论经营者集中审查制度在国有企业并购中的适用

在深化国有企业改革大背景下，一般观点认为，并购重组乃优化国有经济布局和升级产业结构、 避免同业恶性竞争、提高国有资产监管效率、提升规模经济水平的有效途径，于是这成为政府产业政策的偏 好。但国有企业尤其是中央企业并购这种大规模经营者集中会对市场竞争带来负面影响，从而背离党的十八 届三中全会《决定》提出的“市场在资源配置中起决定性作用”的原则。《反垄断法》作为规范市场竞争秩序 的“经济宪法”，理应适用于包括国有企业尤其是竞争性国企在内的所有市场主体。涉国有企业尤其是竞争 性国企的经营者审查集中适用《反垄断法》的“社会公共利益”豁免制度时，必须严格限定其适用条件；当产 业政策与反垄断规制冲突时，应该坚持竞争执法优先。国企并购适用经营者集中审查制度当前的法律障碍主 要在于缺乏灵活的经营者集中申报标准、清晰的经营者集中实体分析框架和类型化的经营者集中豁免条件。     

滥用知识产权排除、限制竞争行为规制的初步探索

知识经济的蓬勃兴起,导致随之衍生的滥用知识产权排除、限制竞争行为的问题也逐渐受到关注。我国《反垄断法》对滥用知识产权排除、限制竞争行为已作出原则性规定,作为反垄断执法机关,国家工商总局立足职责,积极开展在知识产权领域开展反垄断执法的相关配套指南、规章制定工作,通过制定规范,更好地明确正当的权利行使行为与排除、限制竞争的滥用行为之间的界限,有助于增强经营者对自身经营活动的预期性,维护有序的市场竞争环境。     

论《反不正当竞争法》与《反垄断法》的协调——以修改《反不正当竞争法》为视角

在《反垄断法》出台实施的背景下,修改《反不正当竞争法》以促进其与《反垄断法》的协调,成为完善我国竞争法体系的重要环节。本文认为应从修改《反不正当竞争法》的一般条款、调整不正当竞争行为的具体类型、强化不正当竞争行为的民事责任、建立竞争执法协调机制等方面完善《反不正当竞争法》,并提出了相关修改建议。     

知识产权与反垄断执法:促进创新和竞争

正知识产权、创新与反垄断执法的关系在很多情况下都是非常复杂和敏感的,涉及对知识产权法和反垄断法两法域边界的划分及其交叉问题的认识和处理,关系到维护竞争和激励创新两大目标的平衡。近年来,知识产权领域的权利行使行为越来越受到反垄断执法机构的关注,如何协调好知识产权与反垄断执法的关系,准确定位适应技术创新要求的竞争政策,是反垄断法在创新经济条件下必须面对的问题。一、知识产权与反垄断法的基本关系实践中,无论是政策制定,还是执法与司法实践,都在努力寻求着反垄断法和知识产权法两者之间的相互补充以促进创新。知识产权法借助排他权驱动创新,鼓     

对我国《反垄断法》知识产权除外条款的质疑

我国《反垄断法》第55条就《反垄断法》在涉及知识产权的案件中如何适用作出了特殊规定。从其立法表述看,采用了除外条款加特殊情形例外的模式。但这种立法表述并不利于对知识产权法与反垄断法关系的正确解读,也容易给反垄断司法、执法实践带来困惑和争议。近年来,随着经营者将知识产权作为一种竞争资源广泛应用于经营活动,类似于《反垄断法》第55条表述的立法例已经或正在为世界各国相关反垄断立法所淘汰。各国反垄断司法和执法实践不断证明：知识产权制度不需要反垄断法作出原则性的除外规定,而需要在将反垄断法适用于知识产权案件时为相关司法执法活动提供具体的指南。因此,我国《反垄断法》也应该按照这个立法趋势进行修订。     

比例原则视角下经营者集中反垄断执法的规则修正

经营者集中审查是保障市场竞争秩序的预防性制度,是涉案数最高的反垄断行政执法,它是一种行政许可行为,而后续可能引发行政强制、行政处罚,相比于其他垄断行为,涉及的执法环节多、裁量类型广、幅度大,因此执法机关遵守比例原则至关重要.从行政法学基本原理、反垄断法理论机制和执法实践情况进行反思,应当对现行《反垄断法》中有关经营者集...     

