What Is The Wrong Of Wrongful Disability? From Chance To Choice To Harms To Persons

The issue of wrongful disability arises when parents face the choice whether to produce a child whose life will be unavoidably flawed by a serious disease or disorder (Down syndrome, for example, or Huntington’s disease) yet clearly worth living. The authors of From Chance to Choice claim, with certain restrictions, that the choice to produce such a child is morally wrong. They then argue that an intuitive moral approach––a “person-affecting” approach that pins wrongdoing to the harming of some existing or future person––cannot account for that wrong since the choice to produce such a child cannot, under the logic of the nonidentity problem, harm that child. The authors propose that we supplement the person-affecting approach with an “impersonal” principle that takes the form of their well-known principle N. In this paper, I argue that the authors are mistaken to suppose that a plausibly articulated person-affecting approach cannot account for the wrong of wrongful disability. We can retain an intuitive, comparative, “worse for” account of harm and still identify serious harms imposed by the choice of wrongful disability. In particular, I argue that harm, both to the impaired child and to others, comes not in the form of that procreative choice’s procreative effect but rather in the form of its many distributive effects. I also argue that the rare, residual case in which a person-affecting approach would approve of the choice of wrongful disability does not function as a counterexample to that approach. As a separate matter, I address legal claims for wrongful disability, which are closely akin to claims for wrongful life. The legal claim is brought by the impaired child, not against the parents, but rather against health care providers whose negligent failure to diagnose or inform parents of an increased risk of a genetic or congenital impairment results in the birth of the impaired child. The authors’ treatment of the moral wrong that is done as impersonal in nature suggests that courts are correct to dismiss any such claim. Once we identify harm, however, the person-affecting approach can identify a clear foundation in the law for the wrongful disability claim.     

The Uncertainties in the Rule in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Re Hasting</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Bass</Emphasis>

Writing extra-judicially, Sir Robert Walker once commented that ‘the decision in Re Hastings-Bass must be seen in its judicial context. It cannot be regarded as giving a “carte blanche” excuse to every body of trustees who have made a mistake. The law on the issue now stands in a state of some uncertainty’ (Walker, The limits of the principle in Re Hastings-Bass, P.C.B 226, 2002). There is no doubt in the minds of most commentators and, indeed those persons seeking to invoke the rule in Re Hastings-Bass on behalf of their clients, that much clarification is needed as to the proper scope of the rule. Recent judicial trends suggest that, not only is the rule in Hastings-Bass being applied at such an unprecedented rate with very little scrutiny from a court beyond that of the High Court, it is also showing signs of plaguing the wider fiduciary community. As the opportunity for the Court of Appeal, and indeed the Supreme Court, to exercise some judicial scrutiny of the rule may not be that far away, this article highlights some of the present uncertainties with the rule in Re Hastings-Bass.     

案例指导制度的域外经验

英美法判例制度主要有两个作用：一是参考作用，一是约束作用。参考作用，是指如果法院认为一个判例的判决原则或法律理念是正确的，法官在审判时可以适用这个案例。而约束作用，是指如果法院认为一个判例是错误的，但按照法律的规定，该判例对法院有约束力，那么，法院即使认为这个判例是错误的，仍要遵从这个案例。     

Ameron International: Expanding Insurance Recovery for Administrative Environmental Proceedings

In Ameron Int'l Corp. v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, the California Supreme Court issued its long-awaited reconsideration of Foster-Gardner v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. which adopted the minority position that administrative notice letters are not “suits” that trigger a CGL insurer's duty to defend. In an important development for insurers and policyholders alike, Ameron limited Foster-Gardner, holding that an administrative process that resembles a court proceeding is a “suit” insurers must defend. This article surveys the majority rule, Ameron, and Ameron's possible impact in minority rule jurisdictions with Foster-Gardner-like precedent.     

Caution in the Classroom: K-12 Teacher In-Class Speech,The Federal Courts and Garcetti

The federal courts’ approach to regulating K-12 public school teacher speech in the classroom has been split during the past twenty years. Some circuit courts use Pickering v. Board of Education, in which speech is examined to see if it touches on a matter of public concern. Others prefer Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, which focuses on whether speech is school-sponsored and whether the school had a legitimate reason for restricting it. In 2007, Garcetti v. Ceballos offered a new perspective on public employee speech. In that case, speech was examined to determine whether it was related to an employee's professional duties. An examination of federal court treatment of in-class teacher speech before and after Garcetti shows the case has further complicated the issue because it is being embraced by some federal courts as an appropriate precedent when dealing with classroom speech.     

