Militarism and Terrorism: The Deadly Cycle

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, destined to strongly influence world politics well into the 21st century, can be understood as part of a larger dialectic linking US militarism and what has become global terrorism. This destructive cycle is likely to deepen as elements of American superpower hegemony--economic, political, cultural and military--become more consolidated, and as the USA continues to pursue its unprecedented and ill-defined war against terrorism. The goal of US ruling elites is to make the world increasingly accessible to capital investment, free trade and corporate domination while simultaneously closing off viable alternatives to the neoliberal New World Order. Here terrorism in its different manifestations amounts to both a striking back at US empire--what might be seen as an especially virulent form of blowback--and the unintended relegitimation of this empire as it helps to bolster the war economy and security state. One of the debilitating consequences of the militarism-terrorism cycle is a further closing off of political discourse in the US in the midst of a resurgent national chauvinism, ideological conformism and militarised culture.     

Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model

Terrorism in general, and suicidal terrorism in particular, is popularly seen as “irrational,” but many economists and political scientists argue otherwise. This paper distinguishes three different senses of irrationality: unresponsiveness to incentives, deviation from narrow self-interest, and failure of rational expectations. It concludes that an intermediate position on the rationality of terrorism is appropriate. The typical terrorist sympathizer deviates only slightly from homo economicus. But active terrorists arguably stray from narrow self-interest and rational expectations, and suicidal terrorists probably violate both. Deterrence remains a viable anti-terrorism strategy, but deviations from rational expectations increase the potential of persuasion and appeasement.     

Political Marketing and Propaganda: Uses,Abuses, Misuses

Although previous issues of well-respected marketing journals (e.g., Revue Française du Marketing, Psychology & Marketing, Journal of Marketing Management, European Journal of Marketing) have focused on political marketing, and although there are now journals which regularly publish papers on political marketing including, of course, this one and the Journal of Public Affairs, none has focused exclusively on how the techniques developed for use in electoral and governmental campaigning, in lobbying and party fundraising campaigns, are now being used more generally in the military, in public diplomacy programs, and by companies, not-for-profit organizations, and even terrorist groups, with a focus on “winning hearts and minds.” The aim of this special issue is to seek to fill in this gap in our knowledge and encourage further research into the political marketing/propaganda interface. In this special issue, we seek to elucidate the meaning of propaganda and political marketing by exploring their parameters, both contemporary and traditional.     

Election Laws,Mobilization, and Turnout: The Unanticipated Consequences of Election Reform

State governments have experimented with a variety of election laws to make voting more convenient and increase turnout. The impacts of these reforms vary in surprising ways, providing insight into the mechanisms by which states can encourage or reduce turnout. Our theory focuses on mobilization and distinguishes between the direct and indirect effects of election laws. We conduct both aggregate and individual‐level statistical analyses of voter turnout in the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections. The results show that Election Day registration has a consistently positive effect on turnout, whereas the most popular reform—early voting—is actually associated with lower turnout when it is implemented by itself. We propose that early voting has created negative unanticipated consequences by reducing the civic significance of elections for individuals and altering the incentives for political campaigns to invest in mobilization.     

The politics of warning: Terrorism and risk communication

The problem of risk communication in the context of imperfect intelligence regarding a prospective, rather than actual, terrorist attack is examined in order to assess recommendations for precise guidance for the public. Particular problems are noted with the iterative quality of risk communications about terrorism, as they allow the terrorists to change their behaviour, the difficulty of offering tactical warning without a prior strategic analysis, and the tendency to focus on the vulnerabilities of a society rather than the intent of the terrorists. These issues are assessed through a case study of the Bali attacks of 2002, before an analysis of the American experience following the attacks of 9/11. This experience confirms the difficulties of attempting to convey risks to the public by altering public alert levels.     

Terrorism,Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Learning the Right Lessons

More than a generation ago, in the wake of investigations by the US Congress into improprieties carried out by US intelligence agencies, the United States, in effect, raised the wall between intelligence and law enforcement in order to protect the liberties of Americans. For similar reasons, its Cold War institutions enshrined distinctions between foreign and domestic, and public and private. The CIA was and is, for instance, enjoined from law enforcement and domestic activity.

Those distinctions served the country tolerably well during the Cold War but set it up to fail on September 11. Now, a rethinking of them is underway, as the balance between security and liberty is re-struck. It is imperative, though, to learn the right lessons on September 11. That means thinking carefully and proceeding slowly as changes are made. It also means carefully evaluating the effects of proposed changes, especially to avoid ‘pain for no gain’ measures that do inconvenience people, or even affect their liberties, for little or no gain in the war on terrorism.     

The Virtual War on Terror: Counterterrorism Narratives in Video Games

Over the past decade, a great deal of research has been done to analyze the ways in which popular media, especially movies and television shows, construct fictional terrorist threats. However, little attention has been given to the extremely popular genre of counterterrorism video games and how they fit into the War on Terror media narrative. Counterterrorism video games reflect many of the themes of other media about terrorism, such as the demonization of terrorist enemies and the exaggeration of terrorist threats. However, video games strengthen these themes to make the threat of terrorism appear more pervasive and imminent. Consequently, counterterrorism games display an intensified vision of the War on Terror narrative, in which the entire world is a war zone. This leads game narratives to simulate and justify more extreme state responses to terrorism.     

Terrorism, Airport Security, and the Private Sector

September 11, 2001, led to renewed emphasis on airport security in the United States. Before the tragedy, government policy led to a suboptimal level of security. The fundamental problem was not simply the use of private security firms, but rather the reliance on airline financing and poor Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversight. After 9/11 a federalized security system was put in place. The current system of tightened security is substantially more costly and should be evaluated in terms of its cost-effectiveness compared to a public–private approach.     

Propaganda,PSYOP, and Political Marketing: The Hamas Campaign as a Case in Point

There is really no significant difference between the various forms of mass persuasion methods, though the terminology used may vary. Analyzing basic elements of political marketing and psychological operations (PSYOP)—beyond the basics of audience/message/channel—shows a similarity of techniques and procedures. An analysis of the PSYOP campaign of the Islamic organization Hamas against Israel in the past decade demonstrates that there is a striking similarity between political marketing and PSYOP (formerly known as “propaganda”). This is not mere theoretical hairsplitting; it is an important understanding that democracies should pay careful attention to when they contemplate their survival strategies.     

Introduction: Ideology,Propaganda, and Political Discourse in the Xi Jinping Era

The ideology, propaganda, and political discourse of the Communist Party of China (CPC) have continued to function as key elements of the political system of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the post-Maoist period since 1978. In the first term of the Xi Jinping leadership (2012–2017), the CPC, for instance, elaborated on its guiding ideological concepts, devised inventive ideational framings of phenomena usually perceived as tangible (such as the “New Normal”), engaged in complex intellectual debates on crucial topics (such as “eco-civilization”), intensified and diversified its argumentation patterns and discursive strategies, and consolidated ideational governance over some citizens’ individual values, beliefs, and loyalties. Furthermore, it is often no longer possible to differentiate between the CPC’s internal and external propaganda, as seemingly exclusively domestic ideational and discursive issues increasingly correlate with international phenomena. However, the trends in the Xi era do not present paradigmatic shifts, but rather an overall reassertion-cum-innovation of previous Maoist and post-Maoist uses of ideology, propaganda, and political discourse, primarily aiming at strengthening one-party rule.