Using strangers for money: a discussion on money-launderers in organized crime

In a recent study of Malm and Bichler (Trends in Organized Crime 16:365–381, 2013) it was found that very little professional laundering occurs in illicit markets. That is to be expected because not every criminal will make enough money to have a need for the services of professional money launderers. However, it is less clear to what extent the same outcome applies to those criminals who do make a lot of criminal money. In order to find out, 31 case studies were examined that deal with large scale importation of cocaine in Europe. It appears that professionals are often engaged, as almost half of the files indicate the presence of such specialists. However, that doesn't imply that such specialists are absent in the other half of the files. After examination of the investigative strategy of each police investigation, it turns out that there is a strong correlation between a focus on financial matters at the beginning of an investigation and the finding of professional launderers. This has important implications for the use of Social Network Analysis and qualitative case file research. The nonappearance of certain types of people in the police investigations has as much to do with the investigative strategy as with their real absence.     

The Impact of the 1994 Federal Assault Weapons Ban on Gun Markets: An Assessment of Short-Term Primary and Secondary Market Effects

The reactions of the gun market, including those of producers, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers, play an important role in shaping the potential impact of gun control policies on gun crime. As a case in point, this paper examines the federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which bans a group of military-style semiautomatic firearms (i.e., assault weapons). Using a variety of national and local data sources, we assess the short-term (1994–1996) impact of the assault weapons ban on gun markets, examining trends in prices and production of the banned weapons in legal markets and assessing the availability of the banned weapons in illicit markets as measured by criminal use. Prices of assault weapons rose substantially around the time of the ban's enactment, reducing the availability of assault weapons to criminal users in the very short run. However, a surge in assault weapon production just before the ban caused prices to fall in the months following the ban. Implications of the findings for assessing this and other gun control policies are discussed.     

Market offenses and limits to growth

The purpose of this article is to explore various factors that may regulate or stabilize levels in market offenses. Instead of assuming that illegal markets are ‘out of control’, evidence is advanced to demonstrate, on the contrary, that there are indeed limits to growth in criminal markets. This is presented along three principal and interconnected arguments. First, social norms limit the ability of suppliers to shape demand for illicit goods and services. Using public opinion surveys, it is concluded that the more objectionable the moral status of an illegal market, the smaller the pool of potential consumers and sellers. Second, there are considerable obstacles that confront suppliers of illegal goods and services accumulating capital and upward mobility. The consequences of product illegality inhibit the organizational growth capacities as well as the geographic expansion of illicit firms. Third, while impunity via corruptible alliances do cancel some of the effects of product illegality, this impunity is not a constant that can always be depended upon. To the extent that corruption varies across jurisdictions and over time, illegal entrepreneurs may come to realize that impunity is intrinsically limited in scope and volatile in nature and over which they essentially have very limited control. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Conditions for Guilt-Free Consumption in a Transnational Criminal Market

It has been widely opined in discussions around a number of transnational criminal markets that where a global economic supply and demand relationship exists, demand reduction by way of consumer education and ‘awareness-raising’ may be an effective intervention in reducing illicit trade. It seems an obvious and sensible suggestion on the face of it, but just how amenable are consumers to being educated away from purchasing illicitly obtained and trafficked goods, and what are the barriers that stand in the way of that process of demand reduction through awareness-raising? This paper approaches these questions by asking what are the conditions for guilt-free consumption in the international trade in illicit cultural objects. The paper identifies seven such conditions, and concludes that in this global market we are witnessing the playing out of a common social story in which a powerful group of market capitalists and end-consumers employs a range of sociologically developed linguistic and performative strategies to obfuscate or legitimise their exploitation of a group of less powerful victims. If that is the context for the so-called debate about illicit antiquities, crime-reduction strategies involving consumer education seem considerably more difficult to achieve than has been widely recognised in policy discussions on transnational crime.     

On ‘Organized Crime’ in the illicit antiquities trade: moving beyond the definitional debate

The extent to which ‘organized crime’ is involved in illicit antiquities trafficking is unknown and frequently debated. This paper explores the significance and scale of the illicit antiquities trade as a unique transnational criminal phenomenon that is often said to be perpetrated by and exhibit traits of so-called ‘organized crime.’ The definitional debate behind the term ‘organized crime’ is considered as a potential problem impeding our understanding of its existence or extent in illicit antiquities trafficking, and a basic progression-based model is then suggested as a new tool to move beyond the definitional debate for future research that may help to elucidate the actors, processes and criminal dynamics taking place within the illicit antiquities trade from source to market. The paper concludes that researchers should focus not on the question of whether organized criminals- particularly in a traditionally conceived, mafia-type stereotypical sense- are involved in the illicit antiquities trade, but instead on the structure and progression of antiquities trafficking itself that embody both organized and criminal dynamics.     

