BBC News, 24May 2005. ^4. The Joint Operations Command - comprised of army, police, prisons,and intelligence heads - coordinates military and security affairsand, on these matters, now carries greater policy weight thanthe civilian cabinet. A senior state intelligence officer wasquoted as saying that ‘the operation is meant to reducethe number of people in the central business district so that,if violence erupts, it would be easy to contain.’ ZimOnline (South Africa) www.zimonline.co.za, 24 May 2005. JournalistBaffour Ankomah, usually sympathetic to Mugabe, also reportedthat ‘the operation was the brainchild of Zimbabwe’sintelligence community’ designed to forestall ‘aUkrainian-style revolution’ New African (London), October2005, reprinted in The Herald (Harare), 4–5 October 2005. ^5. Government of Zimbabwe, ‘Response of the Government ofZimbabwe to the Report by the UN Special Envoy on OperationMurambatsvina/Restore Order’ (Harare, 2005). ^6. ‘Rallying cry belies Mugabe’s fear of voter revolt’,The Times (UK), 31 March 2005. ^7. Compared to the 2000 parliamentary election, ZANU-PF’sshare of elected seats rose from 62 to 78, and the MDC’sshare fell from 57 to 41. With the support of an additional30 appointed MPs in the 150-seat House, ZANU-PF therefore enjoyeda two-thirds majority, enough to change the constitution. ^8. Zimbabwe Election Support Network, ‘Statement on the 2005parliamentary elections’, Harare, 3 April 2005. See alsoCarole Andrews and Bryn Morgan, ‘Zimbabwe after the 2005parliamentary elections’, Research Paper No. 05/58 (UKHouse of Commons Library, London, August 2005). ^9. ‘Police in Zimbabwe arrest 9000 traders’, Guardian(UK), 24 May 2005. ^10. ‘Zimbabwe government continues blitz’, AssociatedPress, 5 June 2005. ^11. ‘U.N. condemns Zimbabwe for bulldozing urban slums,’New York Times, 23 July 2005. ^12. United Nations, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabweto Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina bythe UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe,Mrs. Anna Tibaijuka (United Nations, New York, 18 July 2005),p. 7. ^13. ‘UN chief Annan’s statement on Zimbabwe demolitions’,Reuters, 22 July 2005. ^14. ‘Zimbabwe steams ahead with demolitions’, Mail andGuardian (SA), 26 July 2005. ^15. See ‘UN envoy says Zimbabwe’s crisis is deepening’,Business Day (SA), 7 December 2005 and ‘New threat ofurban demolition’, IRIN - Integrated Regional InformationNetworks (UN), 7 April 2006. ^16. For information on country coverage and research methods, seewww.afrobarometer.org. ^17. The sampling frame was the Government of Zimbabwe, Central StatisticalOffice, Census 2000 Zimbabwe: Preliminary results summary (GovernmentPrinter, Harare, 2003). In drawing the national probabilitysample, we followed the standard Afrobarometer sampling protocol,which can be found at http://www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html.For ease of access to the present article, we did not burdenthe text with extensive methodological apparatus. If readershave queries about data collection or analysis, they are invitedto visit the website or contact the authors directly. ^18. ‘Zimbabwe takes harsh steps in major cities to counterunrest’, New York Times, 2 June 2005. ^19. Action Aid International/Combined Harare Residents Association,A Study on the Impact of ‘Operation/Murambatsvina/RestoreOrder’ in 26 Wards of Harare High Density Housing Areas(AA/CHRA, Harare, July 2005). ^20. Report of the Fact-Finding Mission (2005), p. 8. ^21. Ibid., p. 34. ^22. ‘Annan may take up Mugabe invite’, The Scotsman(UK), 26 July 2005. ^23. ‘Mugabe hoping to sidestep Mbeki and Annan’, SundayIndependent (SA), 24 July 2005. Zimbabwe’s Ambassadorto the UN also branded the report ‘exaggerated’,BBC News, 27 July 2005. ^24. The margin of sampling error for a survey with 1048 respondentsis plus or minus 3 percentage points at a 95 percent level ofconfidence. The confidence interval around the point estimateof 54 percent for OM victimization is therefore between 51 and57 percent. This result almost exactly replicates the findingof an earlier survey conducted by the Mass Public Opinion Institute.Based on a national probability sample of similar size (n =1041) and using the same question, MPOI found in July-August2005 that 55 percent of respondents reported that they or theirimmediate families were affected. See Eldred Masunungure andAnyway Ndapadzwa, Zimbabwe Elections, 2005: Post-Parliamentarysurvey report (MPOI, Harare, August 2005). ^25. Census 2002, p.1. ^26. This guesstimate is conservative compared to the Reserve Bankof Zimbabwe’s claim of 3.4 million Zimbabweans livingabroad in 2004 (www.homelinkzimbabwe.com) and various journalisticaccounts of 3 million or more, for example by Geoff Hill, WhatHappens After Mugabe? (Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2005), p. 2. ^27. The World Bank’s African Development Indicators says 43percent are under age 14 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004),p. 309. ^28. Or, taking sampling error into account, between 2.55 and 2.85million. ^29. Survey respondents may have used an especially broad subjectivedefinition when defining an OM victim as a member of their ‘immediatefamily’. There is also a small risk that some victimswere double-counted as members of more than one respondent’sextended family. Either way, we doubt that we have undercounted. ^30. Squatter settlements were unapproved, but many of them had existingcourt judgments that prevented the government from removingthem without providing alternative accommodation. Some shacksin urban areas even had planning permission. ^31. ‘Msika officially launches operation Garikai’, TheHerald (Harare), 30 June 2005. Also ‘Zimbabwe: operationlive well struggles to take off’, IRIN - Integrated RegionalInformation Networks (UN), 19 August 2005. ^32. In Zimbabwe, as in other African countries, young and unemployedpeople are least likely to vote. ^33. Mass Public Opinion Institute, Zimbabwe Elections, 2005 (MPOI,Harare, 2005) p. iii. ^34. Note: the percentage figures should be treated with cautionas the number of cases is small (n = 56). ^35. Sixty percent of these respondents were urban versus 34 percentrural. ^36. 35 percent among the former versus 37 percent among the latter. ^37. 41 percent among the random sample of adults, 45 percent amongdisplaced persons. ^38. For 2004 estimates of institutional trust, see Michael Bratton,Annie Chikwana, and Tulani Sithole, ‘Propaganda and publicopinion in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Contemporary AfricanStudies 23, 1 (2005), pp. 77–108. ^39. According to an official report, ‘Police had been approachedby local authorities to help in enforcing Council by-laws, whichwere being ignored . . . (and) to relocate street kids, vagrants,touts and vendors who were causing chaos in town.’ ZimbabweRepublic Police, ‘Zimbabwe Republic Police response toallegations of deaths suffered during Operation Murambatsvina/RestoreOrder’, (Harare, August 2005). ^40. This slight adjustment lies within the margin of sampling errorfor a single survey. ^41. Pearson’s r = 0.271, p < 0.001. ^42. By 9 percentage points: 71 percent for OM victims versus 80percent for non-victims. ^43. ‘Price of basics soars beyond reach of poor Zimbabweans’,Mail and Guardian (South Africa), 20 March 2006. ^44. Pearson’s r = 0.962, p < 0.001. Indeed, these indicatorsare so closely correlated that either could act as a proxy forthe other. ^45. The proportion of MDC supporters who said they did not trustthe ruling party ‘at all’ rose from 49 percent inApril 2004 to 62 percent in October 2005. ^46. Although the results of the bye-election of May 2006 in Budirirosuggest the mainstream MDC headed by Morgan Tsvangirai has littleto fear from the breakaway MDC faction led by Arthur Mutambara. ^47. See International Crisis Group, ‘Post-election Zimbabwe:What next?’ Africa Report No. 93 http://www.crisisgroup.org(7 June, 2005). ^48. Eldred, Masunungure, Anyway Ndapwadza, and Noma Sibanda, ‘Supportfor democracy and democratic institutions in Zimbabwe’,Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 27 http://www.afrobarometer.org(March 2006). ^49. International Crisis Group, ‘Zimbabwe’s operationMurambatsvina: the tipping point?’ Africa Report No. 97,p. 4 http://www.crisisgroup.org (17 August, 2005). ^50. ‘African leaders break silence over Mugabe’s humanrights abuses’, The Guardian (UK), 4 January 2006.     

