Implementing International Human Rights Law at Home: Domestic Politics and the European Court of Human Rights

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) boasts one of the strongest oversight systems in international human rights law, but implementing the ECtHR??s rulings is an inherently domestic and political process. This article begins to bridge the gap between the Court in Strasbourg and the domestic process of implementing the Court??s rulings by looking at the domestic institutions and politics that surround the execution of the ECtHR??s judgments. Using case studies from the UK and Russia, this article identifies two factors that are critical for the domestic implementation of the Court??s rulings: strong domestic, democratic institutions dedicated to implementing the ECtHR??s judgments and an overarching sense of responsibility to set a good example at home and abroad for respecting human rights and the rule of law. This article concludes with a discussion of the steps necessary to facilitate better implementation of the ECtHR??s rulings.     

Violence,Nonviolence, and the Effects of International Human Rights Law

Under what conditions are individuals more likely to approve of human rights abuses by their governments? While various theoretical expectations have been offered about public approval of repression, many of them have not been directly tested. We analyze the effects of differing opposition tactics, differing government tactics, and legal constraints on approval of repression through a series of survey experiments in India, Israel, and Argentina. Our results indicate that violent action by opposition groups consistently increases support for government repression. In the context of contentious politics, we find that the effects of international law vary by national context. While our respondents in India were less likely to approve of their government when told the government violated international law, the same information likely increased approval of the government in our Israel experiment. The findings provide insights into the microfoundations of existing theories and suggest areas for theory refinement.     

Norms and Human Rights in International Relations

The three volumes on human rights reviewed here constitute the first wave of in-depth case studies of human rights from a constructivist approach in international relations. By acknowledging the theoretical contributions of these works, identifying their shortcomings and engaging in critiques of the authors' conceptions of identity and norms, this article provides direction for future studies on human rights through the constructivist framework.
Foot, R. (2000) Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle Over Human Rights in China . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Risse, T., Ropp, S. C. and Sikkink, K. (eds) (1999) The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thomas, D. C. (2001) The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism . Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.     

Dealing With Human Rights in International Organizations

Over time human rights have gained prominence in international organizations. At the same time, dealing with them has proved difficult and contentious. The present article focuses on the way in which the United Nations have addressed human rights issues, especially through the Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and its successor the Human Rights Council (UNHRC). Drawing on data on resolutions debated and (largely) adopted in these two bodies in the last 17 years, I offer a comparison of the voting record in these two periods. By analyzing in detail in a comparative fashion the votes in these two bodies, the article shows that despite the high hopes, the UNHRC faces some of the same challenges as its predecessor. More specifcally, I find that the conflict lines have largely remained the same in these two bodies, and the degree of polarization has slightly increased in the new UNHRC.     

Delivering Lasting Peace, Democracy and Human Rights in Times of Transition: The Role of International Law

¹The increasing scope of international legal regulation, particularlyin the field of human rights, has facilitated the impositionof sustained policies of domestic reform aimed at entrenchinginternationally accepted standards of governance in transitionalsocieties. At the point of such societal change, however, thesymbolism of who makes and enforces the law is important. Thequestion of the relationship between national and internationallaw is therefore one that bears scrutiny. This article examinesthe theoretical basis upon which such policies are based, namelythe idea of a liberal peace, considering the extent to whichthe blanket implementation of international standards can addressthe need of transitional societies to reestablish the legitimacyof both political and legal authority in order to ensure thefuture protection of human rights.     

Domestic Attitudes Towards International Jurisdiction over Human Rights Violations

Building on research regarding the influence of national identity salience on attitudes towards international institutions and the impact of nationalism on foreign policy preferences, in a case study of America, I explore the role of chauvinistic nationalism to understand its impact on attitudes towards international jurisdiction of punishment for alleged human rights violations by members of the American military. Using binomial regression of survey responses from the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, I find that respondents with higher levels of chauvinistic nationalist sentiment also have higher levels of opposition to the jurisdiction of international legal institutions to prosecute members of a nation’s military. This study is the first of its kind to offer a systematic and multivariate explanation for public opinion towards the jurisdiction of international human rights institutions over a nation’s armed forces using national survey data.     

Reviving Social Rights in Latin America: The Potential Role of International Human Rights Documents

Social rights are essential to our ability to fully participate in society. In Latin America, these rights are increasingly marginalized as neoliberal policies take hold. At the same time, the related concepts of civil society and social capital are often incorporated into strategies aimed at alleviating the problems of the Latin American poor. It is expected that by strengthening people's civic capacity, their sense of mutual responsibility and ability to self-provide certain services will be enhanced. In the context of the current policy environment, however, such strategies are unlikely to be entirely successful. Lack of economic resources may preclude the Latin American poor from effective civic participation. More importantly, the promotion of civil society and social capital on the part of aid agencies and governments may represent an implicit threat to social rights, in as much as the organizations advocated are not likely to actively struggle for expansion of rights. Nevertheless, human rights documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child provide a base upon which rights-based movements can be constructed.     

Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements

Do national legislatures constitute a mechanism by which commitments to international human rights treaties can be made credible? Treaty ratification can activate domestic mechanisms that make repression more costly, and the legislative opposition can enhance these mechanisms. Legislative veto players raise the cost of formalistic repressive strategies by declining to consent to legislation. Executives can still choose to rely on more costly, extralegal strategies, but these could result in severe penalties for the leader and require the leader to expend resources to hide. Especially in treaty member‐states, legislatures can use other powers to also increase the cost of extralegal violations, which can further reduce repression. By using an empirical strategy that attempts to address the selection effects in treaty commitment decisions, I show that positive effects of human rights treaties increase when there are more legislative veto players.