Crime Volume and Law and Order Culture

The literature on public opinion about crime and justice has neglected the exploration of macro‐ or community‐level influences on individual‐level attitudes. A key macrofactor that may be related to individual level attitudes is the volume of violent crime. High crime rates can facilitate the development of a culture of “law and order,” a response that may be a practical or instrumental attempt to control crime. The present paper tests the hypothesis that persons residing in nations marked by a high volume of crime will be more likely to adhere to elements of a law and order culture. It employs data from the International Social Science Program (N = 15,024). Controls are taken from major theoretical perspectives on public opinion about crime as well as demographic factors. The results from a hierarchical linear model support the hypothesis that individuals residing in nations with high crime rates are more likely than others to support law and order ideologies. The findings extend the support for this relationship from research based on the US alone to other industrialized societies.     

Social support and homicide in transitional Russia

Like the United States, Russia is a large industrialized nation with high violence rates. Although its overall homicide rate is among the highest in the world, however, local rates of crime vary widely. Similarly, the level of social support provided by the state varies throughout Russia due to former Soviet policies, the differential pace of political and economic change, and the level of development. Relying upon recent criminological literature on social support theory, this study tested the hypotheses that areas with higher levels of social support will have lower homicide rates and that the effects of negative socioeconomic change on homicide rates will be moderated by levels of social support. Utilizing data from Russian regions (n = 78) and controlling for other structural covariates, negative binomial regression was employed to estimate the effects of social support on regional homicide rates. As expected, negative socioeconomic change was associated with higher homicide rates, but the results provided no support for direct or conditioning effects of social support on homicide. The findings are discussed in the context of Russia-specific conditions and of the meaning of these findings for recent research on social support and crime.     

ANALYZING URBAN CRIME DATA: Deterrence and the Limitations of Arrests per Offense Ratios

Police reports of Index crimes, arrests, and population estimates for 1960 through 1977 for 49 U.S. cities are used to compare trends in arrest rates, crime rates, and the arrests per crime (A/C) ratio-a measure sometimes correlated with crime rates to assess the deterrent effect of arrest. Since the correlation of the A/C ratio with the crime rate can produce tautological results in a trend analysis. comparisons of trends for crime rates and arrest rates for specific cities are examined. The results do not support a deterrence hypothesis. but indicate that the A/C ratios for some of the nation's largest cities are unstable over time and sensitive to changes in reporting practices. The analysis illustrates the pitfalls encountered when data limitations are overlooked and underscores the need for more dependable measures of crime, apprehension, and punishment.     

Fear of Crime in Botswana: Impact of Gender,Victimization, and Incivility

The subject of fear of crime has generated a substantial body of empirical study within Western industrialized society. However, the current focus on comparative criminology inspires efforts to study fear of crime cross culturally. This study attempts to assess some of the widely accepted predictors and conclusions of fear of crime found in developed nations on the urbanized capital city of Botswana. More specifically, in this article, the author explores the relationships between gender, victimization, incivility, and fear of crime in Gaborone, Botswana. Findings suggest that gender, victimization, and, in part, the environment are all useful in explaining fear of crime in Gaborne. However, it appears that gender, more than victimization and incivility, is itself a genuinely powerful determinant of fear of crime.     

CHILD SUPPORT REFORMS

The use of the Australian equivalent to the Internal Revenue Service is described and the far-reaching efforts of the Australian government to collect. Readers from other countries will recognize similar themes: noncompliance with orders, establishing orders in a majority of cases, providing an efficient means for modifying support awards, creation of two classes of enforcement—for those receiving public support and for those who are entitled to support and do not receive pensions, the use of statistics regarding compliance, and many others. This article documents the common concerns for all modern, industrialized nations in ensuring adequate support for children.     

CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATION IN HOMICIDES: IS RACE A FACTOR?