论《反垄断法》中经营者的认定标准

经营者认定是垄断行为认定的先决问题,我国《反垄断法》对经营者的界定,较《反不正当竞争法》有所进步,但仍欠明确的认定标准。因此,有必要将立法规定具体化,确立经营者认定的一般标准,用以指导《反垄断法》的执法与司法实践。在具体操作上,认定何为经营者,必须从主体资格、行为性质与独立地位三个方面综合判断。     

反垄断法中受害人的司法救济程序

反垄断法是公法与私法的结合,是以社会利益为本位之立法,其所规制的对象为垄断与限制竞争行为。反垄断法对市场主体之间竞争关系的调整、对垄断行为之规制、对社会公共利益与消费者利益的保护,实质上是公权对私权的主动介入,这种介入的出发点是为了社会整体利益包括受到或可能受到垄断行为损害的受害人之利益而限制垄断行为人的私人权利。对于受到或可能受到垄断行为损害的受害人利益,世界各国的反垄断法律普遍性地规定了政府执法和私人讼告两种基本救济模式,中国的相关立法完全可以学习借鉴。一、反垄断法的立法宗旨决定了规范受害人权利救…     

专利搭售行为的反垄断法规制研究——以“专利设备+材料”型搭售为分析范式

专利搭售行为具有提高效率的正面效应与排除、限制竞争的负面效应,因此需要对其反竞争性进行再判断.反垄断法规制专利搭售行为具有加大规制力度、扩展规制范围、提升规制利益的多方面优势.在反垄断法规制专利搭售行为的立法与司法经验方面,美国转变适用合理原则,欧盟注重考虑市场支配地位的决定作用.我国专利搭售反垄断法规制的立法与执法需要重点考虑四方面的问题:同等对待非专利搭售案件与专利搭售案件、坚持合理原则的基本分析方法、强化指南的可操作性、协调反垄断法与专利法的关系.     

关于低于成本价销售行为的法律思考

从反垄断法角度分析低于成水价销售行为 一、立法现状 一般地说，反垄断法以维护竞争自由为主要目的，以狭义的竞争关系，即商品之间具有替代关系的经营者之间的相互争夺交易机会的关系为调整对象。①各国大都在《反垄断法》中规制限制竞争的低于成本价销售行为。从反垄断法考察低于成本价销售行为是否合法．正是在狭义的竞争关系中识别经营者的降价行为，是合法的行使自己的自主经营定价权、还是将低于成本销售作为排挤竞争对手的手段，而成为破坏相关市场的自由竞争秩序的限制竞争行为。我国现行规制限制市场竞争的低于成本价销售行为的法…     

The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law

It is well understood that the exchange of information between horizontal competitors can violate competition law provisions in both the European Union (EU) and the United States, namely, article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, despite ostensible similarities between EU and U.S. antitrust law concerning interfirm information exchange, substantial differences remain. In this article, we make a normative argument for the U.S. antitrust regime's approach, on the basis that the United States’ approach to information exchange is likely to be more efficient than the relevant approach under the EU competition regime. Using economic theories of harm concerning information exchange to understand the imposition of liability in relation to “stand-alone” instances of information exchange, we argue that such liability must be grounded on the conception of a prophylactic rule. We characterize this rule as a form of ex ante regulation and explain why it has no ex post counterpart in antitrust law. In contrast to the U.S. antitrust regime, we argue that the implementation of such a rule pursuant to EU competition law leads to higher error costs without a significant reduction in regulatory costs. As a majority of jurisdictions have competition law regimes that resemble EU competition law more closely than U.S. antitrust law, our thesis has important implications for competition regimes around the world.     

The economic analysis of antitrust consents

Henry G. Manne, our friend, Mentor, and colleague, was a pioneer in the economic analysis of law. By consistently challenging the notion that existing institutions were well understood, he expanded the domain of economics to new and fertile ground. In that spirit, our goal in this article is to bring out of the shadows an institution that has thus far evaded the light of economic analysis: antitrust consents. In our view, competition authorities around the world should be asking themselves what ratio of litigation to settlement is optimal for their agency. Over the last 35 years, the United States Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have shifted dramatically toward greater reliance upon consent decrees than upon litigation to resolve antitrust disputes. As an aid to national competition agencies considering the desirability of adopting a similar approach, we focus upon the importance of economic analysis in evaluating movement along the continuum from a law enforcement model to a regulatory model of agency behavior. We draw upon the U.S. experience to substantiate our claim that the costs associated with a shift toward the regulatory model, including the potential distortion in the development of substantive antitrust doctrine, may be under-appreciated and discernable only in the long run. We acknowledge that consent decrees can and should be an important tool in an antitrust agency’s toolkit for resolving antitrust disputes. We contend, however, that a full economic analysis of reliance primarily upon consent decrees is necessary to inform each competition agency’s strategic decision about the optimal mix of law enforcement and regulatory techniques.     

Antitrust, health care quality, and the courts

Antitrust law represents the principal legal tool that the United States employs to police private markets, yet it often relegates quality and nonprice considerations to a secondary position. While antitrust law espouses the belief that vigorous competition will enhance quality as well as price, little evidence exists of the practical ability of courts to deliver on that promise. In this Article, Professors Hammer and Sage examine American health care as a vehicle for advancing understanding of the nexus among competition, quality, and antitrust law. The Article reports results of a comprehensive empirical review of judicial opinions in health care antitrust litigation between 1985 and 1999, with specific attention to courts' handling of quality and other nonprice concerns. Professors Hammer and Sage conclude that, although antitrust law cannot be expected to serve as the sole oversight mechanism for industries as complex and quality dependent as health care, courts have been successful incorporating some nonprice factors into antitrust analysis.     

