Consenting to Exclude? Empirical Patterns of Democracy and Immigrant Integration Policy

Studies explaining immigrant integration policies commonly focus on single aspects such as right-populist party politics or the immigration legacy of a country. This neglects the overall character of the democratic system within which policy-making unfolds. Research on empirical patterns of democracy, in turn, suggests that consensus democracies pursue ‘kinder and gentler’ policies and outperform majoritarian democracies in terms of minority representation. The article tests whether this conclusion holds for the specific group of immigrant minorities and analyses the relationship between patterns of democracy and immigrant integration policy using a new dataset on empirical democracies in 30 European and North American countries. Simultaneously estimating the character of democratic systems in terms of power dispersion and its effect on integration policies, the analysis reveals a distinct ‘Janus-faced’ pattern: while proportional power dispersion tends to coincide with more inclusive immigrant integration policies, pronounced veto structures tend to foster exclusion.     

Ian Paisley and the Reformed Tradition

This article examines the religious beliefs underlying the political ideology of Ulster's fundamentalist politician, Ian Paisley. Paisley claims to follow the Reformation tradition in both his theology and political beliefs, and cannot be understood without reference to this tradition. Adopting an apocalyptic world view from Reformation Protestants such as Knox, Paisley views the Roman Catholic Church as the Harlot of Babylon condemned in Revelation, and this belief underlies his anti-Catholicism. This world view shapes Paisley's understanding of politics because he follows Knox in believing that the political community has a covenantal relationship to God requiring complete repudiation of Roman Catholic 'idolatry'. Paisley invokes the Scottish covenanting tradition as a model for Protestant political activity in Ulster, advocating resistance against any attempt to show political favour to the Roman Catholic Church.     

The Institutional Basis of Democratic Accountability

This article offers an institutional approach to accountability in representative democracies. Theorising accountability comprises both settled polities with well-entrenched institutions and unsettled polities with weak or contested institutions, and it is argued that agency theory and formal principal–agent models giving priority to compliance and control usually make assumptions that are unlikely to apply to the latter type of polity. An institutional approach challenges principal–agent assumptions regarding what accountability means and implies, what is involved in demanding, rendering, assessing and responding to accounts and assigning accountability, and how accountability institutions work and change. Accountability is related to fundamental issues in democratic politics and the paper treats distributions of information, normative standards of assessment, authority and power relations as endogenous to democratic politics. The paper also holds that institutions affect actors’ identities and roles through socialisation, internalisation and habitualisation, as well as through external incentives. An aspiration is to take a modest step towards understanding areas of application for competing approaches to democratic accountability.     

Public attitudes toward economic conditions and their impact on government behavior

This article reviews extant studies of the impact of economic conditions on government electoral behavior in the Western democracies. Three conclusions are reached: (1) in representative democracies there exists a consistent relationship between the economic situation and citizen evaluation of government; (2) the proposition that governments are interested in achieving their selfish goals in elections fares well compared with the competing proposition that governments are interested in the state of the economy as such; and (3) governments and voters are not the only actors in politico-economic decisions: bureaucracies and interest groups may make government incapable of changing its policies quickly in the face of stiff resistance from this multitude of other actors. Their inclusion in relevant models is a necessary next step in research designed to understand better the functioning of modern democratic societies.This paper was written while the author was at GSIA, Carnegie-Mellon University.     

Valence politics and electoral choice in a new democracy: The case of Taiwan

After two peaceful alternations of political power in a single decade, Taiwan is a democratic success story, demonstrating levels of party competition, turnout rates and patterns of civic engagement similar to those in mature Western democracies. What factors drive electoral choice in Taiwan's new democracy? This paper addresses this question by testing rival models of voting behavior using the Taiwan Elections and Democratization Study (TEDS) 2008 presidential election survey data and the 2010 mayoral election survey data. Analyses show that, similar to their counterparts in mature democracies, Taiwanese voters place more emphasis on the performance of political parties and their leaders in delivering policies designed to address valence issues concerning broadly shared policy goals than on position issues or more general ideological stances that divide the electorate. Findings demonstrating the strength of the valence politics model of electoral choice in Taiwan closely resemble the results of analyses of competing models of voting behavior in Western countries such as Great Britain and the United States.     