Understanding parrot trafficking between illicit markets in Bolivia: an application of the CRAVED model

The CRAVED model has been used to understand theft variation in a whole host of hot products, including wildlife. Past research, however, has only applied the model at either the theft or illicit market stage to understand why particular products are stolen in high numbers. The CRAVED model has yet to be applied to the trafficking stage of hot products smuggled between illicit markets and, therefore, its applicability at this particular stage remains unknown. Using secondary data from the Los Pozos wildlife market in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, this study applies the CRAVED model to explain why parrot species are trafficked between illicit markets in Bolivia. This research finds that species that are more “available” and less “valuable” are more likely to be trafficked between illicit markets, suggesting that variation at the trafficking stage of the parrot trade can be explained by nearly the same CRAVED concepts as they do at the poaching stage. This study also finds that one-quarter of parrots in the Los Pozos market are trafficked to other cities, of which 99% are to the city of Cochabamba. These findings suggest that shutting down illicit markets and patrolling major roadways between cities can substantially reduce the illegal parrot trade.     

THE TRADE IN TOOLS: THE MARKET FOR ILLICIT GUNS IN HIGH‐RISK NETWORKS

Illegal guns circulating among high‐risk networks represent a threat to the security and well‐being of urban neighborhoods. Research findings reveal that illegal firearms are usually acquired through a variety of means, including theft and diversions from legitimate firearms commerce. Little is known, however, about the underground gun markets supplying the gang and drug networks responsible for a large share of gun violence in U.S. cities. In this article, we take a mixed‐methods approach, combining trace analyses of recovered handguns with ethnographic interviews of high‐risk gun users to develop new insights on the entry of guns into three criminal networks in Boston. We find that guns possessed by Boston gang members are of a different character compared with other crime guns; these guns are more likely to be older firearms originating from New Hampshire, Maine, and I‐95 southern states. The results of our qualitative research reveal that gang members and drug dealers pay inflated prices for handguns diverted by traffickers exploiting unregulated secondary market transactions, with significant premiums paid for high‐caliber semiautomatic pistols. Taken together, these findings provide an analytic portrait of the market for illicit guns among those most proximate to violence, yielding novel empirical, theoretical, and practical insights into the problem of criminal gun access.     

Church Theft,Insecurity, and Community Justice: The Reality of Source-End Regulation of the Market for Illicit Bolivian Cultural Objects

In 2012 two men were lynched in Bolivia, first because there is an illicit market for Bolivian cultural objects, and second because a small, poor community turned to desperate measures to protect themselves from that illicit market due to the failings of national and international regulation. This paper is a case study of the reality of source-end regulation of an international criminal market in a developing country. I will discuss what is known about thefts from Bolivian churches, the international market for items stolen from these churches, and how such thefts are meant to be prevented on-the ground. Following this, I will present lynching in Bolivia as the most severe community response to the issues created by local politics, ineffectual policing, unenforceable laws, and a history of oppressive racism. I will conclude with a discussion of what we can reasonably hope to accomplish with source-end regulation.     

‘C’ is for commercial collaboration: enterprise and structure in the ‘middle market’ of counterfeit alcohol distribution

This article utilising the work of Pearson and Hobbs [1] defines the middle market in counterfeit alcohol. Drugs markets have a resemblance to counterfeit alcohol markets in as much that they share the illicit nature of the product and the need to distribute the product at the ‘street’ level. Drawing on two case studies taken from a European regulator the article details the dynamics of the market, the enterprise actions of the actors and how law enforcement responses can, in certain circumstances, make the task of the distributors easier. The traditional notions of organised crime are challenged and organisation of counterfeit alcohol markets is viewed as being reliant upon those who have legitimate access to the market and are able to develop networks of commercial collaborators who by their position in the legitimate market are able to conceal their illicit actions.     

Irrationality,Liminality and the Demand for Illicit Firearms in the Balkans and the North Caucasus

Most conventional approaches to the study of arms trafficking are grounded on the assumption that people are rational and always seek the most cost-effective means to achieve a goal. This article discusses the illicit firearms markets in the Balkans and the North Caucasus—the regions in which trafficking of illicit firearms has been flourishing since the early 1990s. By studying the demand side of this illicit market, it provides some possible explanations as to why numerous arms reduction measures have had limited results. It argues that cultural attitudes, socio-political complexity and emotions could explain much of the “irrational” behavior of those demanding weapons in these regions. The article contributes to the scholarly debate on the applicability of the rational choice theory-inspired arms reduction policies in highly textured sociocultural contexts. It is an effort to construct multifaceted conceptualization of human choice that focuses not only on the functionality of firearms but also on their symbolic and situational meaning.     

A mountain or a molehill: is the illicit trade in cigarettes undermining tobacco control policy in South Africa?