J. P. Rushton has done research indicating that predominantly black nations have higher rates of violent crime than predominantly white nations, which have higher rates than predominantly Asian nations. He attributes these differences to constitutional, inheritable factors on which the races vary. This article discusses the numerous problems with Rushton's use of international crime data and analysis, foremost of which are his use of one-way analysis of variance and lack of consideration of other causes of variation. Regression analysis-including dummy race variables and other relevant explanatory variables-indicates no significant association between race and cross-national homicide rates, the best and probably only valid indicator of cross-national variation in violent crime. This is the case whether reanalyzing Rush-ton's data or analyzing properly adjusted, inspected, and selected homicide rates.     

Democratization Processes and Homicide Rates in the Balkan Region,Bulgaria and Romania

The transition of countries from an autocratic to a democratic regime is a complex process characterized by big political, social and economic changes. This process is usually accompanied by an increase in violent crime rates which has been investigated by a large number of studies in the last decades. A special role in this analysis is played by the studies on the former communist countries, especially the ones that stress the relationship between post-communist regimes and the exponential rise of violent crime rates experienced in their transition. The majority of these studies have tried to explain the violent crime booms, but no research empirically tested if violent crime is willing to decrease as democracies consolidated. According to one of the most recent studies by Alvazzi del Frate and Mugellini, the Western Balkan region and a large number of “Non-Western” countries have recently experienced a drop in their homicide rates which has not been empirically analysed yet. This article aims at fulfilling this lack of knowledge by empirically analyzing eight countries of the Balkan region, Bulgaria and Romania. The main hypothesis is that, in terms of reduction of violent crime, there is a benefit in shifting from a transitional to a more democratic regime in post-communist countries. Data on Polity score and homicide rate from 1995 to 2011 were collected to conduct a fixed effect panel data analysis on the level of democracy and violent crime in the Balkan region, Bulgaria and Romania confirming a negative association between the two variables.     

Crime and Justice in Japan: Implications for the United States

Examining official statistics from the United States since the mid-1960's, we see rapidly increasing rates of crime. Japan, on the other hand, has experienced rates that have dramatically declined during this same period. In fact, Japan is the only industrialized non-communist nation where crime has been decreasing. This paper summarizes the structural/cultural and justice related reasons for this phenomenon. Implications for the United States are specified.     

RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN EXPOSURE TO CRIME: THE CITY AND SUBURBS OF CLEVELAND IN 1990*

Do minorities live in higher crime neighborhoods because they lack the class resources to live in better areas, or do racial differences in exposure to crime persist even for blacks and whites of comparable backgrounds? Does living in the suburbs reduce exposure to crime equally for whites and blacks? This study analyzes the determinants of living in local areas with higher or lower crime rates in the Cleveland metropolitan region in 1990. Multivariate models are estimated for whites and blacks, with separate models for city and suburban residents and for violent crime and property crime. Within the city, exposure to both types of crime is strongly related to socioeconomic status for both races, but there are also strong independent effects of race on exposure to violent crime. In the suburbs, whites are concentrated in communities with low crime rates regardless of their social class. There are substantial class differences among suburban nonwhites, but even afluent blacks live in places with a higher violent crime rate than do poor whites.     

The Economic Cost of Crime in Chile

This study estimates that the economic cost of crime in Chile, using the accountancy method, is $1.35 billion as at 2002; that is, this cost is equivalent to 2.06% of Chile's GDP. Crimes included in the estimation are murder, robbery, larceny–theft, burglary, wounding, rape and sexual assaults, domestic violence and economic felonies such as fraud, forgery and so on. Consequential costs are the most important, representing 68% of the total cost of crime. Government spending represents 23% of the total and anticipatory cost account for the remaining 9%. Chile presents higher level of crime than most developed countries—though less than most developing nations—but government's spending on citizen's security is considerably lower than that of the US and several other European countries.     

