Hayek's Bizarre Liberalism: A Critique

This paper questions the conventional view of F. A. Hayek as a reviver of 'classical liberalism'. It argues that the foundation of Hayek's doctrine is a naturalist or physicalist conception of man which is at variance with the classic tenets of liberalism. It shows how Hayek's theory of society and of the abstract rules that ought to govern society are partly a continuation and partly a contradiction of his physicalist notion of man. The paper draws particular attention to Hayek's work The Sensory Order and to the sometimes overlooked influence of Ernst Mach on his ideas.     

John Rawls and Policy Formation

Liberalism has bay far been the most appealing ideology in modern political thought, and considered by many as one of human kind's greatest inventions, product of our development as a race. However, new theories have threatened the philosophical foundations upon which liberalism itself stands. One of the most strongly criticized theories is that of the Original Position, developed by the political philosopher John Rawls, and which is itself a fundamental cornerstone in Rawls's Theory of Justice. In this article, I will focus on discussing the problems and questions that arise for policy formation when analyzing the Orginal Position.     

Liberal equality: political not erinaceous

Ronald Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs defends liberal political morality on the basis of a rich account of dignity as constitutive of living well. This article raises the Rawlsian concern that making political morality dependent on ethics threatens citizens’ political autonomy. Thereafter, it addresses whether the abandonment of (erinaceous) ethical foundations signals the demise of Dworkin’s liberalism and explores the possibility of laundering his conception so as to facilitate a marriage between the political philosophies of Rawls and Dworkin. The article finishes by rebutting some objections Dworkin raises against Rawls’s account of public reason.     

Community government: voluntary agencies,social justice,and the responsibilization of citizens1

This paper analyzes the ways in which the Canadian voluntary sector has been created as a ‘community of service providers’. Drawing upon a governmentality perspective, we illustrate how governmental interventions have been largely successful in carrying out the voluntary agencies' responsibilization efforts within the sector. We trace this responsibilization project through fiscal policies and programmatic schemes, characteristic of advanced liberalism. Once invested with the task of governing, we argue that voluntary agencies take it upon themselves to train their volunteers to become responsible citizens. As a form of, what we call, community government, these voluntary agencies have therefore become doubly responsible: they provide social services to disadvantaged individuals and simultaneously train community members to assume their moral duties. Overall, this paper contributes to the growing literature on governmentality and citizenship studies by producing new insights into the links between the voluntary sector and ‘responsible citizenship’ under advanced liberalism.     

Liberalism,socialism and democracy: variations on a governmental theme

Liberalism is commonly understood as a political doctrine or ideology concerned with the maximization of individual liberty. However, following Foucault's work on governmentality, a different usage has been suggested, based on the idea of a liberal mode of government. I argue that the differences between these accounts of liberalism derive from a fundamental ambiguity in the liberal project, as a result of which the figure of a community of autonomous individuals appears on the one hand as given reality, serving to identify the character and the limits of legitimate government, while on the other it appears as yet to be realized positivity, serving to define the objective for a variety of governmental projects.

This paper examines the implications of that ambiguity for the understanding first of liberalism as doctrine and second of its relationship to other contemporary doctrines - democracy, socialism and the neo-liberalism in particular. Since the figure of the community of autonomous persons considered as given reality tends to dominate standard characterizations of liberalism as doctrine of government, it also plays an important part in the contrasting characterizations of democracy and socialism. We should expect the view of such a community as artefact to produce a rather different picture.     

Feminism and Contemporary Liberal Citizenship: The Undecidability of 'Women'

Liberal citizenship has been seen as posing a dilemma for feminists. Either women are taken to be equal to men, in which case their specific capacities as women are unrecognised and their citizenship is substantively unequal; or else women are taken to be different, with the consequent risk that the rights citizenship allows and the obligations it imposes will again be substantively unequal. On this view, women cannot simply be included in liberal citizenship because the meaning of the liberal public sphere is constructed in opposition to the private sphere of natural feminine care and women's subordination to male heads of household. Using Derridean deconstruction to examine three significant moments in liberalism, this paper argues that the term 'women' is more productively seen as 'undecidable' in this tradition, working both to construct the binary opposition between public and private on which it depends but also to disrupt it. While the feminist critique of liberalism is important to analysing the logic by which women have been positioned outside full citizenship rights, in practice feminists have made some gains by reconfiguring the terms of liberalism around this undecidability. The aim of the paper is to carry out something like a genealogy of contemporary liberalism in order to discern its multiple origins and contingent development; we will then be in a better position to understand the practical possibilities for women's citizenship in Britain today.     

