The European refugee crisis,party competition,and voters’ responses in Germany

Studies show that globalisation creates political potentials that can transform electoral competition in Western societies. The specific process of how these potentials become effective is not completely understood. It is argued in the article that attention-grabbing events can trigger the transformation of electoral competition as they force actors to take clear positions and thereby allow citizens to align their partisan preferences and policy attitudes. The article analyses the case of German parties’ reaction to the arrival of large numbers of refugees at Europe’s borders in 2015/16. Using panel data that bracket this event, it is shown how German citizens responded to party behaviour by changing partisan preferences on the basis of prior immigration attitudes. The so-called refugee crisis may thus have been a critical juncture transforming party competition in Germany. As such, the crisis represents a striking example of how events may focus attention on a new policy dimension and catalyse the evolution of new cleavages.     

Parallel publics? Support for income redistribution in times of economic crisis

This article investigates the dynamics of support for income redistribution in Europe. With European Social Survey data spanning 2006 to 2012, it assesses whether the Great Recession resulted in substantial parallelism or increasing polarisation in preference change across various sub‐publics. After introducing hypotheses based on claims that social groups are affected differently by economic insecurity, the article proceeds in two empirical sections. First, whereas prior research suggests that hard times fuel diverging attitudinal patterns, it is found that income groups, ideological groups and educational groups did not shift differently over time during the first years of the crisis, thus providing strong evidence for the ‘parallel publics’ hypothesis in the European context and in times of economic turmoil. Next, the article addresses the extent to which change in aggregate support for redistribution came from changes in small minorities of the population, supposed to be more responsive to their economic environment. Using multilevel analysis, it is shown that the most educated significantly contributed to the overall change more than the others. As a result, they may have been partly driving the economic mood during the first years of the Great Recession.     

Population,economy, and society: conflict or convergence in the future of Mexico?

"Probable demographic trends and characteristics from the 1990s to the year 2020 [in Mexico] are presented. Then, some of the main economic and social implications of these trends are explored at the aggregate level. Also, some general considerations are given to the possibilities of convergence or conflict between the future demographic evolution, the needs of an open and free-market-oriented economic development strategy, and some social demands associated, probably, to a less controlled and less predictable political system." (EXCERPT)     

Challenging business as usual? The rise of new parties in Spain in times of crisis

The two-party system in Spain collapsed in the aftermath of the Great Recession with the appearance of two new parties, Podemos and Ciudadanos. How are we to understand the sudden emergence of these new formations? Using 2015 and 2016 post-electoral survey data to map the ideological space and model voting behaviour, it is shown that economic voting is only part of the story. This article contends that the transformations in the Spanish party system are best understood through the prism of the crisis of representation that unfolded alongside the severe economic crisis. It is dissatisfaction with the political system that drives the vote for both new parties. The results also show that a unidimensional ideological structure and a generational divide cut across these critical attitudes. The young and politically dissatisfied are more likely to vote for new parties, each on different sides of the ideological spectrum.     

How do fiscally decentralized federations fare in times of crisis? Insights from Switzerland

This article examines federal dynamics during times of crisis in fiscally decentralized federations using Switzerland as an example. Based on qualitative research, we analyse how the relationship between the federal government and the cantons evolved during the recent ‘Great Recession’ and ensuing financial crisis. We contend that fiscally decentralized structures, as well as the consensus-oriented institutions of the political system, protect the federal balance of power. Our results show that Switzerland indeed adapted well to the crisis of the 2009 economic recession. However, the deficit crisis has revealed challenging coordination problems, notably in the areas of fiscal equalization and corporate taxation, which have the potential to put federal stability under stress. So far, the system has adapted well and safeguarded the federal order. Due to its combination of fiscally decentralized institutions and a strong consensus culture, Switzerland has proven to be a particularly robust federation.     

The Marxian theory of crisis,capital and the state ∗

An interpretation of the Marxian theory of crisis that rejects the ‘Keynesianism’ of most post-war contributions on the topic. Various criticisms of Marx's position are examined and two popular but incorrect versions of the theory are discussed; the underconsumptionist and disproportionality theory of crisis. An attempt is made to begin an analysis of the role of state intervention in the economy and indicate the limitations of intervention by the capitalist state implied by Marx's theory of crisis.     

