APEC贸易投资自由化20年:成就与展望

APEC贸易投资自由化进程历经20年,在关税减让、非关税措施削减、服务和投资市场开放等四个具体领域取得了显著成就。由于受到国际经济形势新变化的影响,APEC贸易投资自由化的整体进程及具体领域均面临新的挑战和问题。在此背景下,总结和分析20年来APEC贸易投资自由化的成就,展望其贸易投资自由化进程的前景,并探讨APEC进程的未来发展方向与方式,对于推进APEC进程具有重要意义。     

Apec beyond Osaka: A balanced approach

Good ideas for economic cooperation within APEC must be adapted to Asia‐Pacific realities, says Andrew Elek, Senior Fellow at Australian National University's Australia‐Japan Research Centre. Emphasizing that “APEC will not make decisions, Asia‐Pacific governments will make decisions,” Elek asserts that APEC can draw on EU experience, while avoiding the creation of a regional bureaucracy, through a voluntary but orderly process of concerted, unilateral decision‐making. At Bogor, APEC governments agreed to reduce obstacles to economic development and integration within the region, without discriminating against the rest of the world. Elek notes that the November 1995 high‐level APEC meeting in Osaka provides the opportunity to clarify the historical Bogor vision. In this article, he proposes concrete measures for realizing APEC's potential as an open economic association.     

Asia‐Pacific economic cooperation: Progress and prospects

Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo L. Siazon Jr. of the Philippines discusses the Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum's path to the present, and charts a map for its future. Siazon sees the importance of promoting greater private‐sector involvement in APEC and enhancing economic cooperation among member economies. Siazon discusses the special significance of this year's meetings to be held at Subic Bay in the Philippines, the former home of the US Pacific Fleet and now a growing industrial and tourism center. Pursuing APEC's free‐trade goals, he says, holds the brightest economic future for the Philippines and the region.     

What might be expected from the APEC meetings in Osaka

The purpose of the third APEC “summit,” taking place in Osaka on November 19, 1995, is to begin securing agreement on an action plan for achieving the “Bogor goals” of free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region by 2020, with the developed economies doing so by 2010. With pragmaticism as the hallmark of APEC deliberations, the leaders are expected (1) to focus on the principles of an action plan, leaving aside more difficult issues, (2) to conclude certain “business facilitation” agreements, and (3) to agree to accelerate the implementation of certain Uruguay Round agreements.     

APEC,globalization, and 9/11

The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) has, in the main, been based on attempts to advance neoliberal ideas about economic governance, although this has stimulated a great deal of controversy and resistance. Having failed—despite much effort—to entrench neoliberalism within APEC the United States and other “Western” members of APEC are now “securitizing” economic policy in an effort to reconfigure the Asia Pacific along lines favored by major capitalist players in the region. Critics argue that this securitization of economics is simply a tactical effort to bring in through the back door policies that APEC members have resisted in the past. Faced with the prospect of not getting its own way through straight trade negotiations within APEC, Washington appears to be promoting measures — “urgently needed in the name of security”—that might never have been accepted otherwise. At the same time, a twin strategy of pursuing bilateral trade negotiations with key APEC states is threatening the multilateral nature of the body, further emasculating APEC's position as a serious trade body.     

APEC: New paradigm for Asia‐Pacific relations

APEC has undergone major changes since its inception in 1993. From an organization for exchanging opinions among experts it has evolved to become a forum for discussing trade liberalization and directing the future of Asia. Japan's ambassador in charge of APEC, Hiromoto Seki, states that with the Action Agenda proposed at the APEC Forum in Osaka last November, APEC has reached a turning point where member countries can put the principles agreed upon into practice and effect positive change among APEC nations.     

An Asia‐Pacific community as a regional order: Possibilities and limitations of APEC

Expectations for the Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation forum have been numerous and varied, leading some observers to predict that APEC will gradually take on a security dimension in addition to the economic role it plays today. In this paper, Professor Susumu Yamakage of the University of Tokyo examines the evolution — and the limitations of — APEC and, taking into consideration the variety of issues and problems in the region, concludes that it is premature to expect APEC to become a multifaceted cooperative framework. Rather, he points out, it is likely to continue its current function of encouraging trade liberalization and defending the world trade system.     

Next task for the WTO system and the APEC process

With the “globalization” of production, firms need to be able to operate in other economies, exploiting their advantages, enabling them to remain internationally competitive. Today, the focus of attention, in the international trading system, is shifting to measures that affect the ability of foreign firms to invest and conduct business in national economies, to the openness of markets to global competition. However such measures are broached, governments cannot get away from deciding unilaterally whether, when, and how to deregulate, creating an internationally attractive business environment. Asia has benefited much from foreign direct investment, not regional trade negotiations, and APEC should adhere to non-discrimination as its guiding principle. Ryutaro Hashimoto has been minister of international trade and industry in the government of Japan since 1994, having earlier been minister of finance (1989–1991) and minister of transport (1986–1987).     