Securities laws ‘facilitating’ private enforcement

La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (J Financ 61:1–32, 2006) (LLS) have undertaken an empirical analysis, making a critical but somewhat provocative proposition that “securities laws ‘facilitating’ private enforcement, rather than providing for public enforcement, benefit the securities market.” After briefly providing a theoretical connection to the existing law and economics literature, I attempt to empirically advance this LLS proposition two-fold, particularly on the ‘joint use of regulation and the liability rule,’ by exploring the most meaningful word ‘facilitate’ therein. Firstly, I explore the cross-country LLS data associated with the specific case of an initial public offering to seek possibly more solid evidence on the facilitating effect. Secondly, motivated by LLS, I pursue a within-country positive analysis, regarding the major determinants of the joint use, but across overall harmful activities covered in the Korean Securities Law. The major tenet underscoring this second empirical exploration was the clear message from the existing theoretical literature that the joint use should be adopted in a selective manner even within a single substantive statute, because it usually governs vastly different harmful activities. Finally, I call for some essential research agenda, prior to approving the ineffectiveness of public enforcement claimed in the second part of the LLS proposition.

Sharing a Single Seat: The Poetics and Politics of Male Intimacy in the Vikramāṅkakāvya

In this essay, I trace the enabling conditions for the major statement of the subversive subtext in Bilhaṇa’s Vikramāṅkadevacarita (VDC) by unpacking the operation of the work’s patent, eulogistic text. In particular, I will explore the place given to the depiction of male intimacy as a poetic substitute or simulacrum for the political alliances central to Vikramāditya’s coming to the throne, as described in the mahākāvya’s fourth through sixth sargas. My intention in focusing on the intense friendships between men is to highlight a significant rhetorical strategy of Bilhaṇa’s, which allowed the poet both to introduce and to buffer the poem’s most explicit statement of his skepticism towards royal power. It is this charged affective theme—one that occupied only a tenuous position within the regnant critical discourse of literary emotion at the time—that sets up Bilhaṇa’s most powerful and explicit denunciation of kingship. The explicit theme of royal praise and the subtext of its denunciation can thus be seen as contrapuntally related, which goes some way towards explaining how the court poet was able to successfully carry off his potentially incendiary literary project.     

Breaking the Circle. Dharmakīrti’s Response to the Charge of Circularity Against the Apoha Theory and its Tibetan Adaptation

This paper examines the Buddhist’s answer to one of the most famous (and more intuitive) objections against the semantic theory of “exclusion” (apoha), namely, the charge of circularity. If the understanding of X is not reached positively, but X is understood via the exclusion of non-X, the Buddhist nominalist is facing a problem of circularity, for the understanding of X would depend on that of non-X, which, in turn, depends on that of X. I distinguish in this paper two strategies aiming at “breaking the circle”: (i) conceding the precedence of a positive understanding of X, from which a negative understanding (i.e., the understanding of “non-X”) is derived by contrast, and (ii) denying any precedence by proposing a simultaneous understanding of both X and non-X. I consider how these two options are articulated respectively by Dharmakīrti in his Pramāṇavārttika cum Svavṛtti and by one of his Tibetan interpreters, Sa skya Paṇḍita, and examine the requirements for their workability. I suggest that Sa skya Paṇḍita’s motivation to opt for an alternative solution has to do with his criticism of notions shared by his Tibetan predecessors, an outline of which is given in Appendix 1. In Appendix 2, I present the surprising use of the charge of circularity by an early Tibetan logician against his coreligionists.     

The emergence of the rule of law in Russia

This paper challenges an empirical claim about the commercial courts (arbitrazhnye sudy) made by Kathryn Hendley and her co-authors in their paper “Law, Relationships and Private Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russian Enterprise” in Vol. 52, No. 4, Europe-Asia Studies in 2000. Basing their case on a quantitative survey of Russian firms, they conclude that economic actors in the 1990s relied on ‘the law and legal institutions’ because the commercial courts were relatively effective. In order to test this claim about the link between individual behaviour and the judiciary, I ask: What type of belief about corruption was held by Russian economic actors who trusted the commercial courts for conflict resolution at the end of the 1990s? The data set is drawn from a survey of 227 Russian firms made in 1997. I use self-reported data on economic actors’ preference for using or not using the commercial court (in case of a hypothetical conflict about a considerable amount of money) as a proxy for trust. A binary logistic regression model shows that economic actors who accepted corruption as a fact of life at the time of market entry were three times more likely to trust the commercial courts for conflict resolution than economic actors who rejected corruption. This finding contradicts any reasonable definition of the rule of law and suggests that the neo-liberal reformers should have paid more attention to the content – rather than merely to the speed – of reform.     

