Stalinism as a Civilization: New Perspectives on Communist Regimes

A new line of inquiry into the history of communist regimes and the cold war has emerged. Pioneered by Stephen Kotkin and other American historians, it views Stalinism as the defining era of socialism, building a specific anti-capitalist and illiberal modernity that mustered voluntary participation and international legitimacy. This model of Stalinism as a rival civilization, held together by participatory totalitarianism, challenges older research on communist regimes – both revisionist and totalitarian studies. However, the degree of originality of this perspective is questioned here, citing precursors, parallels and contrasts within European research and political science.     

Modernity Gone Awry: Lefort on Totalitarian and Democratic Self-representation

Abstract

This essay starts by reviewing Claude Lefort's writings on totalitarianism, a theme that runs like a red thread through his oeuvre and plays a key role in the different stages of his intellectual development. The analysis of the USSR is a central interest of Lefort and his colleagues at Socialisme ou Barbarie (and inspires them to adopt an explicitly "political" approach against the "economism" of their fellow Marxists); the problem of totalitarianism features prominently in Lefort's theory of democracy and human rights (where it functions as the "flipside" of democracy); and the theme holds Lefort's attention well after the events of 1989. The emphasis of this essay, however, is not on the chronology of Lefort's trajectory, but on the methodological role of totalitarianism in his theoretical framework. Lefort's account of totalitarianism serves him as a tool to dissect the symbolic fabric of modern society. In Arendt's view, totalitarian rule reveals something of the essence of modernity, as a movement towards ever increasing technical mastery. For Lefort, by contrast, totalitarian tendencies arise as an attempt to close off the experience of indeterminacy that has been opened up by political modernity. He shows that the totalitarian "imaginary" (which he dissects in psychoanalytic terms) presupposes yet deliberately inverts the very ideas that sparked the democratic revolution and that are central to the self-representation of democratic societies. In consequence, democracy is continuously at risk of degenerating into totalitarianism. Importantly, the totalitarian threat, which Lefort believes to be the main threat to modern society, only becomes visible by adopting a specifically "political" perspective. It is therefore of the utmost importance that we continue to under stand and to interpret our society in "political" terms, that is, in reference to the symbolic constellation of collective power.     

DIALOGUE SECTION

Absract The categories of biopolitics and biopower were invented by Michel Foucault, who wanted to underline a shifting in state political power toward the caring of biological life of the entire social body. This transformation of political power allowed a combination of techniques that aimed to control the individual body and the standardised multitude of bodies. This paper analyses the biopolitical mechanisms and how did they work during the era of totalitarian states, and how do they act today. During the totalitarian era, biopolitics became a tool of surveillance and regulation of the social body, shifting toward racism. During the second half of the 20th century, biopolitics sought to minimise social risks. Criminal and underclass policies, as well as new genetics, are all aspects of the new authoritarian biopolitics. Far from being a neutral tool to improve people's well being, the spectre of eugenics casts a shadow over the new biopolitics.     

A Lockean Theory of Territory

In this article I defend a straightforward application of Lockean property arguments to territorial rights. The article is divided into three parts. In the first part I explain the difference between two rights to land: property rights and territorial rights. In the second part I explain why an individualistic account of a Lockean theory of territory cannot be used to theorise about territorial rights. In the third part I defend a collectivist version of Lockean theory of territory. I argue that it is possible to apply directly Lockean principles regarding land use to territorial rights. I punctuate my defence with examples where Lockean principles are intuitively helpful in resolving conflicts over territorial rights.     

John Locke’s America

This essay argues that John Locke’s thought has been a significant influence on how Americans understand public life and that this remains true despite contemporary conservative arguments that Progressivism is ascendant while our Lockean founding is in retreat. Many of the things conservatives bemoan—same-sex marriage, for example—can be understood in Lockean terms. Moreover, Lockean individualism can be consistent with a robust sense of community. Yet it is striking that a most Lockean virtue—responsibility—is altogether missing from critical accounts of Locke’s influence on American politics and culture.     