APEC labour markets: Structural change and the Asian financial crisis

This study examines the impacts of longer-term structural changes on the labour markets of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) member economies, as well as the short-run labour market consequences of the Asian financial crisis. All APEC economies have experienced significant structural change in the process of development. A major factor in this structural change has been increased trade intensity (increase in exports and imports as a share of GDP) that has occurred over the last 20 years. Because these structural changes have been extensively induced by trade liberalisation, this study provides insights into the likely consequences of the implementation of APEC's agenda on trade and investment liberalisation and facilitation. The impact of structural change is examined using a range of data, such as disaggregated changes in output and employment by industry and occupation over the period 1980 to 1997, and data on changes in trade intensity for each of the APEC nations. Other data, such as changes in rates of urbanization, are also used to indicate the other important concomitant effects of economic transformation. For several Asian economies, the linear path of growth and structural change was severely disrupted by the Asian financial crisis. This article examines the impact of this crisis on Asian labour markets, in general, and those most affected by the crisis, in particular. In many countries within the region, a failure of education and training systems to respond to often rapid shifts in the skill composition of labour demand is leading to industry and occupation specific labour shortages. International labour migration within the APEC region is viewed as a product of these structural changes and a mechanism that assists in filling gaps in the labour markets of the region's economies.     

Why and how the APEC process is working

Although there has been no grand design, the process of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has made steady progress, much more than the ministers present at its creation in 1989 could possibly have envisaged. It has made progress by proceeding pragmatically. the impetus came from the economies of the Western Pacific that are dependent on trade, and on the maintenance of an open trading system, and accordingly got fed up to the gills with being discriminated against in the markets of the major trading powers. APEC might thus be seen as an exercise in “collective action” to influence more powerful countries and strengthen the multilateral trading system.     

Whither East Asian regionalism

The 1997 financial crisis dealt a severe blow to Asia's self-confidence. In the following article, Professor Ippei Yamazawa, of the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies at Waseda University and the Institute of Developing Economies, examines the effect of regionalism on East Asia before and after 1997. On the surface, regional trade arrangements (RTAs) would seem to repudiate the WTO's multilateral trade liberalization efforts but Yamazawa argues that if RTAs are pursued in parallel with multilateral trade talks then they would complement, rather than compete against, multilateral trade arrangements. He concludes that APEC could find itself a useful role as the intermediary between RTAs and the WTO.     

大萧条时期美国贸易政策与中美贸易

20世纪30年代世界经济大萧条时期,开始于美国的贸易保护主义政策,极大地损害了国际贸易的发展,中国的对外贸易尤其是中美贸易也受到了严重冲击。1929～1932年,尽管中国货币被动贬值,但其对出口的积极效应远远小于美国进口税提高及进口需求下降的效应。1933年以后美国关税壁垒降低,美国货币贬值及白银购买导致中国货币相对升值,但有限的贸易自由化及国民收入的增加,引致进口需求扩大,并由此带动了中国对美出口贸易的增长。     

The continuing evolution of Japan's business model

We need to recognize the abiding strengths of the Japanese business model and adapt them to a changing world, says Yoshinori Usui, Director of International Affairs at the Institute for International Economic Studies in Tokyo. In this article, Usui points out that rekindling economic expansion in Japan is indispensable to economic recovery in Southeast Asia and to the lasting growth of the global economy. He discusses the merits of the Japanese business model and argues that its basic elements remain entirely sound and effective. Japan's lack of competitiveness in non‐manufacturing sectors, he says, is more due to excessive regulation than to any failings of its business model. Usui speaks in optimistic terms about the potential for combining the best elements of the traditional Japanese model with the worthy elements of the Anglo‐Saxon model.     

Showtime for Southeast Asia: An economic and political crossroads

In the ASEAN region, booming exports and imports, and rapidly rising per capita incomes, have brought new challenges to trade policy. ASEAN is promoting its own “free trade area”; the United States backs the much wider and all-inclusive APEC format; and Malaysia urges a “caucus” restricted ethnically and racially to East Asians. The result is a genuine trade debate, along lines familiar in the already-industrialized nations. If ASEAN follows genuine openness there are considerable opportunities, but if it takes the timeworn paths of protectionism, restrictions on investment, and excessive sensitivity to fears of “foreign manipulation,” the future is liable to be less bright.     

