When Killers Become Victims: Diversionary War,Human Rights,and Strategic Target Selection

The diversionary theory largely focuses on the incentives leaders have to use force. However, little attention has been given to the characteristics that make for a good target. We argue that US presidents choose targets that repress human rights since they are the easiest to sell to international and domestic audiences. By targeting repressive states US presidents can justify their use of force by cloaking their motivation in the language of human rights, responding to calls for intervention, pointing to the failure of international actors and institutions to resolve these problems, and building upon emerging norms that allow for intervention in repressive states. Updating US Use of Force data, we empirically test and find support for our hypothesis that presidents target human rights abusers when they face trouble at home. This paper contributes to target selection process by offering a complete theory of diversionary conflict accounting for cost/benefit calculation of presidents. Moreover, we believe that our findings reveal human rights practices’ role in international conflict, as well.     

Do governments mean business when they derogate? Human rights violations during notified states of emergency

Whether international human rights treaties constrain the behavior of governments is a hotly contested issue that has drawn much scholarly attention. The possibility to derogate from some, but not all, of the rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) during declared and officially notified states of emergency provides a hitherto unexplored test case. If governments were increasingly violating non-derogable rights during derogation periods then this provides evidence that the ICCPR has no sufficient constraining effect on state parties. I analyze whether specific individual human rights as well as two aggregate rights measures are systematically more violated during derogation periods in a global sample over the period 1981 to 2008. I find that regime type matters: autocracies step up violation of both non-derogable and derogable rights, anocracies increasingly violate some derogable and some non-derogable rights, whereas democracies see no statistically significant change in their human rights behavior during derogation periods. This result suggests that the main general international human rights treaty fails to achieve its objective of shielding certain rights from derogation where, as in autocracies and anocracies, a constraining effect would be needed most.     

The psychological effects of state socialization: IGO membership loss and respect for human rights

We present an interdisciplinary theory that considers how loss of membership in international organizations affects states’ human rights practices. Drawing mostly from social psychology and international relations research, we argue that states are socialized into the international community through a process of social influence, whereby they are incentivized to comply with group norms by the promise (threat) of social rewards (punishments). Social influence occurs when states form social bonds through interactions with other states. When social bonds are severed, fewer opportunities for social influence occur due to lower information to both the remaining states and the state that lost those social bonds. Thus, we hypothesize that the loss of membership from IGOs reduces incentives to comply with group norms and adversely affects human rights practices at home. A combination of propensity score matching/regression and autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models on a global cross-section across the years 1978–2012 supports the theory. Specifically, losing at least one IGO membership leads to a long-run drop in human rights respect of about one quarter to one half standard deviation.     

The cost of complying with human rights treaties: The convention on the rights of the child and basic immunization

The determinants of compliance with human rights treaties likely vary according to the right in question, yet heterogeneity in the pathways through which ratification affects various human rights outcomes has received limited attention. This paper first develops an account of treaty compliance that incorporates the intrinsic benefits to the state of compliance, regime costs associated with certain rights, the political costs that NGOs, judges, and others are able to impose for non-compliance, and the fiscal and economic costs of compliance. The paper argues that for child survival rights, fiscal and economic costs are likely to be dispositive, and that as a result richer countries are more likely to comply. The paper then uses an instrumental variable approach to investigate whether ratification of the Convention of the Rights of the Child was associated with stronger effort at the country level on child survival rights. It finds that ratification of the CRC was correlated with a subsequent increase in immunization rates, but only in upper middle and high income countries.     

Transnational Terror and Human Rights

Do terrorist attacks by transnational groups lead governments to restrict human rights? Conventional wisdom holds that governments restrict rights to forestall additional attacks, to more effectively pursue suspected terrorists, and as an excuse to suppress their political opponents. But the logic connecting terrorist attacks to subsequent repression and the empirical research that addresses this issue suffer from important flaws. We analyze pooled data on the human rights behavior of governments from 1981 to 2003. Our key independent variable of interest is transnational terrorist attacks, and the analysis also controls for factors that existing studies have found influence respect for human rights. Repeated terrorist attacks lead governments to engage in more extrajudicial killings and disappearances, but have no discernable influence on government use of torture and of political imprisonment or on empowerment rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, and religion. This finding has important implications for how we think about the effects of terrorism and the policy responses of states, non-governmental organizations, and international institutions interested in protecting human rights.     