Islam,immigration and group recognition 1

Islam generally, and Muslim immigrant communities in particular, have recently been targeted for criticism by Western academics and in popular Western media. This article explores the substance of these criticisms and weighs them against the beliefs and practices of Muslim immigrants in Western liberal democracies. The article addresses three distinct questions. First, what sorts of cultural adaptations is it reasonable for liberal democratic states and societies to expect immigrants to make, and what kinds of adaptation is it unreasonable to demand? Second, how vulnerable are Islamic beliefs and practices to the criticisms commonly leveled against them in the name of liberal democracy and gender equality? Finally, how strong are the parallels between the claims for political recognition and accommodation that issue from immigrant cultural communities and the claims for recognition and inclusion that issue from groups that have historically been marginalized within liberal democratic societies? Although the authors do not dismiss the notion that there may be tensions between the core commitments of liberal democratic societies and some Islamic practices, they conclude that these tensions are exaggerated by Western writers. Muslim communities generally pose no greater challenge to liberal societies than do other religious and immigrant communities. Western writers should be chary of rejecting their claims to toleration and accommodation too swiftly.     

Liberal Democracy: One Form or Many?

This article examines whether there are significant differences between liberal democracies which warrant them being classified as different forms of democracy. The article begins by outlining six features of liberal democracy which are crucial in understanding how this type of government works. The subsequent section examines the origins of liberal democracy and considers the relevance of arguments derived from American 'exceptionalism'. Attention is then focused on liberal democratic governments today - by reference to Lijphart's distinction between 'majoritarian' and 'consensus' democracies. Finally, the article looks at whether the form of liberal democracy is changed substantially when it is transplanted into a cultural context different from the one in which it originated. The general conclusion is that there is no case for identifying different forms of liberal democracy.     

Religion and Euroscepticism: Cleavages,Religious Parties and Churches in EU Member States

Taking into account the attempts to render the European integration process a new cultural and value-based quality on the one hand, and the prevalence of sceptical positions on the other, the role of religion as a factor shaping the process of European integration and its accompanying features such as Euroscepticism deserves special attention. It may be argued that the entire EU is a project inaugurated and pushed along primarily by Christian Democratic forces and inspirations. However, the EU is currently characterised by an advanced state of secularisation in most of its member states and high levels of religious and cultural pluralisation. This article raises the question to what extent religious, in particular Christian, actors such as religious parties and the churches have strayed from this integrationist past and contributed to Euroscepticism. Furthermore, the second question is whether a confessional pattern of Euroscepticism can be identified. The paper addresses these questions by empirically and comparatively analysing the positions and influence of religious actors on Euroscepticism in a selected group of EU member states.     

Elite Influence? Religion and the Electoral Success of the Nazis

In Weimar Germany, the Catholic Church vehemently warned ordinary parishioners about the dangers of extremist parties. We establish that constituencies' religious composition is a key empirical predictor of Nazi vote shares—dwarfing the explanatory power of any other demographic or socioeconomic variable. Even after carefully accounting for observational differences, Catholics were far less likely to vote for the NSDAP than their Protestant counterparts. The evidence suggests that this disparity was, in large part, due to the sway of the Catholic Church and its dignitaries. At the same time, we show that attempts to immunize Catholics against the radical left failed to achieve the desired result. To explain the puzzling asymmetry in the Church's influence at the ballot box, we develop a simple theoretical framework of elite influence in electoral politics.     

Social Class and Party Choice in Northern Ireland's Ethnic Blocs

The peace process in Northern Ireland has not diminished the acute ethnic electoral faultline between the majority Protestant British population, supportive of parties favouring Northern Ireland's continuing place in the United Kingdom and the minority Catholic Nationalist population, which backs parties harbouring long-term ambitions for a united Ireland. Within each bloc, however, there has been a dramatic realignment in favour of parties once seen as extreme and militant. The Democratic Unionist Party has emerged as the main representative of the Protestant British population, whilst Sinn Fein, having for many years supported the Provisional IRA's ‘armed struggle’ against British rule, has become the dominant party amongst Catholic Nationalists. As both parties have entered the political mainstream and advanced electorally, to what extent have they moved from their electoral near-confinement among the working class to enjoy broader cross-class support – and how?     