Über die Notwendigkeit und Bestimmung liberaler Bürgertugenden

Numerous sociological studies describe the status of contemporary liberal democracy as frightening. Taking up these investigations, this article asks for the pre-conditions of liberal democracy, particularly for their moral foundations. In contrast to the classic political theory of liberalism, these moral foundations are not assumed to be locked in the institutional order of the state, but in a certain morality of the citizens. The first target of the investigation is to proof that a moral quality of the citizens is a necessary prerequisite for the persistence of a liberal democracy. The second aim of the work is to show how these moral orientations (liberal virtues) should be shaped within each citizen. This is clarified by discussing three liberal thinkers (Charles Larmore, John Rawls, and Ralf Dahrendorf). The so distilled central liberal virtue is formulated as follows: The political convictions of the citizens must be justifiable for everybody, i.e. also to citizens with a different world view. Political convictions and values, which are expressed during the political process and which influence the voting-behaviour, should therefore not rely exclusively on one’s own set of moral values. The work closes with a discussion of the implications of this normative claim.     

Postliberalism: The New Centre Ground of British Politics

Brexit and support for anti‐establishment insurgencies suggest that British politics is moving away from the old left–right opposition towards a new divide between the defenders and detractors of progressive liberalism. As this article suggests, progressive liberalism differs significantly from both classical and new liberalism. It fuses free‐market economics with social egalitarianism and identity politics. Both the hard left and the radical right reject this combination and want to undo a number of liberal achievements. British politics is also moving in a postliberal direction. In the economy, postliberalism signals a shift from rampant market capitalism to economic justice and reciprocity. In society, it signals a shift from individualism and egalitarianism to social solidarity and fraternal relations. And politically, it signals a shift from the minority politics of vested interests and balkanised group identity to a majority politics based on a balance of interests, shared identity and the embedding of state and market in the intermediary institutions of civil society. This article argues that postliberalism is redefining Britain's political centre ground in an age where neither progressive liberalism nor reactionary anti‐liberalism commands majority support. First, it charts the ascendancy of progressive liberalism over the past quarter‐century. Second, it contrasts anti‐liberal reactions with postliberal alternatives, before exploring why earlier iterations of postliberalism failed to gain traction with the political mainstream. Third, it provides a discussion and critique of Theresa May's postliberal conservatism, notably the tension between free‐market globalisation and free trade, on the one hand, and the support for national industry and the indigenous working class, on the other.     

Can my religion influence my conception of justice? Political liberalism and the role of comprehensive doctrines

In his last works, John Rawls explicitly argued for an overlapping consensus on a family of reasonable liberal political conceptions of justice, rather than just one. This ‘Deep Version’ of political liberalism opens up new questions about the relationship between citizens’ political conceptions, from which they must draw and offer public reasons in their political advocacy, and their comprehensive doctrines. These questions centre on whether a reasonable citizen’s choice of political conception can be influenced by her comprehensive doctrine. In this paper I present two models of the relationship, which give contrasting answers to these questions, and defend the model that is more permissive with regard to the influence of comprehensive doctrines. This has important implications for our understanding of Rawlsian political liberalism, and reduces the force of objections that have been offered by theorists sympathetic to religion.     

Can a value-neutral liberal state still be tolerant?

ABSTRACT

Toleration is typically defined as follows: an agent (A), for some reason, objects to certain actions or practices of someone else (B), but has outweighing other reasons to accept these actions or practices nonetheless and, thus, refrains from interfering with or preventing B from acting accordingly, although A has the power to interfere. So understood, (mutual) toleration is taken to allow for peaceful coexistence and ideally even cooperation amongst people who disagree with each other on crucial questions on how to live and what to value, which is why it has traditionally been regarded as an important part of political liberalism. An explicitly value-neutral liberal state then avoids taking sides when it comes to different and competing ways of life. However, following this idea of liberal neutrality, it has been questioned whether a value-neutral liberal state still needs toleration or is even compatible with it, for apparently neutrality leaves no more room for the objection component of toleration to take hold. In this paper, I take up this question and argue that there is, indeed, conceptual and practical room left for a value-neutral liberal state to be tolerant. Drawing on the interplay between four kinds of reasons (pragmatic, ethical, moral, and political), pragmatic and political reasons may still provide the needed evaluative and normative ground upon which the combination of objection and outweighing acceptance can be made sense of. However, the possible scope of toleration for a value-neutral liberal state is considerably limited.     

A Rawlsian Argument Against the Duty of Civility

In this article, I show that the assumptions underpinning John Rawls's so-called "duty of civility" ought to lead one not to affirm the duty but to reject it. I will begin by setting out in its essentials the content and rationale of the "duty of civility," which lies at the heart of Rawls's ideal of public reason. Secondly, I will argue that the very premises allegedly underpinning the duty of civility—namely, the values of reciprocity and political autonomy, and the burdens of judgment—in fact rule it out. Thirdly, I will suggest that if my argument against the duty of civility is correct, then one recent attempt to salvage political liberalism and reasonableness from the charge of incoherence fails. Finally, I draw some challenging lessons from our discussion for political liberalism and the liberal tradition as a whole.     