The Legal Analog of the Principle of Bivalence

The principle of bivalence is the assertion that every statement is either true or else false. Its legal analog, however, must be formulated relative to particular legal systems and in terms of validity rather than truth. It asserts that every statement of law that can be formulated in the vocabulary of a given legal system is valid (correct) or else invalid (incorrect) in that system. A line of New York cases is traced, beginning with Thomas v. Winchester (1852). This case, which involved a poison mislabeled as a medicine, established an exception to the rule that a manufacturer or supplier is never liable for negligence to a remote purchaser. The court made an exception because a poison is an “imminently dangerous” thing. How far may this exception be applied to other fact‐situations? Some subsequent cases are examined, and it is considered whether there is no correct answer in these instances and, more dramatically, whether more than one correct answer is tenable. In either event the legal analog of bivalence would seem to fail.     

Politics of Law and the Lacanian Real

The paper explores the role of Jacques Lacan’s Ethics of Psychoanalysis in debates in law and legal philosophy. It proceeds by considering a debate between Slavoj Žižek and Judith Butler over Lacan’s concept of the real, which forms part of a larger discussion over the future of democracy and the rule of law (Butler et al. 2000). Through reference to discussions of the relationship between law and ethics based on the Antigone tragedy, I argue that the difference between Žižek and Butler’s positions should not be understood in terms of the correctness of their reading of Lacan, but in terms of the political commitments that inform their respective interpretations. I explain the implications of this debate over one of Lacan’s most enigmatic concepts, thereby showing how Lacan’s theory can be used to rethink the politics of law in light of the increased emphasis on ethics in contemporary legal debates.     

Out on a Limb: Appointing a Parenting Coordinator with Decision‐Making Authority in the Absence of a Statute or Rule

This Article addresses the issue of whether a court may appoint a Parenting Coordinator (PC) with decision‐making authority in the absence of a statute or court rule. The Article identifies possible sources of authority for the appointment of a PC with decision‐making authority in a state with no authorizing statute or court rule. It also provides a paradigm for constructing an appointment that allows for the benefits of Parenting Coordination but does not delegate decision‐making authority to an extent that it would constitute an impermissible delegation of judicial authority.

Key Points for the Family Court Community:
• Where a court seeks to appoint a PC with decision‐making authority in the absence of an authorizing statute or court rule, the court may find some authority allowing the appointment in (1) its equitable authority over child custody and visitation, (2) its authority to enforce its own orders, or (3) its authority to appoint other extrajudicial assistants such as a special master or mediator.
• Where a court seeks to appoint a PC with decision‐making authority in the absence of an authorizing statute or court rule, the court must craft an appointment that delegates enough decision‐making authority to the PC for parenting coordination to be effective yet, at the same time, not so much decision‐making authority as to render the appointment an impermissible delegation of a judicial function, specifically:
  • The PC's role should be limited to assisting the parties in implementing custody and visitation terms already decreed by the trial court.
  • A PC should be appointed only if the parties to the divorce consent to the appointment or if the trial court makes a finding that the case is a high‐conflict case.
  • The parties must have the opportunity for the trial court to meaningfully review any decision of the PC so that the trial court retains ultimate decision‐making authority.

     

The Structure of Conflicts of Fundamental Legal Rights

In recent years, the most widespread doctrine about the conflicts between fundamental (usually constitutional) legal rights could be summarized in the following three main theses: (1) The elements in conflict are legal principles, as opposed to legal rules; (2) Those conflicts are not consequences of the existence of inconsistencies or antinomies between the norms involved, but rather depend on the empirical circumstances of the case. In other words, the norms are logically consistent and the conflicts are not determinable a priori or in abstracto, but only in concreto; and (3) The classical criteria for solving conflicts between norms, such as lex superior, lex posterior and lex specialis, are not suitable to solve conflicts among fundamental legal rights. Indeed, they require a specific method known as ‘weighing and balancing’. Although all three theses could be (and indeed have been) regarded as problematic, in this paper I address mainly the second one. I try to show that there is room for a tertium genus between antinomies (deontic inconsistencies) and conflicts caused by strict empirical circumstances that I call ‘contextual antinomies’. There are situations in which the norms involved are not inconsistent but the conflict arises for logical reasons. My thesis is that many conflicts between fundamental legal rights fall in this category. I offer, in an appendix, a proposal of formalization of this kind of conflict and the elements involved in it.     