The State of Enslavement: the East European Substitute for the State of Nature

Comparing the Soviet-type political system before the emergence of independent groups and movements with the state of nature in the contractarian tradition indicates that both these conditions havecommon features. The situation under the Soviet-type system is reminiscent of the state of nature since it has a pre-political, analytical, as well as a normative character. However, the Fact that the condition under the Soviet-type system is real and the state of nature is fictive poses a challenge to social contract orthodoxy which exclusively ascribes the pre-political and normative components to the state of nature. This interpretation renders invalid the main argument of the critics of contractarianism: that social contract theory is based upon the fictive state of nature and, therefore, upon the concept of an abstract human nature. Moreover, under special circumstances, it permits us to consider social contract theory not only as normative but also as empirical     

Unravelling the Putin Myth: Strong or Weak Caesar?

Having left office, the legacy of Putin will be examined in a multitude of different ways and from a variety of contrasting positions. The approach suggested here is that Putin can be seen as a leader who embarked upon a series of Caesarist strategies in order to create a stable and distinct sociological base for the post-communist Russian state. Its success can be assessed by whether Putin managed to appear as a 'strong prince' and/or succeeded in harmonising Russian civil and political society towards a hegemonic state, or whether he ultimately failed to solve the problems of instability that were left by his predecessor.     

The Future of British Political History: Concluding Remarks

These concluding remarks reflect, in the light of the preceding articles, on two themes that recur throughout the collection. First, how can historians maintain an effective presence in public debate about politics in Britain? Second, how should political historians position themselves within the discipline, at a time when—it is suggested—political history is losing ground among British academic historians? It is argued here that, in each case, they should reflect on what they can most distinctively contribute, either as historians or as political historians; and that they should frame their interventions accordingly.     

A Russian Citizen in Uniform? Assessing the Applicability of the German Model of Civil—Military Relations to the Armed Forces of a Democratising Russian State

A key element in determining the prospects for success in transforming totalitarian political systems into democratic political systems is the extent to which the armed forces can be included in the democratisation process and brought under constitutional, civilian and political control. In the aftermath of the 1998 financial crisis in Moscow and the probable retreat of democracy in Russia, this utterly critical question assumes even more importance. This article is concerned with the problem of devising a new system of civil—military relations for a democratising post-Soviet Russian state, particularly the relevance of the German citizen in uniform model to the armed forces of the Russian Federation. After a brief history of the German system of civil—military relations, the author proceeds to analyse the German model in detail. The paper then assesses the current context of the Russian state, society and armed forces before evaluating the prospects for the successful application of the German system of civil—military relations to Russia. The author concludes that the German system is inapplicable because Russia does not presently possess the socio-political structures and norms to sustain such a system of civil—military relations. However, the article proposes an immediately viable third strategy for democratising Russian civil—military relations which does not rely either on the inappropriate German model or on meekly managing the intolerable status quo.     

Privatizing the housing sector: The case of Slovakia

The events of the 1980s generated the end of an era in central Europe—an era characterized by central, planned economies and totalitarian political structures. As each new country struggled to create democratic political processes and market economies, many problems emerged; one of the most vexing was the privatization of housing. In Slovakia, individual family housing had never been nationalized, leaving most of the rural and village families owning their own homes. Apartment houses, as well as multiple dwellings and estates, however, had been nationalized. Consequently, the state created a Restitution Act early on (1990), so that people could reclaim properties unjustly taken from them. In addition, the state had built considerable housing units (usually high-rise apartment blocks); many of these units were simply rented to individual families. But there had also been state construction companies that operated as co-operatives, such that rent payments were credited toward the eventual ownership of the housing. Lastly, many large industries (state owned) had built housing units, which they rented to their employees. But there were not nearly enough housing units, and many people, especially young people, newlyweds, and elderly, were on waiting lists for housing. In all cases ‘rent’ was almost negligible as were utilities, and since there were no taxes or insurance, the total amount of a family budget spent for housing was, on average, quite meagre. This, then, was the situation confronting the new government in 1990. Beginning with data from 1988, this article examines the economic restructuring, apartment construction, changes in proprietary relations, and issues as yet unresolved regarding the privatization of housing in Slovakia.     