A COMPARISON OF DELINQUENCY TRENDS

Comparative data are presented assessing trends in the juvenile crime rates for Japan and the United States over the past decade. Both court and arrest records show that the rate of juvenile crime has increased substantially in the United States while remaining essentially stable in Japan. The analyses demonstrate that this conclusion holds even when appropriate controls are introduced for the age groups involved. Suggestions are made for future research that might explain the differences reported for the two nations.     

The Effect of Police Personnel Levels on Crime Clearance Rates: A Cross-National Analysis

A recent upsurge in governmental concern about police efficiency has produced a plethora of evaluative studies. Most of these studies have assumed a relationship between police activity and crime that has been, during the past eight years, seriously questioned. The present study investigates this relationship by employing a cross-national sample to resolve past methodological problems. Based on previous literature, the social conflict, economic, and political factors that confound the relationship between police personnel levels and crime clearance effects are identified and then controlled through regression analysis.

The findings indicate that the number of police has a negative effect on clearance rates. However, its effect is minimal. In addition, the social structural characteristics of nations explain more variance in clearance rates than do the levels of police, as well as attenuate the observed relationship between the police personnel and crimes cleared by arrest. Of special interest is the finding that increased system openness as well as concern for political and civil rights positively affects clearance rates, a finding which runs counter to current justice thinking.     

Cashlessness and Street Crime: A Cross-national Study of Direct Deposit Payment and Robbery Rates

Substantial variation in national crime rates suggests social structure and cultural context influence offending and victimization. Several prominent criminological theories anticipate a positive association between the prevalence of cash in a society and its rates of pecuniary crime. We examined the association between one form of “cashlessness” and national robbery rates across nations (n = 67), controlling for several structural covariates of national crime rates. We obtained data on robbery from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and data on government-based cashlessness from the Global Financial Inclusion Database. We found nations with higher levels of government-based cashlessness had lower robbery rates (β = ?.41, p = .02). We also undertook several sensitivity analyses, including tests for a relationship with commercial cashlessness and for crimes like homicide and burglary. Our results suggest technological advancements that reduce cash in a society may have implications for a nation’s robbery rates.     

Murder in the shadows: evidence for an institutional legitimacy theory of crime

The focus on the institutional control of violent crime has increased over the past few decades, stimulated largely by Messner and Rosenfeld’s “institutional anomie theory.” A related theory, referred to as “institutional legitimacy theory” in this study, has received considerably less attention. This theory, originating in the social control theoretical tradition, is tested in an analysis of homicide rates (circa 2012) across 108 nations. Overall, institutional legitimacy theory receives support as economic, political, familial, and religious institutional legitimacy assist in reducing homicide rates across societies. Most notably, homicide is positively associated with the size of the shadow economy (the measure of waning economic institutional legitimacy), consistent with the hypothesis that parties lacking institutional redress are more likely to use unilateral violence to resolve grievances.     

Islamic courts and corrections

This paper explores Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure. There are some differences among Islamic states but these differences are relatively minor. Muslims are tried in Sharia Courts for offenses found in the Quran. Non‐Muslims can not be held to the same standard (Apostasy). All people are subject to the jurisdiction of Mazalim Courts which handle taxation, traffic, and other administrative functions.

Islamic Law has three major divisions of crime: 1. Hadith Crimes (most serious); 2. Quesa Crimes and Diya (restitution); and 3. Tazir Crimes (least serious).

Islamic Law has many similar “defenses to crime” as the Common Law nations. They use puberty of a juvenile as the age of accountability. Police must obtain a search warrant for property. The punishment philosophies are similar to western views in theory, but they do apply these ideas in much different ways. Many punishments are public and done as a deterrent for others. Islamic judges have more freedom for sentencing options than western judges. They have mandatory sentences for only a few of the most serious Hadith Crimes. Some in the popular media point to the harshness of Islamic Law, and conclude that it must be wrong. They have very low crime rates and few social problems. We conclude that Islamic Law is not wrong, only different.     