Hybrid Hegemonic Masculinity of the EU before and after the Arab Spring: A Gender Analysis of Euro-Mediterranean Security Relations

In the academic literature on EU–southern Mediterranean relations, a focal point of neglect has been the gendered dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations. This article argues that the Euro-Mediterranean space has been formed within the gendered global West/non-West relations with the purpose of promoting the West's security interests. Euro-Mediterranean security relations, thus, embody a gendered power hierarchy between the hybrid hegemonic masculinity of the EU (bourgeois-rational and citizen-warrior) and the subordinate (both feminized and hypermasculinized) southern neighbourhood. In addition, it shows that following the Arab Spring the EU has been determined to maintain the status quo by reconstructing these gendered power relations. This gender analysis contributes to the literature on Euro-Mediterranean relations through its specific focus on the (re)construction processes of gendered identities within the West/non-West context in tandem with the EU's competing notions of security.     

Engaging the issues

From the editors: In 2005 Monthly Review Press (New York) published a book entitled China and Socialism: Market Reforms and Class Struggle, written by Martin Hart-Landsberg (a coeditor of Critical Asian Studies) and Paul Burkett. (The content of the book had appeared earlier, in the July-August 2004 issue of Monthly Review [vol. 56, no. 3].) We invited the editors of Critical Asian Studies to participate in a roundtable discussion of the issues that Hart-Landsberg and Burkett have raised. Responses from CAS editors Victor Lippit, Gene Cooper, Alvin So, Mobo C.F. Gao, and Tai-lok Lui appear in the September 2005 issue of the journal (vol. 37, no. 3). A rejoinder by Hart-Landsberg and Burkett is presented here.     

Book Reviews

Books reviewed in this issue.
R eview E ssay : T he A rmenian Q uestion *
Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuştur: Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Savaş Yıllarında Ermenilere Yönelik Politikalar [The Armenian Question Resolved: Policies Toward the Armenians in the War Years according to Ottoman Documents]¹ By Taner Akçam.
Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations , by Avi Shlaim.
Oman: Politics and Society in the Qaboos State , by Marc Valeri.
Images of the Prophet: Narratives of the Prophet of Islam across the Centuries , by Tarif Khalidi.
The Arabs, A History , by Eugene Rogan.
Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam and the West , by Christopher Caldwell.
Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power and Performance in Yemen , by Lisa Wedeen.