British Diplomacy and the Telegraph in Nineteenth-Century China

Until the 1870s British officials in China often acted without the Foreign Office's official consent because they could only communicate with London via mail. In the 1870s telegraph lines connected China to Europe. The Chinese government initially opposed foreign telegraph lines arguing that they undermined Chinese authority. British diplomats in China were also wary of the telegraph because it allowed the Foreign Office to intervene more quickly. From the 1880s the telegraph was increasingly used as an instrument of imperialism in China. The Boxer Rebellion in 1900 showed how important the telegraph had become as means of communication.     

Red Star Ascending,Flagging Union Jack: Soviet Views on the Handover of Hong Kong

On 22 September 1982, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher met the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, where they discussed the future of Hong Kong. The meeting did not go well. Deng made it clear that, with or without British cooperation, China would resume full sovereignty and administration over the tiny colony when the lease on Hong Kong expired on 30 June 1997. This article is based on two recently released documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry Archive (AVP RF) and reveals the hitherto unknown Soviet attitude toward these talks and the handover itself. Soviet leaders were very concerned that the Chinese should not consider Soviet control over vast territories in the Far East as based on unequal, hence illegitimate, nineteenth century treaties, as they did British control over Hong Kong. If those Russian treaties were unequal, then Soviet rule would be in grave danger. The Soviets sought to distinguish their treaties from the British ones. Seeking normal relations, the Chinese agreed not to challenge this interpretation.     

Red Star Ascending, Flagging Union Jack: Soviet Views on the Handover of Hong Kong

On 22 September 1982, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher met the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, where they discussed the future of Hong Kong. The meeting did not go well. Deng made it clear that, with or without British cooperation, China would resume full sovereignty and administration over the tiny colony when the lease on Hong Kong expired on 30 June 1997. This article is based on two recently released documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry Archive (AVP RF) and reveals the hitherto unknown Soviet attitude toward these talks and the handover itself. Soviet leaders were very concerned that the Chinese should not consider Soviet control over vast territories in the Far East as based on unequal, hence illegitimate, nineteenth century treaties, as they did British control over Hong Kong. If those Russian treaties were unequal, then Soviet rule would be in grave danger. The Soviets sought to distinguish their treaties from the British ones. Seeking normal relations, the Chinese agreed not to challenge this interpretation.     

The German community in 19<Superscript>th</Superscript> century Hong Kong

This article examines the development of the German community in Hong Kong between the 1840s and the outbreak of the First World War. It pays particular attention to the question of how the Germans, as a minority group in the crown colony, attempted to strike a good balance between integration and segregation, cultural assimilation and dissimilation, national identity and marginalization. Through investigating their social life, missionary activities and economic activities in Hong Kong, it shows that they, on the one hand, cooperated closely with the British who were in charge of key political and economic affairs, and on the other hand worked with the local Chinese on different social stratums. Although the unification of Germany in 1870 strengthened the sense of nationhood among German people in Hong Kong, they strove to strengthen the German cultural and economic network that already existed in and around the colony, without sacrificing their business and social interests which were interwoven with those of the British and the local Chinese. It is this strategy that enabled them to survive in Hong Kong until 1914.     

The Eurafrique Initiative,Ernest Bevin and Anglo–French Relations in the Foreign Office, 1945–1950

This analysis examines the prevalence of Eurafrican thinking in the British Foreign Office throughout the late 1940s. Drawing on British and French diplomatic archives, it reveals the centricity of the Foreign Office, and British Embassy at Paris to a project largely confined to the mental map of the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. The financial stains facing Britain, often misinterpreted as “decline”, seemed a temporary phenomenon that “multilateral European cooperation” could rectify. Although shelved in 1949–1950, the Eurafrique initiative has seen few historians analyse its strategies across the corridors of power. This analysis reappraises British desires for Western European “co-operation” and a renewed faith in the Entente Cordiale as a geo-political counterweight to growing East–West bipolarity. Discussions of strategies to pool African possessions to recover the European economy were short-lived. Yet they challenged prospects of long-term economic dependence upon the United States in favour of an Anglo–French led European bloc.     

Anglo–American Relations and the Cold War in 1950

1950 was a crisis year in the Cold War and saw a growing rift between the United Kingdom and the United States over how best to wage it. It was in the Far East that the most dangerous crisis occurred. Britain recognised the People's Republic of China, not only because the Communist regime clearly controlled the mainland, but also because it was felt that it was not irretrievably linked to the Soviet Union. The United States, on the other hand, regarded China as a Soviet satellite and displayed a consistently hostile attitude towards it. The situation worsened with the outbreak of the Korean War in June. Although the United States and Britain agreed that the invasion of South Korea must be repelled, the British were anxious not to broaden the conflict, whilst the Americans used it as a stick to beat the Chinese. The war also prompted accelerated rearmament and the Americans favoured the rearmament of West Germany. Things came to a head in November, with the large-scale Chinese intervention in Korea, followed in early December by a visit to Washington by the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. The British believed that the United States had already concluded that a global war was inevitable, whereas they wished to avoid it if possible. As this article shows, the events of 1950 amply demonstrated the subordinate position of Britain in the “special relationship.”     