This study estimates the size of the market for illicit cigarettes in South Africa between 1997 and 2007 in order to consider the impact of the illicit trade in cigarettes on the effectiveness of tobacco control policies. Estimates of the illicit market are made using data on smoking prevalence and simulations of smoking intensity. The paper shows that the size of the illicit market to have grown substantially from 1997 until peaking in 2000 between 9.4% and 11.5% of the total market. The most recent estimate for 2007 suggests that the illicit market occupied between 7.0% and 11.2% of the total market. These estimates are significantly lower than the anecdotal claims of the tobacco industry. Although the scale of the illicit market is significant it has not undermined tobacco control policy. Consumption in the total market, including both the illicit and legal market, has declined in size consistently. At the same time, tax revenue from higher excise taxes has offset the tax losses as a result of illicit trade.     

EXAMINING THE CONDITIONAL NATURE OF THE ILLICIT DRUG MARKET-HOMICIDE RELATIONSHIP: A PARTIAL TEST OF THE THEORY OF CONTINGENT CAUSATION

Recently, Zimring and Hawkins (1997) have suggested that drug markets are a “contingent cause” of the increase in homicide rates. That is, where structural conditions known to produce violence are already in place, the drug distribution‐homicide link may be exacerbated. This analysis uses hierarchical linear modeling to investigate two key research questions: (1) Is within‐city variation in illicit drug market activity positively associated with within‐city variation in homicide rates during the 1984–1997 period? (2) Is the illicit drug market‐homicide association contingent on preexisting violence conducive socioeconomic conditions? Using three measures of drug market activity, analyses provide affirmative evidence on both questions. Theoretical and research implications of these findings are discussed.     

Small arms,big guns: a dynamic model of illicit market opportunity

Transnational illicit markets are deeply embedded within legal trade systems and thus should be affected by shifting market conditions. Applying a stochastic actor-oriented model (SAOM), this study tests whether variation in illicit market opportunity could account for changing relations within the small arms trade (2003–2008). Measures of market accessibility – changes in export activity, reporting transparency and the percent of the labour force that is armed – outperformed measures of weapon availability with the exception of involvement in armed conflict. Significant structural change in outdegree density and transitivity suggest the development of trade factions, and decreasing balance hints that leaders are emerging. With the pending de-escalation of US-led conflict in the Middle East, a flood of second-hand weaponry is about to enter the market. Continued research is required to further uncover how the legitimate trade infrastructure facilitates the illicit flow of goods.     

Illicit deals in cultural objects as crimes of the powerful

Research with dealers at the market end of the global chain of supply of cultural objects leads to the suggestion that the analytical framework associated with the concept of ‘crimes of the powerful’ can be useful in helping us to understand the role of dealers in driving the market, and in focussing our attention on the difficulties of engaging with the illicit trade through a conventional criminal justice approach. This paper explores the nature of the power that is associated with high-level antiquities dealers, and considers its regulatory implications.     

Tax evasion and illicit cigarettes in California: prevalence and demand-side correlates

Crime, Law and Social Change - Unlike some areas of crime, participation in illicit tobacco markets is not rare and spans most sociodemographic groups. Measurement of the scale of illicit trade in...     

Implications of cross-border crime risks in an open Europe

It is to be expected that the development of an open economic space within the E.C. and the increased accessibility of Eastern Europe will lead to new patterns of cross-border crimes. So do the risks of becoming a victim of one of those crimes. However, the risks may not be spread evenly: some markets may become more affected by crime-entrepreneurs than other markets, though most attention is devoted to drug trafficking and drug money related money-laundering. However, organized drug trafficking and organized fraud are not so neetly seperated. From crimeentrepreneurial point of view one can broadly speak of cross-border crime markets in European regions.The criminological implications may be the development of Euro-crime markets in which crimeentrepreneurs develop lasting patterns of cooperation and cross-border organizations. This is already the case on the illicit drug market. Crime patterns on the field of organized commercial crime, toxic waste trafficking or EC-fraud point in the same direction. The implications for business and law enforcement alike are that without the development of new strategies of prevention and cross-border police investigations organized crime may well intertwine into the developiing European economic and social structure thus acquiring a corrosive foothold in the legitimate industry.     

Arms Prices and Conflict Onset: Insights from Lebanon and Syria

What drives the prices of arms and ammunition sold at illicit markets? Do the prices of illegal arms soar during episodes of marked insecurity, such as conflict onset? This article seeks to advance knowledge on the dynamics and determinants of weapons prices through the quantitative analysis of illicit arms market price data in Lebanon for the period February 2011 to September 2012. The article also examines the relationship between arms and ammunition prices in Lebanon, and reported conflict fatalities in Syria, as the period under study overlapped with the onset of conflict in the latter country. Key results include strong, statistically-significant correlations between the prices of arms and the prices of ammunition in Lebanon, as well as between the prices of arms and ammunition in Lebanon and reported conflict fatalities in neighbouring Syria. These findings highlight the value of monitoring illicit arms market prices, including prices for a diverse range of weapons and ammunition, to improve our understanding of both illicit markets and conflict dynamics. The strong correlations observed in the article also suggest that crowdsourcing methodologies used by organisations monitoring killings during the Syrian conflict can effectively capture variations in conflict intensity over time.