THE POLITICS OF DEFENSE POLICY COMMUNICATION: THE "THREAT" OF SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE

This paper suggests a technique for evaluating threat assessments when reliable data is unavailable. Previously, scholars have found that political leaders manipulated threat assessments to achieve desired defense policy outcomes. Yet contemporary communication about threats are not easily studied, leading some writers to call for new studies of Clausewitz's so-called "social" dimension of strategy – the efforts by governments to assure domestic support for defense policies. To apply the suggested technique, this paper examines the Reagan Administration's claim that the threats from Soviet strategic defenses justify the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. The Administration's arguments are found to be unclear and internally inconsistent. Despite some fear appeals about Soviet threats, Reagan officials typically noted that American offensive forces will continue to render Soviet defenses impotent and obsolete for the forseeable future. Indeed, vague and inconsistent statements about Soviet forces may have undermined Administration efforts to fulfill SDI funding goals, to codify early deployment plans, and even to establish Manhattan or Apollo-type policy preeminince.     

NEGOTIATING HOUSING POLICY THE QUEENSLAND HOUSING COMMISSION AND FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 1945–64

Abstract: An examination of a single institution and its relationships with different levels of government can be used to question commonly held interpretations. This study of the Queensland Housing Commission (QHC) indicates that there is some need to reassess the effectiveness of tied grants as a mechanism for commonwealth intervention in areas of state concern. In Queensland, at least, the state government played a much more significant role in determining both the overall direction of the housing authority and its day-to-day operations. This suggests that the assumption that statutory authorities have some autonomy from direct government intervention may not always be appropriate. The weakness of local government in Australia is acknowledged but it is important to note that state government instrumentalities have contributed significantly to this weakness. This study of the QHC provides one example of how local autonomy can be compromised.     

ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY MAKING: ADJUDICATION BY THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS IN ASYLUM-RELATED APPEALS 1980–1987

This analysis examines the extent to which the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), from 1980 to 1987, complied with a new policy of Congress, set forth in the Refugee Act of 1980, which called for an elimination of bias in favor of aliens from hostile countries. Statistical analysis reveals that the BIA did not enforce the Refugee Act of 1980. I argue that Congress never intended to eliminate this bias since doing so would bring it into conflict with actors within the executive branch (including the President and the State Department) that have traditionally dominated policy-making relating to refugees and asylees. Instead, in the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress allowed these actors to retain control through a broad definition of "refugee" and by failing to clearly specify standards for political asylum and withholding of deportation. Simultaneously, Congress temporarily placated private and public "refugee rights" interest groups with statutory provisions that (presumably) eliminated the hostile country bias in U.S. refugee and asylum admis- sions, and granted increased federal aid to private organizations and units of state and local governments.