Powerless and Frustrated: Britain's Relationship With China During the Opening Years of the Second Sino–Japanese War, 1937–1939

Foreign policy is multi-faceted. It was not only diplomatic, political, socio-cultural, economic, Imperial, and strategic factors that structured—and limited—Britain's foreign policy during the interwar period; so, too, did those of other countries. Given the number and variety of Britain's—and the interconnected other Powers'—interests in China, Britain's relationship with China during the opening years of the Second Sino–Japanese War provides a useful insight which has wider implications on Britain's road to war narrative. Given the topic's neglect, one can be forgiven for inferring that events in Europe entirely eclipsed those of East Asia. This article demonstrates the contrary. As awareness of Chinese suffering spread and as Japanese aggrandisement threatened British interests, sinophilism became vogue once again. However, the often insurmountable obstacles that the interwar period presented to Britain and others—particularly the United States—limited Britain's ability to aid China. It was not for want of fortitude.     

Ernest Satow's Early Career as Diplomatic Interpreter

This article is concerned with Satow's seven years as diplomatic interpreter in the Japan of the fateful 1860s. He was sent first to Peking because the Foreign Office in its ignorance thought that Japanese was very similar to Chinese, but this detour did at least enable him to meet there another notable British diplomatic interpreter, Thomas Wade. He soon learned better about Japanese, and once he had mastered it fluently he became a privileged observer of traditional society and culture in the crucial period when it was being shaken by the first rumblings of the Meiji era. He was therefore able to render outstanding service to his head of mission, who was himself an ex-interpreter. Satow went on to enjoy a long and distinguished career in the diplomatic corps, rising from interpreter to ambassador.     

Ernest Satow's Early Career as Diplomatic Interpreter

This article is concerned with Satow's seven years as diplomatic interpreter in the Japan of the fateful 1860s. He was sent first to Peking because the Foreign Office in its ignorance thought that Japanese was very similar to Chinese, but this detour did at least enable him to meet there another notable British diplomatic interpreter, Thomas Wade. He soon learned better about Japanese, and once he had mastered it fluently he became a privileged observer of traditional society and culture in the crucial period when it was being shaken by the first rumblings of the Meiji era. He was therefore able to render outstanding service to his head of mission, who was himself an ex-interpreter. Satow went on to enjoy a long and distinguished career in the diplomatic corps, rising from interpreter to ambassador.     

Naturalist Law and Japan's Legitimization of Empire in Manchuria: Thomas Baty and Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Thomas Baty (1869–1954), a prolific, British international law scholar, achieved prominence in diplomatic affairs by serving as Japan's Foreign Legal Adviser in the years spanning two world wars. Baty's advice to the Japanese government was rooted in the non-mainstream natural law philosophy of international legal theory. Baty's law became the defence of the Japanese government before the League of Nations with Japan's occupation of Manchuria in the early 1930s. Baty contended that China's objections to Japanese actions had no basis in the natural fabric of the nation-state system since China was a non-state.     

Naturalist Law and Japan's Legitimization of Empire in Manchuria: Thomas Baty and Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Thomas Baty (1869-1954), a prolific, British international law scholar, achieved prominence in diplomatic affairs by serving as Japan's Foreign Legal Adviser in the years spanning two world wars. Baty's advice to the Japanese government was rooted in the non-mainstream natural law philosophy of international legal theory. Baty's law became the defence of the Japanese government before the League of Nations with Japan's occupation of Manchuria in the early 1930s. Baty contended that China's objections to Japanese actions had no basis in the natural fabric of the nation-state system since China was a non-state.     

Introduction

Even before 1865, it was an axiom that British foreign policy was designed and pursued to ensure international stability. Stability not only gave security to the British Isles and to its global Empire; it minimized disruptions to trade and commerce - the life-blood of 'Great' Britain. In the century after 1865, the pursuit of international stability remained at the heart of diplomatic initiatives supported by capable armed forces and a strong economy. The grand strategy by which successive British governments endeavoured to achieve these national and imperial ends involved the maintenance of a balance of power - both in Europe and in the wider world where the protection of British interests in the form of prestige, markets, strategic outposts, and lines of communication preoccupied cabinets, the Foreign Office, the service ministries, other departments of state, and, sometimes, public opinion. In one sense, there were a number of individual balances of power - in Western Europe, in the western and eastern Mediterranean, in the Western Hemisphere, in South Asia, and in the Far East and Pacific Ocean. In the British diplomatic parlance of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these balances were represented as 'questions', like the 'Eastern Question'; and the answers to these questions combined in the minds of those responsible for British foreign policy as representing a global balance of power. In this context, the European balance of power had decided importance because any continental disequilibrium could imperil the security of the home islands, the centre of the Empire, and the well-being of Britain's people and economy.     