论知识经济时代中国与东盟的经济合作

在知识经济时代,面对知识经济产生的重大影响,同为发展中国家的中国与东盟,应对双方的经济合作拟订新的思路和框架,以推动双方经济的更大发展。技术合作与技术贸易,即是双方今后合作的重点,具体包括“三个层次”和“两个层面”。“三个层次”指的是在亚太经合组织中的合作、中国与东盟组织的合作,以及中国与东盟各国的合作。“两个层面”指的是政府间合作与非政府间合作。     

Trade Liberalisation and the Australian Labor Party

The three most substantial decisions to reduce Australia's trade barriers — in 1973, 1988 and 1991 — were made by Labor Governments. Labor's policy shift preceded the conversion of social democratic parties in other countries to trade liberalisation. To understand why this was so, it is necessary to consider trade policy as being shaped by more than interest groups and political institutions. Drawing on interviews with the main political figures, including Gough Whitlam, Bob Hawke, Paul Keating and John Button, this article explores why the intellectual arguments for free trade had such a powerful impact on Labor's leadership, and how those leaders managed to implement major tariff cuts, while largely maintaining party unity.     

The Japan-Soviet far east trade relationship: A case of the cautious buyer and the overconfident seller

Given Japan’s resource scarcity, the eastern Soviet Union’s wealth of natural resources and dire need for large infusions of investment capital and technology, and the close distance between the two, one would believe that trade between the two countries would be quite sizable. However, the converse is the case, with each country providing no more than 2 percent of the other’s foreign trade. To explain this phenomenon, it is necessary to explore the intrinsic and self-imposed obstacles to expanded Japanese-USSR trade. It turns out that both countries do not pursue trade for mutual advantage but rather seek an entirely different set of ulterior zero-sum motives. The article discusses what would appear to be a natural “fit” between the two countries’ needs and abilities, explores the extensive joint Siberian development projects of the 1960s and 1970s to explain the undesired side effects of Japanese-Soviet trade, details Japanese and Soviet business, government, and economist arguments for and against expanded economic relations, explains the maldevelopment of a resource-extractive versus commodity-producing eastern USSR as a product of climate, labor shortages, investment policies, and a Stalinist-planned system, outlines Japanese desires to accrue political advantages from its trade with the Soviet Union, and predicts the inability of Gorbachev’s economic reforms to truly expand Japanese-Soviet trade at a low cost to its larger geopolitical concerns. Although continuing private Japanese efforts are being made to work out joint venture deals with the USSR (thus belying the notion of a completely consensus-unified “Japan, Inc.”), they are still anomalies. Ultimately, if expanded trade ties are to occur (and indeed it is this article’s contention that they must for the USSR to survive as a superpower), then they must be made on Japan’s terms.     

Agricultural trade liberalization and the APEC process

The liberalization of agricultural trade in the Asia-Pacific region is important to the relatively efficient, low-cost exporters of farm commodities that are participating in the APEC process. While the Uruguay Round negotiations succeeded, for the first time, in extending the GATT trade liberalizing process to agriculture, the agreement was modest. Japan and Korea were allowed more time in which to prepare for the opening of their markets. But the farm-support policies of both are destroying their agricultures. The sooner they are changed, as those of Taiwan have been changed, the better it will be for the Japanese and Korean economies—for consumers, public finances, land prices, and the farmers who remain. Among his many writings on agricultural policy, he is author of the seminal wookWorld Agriculture in Disarray (Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 1973 and 1992).     

亚太经合组织中区域利益和成员利益的冲突与协调——APEC成立十周年回顾与展望

亚太经合组织（ＡＰＥＣ） 是区域利益的代表。作为成员利益的集中体现,ＡＰＥＣ 的区域利益主要由贸易投资自由化和经济技术合作两大部分组成。由于发达成员和发展中成员在以上两个方面有不同的利益追求,ＡＰＥＣ 中区域利益和成员利益一直存在着冲突。在过去的十年中,贸易投资自由化和经济技术合作的不平衡发展使这种冲突逐渐表面化。展望未来,ＡＰＥＣ 的持续发展有赖于成员经济体享有充分灵活性的基础上,通过协商一致,处理好发达成员和发展中成员的利益分歧     

Harmonizing investment incentives in the APEC process

Security of access to markets is critically important in international trade in goods and services. Security is also critically important to foreign direct investment. With the “globalization” of production, international attention has been turning to improving the institutional environment for FDI, especially in developing economies. In APEC, the focus has been on principles and a non-binding code, but in due course the focus will have to shift to a binding agreement with rules that instill the confidence needed for providers of capital to invest in the major infrastructure projects that will make a difference in East Asia’s development. The focus here is on limits on the level of investment incentives that governments can use to attract foreign investors.