International Organizations and Government Killing: Does Naming and Shaming Save Lives?

Do international organizations affect government killing? Extant work has studied international organizations' effects on a set of human rights, but has not examined the abilities of specific actors to protect specific rights. I analyze naming and shaming by three types of international organizations (human rights nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], the news media, and the United Nations), focusing on their impacts on a single type of abuse: one-sided government killing. I present a principal-agent theory in which the government develops a preference for killing, and then delegates the murderous task to a set of individual perpetrators. The theory reveals new ways for international organizations to make killing costly, and statistical analyses support my expectations: By calling attention to abusive states, human rights NGOs and the United Nations can reduce both the likelihood and severity of state-sponsored murder. I also find that international organizations are better equipped to prevent killing from the beginning than to limit mounting body counts once it has begun.     

Human rights treaties and mobilized dissent against the state

How does state obligation to international human rights treaties (HRTs) affect mobilized dissent? We argue that obligations to protect human rights affect not only state behavior but also the behavior of dissidents. We present a theory in which the effect of HRTs on dissent is conditional on expectations of when it will constrain government behavior. We assume that HRT obligation increases the likelihood that government agents face litigation costs for repression but argue that leaders are only constrained when they would be most likely to repress. The expectation of constraint creates opportunity: citizens are more likely to dissent in HRT-obligated states with secure leaders and weak domestic courts. We find empirical support for the implications of our theory using country-month data on HRT obligation and dissent events from 1990 to 2004.     

Reforming the equilibrium? Veto players and policy change in the European constitution-building process

The EU currently experiences a reform dilemma which is common to many international organizations composed of a large number of veto players who must adopt a change of the status quo. After the accession of ten countries in May 2004, the 25 governmental veto players adopted a modest reform text that proposes as many changes as it retains provisions of the Nice treaty. This ambivalent outcome raised much criticism and has been rejected by the French and Dutch voters who had to ratify the reform. This raises questions on the reasons for change and stability in organizations which attempt to reform their obsolete provisions under the constraint of many (types of) veto players. This study examines under which conditions the positions of the different types of veto players—governments, parliamentary ratification pivots, median voters and the supranational actors—are important to explain the outcome of the draft treaty. Our results suggest that the probability for reform is only determined by governmental gains when we control for parliamentary ratification pivots and median voters from status quo-prone member states. We also find that governments favoring the status quo retain their veto in case either parliaments or voters favor reform. This responsiveness is supported by the fact that median voters also matter when member states did not announce a referendum.     

Explaining Costly International Institutions: Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights Norms

Why do states create enforceable international human rights norms that empower third parties to prevent and sanction domestic human rights abuses? Recent theories suggest that international institutions are shaped not only by power and interests but also by the content of arguments during intensive communication and argumentation processes. Moving beyond the simple notion that "communication matters," I argue that states are likely to be persuaded by arguments that draw on widespread taken-for-granted norms, in particular, prohibitions on bodily harm, the importance of precedent in decision making, and the link between cooperation and progress. This model extends previous theories by specifying mechanisms and scope conditions for international change through persuasion. I illustrate the argument by examining the convention against torture, a costly international institution that allows domestic courts to prosecute crimes that occur in the territory of other states (universal jurisdiction). Because of its enforcement mechanisms, the torture convention poses a difficult case for theories explaining international institutions. If persuasion models can explain even costly institutions, they should be more widely considered as explanations for all kinds of international institutions.     

The impact of human rights INGO activities on economic sanctions

What impact do human rights international non-governmental organizations (hereafter HROs) have on the initiation of economic sanctions? The extant literatures on sanctions and transnational non-state groups have largely overlooked the role, if any, the activities of these transnational non-state actors have on the use of economic coercion as a popular policy tool. In this study, we argue that HROs could affect sanction decisions through two distinct mechanisms: information production (“shaming and blaming”) and local empowerment (local presence). By bringing poor human rights performers into the international spotlight, we argue that this effect should hold even after accounting for human rights practices in the targeted countries. Using dyadic data on HROs and economic sanctions, we find robust support for our basic argument that HRO activities increase the likelihood of sanction events against repressive regimes. Additionally, much of the empirical support highlights the role of information production, as opposed to local empowerment, in leading to sanction onset. Overall, our findings indicate that HROs are powerful actors in influencing foreign policy decisions between states.     