Slavery: a dual-equilibrium model with some historical examples

What sustains slavery, and why at critical junctures—the fall of the Roman Empire, the early modern expansion of plantation agriculture, the later phases of the industrial revolution, the totalitarian regimes of the 1930s—has it often expanded or contracted so rapidly? Why have elites sometimes been united, but sometimes violently divided, over the choice between free and servile labor? Why has slavery usually been ended by legal prohibition rather than voluntary abandonment? An extremely simple dual-equilibrium picture can illuminate how, when, and with whose support slavery is introduced or abolished. Internal divisions over slavery are likely to be most intense as a society approaches either of these “tipping points.” The most striking example, explored fleetingly here, is the US Civil War.     

The Rise of Citizen Groups? The Mobilization and Representation of Danish Interest Groups, 1975–2010

Over the last several decades, a number of societal changes can be expected to have led to the increased mobilization of interest groups representing citizen interests. For this mobilization to be effective, citizen groups need to win access to relevant political arenas. This article investigates the development of the Danish interest group system and the representation of interest groups in political arenas. While replicating findings of increasing citizen mobilization from other countries is expected, it is argued here that the development of groups’ political representation as a consequence of this mobilization depends on the dynamics of resource exchange in different political arenas. This argument is tested on a unique dataset of Danish interest groups in 1975 and 2010 which includes data on group populations and group access to the administration and the media. The analysis demonstrates that citizen groups must overcome not only the challenge of organizing, but also persistent logics guiding the inclusion of, interest groups in different political arenas. Citizen groups have been more successful in increasing their representation in the media than in the administrative arena.     

Political values in independent agencies

Despite that independent agencies are typically justified in terms of technical efficiency, they inevitably have to make political judgments. How can political reasoning be legitimate in such institutions? This paper starts by investigating the merits of two prominent models. The “avoidance model” asks agency reasoning to stick to empirical facts and as far as possible stay clear of political values. By contrast, the “specification model” recognizes the need for constructive normative work, but confines it to the refinement of given statutes. This paper challenges both models and defends a third alternative. The “public reason model” requires agencies to ground their value judgments in a publicly accessible framework of reasoning, which is here interpreted as their overarching mandate. The paper argues that agency mandates should be conceived as distinct domains of reasoning, and it delineates three institutional virtues that enable agencies to track this domain.     

Whither Individualism?

Peter Lawler intelligently challenges conservatives to make the best of Lockean individualism, to recognize its natural limits and its debt to Christianity, and he downplays Tocqueville’s concern that a loss of virtue must lead to a rise in statism. But he does not see clearly enough that individualism and statism have always been two sides of the same coin, or that the Christian pedigree of Lockean individualism is not necessarily good news. It is true enough that individual liberty will always depend upon virtue, but it does not follow that liberty will always generate virtue. If the failure of virtue does not lead to statism, then where it does lead may still not be very pretty.     

Ideocracy and Totalitarianism: A Formal Analysis Incorporating Ideology

In the present paper it is shown how totalitarianregimes can arise or be averted depending on theconditions described by the parameters and the initialvalues of the system. The main reason for theevolution of totalitarian regimes is the presence ofbelievers who are convinced that others have to beconverted to the supreme values of their ideology fortheir well-being and, possibly, that there existinconvertible enemies of their creed whose presence isobnoxious to them and to the absolute truths of theirideology. Believers are thus prepared to spendresources on winning new converts and to win thesecular power of the state. Whether they succeed inthis endeavour depends on the costs of converting newbelievers and on the amount of resources they areprepared to spend for this purpose, given theiravailable incomes and their propensity to consume.Their chances to succeed are greater if a crisisoccurs, an event which is usually outside of theircontrol. Once secular power has been secured, theresources of the state can be used to win moreconverts, to drive into exile or to killinconvertibles and to try to reach the imperialisticaims implied by the ideology. If the latter is not thecase, the regime may turn into a mature ideocracyafter having reached its domestic aims. This would forinstance be the case, if all inconvertibles had beenremoved and all the other population been converted. Inthis case no further terror and (or) repressionscharacteristic of totalitarian regimes are required. If the ideology implies ambitious imperialistic aims,for instance the conversion of all people on earth(except for inconvertibles) or the domination of thewhole globe by the believers, it is highly probablethat these aims cannot be reached. As a consequenceeither a war is lost and leads to the removal of thetotalitarian regime, or the ends have to be adapted tomaintain the credibility of the ideology. But then thetotalitarian state may again turn into a matureideocracy, if the ideology has been reinterpreted toremove its unrealistic imperialistic aims. Or thechange of the ideology weakens the regime in a waythat it loses its proselytizing character altogether,and turns into an ordinary autocratic regime.     