Monks Who Have Sex: Pārājika Penance in Indian Buddhist Monasticisms

In the study of Buddhism it is commonly accepted that a monk or nun who commits a pārājika offence is permanently and irrevocably expelled from the Buddhist monastic order. This view is based primarily on readings of the Pāli Vinaya. With the exception of the Pāli Vinaya, however, all other extant Buddhist monastic law codes (Dharmaguptaka, Mahāsāṅghika, Mahīśāsaka, Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda) contain detailed provisions for monks and nuns who commit pārājikas but nevertheless wish to remain within the saṅgha. These monastics are not expelled. Rather, they are granted a special status known as the śikṣādattaka. In this paper I explore the rules. concerning pārājika penance and the śikṣādattaka with specific regard to monastic celibacy. Given that five out of six extant law codes recognise this remarkable accommodation to the rule of celibacy, I argue that we must look to Vinayas other than the Pāli Vinaya if we are to arrive at a nuanced and representative view of Indian Buddhist monasticism.

Grant me chastity and continence, but not yet. Augustine of Hippo (354–430 C.E.)

     

Law,Fact and Narratives in Ancient Rhetoric: The Case of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">causa Curiana</Emphasis>

The present article examines the role of narratives in rhetoric and jurisprudence, trying to understand the ancient system of ‘issues’ (staseis), an essential part of the rhetorical curriculum in antiquity, with the help of some basic notions of legal semiotics. After a brief reconstruction of the doctrine, I argue that narratives are essential to classical rhetoric, that the basic types of issues correspond to particular stories in and of the trial, and finally that the system of ancient rhetorical theory is capable of giving an account of the narrativisation of the pragmatics of the trial. Then I turn to a cause célèbre of Roman law, the causa Curiana, trying to show that not only the trial itself but also subsequent (ancient and modern) debates concerning the case were shaped by some grand narratives, and that stories about the trial are likely to return to the court, where they may become part of the story of the trial.     

The Rule in Cradock v. Piper (1850): Exception or Principle

In Cradock v. Piper (1850) the court allowed a solicitor-trustee to charge for his professional services in relation to certain litigation This was in the absence of a charging clause, and in apparent violation of a strict and general principle of the law of trusts that trustees had to act without remuneration. The rule still exists today, though it is invariably described as anomalous and lacking any rational basis.This paper examines whether the court did indeed establish an exception to the general no-remuneration rule, or whether it applied legal principle correctly The analysis of the court's judgment, of case law, and of contemporary attitudes to professional trustees, shows that the court was correct in refusing to prohibit remuneration where the connection was too tenuous to give rise to a conflict of interest.     

为判例制度正名——关于构建我国判例制度的思考

我国当前并无明确的判例制度,但实际上存在着＂近似判例制度＂,如案件请示批复制度是有实无名的判例制度,案例选编公告制度是心照不宣的判例制度,案例指导制度是欲言又止的判例制度,这些制度有诸多不足。随着社会的发展和司法实践的需要,我国应当建立判例制度。建立判例制度有利于维护法律的稳定性,树立法律的权威;有利于矫正我国的近似判例制度,树立司法的权威;有利于提高我国个案审判和判决书的质量,树立法官的威望。我国构建判例制度的基本思路应当是,使判例制度与法律方法相结合,使判例制度与司法解释制度相结合。我国应当构建一个由最高人民法院和审案的人民法院共同制作判例、由最高人民法院发布判例的判例制度,这是构建我国判例制度的关键。     

Recidivism Outcomes for Suburban Mental Health Court Defendants

Mental health courts have recently emerged as one means to reduce the number of persons with mental illness in the criminal justice system. Using a post-test only comparison group design, this study examined rearrest rates for 1 year post discharge among three groups meeting admission criteria for a municipal mental health court. The rearrest rate of defendants who successfully completed the program (N = 351) was 14.5%, compared to 38% among defendants negatively terminated from the program (N = 137), and 25.8% among defendants who chose not to participate (N = 89). This positive result held even when controlling for a range of variables in a Cox regression survival analysis. Factors associated with rearrest are identified for each of the three groups.