The Tamil people's right to self-determination

This article provides an overview of the crisis in Sri Lanka and states why an armed conflict has developed in the northern and eastern parts (north-east) of the country. The Tamils' accusations—of discrimination, denial of the right to self-determination, abrogated agreements and violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to genocide by successive Sri Lankan governments—are supported by specific evidence given by international human rights and legal experts, international human rights non-governmental organizations and other relevant entities. The democratic parliamentary efforts and the non-violent resistance struggle of the Tamil people prior to the outbreak of war are traced over several decades. The article includes an outline of social and law and order achievements in the north-east under the de facto administration of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and concludes with some current international dimensions of the situation.     

Can human rights conditionality reduce repression? Examining the European Union’s economic agreements

The insertion of human rights commitments into international economic agreements is now a widespread practice. We argue that the effect of such commitments depends on the degree of leverage held by one partner over the other. In a comprehensive analysis of the European Union’s (EU’s) relations with developing countries, we find that human rights clauses are conditionally effective; they are associated with improved political freedom and physical integrity rights only in countries that are more heavily dependent on EU aid. An in-depth look at the EU’s enforcement of its human rights clause in the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group reveals that the Union most often responds to violations of political rights—particularly coups and flawed elections—and that enforcement is indeed a more powerful catalyst for change in highly aid-dependent states. Alternative explanations—that the impact of the human rights clause depends on legalization, the country’s strategic importance, NGO activity, or domestic institutions—find little support.     

Norms,Behavioral Compliance,and Status Attribution in International Politics

Extant work on status attribution has largely focused on major powers or state capabilities as key explanatory factors driving these social processes and suggests that status considerations increase conflicts between states. We argue for a more comprehensive approach to status attribution that considers international norms as another major factor that is weighed in the attribution process. We contend that states (policymakers) evaluate one another not only on the basis of economic and military capabilities but also on the extent to which there is behavioral conformance with normative expectations and reward one another dependent upon whether these expectations are met. However, this attribution of status is dependent upon the level of contestation pertaining to that norm. Using a data set that assesses consistency with six different norms (resource transference, multilateralism, economic liberalism, democratic governance, respect for human rights, and peaceful dispute resolution), we find that status attribution is associated with norm-consistent behavior but only when these norms are uncontested at the global level.     

Toward the Year 2000

To adapt and renew today's fraying international order, the West must partner more closely with democratic rising powers that remain ambivalent about existing international arrangements. There are four such ‘global swing states’: Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey. An effective engagement strategy will need to adjust the order's main pillars to enhance their appeal without transforming the fundamental character of the system in the process. It will need to influence what global swing states want through outreach to publics and private sectors. And it will need to make the case that all four can best manage China's rise by strengthening international rules of the road. If the West can enlarge the circle of countries that uphold the global order to include these rising democracies, the system that has long safeguarded international security and prosperity and promoted human rights will be able to endure.     

The Fundamental Role of International (Criminal) Law in the War in Ukraine

The repercussions of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are reverberating around the world. The multilateral and coordinated response of the international community to Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine was immediate and has been waged on multiple fronts. While the world’s major powers are focused on the best strategies to face the ongoing conflict, international humanitarian law and human rights law are violated every day in Ukraine. Innocent civilians are tortured, killed, or obliged to leave their city or country to avoid the worst atrocities, while civilian buildings and infrastructure are destroyed. This article examines the most relevant decisions adopted at the international level and identifies possible solutions to prosecute and punish international crimes perpetrated in Ukraine. International (criminal) law and cooperation between states and international organizations will play a crucial role in the fight against impunity for those responsible for the worst atrocities against the Ukrainian population.     

The United Nations and Terrorism: Rethinking Legal Tensions Between National Security, Human Rights, and Civil Liberties

As the international community responds to the September 11 attacks and the general war on terrorism, member states in the United Nations (UN) must continue to address the balance between the rights of the individual and the security of the state. This study highlights the various roles that the UN plays in combating transnational terrorism through norm setting, codification of human rights law, as well as the drafting and effective implementation of 12 key multilateral agreements aimed at counter-terrorism. In these ways, the UN provides direction and guidance for implementing human rights rules and the ways in which they should be enforced. Even so, national governments must make these rules work. In a system of sovereign states, the role of the UN organization in checking or reversing these human rights abuses remains severely limited and largely dependent upon the political will of the member states. As a consequence, part of the price paid for protecting national security against threats posed by terrorism may well be the curtailment of some human rights and civil liberties within the liberal democratic state.     