Church Engagement, Religious Values, and Mass-Elite Policy Agenda Agreement in Local Communities

We provide evidence on two prominent but heretofore untested expectations about the relevance of religion for the democratic process: (1) that greater engagement in churches or comparable religious institutions and their organizational life enhances representational processes; and (2) that religious values in a community have greater influence on the latter processes, with more liberal religious values expected to enhance the responsiveness of community leaders to general public preferences. Using data on local communities in the United States in the late 1960s, we find strong support for the expected relevance of religious liberalism for representation, but none for the expected effect of church engagement. We provide evidence, too, that our findings about religious values are generalizable to present-day politics.     

The three stages of the anti-incumbency vote: Retrospective economic voting in young and established democracies

Economic prosperity is the best recipe for an incumbent government to be re-elected. However, the financial crisis was significantly more consequential for governing parties in young rather than in established democracies. This article introduces the age of democracy as a contextual explanation which moderates the degree to which citizens vote retrospectively. It shows a curvilinear effect of the age of democracy on retrospective economic voting. In a first stage after the transition to democracy, reform governments suffer from a general anti-incumbency effect, unrelated to economic performance. In a second step, citizens in young democracies relate the legitimacy of democratic actors to their economic performance rather than to procedural rules, and connect economic outcomes closely to incumbent support. As democracies mature, actors profit from a reservoir of legitimacy, and retrospective voting declines. Empirically, these hypotheses are corroborated by data on vote change and economic performance in 59 democracies worldwide, over 25 years.     

Religion and Euroscepticism: Direct,Indirect or No Effects?

Taking as starting points the (growing) political significance of religion and increasing scepticism towards European integration, this study sets out to investigate the impact of religious divides and religiosity on attitudes towards the EU, both on the micro and on the macro level. In addition to considering direct effects, it focuses on the mediated nature of relationships between religion and Euroscepticism through immigration attitudes and authoritarian value orientations. Drawing on data from the 2006 European Social Survey the authors find that individuals' religious attachments have only indirect relevance for explaining Euroscepticism when controlling for immigration attitudes and value orientations. Religious context, however, does contribute to explanatory models of Euroscepticism, with citizens of Protestant countries being more Eurosceptic than those in religiously mixed or in Catholic countries. The authors furthermore show that both authoritarianism and anti-immigration attitudes are to some degree influenced by individuals' denomination and level of religiosity and in turn predict Euroscepticism. Yet, even indirect effects of religion on Euroscepticism are small or appear to cancel each other out. The article concludes that religion on the micro level is largely irrelevant for explaining Euroscepticism, whereas it is an important macro-level explanatory variable.     

Acts of Faith: Churches and Political Engagement

Many observers suggest that white evangelical Protestant churches serve to mobilize their members into politics, while others argue that they encourage withdrawal from political life. This paper reconciles these two claims. I hypothesize that the time members of evangelical Protestant denominations spend in service to their church comes at the expense of participation in the wider community, contrary to the way mainline Protestant and Catholic churches foster civic activity among their members. However, I further hypothesize that the tight social networks formed through this intensive church activity can at times facilitate rapid and intense political mobilization. Data from the Citizen Participation Study supports the first hypothesis, while applying King's method of ecological inference to two elections in Alabama supports the second.     