The Damage Done: Cocaine Methods in Detroit

The pro-competitive antitrust doctrine has originated in the free-market economies of Western capitalist countries but with economic transformations in Eastern Europe the doctrine ceased to be an exclusive Western concept. Using the example of the Polish law on combating Trust in the National Economy of 1987, the author demonstrates the spread of the antitrust doctrine from capitalism to socialism. Apart from these changes, the doctrine has been spreading on the international level because increasingly it has found application not only within particular countries but also with regard to trade and commerce between and among countries. The multidimensional nature of the antitrust doctrine has important implications for combating both domestic and international antitrust crime. The efficiency of efforts to combat abuse of a dominant market position, limiting access to the market or other forms of restraining competition will depend increasingly on the degree to which organs responsible for fighting antitrust crimes are willing to benefit from the multi-dimensional nature of the antitrust doctrine.     

竞争法对知识产权的保护与限制

知识产权法对知识所建构的权利义务规范以及民法基本原则对知识产权的保护和限制存在着天然的缺陷。知识的私有性与社会性,决定了知识产权与反不正当竞争法和反垄断法的被保护与被规制的关系。反不正当竞争法着眼于侵权人,保护知识产权不受侵犯;反垄断法着眼于权利人,以便防范知识产权的滥用。二者弥补了私法层面对知识产权保护的不足和对滥用知识产权行为制约的局限。     

中国企业在美国反垄断诉讼中的挑战与应对:基于对相关判决的质疑

中国企业在美国的一系列反垄断诉讼发生在中国加入世界贸易组织后与美国在经贸关系中博弈摩擦不断升级的背景之下,其中涉及了美国反托拉斯法的域外适用、国际礼让原则、外国法查明、外国政府对本国法律解释的效力等一系列焦点问题。在相关案件的判决中,美国法院就上述问题的观点和论述存在诸多漏洞和偏颇之处,包括限缩适用"国际礼让原则"中"真实冲突"的条件、外国法查明中客观性的缺失等。而未来随着中国企业日益成为美国反托拉斯重点关注对象,中国企业会面临更多挑战,需从美国国内法、国际法、中国相关政策法规的制定以及企业自身行为的合规性等方面积极应对。     

Dagher redux: searching for the missing pieces

The most relevant question for any joint venture is, when does the relationship become a jointventure and not simply a price-fixing cartel? With respect to this question, this Article juxtaposes Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. 1276 (2006), against years of contrary precedent. In Dagher, the Court altered the seemingly settled foundation of antitrust law by changing its view on past holdings and abandoning the ancillary effects doctrine. The Article provides an outline of key holdings prior to Dagher, as well as a discussion of the issues that can arise as joint ventures are formed. Additionally, the authors examine how the decision altered the foundation of joint venture law in the United States. In particular, the Article exposes several important antitrust concerns relating to joint ventures that the Supreme Court did not address in Dagher. Perhaps the most perplexing issue of Dagher is whether the venture at issue would have survived analysis under the Federal Trade Commission's "continuum" approach.     

反垄断法视野中的低于成本价销售行为

反垄断法规范限制竞争的低于成本价销售行为虽然在一定程度上限制了市场主体的经营自主权 ,但却维护了竞争机制 ,有利于实现社会整体利益最大化。试图从现有的法律规定出发来研究反垄断法规范低于成本价销售行为的一些具体问题 ,揭示出反垄断法并不是禁止所有的低于成本价销售行为 ,而只是禁止具有市场支配地位或者经济优势的企业从事目的在于限制竞争 ,行为后果已经限制或可能限制竞争的低于成本价销售行为 ,防止竞争执法机构陷入禁止所有低于成本价销售行为的执法误区     

论知识产权法与竞争法在促进有效竞争方面的平衡与协调

知识产权法不仅需要维护权利所有人的利益,而且需要服务于维护公平竞争的目标。在知识产权法与反不正当竞争法、反垄断法等竞争法之间,存在一种利益平衡问题,需要实现知识产权的行使与反垄断控制、反竞争控制间的平衡。这种平衡机制总的来说是平衡各种应当保护的利益,主要涉及知识产权的私人利益和促进公平竞争的社会利益。     

论我国《反垄断法》域外适用制度

我国《反垄断法》于2008年8月1日开始实施,该法确立了建立在效果原则基础上的反垄断法域外适用制度。效果原则确立了国家管辖权行使的法律前提,但容易带来法律冲突。我国应不断完善反垄断执法程序,将效果原则与合理原则配合使用,积极和其他国家与地区开展反垄断执法合作,并不断深化反垄断法域外适用制度的理论研究。