The effect of jury nullification instruction on verdicts and jury functioning in criminal trials

Jury nullification is a mechanism, and a defense, which allows the jury, as representatives of the community, to disregard both the law and the evidence and acquit defendants who have violated the letter, but not the spirit of the law. Should juries simply follow the law as articulated by the trial judge, or should they act as “conscience of the community,” and neglect the strict requirements of the law when it would lead to unjust or inequitable verdicts? The present study was aimed at providing empirical data for the following question: will the jury operate in a manner which is different than its normal functioning if given explicit nullification instructions? Three nullification instructins varying in explicitness as to nullification were combined with three criminal cases to yield a 3×3 factorial design. Forty-five six-person juries (270 subjects), were randomly assigned to the nine experimental groups. The results showed that juries given explicit nullification instructtions were more likely to vote guilty in a drunk driving case, but less likely to do so in a euthanasia case. The third case, which dealt with murder, did not show any differences due to instructions. Juries in receipt of nullification instructions spent less deliberation time on the evidence and more on defendant characteristics, attributions, and personal experiences.     

Juror experience and jury verdicts

Most trial attorneys believe that repeated jury service produces several effects in jurors, one of the most important of which is an increased disposition toward conviction of criminal defendants. However, case law reveals a reluctance to accept the proposition that prior service per se would disquality a juror from sitting on an instant case because of actual or implied bias. The need for direct empirical investigation of the effects of prior jury service prompted the present study, which examined a complete docket of 175 consecutive criminal trials across onecalendar year in a state circuit court which required a 30-day term of its venire. The results indicated that as the number of jurors with prior jury experience increased there was a modest, but significant, increase in the probability of a conviction. Analysis of the relationship between initial verdicts and subsequent service disconfirmed the alternative hypothesis that attorneys deselected jurors on the basis of their first verdicts. Several parameters of experience were also related to foreperson selection. Implications for legal practice and for additional research are discussed.Support for this research was provided, in part, by National Science, Foundation grant No SES-8209479. A portion of this work was conducted while the senior author was a James McKeen Cattell Foundation Fellow.     

Prediction of first ballot mock jury votes by the Analytic Juror Rater

Two scales of Abbott's (1987) Analytic Juror Rater (AJR) were used with 24 mock jurors to predict first ballot mock jury votes. Each participant observed one of two mock trial proceedings involving an actual second degree murder case. In a moot courtroom, they heard arguments from attorneys and witnessed examination of the defendant and actors portraying witnesses. The Cosmopolitan Lifestyle Scale of the AJR successfully predicted first ballot votes of participants (p<.02), while the Non-Authoritarian Scale showed a non-significant trend in the hypothesized direction. It was concluded that, in cases where evidence is not strong, the AJR may lend modest assistance to the attorney using peremptory challenge to eliminatevenire members who may be biased against a defendant.     

Fair and impartial railroad: The jury,the media,and political trials

The clash between social movements and political authority is often played out in the court rooms in criminal cases which are loosely described as “political trials.” While prosecutors, judges, and defendants rarely agree as to the “political” nature of a particular case, all parties usually regard the jury as the pivotal factor. The jury, of course, is enshrined in Anglo-American legal theory as the final check against suppression of liberty by the state. Plea bargaining is out of the question when the very legitimacy of the state is challenged and when dissident defendants are determined to use the trial process as a means of political expression. The crucial question is whether the jury has in fact lived up to its Constitutional role.The article attempts to answer this question at two levels. First, the history of political trials in the United States is reviewed with the general finding that radicals have faced juries which were both grossly unrepresentative of the general population and typically hostile to the ideas, life styles, and social origins of the defendants. Second, the article considers in some detail the impact of media coverage on potential jurors on one particular recent political case, the 1977–1978 trial of accused “guerrilla-bombers” Richard Picariello and Eduard Guilion in the Federal District Court of Southern Maine. The survey opinion data presented for this case strongly indicate that any chance of a fair trial for the defendants was compromised by effects of sustained hostile media coverage before the onset of the trial. Finally, the article considers available remedies in the form of either legislative reforms designed to ensure representative juries, or voir dire procedures aimed at eliminating biased jurors. A review of these remedies offers little hope that future political trials will be substantially fairer than in the past. Moreover, the direction of current criminal justice reforms, as in the proposed S-1722 Federal Criminal Code, promise to criminalize further important forms of political expression.The conclusion is not that jury trials should be avoided or minimized, since judges are apt to be even more predisposed against dissidents. Rather, the point is that the social and ideological biases which intrude especially in political trials are rooted in the political economy of capitalism which underlies the legal system itself. The jury system remains the best available defense against legal repression, but “justice” must ultimately await the outcome of continued social struggle, rather than further refinements of legal process.     

DNA evidence in jury trials: the "CSI effect"

In Murdoch v The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329, Hillier v The Queen (2007) 228 CLR 618 and Forbes v The Queen (2009) 167ACTR 1, Australian appellate courts considered the interpretation of DNA evidence and the possibility of secondary transfer of DNA samples and questions about the statistical calculations used to produce probabilities of DNA matches. Following the 2010 Victorian case of Farrah Jama, whose conviction for rape was quashed 16 months into his prison sentence after it was discovered that the incriminating DNA sample was contaminated, Mr FRH Vincent QC, in his report to the Victorian Attorney-General, was scathing of the conduct of the case and made a number of recommendations, all of which were immediately adopted by the Victorian Government. Following the release of the Vincent Report, Australia's Attorneys-General have established a working party to examine national standards for the use and collection of DNA evidence. The use and interpretation of DNA evidence in jury trials is considered and factors that improve jury understanding of DNA evidence are discussed.     