Culture,Philosophy and Crime: The Japanese Experience

As societies modernize, one usually sees rapidly increasing rates of conventional crime. Contrary to this trend, Japan has experienced patterns that have either declined or remained basically horizontal during this process. In fact, this Oriental society is one of the few nations that has not had a positive development/crime correlation. Expanding on a societal explanatory approach suggested by Reischauer, this article describes how cultural traditions within Japan may explain this phenomenon, how their dark side of crime is also related to these cultural features, and how Implications for research are specified.     

The traffic in garbage and hazardous wastes: an overview

The traffic in garbage and hazardous wastes is a huge illicit transnational business that involves a wide array of criminals, including private entities, corrupt public officials, and organized crime groups. The traffic in CFCs and radioactive materials and the chemical by-products of illicit crop cultivation and production are related problems with significant negative environmental and social consequences. Inelastic demand, price differentials among industrialized and developing nations, corruption, incongruent international regulations, a lack of political will, and the emergence of waste brokers are all factors that drive the illegal trade and inhibit law enforcement. While regulatory and criminal justice efforts have been mostly ineffective, technological innovations that reduce waste and the costs of safe disposal may limit opportunities for waste traffickers. The right mix of subsidies and taxation as well as monitoring and compliance at the local level could make legal disposal more attractive, and thus further inhibit criminal opportunities.     

The Juvenile Delinquency Problem in Japan: Application of a Role Relationship Model

The purpose of this paper is to seek a better understanding of the social conditions within Japan which may be related to the increasing rates of juvenile delinquency. This trend is in sharp contrast to their overall crime patterns. In fact, as reported by Ames (1981:1), Japan has the lowest crime rate in the industrialized world, and its crime totals have declined since 1955. Within this article, we discuss youth crime trends, explain the applicability of a role relationship model, discuss the breakdown in informal social control/social relationship areas, and suggest implications for Western societies.     

Liberation/Emancipation, Economic Marginalization, or Less Chivalry

The alleged criminogenic nature of female liberation/emancipation has been tested recently by numerous North American researchers. Not only did the results lead them to different conclusions, but they did not test simultaneously for the effects on female conviction rates of increasing economic marginalization or less chivalrous treatment by the public, police, or courts toward female suspects. Data relating to England and Wales for 1951-1980 are used to test these competing explanations for changes in female criminality. The results give little support to the emancipation/liberation causes female crime hypothesis, but do provide limited support for the marginalization thesis. However, changes in social labelling appear to have a significant impact on female conviction rates, suggesting that previous researches omitting this possibility were seriously deficient. The authors suggest further research on actual women's lives and behavioral responses as a means of testing the effects of liberation/emancipation and marginalization on female criminal behavior.     

DO CELLMATES MATTER? A CAUSAL TEST OF THE SCHOOLS OF CRIME HYPOTHESIS WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION AND DETERRENCE THEORIES

In the schools of crime hypothesis, social interactions between inmates are assumed to produce criminogenic rather than deterrent prison peer effects, thus implicating them in the persistence of high recidivism rates and null or criminogenic prison effects. We assess the validity of the schools of crime hypothesis by estimating prison peer effects that result from differential cellmate associations in a male, first‐time release cohort from the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. To isolate causal prison peer effects in the presence of essential heterogeneity, we use a semiparametric local instrumental variables estimation strategy. Our results do not support the school of crime hypothesis. In our sample, prison peer effects produced in interaction with more criminally experienced cellmates are always null or deterrent rather than criminogenic. Although we do not explicitly test for the operant conditioning mechanisms theorized to underlie social influence in the context of differential association, we argue that, under the assumption that the differential association context relates positively to the direction of peer influence, our universally noncriminogenic estimates exclude direct reinforcement, vicarious reinforcement, and direct punishment as potential drivers of prison peer effects produced in interaction with more criminally experienced cellmates. Our results support the assertion that operant conditioning mechanisms connect differential association and deterrence theories.