The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy

Liberal democracy is liberalized democracy: that is, democracy defined and structured within the limits set by liberalism. The paper outlines the constitutive features of liberalism and shows how they determined the form and content of democracy and gave rise to liberal democracy as we know it today. It then goes on to argue that liberal democracy is specific to a particular cultural context and cannot claim universal validity. This, however, does not lead to cultural relativism as it is possible to formulate universal principles that every good government should respect. The paper offers one way of reconciling universalism and cultural diversity.     

Policy representation of constituency interests

This paper examines two aspects of congressional representation: the responsiveness of House candidates to constituency opinion and the effect of candidate positions on House election outcomes. For both Democratic- and Republican-held seats, constituency liberalism (as measured by the constituency's vote for McGovern in 1972) is strongly related to the liberalism of incumbent candidates but less so to the liberalism of challengers. House election outcomes are visibly influenced by the positions of incumbent candidates but not those of nonincumbent candidates. The paper argues that elections contribute significantly to achieving congressional representation. Candidate positions are measured from a 1974 CBS survey of all major House candidates.     

The ‘I’ and the ‘we’ of citizenship in the age of waning democracy: Wolin and Balibar on citizenship,the political and dedemocratization

Despite drawing on different historical traditions and philosophical sources, Sheldon Wolin and Étienne Balibar have come to see citizenship and democracy in fundamentally similar ways. However, the work of one has not been considered alongside that of the other. In this paper, I examine some of their key texts and draw out three areas of common concern: the historical specificity of the political, citizenship as a dialectical process and dedemocratization. The significance of Wolin and Balibar’s writing on citizenship and democracy lies in a set of proposals for the eternal rebirth of the citizen as democratic agent between action and institution, hierarchy and equality, individual and community, difference and the universal. Their open-ended frameworks can be seen as an antidote to contemporary pessimism about the fate of democracy as either political order or normative ideal. I conclude by suggesting that contemporary Ecuadorean and Bolivian debates about how to combine relational ontologies and liberalism has opened a fertile domain for re-imagining the I and We of citizenship.     

Liberal Justification: A Typology

Contemporary liberalism exhibits a broad agreement among its proponents as to its content but widespread disagreement on what fundamental values justify its principles. This paper provides a typology of ways in which liberals approach the task of justifying liberalism. It sets out a four-fold typology for categorising different liberal theories by distinguishing between the various reasons why liberals reject or accept neutrality. Such a typology is helpful in showing exactly how and where liberal theories differ in their approaches to the issues of justification, neutrality and pluralism, and in showing where their strengths and weaknesses lie.     

Is Liberalism Now an Essentially Contested Concept?*

In contemporary English-language political theory, conversations between liberals and their critics have been largely superseded by arguments among those placing themselves under the liberal umbrella. As the debate among those calling themselves liberals has widened, so the meaning of liberalism and construction of the liberal tradition have become increasingly contested. It is therefore appropriate to consider whether liberalism is now an essentially contested concept. Gallie's original argument about essentially contested concepts is reconstructed and evaluated and a number of contemporary approaches to liberalism are considered in its light. The significance of the passage of time is examined, and some of the theoretical and practical changes that might have contributed to liberalism becoming essentially contested are outlined. The consequences for critical thinking and fundamental criticisms of society and polity are raised, and it is suggested that liberalism provides normative resources for a society to continuously question, and potentially remake, itself.     

Evolution without democracy: Toward a unified framework for understanding the success and failure of Chinese Communism

This paper establishes an evolutionary framework for studying the dynamics of the power struggle within the Chinese Communist Party in relation to the wider power struggle in the nation. It posits four essential conditions for the applicability of the framework and a prediction of consequences. If a political party meets all the key conditions, then the model predicts that the ultimate winner of the internal power struggle is one who has identified the optimal strategy for the party to win the national power struggle and who has demonstrated the ability of putting it to practical use. The theoretical framework is briefly applied to several periods of the modern Chinese history. One of the evolutionary conditions is that the norm of promotion based on merits, which I argue the CCP inherited from the traditional Confucian culture, figures as the basic rule of game in deciding the intra-party power struggle. Thus, “evolution without democracy” is essentially a continuation of the traditional political culture in the new social context. My basic observation is that the CCP before 1949 met most of the evolutionary conditions, with Mao Zedong emerging as the ultimate winner of the internal power struggle at the same time as the CCP won its national victory. After 1949, however, the CCP has gradually changed from a revolutionary party to a status quo party, with Mao himself the biggest status quo winner, and some of the evolutionary assumptions began to be violated. I suggest that, in the post-Mao (and especially the post-Deng) era, these conditions might begin to be satisfied again. These preliminary observations are to be tested further by extensive case studies. The author thanks Professor Ross Terrill and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on the earlier drafts of the paper.