A concept in search of a definition: The effects of reasonable doubt instructions on certainty of guilt standards and jury verdicts

Eighty (6-person) juries heard 1 of the 5 reasonable doubt instructions in a trial that either had strong evidence for guilt or favored acquittal. None of the instructions produced acceptable criteria of self-reported reasonable doubt, although instructions that informed juries to be firmly convinced (FC) elicited the highest standards of proof. The FC instructions yielded verdicts that tended to correspond with the evidence in both versions of the trial. FC juries focused proportionately more on the evidence and less on non-probative issues than juries given other instructions. Juries had lower self-reported standards of proof when the trial evidence was weak for conviction as opposed to when it was strong. The discussion addresses the surprisingly low self-reported standards of proof.     

Pretrial publicity,judicial remedies,and jury bias

Although past research has established pretrial publicity's potential to bias juror judgment, there has been less attention given to the effectiveness of judicial remedies for combatting such biases. The present study examined the effectiveness of three remedies (judicial instructions, deliberation, and continuance) in combatting the negative impact of different types of pretrial publicity. Two different types of pretrial publicity were examined: (a) factual publicity (which contained incriminating information about the defendant) and (b) emotional publicity (which contained no explicitly incriminating information, but did contain information likely to arouse negative emotions). Neither instructions nor deliberation reduced the impact of either form of publicity; in fact, deliberation strengthened publicity biases. Both social decision scheme analysis and a content analysis of deliberation suggested that prejudicial publicity increases the persuasiveness and/or lessens the persuasibility of advocates of conviction relative to advocates of acquittal. Acontinuance of several days between exposure to the publicity and viewing the trial served as an effective remedy for the factual publicity, but not for the emotional publicity. The article concludes by discussing the potential roles of affect and memory in juror judgment and evaluating the available remedies for pretrial publicity.     

Severity of penalty,seriousness of the charge,and mock jurors' verdicts

It has been suggested that jurors in criminal trials are less likely to convict when the penalty is more severe or the charge is more serious. This was explained by Kerr (1975) in terms of a perceived increase in the cost of a Type I error (convicting an innocent person) that resulted in a criterion shift in the amount of evidence jurors required to vote guilty. The previous research found only weak support for the prediction regarding severity but consistent support for the predicted effect of seriousness. However, in the case materials used in these studies, more evidence was legally required to prove guilt on the more serious charges. This article presents studies in which the amount of evidence needed to prove guilt was equated for all charges. Under these circumstances, there was no effect on verdicts of seriousness of charge or severity of penalty and no evidence of a criterion shift due to either variable. There may still be reason to believe that these factors affect real juries, but this belief is not supported by the systematic evidence from mock jury studies.     

Effects of notetaking on verdicts and evidence processing in a civil trial

Examined the effect of notetaking on juror decision making and cognitive processing of evidence in a complex tort trial. Jury eligible participants either took notes during the trial and had access to those notes during decision making, took notes without access, or did not take notes. Those who took notes during the trial performed more competently than did nonnotetakers. Notetakers made correct distinctions in assigning liability and compensatory awards among four differentially worthy plaintiffs and recalled significantly more probative evidence than nonnotetakers. The almost identical performance of the notes-access group and the notes without access group suggests that notetaking had its impact at the encoding stage rather than at retrieval. We discuss possible motivational differences that may account for the results and constraints on generalizing the findings.This research was supported by National Science Foundation under grant No. SBR 9311922 awarded to Irwin A. Horowitz.     

The jury: Social and psychological variables

The selection of a jury is an important phase of the American court system. Many lawyers believe that wise choices at this point may mean the difference between winning and losing a case. Various means of selecting jurors have been practiced by attorneys, and there seem to be among lawyers general impressions about the type of people best suited for certain cases. These ideas have most often concerned social, economic and psychological variables rather then genetic factors.The purpose of this study is to add to the limited body of knowledge in this area by identifying and testing some of these variables. The first step was to design a research instrument to gather significant data relating to the jury system. Included in this examination were both psychological and socio-economic information. Also incorporated into the study were questions designed to reveal the respondents’ jury backgrounds. Items sought to disclose how a juror perceived the trial, interacted with the group, and voted.After the construction of the research tool, a survey was made using it in one of the counties of Florida. The interviews were conducted to gather data regarding perceptions of jurors and test the research tool. The people chosen to be interviewed came from the venire furnished by the county clerk. Analysis of the information was conducted. Statistical tests of significance revealed that the people illustrated a strong support for the jury system and a relatively high degree of commonality of attitudes. Comparisons were done on groups voting guilty with those voting not guilty. Voting tests on national origin and income further supported a homogeneity of attitudes. The importance of a trial vote to testing jurors was found.This case study aided in identifying some plausible hypotheses and providing data on the relationship of variables that are of import to understanding the jury system.     

Official standards versus actual criteria in bond dispositions

The setting of bond in a first appearance court in one southeastern judicial district was examined to determine its relationship with official standards based on the recommendations of the American Bar Association advisory committee on standards for criminal justice and the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. Eighteen measures of five different recommended standards were considered. Only seriousness of charge showed apparent strength in its relationship with bond. The authors suggest a “facility hypothesis” (that court officials gravitated toward factors such as seriousness of charge) that may be readily processed and understood within constraints of time and organization. As added support for this hypothesis, defendants' demeanor in court is also shown to be significantly related to bond in the present study. These legal and personal criteria may be more identified as indicators of defendants' culpability than many other considerations recommended by the study commissions. Use of other official recommendations may require changes in the concepts of defendants held by court personnel or drastic changes in the organization of first appearance in court.