A crisis of public affairs in Europe?

Public affairs, in relation to European governance system, checks and balances between country interests and public affairs operations at different levels of governance. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Increasingly unequal? The economic crisis,social inequalities and trust in the European Parliament in 20 European countries

The 2008/2009 economic crisis has been identified as an important element contributing to declining trust in institutions in Europe and worldwide. However, it is unclear whether this decline in trust is distributed homogenously among citizens or whether there are differences across social strata. This article applies multilevel models to six waves of European Social Survey (ESS) data to analyse changes in trust in the European Parliament (EP) from 2002 to 2012 in 20 European Union countries. Moreover, it investigates whether individuals with different socioeconomic backgrounds experienced different reductions in trust. The results indicate that trust in the EP declined the most in the peripheral European countries hit hardest by the economic crisis: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Cyprus, Greece and Spain. Furthermore, the results suggest that the decline in trust was more pronounced among subjects with lower social status. The tightening of the link between social and political inequalities is especially preoccupying considering the importance of trust in institutions for citizens to actively participate in society, voice their needs and demand their place at the table. Hence, the worsening economic conditions, combined with declining levels of trust, are not only troublesome for the functioning of democracies as a whole, but they are also problematic at the individual level as they are likely to perpetuate the divide among subjects at different ends of the social ladder.     

Is the EU held accountable for economic performances? Assessing vote and popularity functions before and after membership

The EU has become increasingly responsible for the state of national economies over the last decades. Meanwhile, many observers have claimed that this increased responsibility has not translated into more accountability. In this article, we revisit this literature and analyse vote-popularity functions before and after accession because it provides a situation when the EU is an incumbent and when it is not. Using Eurobarometer surveys from 2001 to 2011, which were carried out in the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, we first show that individuals do not hold the EU accountable for macroeconomic performances before accession, but that they do after accession. Using European Election Studies surveys, we also indicate that the incumbent European Peoples’ Party is held accountable for the state of the economy in countries that are ruled by the EU, but not in countries that have just become EU members.     

Who is the enemy now? Islamophobia and antisemitism among Russian Orthodox nationalists before and after September 11

In this article Verkhovsky focuses on Russian nationalist groups who base their ideology on the Russian Orthodox tradition. These Russian Orthodox nationalists should be distinguished both from those nationalists for whom Orthodoxy is clearly overwhelmed by the ideological demands of ethno-nationalism, as well as from those who use Orthodoxy simply as a popular symbol of national identity. Orthodox nationalists, moreover, are fairly independent of the Moscow Patriarchate and its ideology. The ideology of Orthodox nationalism focuses both on its principal enemy, the Antichrist, and on those enemies subordinate to the Antichrist: Jews, Catholics, the West, the New World Order and so on. In the mid-1990s Islam had no obvious place among this set of hostile forces. The Moscow Patriarchate and moderately nationalist politicians, relying to some extent on Eurasianist ideas, saw the relationship between Orthodoxy and Islam in Russia as a harmonious one, and, on the whole, Orthodox nationalists did not disagree, although individuals occasionally claimed that the Jews, using the West, were setting Islam against Orthodox Russia. The situation began to change during the second Chechen war, when Orthodox nationalists began to issue warnings of an Islamic threat. This was related not only to the situation in former Yugoslavia and in Chechnya, but also to an increase in the immigration of Muslims to ethnically Russian regions of the country. For Orthodox nationalists, this Islamic threat was part of the larger threat coming from the Jews and the West. Islam, they claimed, was being used as a tool by the Antichrist not only because it was a flawed religion, but because it, being less godless than the West, would produce radical Islamism as a synthesis of western technology and eastern passion. In the intense debates that followed in the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001 most Orthodox nationalists in Russia supported adopting a neutral position in the supposed ‘clash of civilizations’ between Islam and the West.     