Religious Belief,Religious Denomination,and Preferences for Redistribution: A Comparison across 13 Countries

Despite clear evidence of a link between religion and welfare state development, research on public support for redistributive social policies has been slow to incorporate religion into models of public preferences. Does religious belief influence support for redistribution? If so, does religion necessarily increase hostility to redistribution as suggested by existing research? Or, do the Catholic and Protestant traditions generate different patterns of preferences consistent with Weber’s notion of a Protestant work ethic? This research explores these questions by comparing public support for redistribution across 13 European states. The data reveal a powerful and complex effect of religious belief on support for redistribution that works on both the individual and cultural levels. The evidence challenges existing research by demonstrating that the impact of religion is not uniform, but varies across different religious traditions, with Catholicism producing significantly greater support for redistribution than Protestantism.     

Institutional Characteristics and Regime Survival: Why Are Semi‐Democracies Less Durable Than Autocracies and Democracies?

Previous studies report that semi‐democratic regimes are less durable than both democracies and autocracies. Still, mixing democratic and autocratic characteristics need not destabilize regimes, as three highly plausible alternative explanations of this correlation remain unaccounted for: (a) semi‐democracies emerge under conditions of political instability and social turmoil; (b) other regime characteristics explain duration; and (c) extant democracy measures do not register all regime changes. We elaborate on and test for these explanations, but find strikingly robust evidence that semi‐democracies are inherently less durable than both democracies and autocracies. “Semi‐democracies are particularly unstable political regimes” should thus be considered a rare stylized fact of comparative politics. The analysis yields several other interesting results. For instance, autocracies and semi‐democracies are equally likely to experience “liberalizing” regime changes more specifically, and once accounting for differences in degree of democracy, there is no robust evidence of differences in duration between military and single‐party regimes.     

Religious market structure and democratic performance: Clientelism

Is there a connection between government intervention in religious competition and partisan clientelism in democratic systems? Drawing on the economics of religion, we argue that alongside commonly examined population-level religious processes (religious diversity), state-level religious processes (government regulation of competition in the religious market) affect institutional performance in electoral democracies. Linking comparative indicators of religion-state relations with measures of partisan clientelism, statistical analysis suggests that uncompetitive religious markets, such as those where a dominant religion is sponsored by the state, create incentives, infrastructures and opportunities that favour clientelism. The study emphasises the importance of light-touch regulation of religion not merely as a normative principle narrowly related to religious freedom, but also as a potential remedy that can enhance the quality of political institutions.     

Cross-Cutting Messages and Political Tolerance: An Experiment Using Evangelical Protestants

Democratic theorists believe that exposure to rationales for conflicting views augments deliberation and tolerance. Evidence suggests that people are more tolerant of opposing groups after being exposed to alternative points of view, yet it is unclear how source credibility and previous exposure to the source moderates this effect. Using experimental survey data from a sample of evangelical Protestant PAC donors, I manipulate Christian Right activists’ exposure to dissonant messages on immigration reform and capital punishment and vary the source of these messages. I find that when the opposing viewpoints are attributed to a religious leader generally found outside the Christian Right social movement (a mainline Protestant), evangelicals are less tolerant than when attributed to a religious leader sometimes found within the movement (a Catholic). Moreover, I find the amount of contact with the respective religious group moderates source effects. In this way, the study reveals how social networks may moderate the effect of elite discourse on public opinion.     

Mediating between state and citizens: the significance of the informal politics of third-party representation in the global south

This article argues that we should take more seriously the role of intermediaries in relationships between states and citizens in the global south. More specifically it holds that the practice of mediation, the third party representation of citizens to states and vice versa, is a widespread and important political practice in this context. Largely distinct from the contentious politics and popular mobilisation of social movements, mediation is more a politics of negotiation and bargaining by representatives. Developed as an emergent analysis from multiple case studies, mediation is a broad concept that includes practices that at other times might be described as lobbying, clientelism and coercion, but that we conceptualise in terms of claiming legitimacy to speak for the poor and marginalised, and theorise in terms of a democratic deficit between formal political institutions and these groups. In addition to identifying different kinds of mediators, the article categorises mediation in terms of the orientation and nature of various mediatory practices. Lastly, the article identifies at least three explanations for mediation including the endurance of pre-democratic political relations and practices, new forms of social exclusion in post-colonial democracies and the erosion of state authority brought about by neo-liberal policies and globalisation.