Keeping a Foot in the Door: Britain's China Policy, 1945-50

Based on Britain and China 1945-1950 (DBPO, 2002), this article examines four major themes in Britain's China policy between 1945 and 1950: British attitudes towards Chinese communism and China's civil war, Anglo-American relations over China, attempts to restore and sustain British commerce in China, and the future of Hong Kong. The central feature of policy was to 'keep a foot in the door', even under a communist government, to protect British interests. Only modest success was achieved. British officials were divided over the issue of Chinese communism and Britain miscalculated the timescale in the ending of the civil war. The US administration proved largely uncooperative over China, and British commerce was eventually squeezed out. Hong Kong survived as a British colony. Amidst the considerable thought given to the future of Hong Kong, and to Britain's ability to defend it, intelligence reported that the communists had no plans to seize the colony.     

A Closed Book? British Intelligence and East Asia, 1945–1950

This article focuses on British intelligence in China, Japan, and Korea from the end of the Second World War to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. It seeks to ascertain whether the collection of secret intelligence and its subsequent interpretation provided an accurate picture of Soviet and local communist intentions in East Asia. Since the war against Japan began, the region was largely an American responsibility and remained so after 1945 when they occupied Japan, Korea below the 38^th parallel, and sent forces to China. Much of the intelligence effort for East Asia also devolved upon the Americans. Yet, the British retained an intelligence interest there not least because of their extensive commercial assets in China and the region's proximity to Britain's imperial position in Southeast Asia. That interest gathered pace after growing Communist threats inside China and Korea. However, the available intelligence resources for the Far East as a whole were scarce, making it difficult to piece together a clear picture of fast moving events in East Asia.     

Lord Home and Anglo–American Relations, 1961–1963

This article focuses on the role of Lord Home, the British Foreign Secretary, in the conduct of Anglo–American relations between 1961 and 1963. It studies three controversial policy areas: the newly independent states of Laos and the Congo, along with the debate over the decolonization of British Guiana; the key Cold War issues of Berlin and Cuba; and a variety of nuclear weapons–related matters. It is argued that Home, in constantly striving to maintain the alliance, was more pro-American than Macmillan. He exercised an important restraining and calming influence on the Prime Minister, preventing him from pursuing potentially damaging initiatives. However, the relationship between the two men was strong. Home’s diplomacy usually complimented Macmillan’s interventions and they often worked together.     

‘A question between empires’: the restriction of Japanese immigration in British Columbia and the reassessment of Japan's foreign policy, 1907–1908

Abstract

Great Britain was the first of the major Powers that revised its unequal treaty with Japan, recognizing the success of Japan's modernization and its growing role in the international arena. However, British Columbia perceived Japanese residents as a threat to ‘the British character’ of this regions' population profile. After the movement against Japanese residents in British Columbia peaked during the anti-Japanese riots in Vancouver in September of 1907, Canadian Minister of Labor Rodolphe Lemieux headed a diplomatic delegation to Tokyo to negotiate the restriction of Japanese immigration to Canada. The dispatch of this mission revealed some of the complexities in relations between the Colonial and Foreign Offices in London on the one hand and the Dominion's and British Columbian governments on the other. Based on previously unused primary sources, this article will examine the interplay between the policy towards Japanese migrants in the British Dominion of Canada and the British policy towards Japan as a nation.     

Britain and the Bonins: discovery,recovery and reclamation

In this article, I explore a little known aspect of British and Japanese history that began not long after Japan open its ports to the west in the middle of the nineteenth century. It is about negotiations between Japan and foreign powers over sovereign control of an island archipelago 1,000 kilometers southeast of Edo (Tokyo). The Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands were first visited by Japanese in the seventeenth century, declared British territory in 1827 and then reclaimed by Japan in 1876. The diplomatic discussions involved the British and US Consuls acting under instructions from their respective governments and negotiating with the highest levels of Japanese authority during both the Tokugawa and Meiji Periods. I argue that the islands were of little importance to either the governments of Britain or America and that the British authorities were more than willing to hand over sovereign control of the Bonin Islands to the Japanese as early as 1862. Indeed, by the mid-1870s, the British authorities in England were more concerned that the Japanese would not claim the islands and that Britain would be burdened with their responsibility. In arguing this, I provide a novel perspective of Japan's struggles with becoming a modern nation in an increasingly international setting.     

陈序经与泰族研究

英国、暹罗的学者认为泰族发源于中国南方 ,南诏是泰族建立的国家 ,忽必烈平定大理引起泰族大量南迁。陈序经教授是我国最先质疑和反对英、暹学者上述论调的学者之一 ,在我国泰族研究学术史上作出了重要的贡献。近年出版的《泰族起源问题研究》一书中提到 ,最先反对“南诏是泰族国家说”的我国学者是凌纯声(1938年12月发表《唐代云南的乌蛮与白蛮考》)、方国瑜(1939年12月发表《南诏是否泰族国家》)和许云樵(1947年发表《南诏非泰族故国考》)①。笔者认为 ,最先在这方面作出贡献的还有一位著名学者 ,他就是曾任中山大学副校长的陈序经教授。…