The Stein Rokkan Lecture 2016 Mission impossible? Reconciling economic and social Europe after the euro crisis and Brexit

During the crisis, the European Union's ‘social deficit’ has triggered an increasing politicisation of redistributive issues within supranational, transnational and national arenas. Various lines of conflict have taken shape, revolving around who questions (who are ‘we’? – i.e., issues of identity and inclusion/exclusion); what questions (how much redistribution within and across the ‘we’ collectivities) and who decides questions (the locus of authority that can produce and guarantee organised solidarity). The key challenge facing today's political leaders is how to ‘glue’ the Union together as a recogniseable and functioning polity. This requires a double rebalancing: between the logic of ‘opening’ and the logic of ‘closure’, on the one hand, and between the logic of ‘economic stability’ and ‘social solidarity’, on the other. Building on the work of Stein Rokkan and Max Weber, this article argues that reconciliation is possible, but only if carefully crafted through an extraordinary mobilisation of political and intellectual resources. A key ingredient should be the establishment of a European Social Union, capable of combining domestic and pan‐European solidarities. In this way, the EU could visibly and tangibly extend its policy menu from regulation to (limited, but effective) distribution, reaping the latter's benefits in terms of legitimacy. The journey on this road is difficult but, pace Rokkan, not entirely impervious.     

Corruption in Ukraine during the Ukrainian–Russian war: A decalogue of policies to combat it

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been a major humanitarian catastrophe. The war in Ukraine has also had serious global consequences. During the war, another of Ukraine's major problems, corruption, was also exposed. In response to these cases, the Ukrainian president has tried to crack down on fraud and corruption. Ukraine is a highly corrupt country, as indicated by the Corruption Perceptions Index. This article outlines Ukraine's corruption problem during the war, and the main forms of corruption, analyzes the country's performance in the Corruption Perceptions Index, and presents a 10-point checklist of measures and policies to combat and end corruption in the short and long term.     

Decentralisation of regional development policies in the Netherlands ‐ A new type of state intervention?

During the past decade, regional development policies in the Netherlands have been dismantled. At the same time, economic development policies have been decentralised to regional and local government level. This has given rise to ‘local initiatives’ for implementing market‐oriented and market‐related development strategies. In the long run, decentralisation of economic policies results in a new type of regulation. It is not through administrative measures and public control that the state intervenes in economic development, but through indirect mechanisms to improve economic growth and innovation. The Keynesian model of regulation, based on far‐reaching intervention, is gradually being transformed into a more ‘modem’ model, characterised by flexible, fragmented, indirect and ‘invisible’ measures. The result is a fundamental change in the relationship between state and economy.     

Old Dogs,New Tricks? The Role of Regional Organizations in the Mediterranean after the Arab Revolts

Taking its point of departure in how specific regional organizations function and interact in the Mediterranean, this article attempts to show to what degree this institutional setup has influenced the developments in the Arab Mediterranean states after the Arab revolts. The analysis of the organizational and institutional setup in the Mediterranean is theoretically founded in the new institutionalism tradition. Furthermore, a regionalism perspective is applied, touching on discussions related to European normative ambitions. It is demonstrated that the regional organizations only to a limited degree have contributed to democratization processes or to democratic consolidation in a post–Arab Spring context, and it is argued that it seems unlikely that these organizations in the future will develop into tools for democratization in the Mediterranean region.     

What matters to citizens in crisis recovery? Being listened to,action, and confidence in government

Policy Sciences - The policy decision-making process in the aftermath of a crisis is a dynamic and iterative process involving circumstances that are emotionally convoluted rather than stable and...     

Muslims,South Asians and the British mainstream: A national identity crisis?

Current popular opinion assumes that Muslims and South Asians in Britain develop anti-mainstream identities because they live in impoverished and segregated ghettos, participate in non-mainstream religions, and politically organise via ethnically and religiously motivated networks. This article uses survey data from the 2003 Home Office Citizenship Survey to challenge each of those points. First, it shows that Muslims and South Asians are almost as likely as whites to identify themselves as British. Second, it argues that discrimination is more important than simple socio-economic difficulties for British identification. In addition, it claims that despite living in ethnically segregated neighbourhoods and retaining ethnic and religious social and political networks, Muslims and South Asians have actively built integrated networks, have trust in mainstream political institutions, and are committed to being a part of the larger British community.