The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms

Does membership in Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) affect states' human rights behavior? One might expect IGOs with a specific human rights mandate, like the International Labour Organization or the Council of Europe, to have a positive effect on the human rights practices of their member states. But what about other sorts of IGOs, particularly those with no direct connection to human rights issues? This study employs cross-national data on abuses of "physical integrity rights" for 137 countries over the period 1982–2000 to test the hypothesis that IGOs can promote the diffusion of human rights norms by providing venues for interstate socialization. Recent empirical work on IGOs has suggested that this sort of socialization effect can play an important role in promoting democracy and can also lead to a more general convergence among states' interests. The results presented here suggest that IGOs can have a surprisingly powerful influence on states' human rights practices as a result of this process.     

A theory of emerging order within institutional complexes: How competition among regulatory international institutions leads to institutional adaptation and division of labor

The article examines the consequences of functional overlap among regulatory international institutions for governance within institutional complexes. Whereas the existing literature assumes that states tend to exploit forum-shopping opportunities to pursue their parochial interests, we show that multiple members of several overlapping institutions operate in a setting of ‘nested games’. They have a general interest in some form of institutional complementarity within the complex and therefore take the implications for overlapping institutions into account when determining their behavior within either of these institutions. On that basis, we show first that the multiple members are likely to induce complementary processes of institutional adaptation, even if their interests diverge with regard to the specific form of institutional rearrangement; second, that a balanced distribution of power among the advocates of different institutions may be expected to produce particularly sophisticated forms of institutional adaptation that do not simply separate the domains of overlapping institutions, but establish patterns of permanent co-governance; and third that state-induced processes of institutional adaptation gradually produce a spontaneously emerging division of labor among overlapping institutions that organizes their governance activities. These theoretical claims are probed by two case studies on institutional complexes that are characterized by sharp distributional conflicts among the multiple members: First, we demonstrate the emergence of a sophisticated division of labor in the institutional complex on international trade in agricultural GMOs. Second, we show that an equally sophisticated division of labor has emerged in the institutional complex on public health-related intellectual property rights.     

Neutrality Regimes

Abstract

I analyze a model of war expansion in the shadow of international law, where neutrality regimes emerge as equilibria in which only aggressive states are expected to violate the law. By sorting belligerents according to their ambitions (restrained or aggressive), neutrality regimes can help resolve third-party uncertainty over the desirability of balancing. Punishment for violations of the law emerges in equilibrium from self-interested power calculations absent any principled legal commitment. The model shows that (a) neutrality regimes can be effective not despite but because of inconsistent compliance; (b) strong third parties are uniquely prone to failures to balance under neutrality regimes; and (c) ratification of neutrality regimes can be facilitated by mutual and severe mistrust. Neutrality regimes need not be epiphenomenal to power politics; rather, they can support balance-of-power systems.     

Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States

What explains change and continuity in the foreign policy behavior of small states? Given the proliferation of small states over the past century, this topic has received relatively little systematic attention. When researchers do focus on small states, the emphasis has been on external and international factors, and the primary conclusion has been that small states are more likely to bandwagon with threatening great powers than to balance against them. In this article, we suggest that state- and individual-level variables can play a greater role in explaining the foreign policy behavior of small states and that small states sometimes choose to balance rather than bandwagon, especially when elite ideology is deeply embedded in formulating foreign policy. We develop this claim in terms of elite ideas about the identity and purpose of the state and examine its plausibility using primary sources and exclusive interviews with the security and foreign policy elite in Georgia. We find that this approach offers a more plausible explanation for Georgia's otherwise puzzling foreign policy behavior than frameworks that focus on the international or regional system. Although Georgia may be the exception that proves the rule, it can advance an understanding of the conditions under which standard explanations of small-state foreign policy behavior may miss their predictive mark and when incorporating the role of elite ideas can provide additional explanatory leverage.