Imposing Procedural Constraints on State Administrative Agencies: An Empirical Investigation of Competing Explanations

Scholars have offered different explanations for administrative procedures. One general approach stresses the importance of normative theory as a determinant of institutional choice, while two other perspectives emphasize the interests and political influence of pressure groups and legislators. To test these models, this study uses comparative state data to predict the adoption of three types of administrative procedures-legislative rule review, procedural requirements opening up the rulemaking process to public participation, and economic impact analysis. The findings suggest that factors associated with the adoption of one kind of administrative requirement may not be associated with the use of others. The analysis also suggests that, while ideology, political culture, and party competition intermittently affect the adoption of particular administrative procedures, they do not always have the kinds of effects that are suggested by the traditional state policy making literature.     

When US Scholars Speak of 'Sovereignty', What Do They Mean?

The term 'sovereignty' figures prominently in international affairs and academic analysis. But does 'sovereignty' mean the same thing in different countries and political cultures? In this article, we examine conceptions of sovereignty as they appear in the writings of US scholars of international law and those international relations scholars who deal with international law, in order to obtain a clearer picture of what 'sovereignty' means in American academic discourse. At first glance, the US literature is dominated by two distinct conceptions of sovereignty: (1) a statist conception that privileges the territorial integrity and political independence of governments regardless of their democratic or undemocratic character; (2) a popular conception that privileges the rights of peoples rather than governments, especially when widespread human rights violations are committed by a totalitarian regime. On closer examination, what seem to be two conceptions are in fact different manifestations of a single, uniquely American conception of sovereignty which elevates the United States above other countries and protects it against outside influences while concurrently maximising its ability to intervene overseas.     

What Is Political Science? What Should It Be?

This paper examines the five myths that govern political science: that it studies politics; that it is scientific; that one can study politics cut off from the other social sciences and history; that the state is neutral; and that the bulk of the work in the discipline furthers the cause of democracy. Within political science, there have been three main approaches to criticizing these myths: a moderate one that treats the elements in these myths as more or less disconnected; a radical one that sees a systemic connection between these elements; and a Marxist one that names this system "Capitalism" and privileges the role of the capitalist state in explaining both politics and political science.     

The Lockean Case for Religious Tolerance: The Social Contract and the Irrationality of Persecution

John Locke's non-religious arguments for tolerance are often seen as inadequate. He is criticized for: (1) failing to give reasons in support of a strict separation between the roles of church and state; and (2) wrongly insisting that the coercion of belief is irrational. I argue that once we understand Locke's arguments for tolerance within the context of his social contract framework, his non-sectarian arguments can circumvent such criticisms. Lockean arguments for tolerance are thus stronger than typically supposed.     

Misreading One's Sources: Charles Taylor's Rousseau

This article challenges Taylor's defense of community by criticizing his reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Taylor, who adheres to the old charge that Rousseau is at bottom a totalitarian, neglects several points of resistance to the claims of the community that are present in Rousseau's political thought. Such points of resistance prove, on close examination, to be unavailable to Taylor. Taylor inadvertently offers a theoretical attack on individualism and a foundation for social tyranny more powerful than any to be found in Rousseau's thought.